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Editorial
Thinking and theorizing about film is almost as old as the medium itself. Within
a few years of the earliest film shows in the 1890s, manifestos and reflections
began to appear which sought to analyze the seemingly vast potential of film.
Writers in France, Russia and Britain were among the first to enter this field, and
their texts have become cornerstones of the literature of cinema. Few nations,
however, failed to produce their own statements and dialogues about the nature
of cinema, often interacting with proponents of Modernism in the traditional arts
and crafts. Film thus found itself embedded in the discourses of modernity, espe-
cially in Europe and Soviet Russia.
“Film theory,” as it became known in the 1970s, has always had an historical
dimension, acknowledging its debts to the pioneers of analyzing film texts and
film experience, even while pressing these into service in the present. But as scho-
larship in the history of film theory develops, there is an urgent need to revisit
many long-standing assumptions and clarify lines of transmission and interpreta-
tion. The Key Debates is a new series of books from Amsterdam University Press
which focuses on the central issues that continue to animate thinking about film
and audiovisual media as the “century of celluloid” gives way to a field of inter-
related digital media.
Initiated by Annie van den Oever (the Netherlands), the direction of the series
has been elaborated by an international group of film scholars, including Domin-
ique Chateau (France), Ian Christie (UK), Laurent Creton (France), Laura Mulvey
(UK), Roger Odin (France), Eric de Kuyper (Belgium), and Emile Poppe (Bel-
gium). The intention is to draw on the widest possible range of expertise to pro-
vide authoritative accounts of how debates around film originated, and to trace
how concepts that are commonly used today have been modified in the process of
appropriation. The book series may contribute to both the invention as well as the
abduction of concepts.
London / Paris / Amsterdam




The process of making this book was a truly stimulating and pleasurable experi-
ence, since many of the authors contributing to it were already involved in the
project Mutations and Appropriations in European Film Studies and helped to prepare
the new book series The Key Debates. Many of the authors as well as the members
of the Editorial Board were involved in the making of this book from it’s infancy,
discussing why we felt we had to revisit Russian Formalism and how we could
best rethink its key concept, ostranenie. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to
both the contributors to this book as well as to the members of the Editorial
Board for their enthusiastic and unrelenting support and extremely generous con-
tributions to this book and to the project in every phase of its becoming, from the
first meetings and workshops via a long series of discussions and emails to cor-
rection suggestions in the very last hours before this first book of the series went
into print. I cordially thank Dominique Chateau, Ian Christie, Eric de Kuyper,
Laura Mulvey, Roger Odin, Emile Poppe, Laurent Creton, Barend van Heusden,
Laurent Jullier, Frank Kessler, Miklós Kiss, András Bálint Kovács, László Tarnay,
and Yuri Tsivian. One of the real challenges of this project was to bring an inter-
national group of scholars together from a wide variety of countries, speaking
different languages, and coming from different academic traditions. The real
pleasure was to see all the different inputs come together, challenge and contra-
dict each other, compete and cohere. I am aware this process took up a bit more
time than we originally planned and I am sincerely thankful to Amsterdam Uni-
versity Press for their patience and utterly supportive enthusiasm in every phase of
this project. I sincerely thank Anniek Meinders, Jeroen Sondervan, Magdalena
Hernas, Martin Voigt, Chantal Nicolaes, Marieke Smeenk, and their teams. More-
over, a team of assistants and students have been very helpful and supportive in
different phases of the project, including the editorial phase. For their help and
support I would like to thank Ruben Allersma, Lotte Kruijt, Emily Ekong, Rein
Mulder and Shira Wolff. I would also like to thank The Netherlands Organisation
for Scientific Research (NWO), the Mulerius Foundation and the Groningen Re-
search School for the Study of the Humanities for their generous financial sup-
port, without which this project would not have been possible. I wish to particu-
larly thank Martin Gosman and Herman Hoen, who as Heads of the Groningen
Research School helped to start this project. Furthermore, I would like to thank
the staff of Arts, Culture and Media from the University of Groningen for their
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support to the project from the start, in particular Liesbeth Korthals Altes, and Els
Jongeneel, from the field of literature; and Susan Aasman, and Annelies van
Noortwijk, from the field of film studies. I would also like to thank the Slavist
Sander Brouwer. Last but not least, I sincerely thank Viola ten Hoorn, who has
been utterly helpful as an assistant in every phase of the making of this book.
Annie van den Oever
Amsterdam, July 2010
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Introduction: Ostran(n)enie as an
“Attractive” Concept
Annie van den Oever
Traditional accounts from the field of literature have tried to understand Viktor
Shklovsky’s “Art as Technique” almost exclusively in relation to literature and
criticism for many years and found some of its most basic statements “easy to
attack.”1 It seems to me, however, that Shklovsky’s fundamental statements on
ostranenie (or “making strange”) in art were first and foremost an urgently re-
quired and utterly relevant theoretical answer to the tremendous impact early cine-
ma had on the early avant-garde movements in pre-revolutionary Russia. Shklovs-
ky himself was part of all this and it was 1913 (and not in 1919, as is often
thought) when he presented his now famous revolutionary statements on percep-
tion in art to his Futurist friends in a lecture in Petersburg.2 That year, 1913, was
also the very year the cinema was at the center of public attention in Russia, as
Yuri Tsivian would later write in his book on the cultural reception of early cine-
ma in Russia.3 Tsivian labels this particular period in history as “medium-speci-
fic.”4 Read within this specific historical context, “ostranenie” and the art theory
in which it is presented regain much of their revolutionary impact as well as their
relevance for cinema and media studies, as will be argued in this book. As part of
the field of literature, one might easily feel that ostranenie and early Formalism are
passé.5 As part of the field of cinema and media studies, though, one might rather
feel that the texts and the term are underexposed and that they urgently need to
be re-read and historicized as part of a “medium-specific” period in history.
It is this book’s objective to help restore the revolutionary impact of the concept
of ostranenie and its relevance for fields of research that reflect on medium speci-
ficity and media change, and on medium-specific periods in history like the past
and the current one. Moreover, the revisits in this book of the pivotal texts re-
sponsible for guiding the post-war discourse on ostranenie in specific directions
(e.g., the “Jakobsonian” re-introduction of Russian Formalism within the context
of French Structuralism)6 will to a certain extent depart from the earlier re-read-
ings of Russian Formalism and the research agenda’s underlying them. As such,
the current revisits may open a new research agenda for cinema and media stud-
ies, and may provide new ways to re-evaluate the “birth” of the cinema as well as
the perceptual and cognitive impact of new optical technologies and artistic tech-
niques and the responses to those developments by the avant-garde movements.7
11
Only within such a new framework of thinking, it may become fully obvious how
deep the impact of the experience of the movies as a “new medium” must have
been in its first decade. The question remains: how exactly did the historical avant-
garde movements (Shklovsky and the so-called “Russian Formalists” were part of
them) respond to the new techniques – not only after but also in the very moment
of “numbness” that is typically triggered by a new medium, as Marshall McLuhan
already indicated in the 1960s at the end of his introduction to Understanding Me-
dia; here, he pleads for the “examination” of the origin and development of new
media, “preceded by a general look at some aspects of the media […] beginning
with the never-explained numbness that each [new medium] brings about in the
individual and society [my italics].”8 So we might ask ourselves whether ostranenie
was indeed instrumental in shattering the baffled silence of the early avant-
gardes, by breaking the glass window of tradition that blocked their theoretical
thinking.
About the title of the book
The concept of ostranenie, coined by Shklovsky, is now almost a century old. It is a
neologism and an “attraction” in itself, similar to many of Sergei Eisenstein mon-
tages, which is to say: it is puzzling and weird, yet put forward by Shklovsky in a
brash, even provocative and slightly aggressive way, typical for the manifestos of
those days. Throughout his career Shklovsky revisited and reconsidered the con-
cept, the (aesthetic) principle and the techniques of ostranenie many times, not
only in “Art as Technique” but also in a dazzling diversity of works such as Theory
of Prose, A Sentimental Journey, a memoir written for his Futurist friend Vladimir
Mayakovsky, Mayakovsky and his Circle, Literature and Cinematography, the many con-
tributions on the cinema in Poetika Kino9 and in his book on Eisenstein, and so on
and so forth. It was not until 1983, however, that Victor Shklovsky reflected on
that very moment seventy years earlier, when he introduced the term ostranenie
and unleashed a revolution in thinking about the arts, that he remarked he “could
now admit to having made a spelling mistake” as he had erroneously spelt ostrane-
nie “with one n.”10 That is how the word entered the history books, with a single
n, to roam about like “a dog with a ragged ear,” as Shklovsky would have it. The
spelling mistake did not prevent the term from being translated worldwide as
“making strange” (or as defamiliarization, deautomatization, alienation, es-
trangement, and so on), as if he had written stannyi (strange). Yet he had quietly
changed the word once again. So now let Ostrannenie be the title of this book, with
that unfamiliar double nn, to once again estrange us from what may now have
become a word too familiar to us, a buzzword, if you will, in art, literature, and
film studies since the 1970s.
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About the contributions to this book
The book is structured in four parts, each of which deals with the concept or
aesthetic principle of ostranenie from a different angle. The first part focuses on
early cinema and the avant-garde period as a phase in which this revolutionary
new theory of art was formed. The second and third parts explore the ways in
which the term has come to resonate deeply in art, film and media studies and
has entered (or enters) into dialogue with corresponding concepts from various
disciplinary fields, the relatively new fields of cognitive and evolutionary–
cognitive research among them (in the third part). Focusing on the appropriation
and mutation of the concept of ostranenie within diverse epistemological traditions
means revealing the prolific range and depth of a concept that has helped shape
the trajectory of theoretical inquiry from 1913 onwards.
The book opens with a contribution by Yuri Tsivian dealing with ostranenie as a
term and an artistic technique which may be closely associated both with early
cinema as well as with the avant-garde in art. In “The Gesture of Revolution or
Misquoting as Device,” Tsivian begins a search for the relation of ostranenie to
what the Russian writer Aleksey Tolstoy named “the gesture of revolution,” a
phrase that encapsulated the essence of art by Russian Formalists and the avant-
garde of the 1920s. Tsivian’s starting point for his quest is Dziga Vertov’s Kino-
Eye (1924), or more specifically, that one odd shot; the rotated street. The road of
discovery Tsivian sets out for his readers, takes him through the writings of Viktor
Shklovsky and Anton Checkov and their reflections on the art of their times (Levi-
tan, Kandinsky, Rodchenko), and leads him back to Eisenstein and Vertov and the
defamiliarizing artistic technique of rotation, or turning things upside down, as
the gesture of revolution.
In “Ostranenie, ‘The Montage of Attractions’ and Early Cinema’s ‘Properly Irreduc-
ible Alien Quality,’” I historicize and contextualize Viktor Shklovsky’s “Art as
Technique” as a true avant-garde manifesto. I argue that its main objective is to
radically re-think art from the perspective of technique, of new techniques and
their impact on perception, as the manifesto’s title in fact properly indicates.
Furthermore, I argue that Shklovsky was deeply embedded in the Futurists’ re-
thinking of the perceptual powers of new artistic techniques, and their sudden
and strong impact on audiences. Thirdly, I argue that this avant-garde project,
with which early Russian Formalism was so closely connected, was itself a crucial
part of what we have come to understand as the tremendous cultural impact of
early cinema in pre-revolutionary Russia. This particular context raises some new
and urgent questions: if Shklovsky’s manifesto was part of the avant-garde’s cul-
tural response to early cinema, then how must we exactly situate and understand
its basic premises and characteristics in relation to its historical and cultural con-
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text, e.g., its radical opposition to the practice of interpretation and to traditional
concepts; its abduction of the “muddled notion of form” (replaced by the notion
of “technique”); its key terms: ostranenie, art, technique; its implications for the
study of the arts, film, and media (history)?
Part two of the book is dedicated to the investigation of the various mutations and
appropriations of the concept in its post-war reception. Four essays trace the his-
tory of the adjustments and modifications of the concept of ostranenie within parti-
cular contexts, disciplinary fields, and theoretical frameworks. In “Ostranenie, In-
novation and Media History,” Frank Kessler concentrates on the way in which the
concept (or principle) of ostranenie can be made or has been made productive in
the fields of film- and media history. He argues that even though the concept was
first applied in the field of literature, right from the very beginning its scope was
directed towards a general aesthetic principle, and as such ostranenie has been
adopted by the so-called neoformalist approach elaborated on by Kristin Thompson.
Kessler’s historical and historiographical perspective clearly shows that the con-
cept of ostranenie has proved itself valuable to several disciplinary fields, and has
influenced artistic theory, even if some scholars indebted to Shklovsky’s ideas did
not always acknowledge it, as Kessler indicates.
In “Knight’s Move: Brecht and Russian Formalism in Britain,” Ian Christie ex-
plores the processes by which Russian Formalism and Brechtian “alienation” be-
came powerful influences on the intellectual regime of Great-Britain during the
1960s and 1970s. Christie sketches how, in those two decades, ostranenie and alie-
nation were introduced to, and appropriated by, British theater, cinema, and most
specifically the critical writings of the British Film Journal Screen, which devoted
special issues to Russian Formalism in the early 1970s. Echo’s of Shklovsky and
Brecht can be found in critical contributions to Screen by Stephen Heath, Peter
Wollen, Laura Mulvey, and others. Christie argues that in the 1960s and 1970s,
both Viktor Shklovsky’s ostranenie and Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt formed
part of an “assertive new vocabulary,” embraced by a generation “keen to declare
their intellectual, and indeed political, independence.” Moreover, he argues that
to lay claim to concepts that originated in Russian and Marxist culture was in
itself a significant gesture of revolt in those days. He shows that the reception of
both Shklovsky and Brecht was in fact part of a wider movement of “revolt against
the mendacity and manipulation of the Cold War,” which also affected the prac-
tice of film making as well as film studies.
In Dominique Chateau’s “Ostranenie in French Film Studies: Translation Problems
and Conflicting Interests,” the complications of the adoption and appropriation
of ostranenie into a foreign language and established theoretical framework take
center stage. Chateau argues that in the 1960s, during a revival of interest in Rus-
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sian Formalism, French Structuralists (Todorov and Genette among them) incor-
porated several Formalist concepts into their theories, but quite remarkably,
Shklovsky’s ostranenie was blatantly disregarded. Chateau shows that the introduc-
tion of ostranenie into French Structuralism and French Film Studies was fraught
with complications as the prevailing intellectual atmosphere of criticism in France
did not allow for a favorable reception of Shklovsky’s theories mainly due to re-
verence towards Roman Jakobson. Chateau may be said to have deepened the
knowledge of the processes of appropriation of Russian Formalism by French
Structuralism as directed by a “Jakobsonian research agenda,” a problem already
signaled by Meir Sternberg in 2006, as Chateau indicates.11
Whereas Dominique Chateau was invited to focus on the translation problems
of ostranenie and its appropriation in the more general context of French Structur-
alism and Film Studies, Emile Poppe was invited to specifically focus on Christian
Metz as a film theorist who, it may be argued, might have (re)discovered and
possibly even appreciated Russian Formalist theory within the context of his own
theorizing on film in the 1960s in France. In “Christian Metz and the Russian
Formalists: A ‘Rendez-Vous Manqué’?” Emile Poppe indicates, however, that fac-
tors such as the popular debate of the days and the inaccessibility of Russian
Formalist works, as well as different and incompatible research affinities and
scholarly agendas, seem to have kept the two parties away from a successful en-
gagement.
Part three of this book deals with cognitive and evolutionary-cognitive approaches
to ostranenie. It explores what the current cognitive approaches have to say about
the question of perception as initiated by Shklovsky in the field of art studies al-
most a century earlier. In the first contribution to this section, “Should I see what
I believe? Audiovisual Ostranenie and Evolutionary-Cognitive Film Theory,”
Laurent Jullier argues that in order to study the process of defamiliarization (or
deautomatization), it is necessary to first examine the way familiarization (or auto-
matization) works on a cognitive level. Yet before being able to know what defa-
miliarization is in a film (or in the cinema), one has to first ask whether the whole
cinematographic process itself is not defamiliarizing, as he argues. Jullier devotes
three separate sections to audiovisual ostranenie, based on three common distinc-
tions in perception psychology: (1) defamiliarizations dealing with the processes
of automatic recognition of visual forms (bottom-up); (2) defamiliarizations deal-
ing with the routines associated with the exploration of the environment by the
whole body; (3) defamiliarizations dealing with high-level cognitive processes
such as opinions and beliefs (top-down). Interdisciplinarity being at the core of
his study, Jullier adds an epistemological preamble to clarify what cognitive psy-
chology has to say about the more general question of perception. For readers not
yet fully familiar with cognitive or evolutionary-cognitive approaches to film,
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Jullier’s preamble offers a good start to get acquainted with the approaches in this
part of the book.
One of the most comprehensive, if not the biggest, challenge that film theory has
to answer to these days is posed by the new digital technology in film production,
as László Tarnay states in his “On Perception, Ostranenie, and Specificity.” In his
contribution to this book, he constructs a possible lineage (as he calls it) of the
concept of ostranenie in aesthetic and film theory from the Russian Formalists to
the present day. His objective is to define a golden thread for the conceptual laby-
rinth that would lead from Shklovsky’s idea – both theoretically and historically –
to what he takes to be a fundamental challenge to the theory of the moving im-
age, namely the arrival of the newest (computer simulated) digital imagery. His
approach is primarily conceptual. With regard to the perceptual process of ostra-
nenie, he indicates that our cognitive system resorts to “specificity recognition” (as
opposed to category recognition), a so-called bottom-up process that renews our
awareness of the medium or object and thus defamiliarizes the perception. This
line of thought, Tarnay argues, is upheld in several 20th century aesthetic the-
ories, from Viktor Shklovsky, to Walter Benjamin, to Gilles Deleuze; there are
several interesting references to Vivian Sobchack as well. Tarnay shows that they
all argue for the uniqueness and singularity of the art object, something which
may be considered particularly remarkable and relevant in our current digital age
of technological renewal.
In “Estrangement and the Representation of Life in Art,” Barend van Heusden
states that Viktor Shklovsky, who considered “estrangement” (or “ostranenie”) to
be the basic function of art, “was right, but for the wrong reasons.” Van Heusden
argues that in “Art as Technique,” Shklovsky mingled three theoretical perspec-
tives: a theory of perception, a theory of semiosis, and a theory of abstraction. In
his step-by-step analysis of Shklovsky’s discourse, Van Heusden gives a detailed
insight in the current knowledge of artistic (perception and) cognition, and in the
shifts and changes that took place in the field of art studies. In passing he points
out that in the course of roughly one century, the study of the arts has moved
from the study of artistic forms, via the study of artistic meaning, to the study of
artistic cognition. His basic statement is that the concept of ostranenie can and
should be reassessed in contemporary art theory. Moreover, he argues that to
keep the concept “alive” in contemporary criticism, we will have to take this
changed context of research into account and treat ostranenie accordingly, “as a
concept that refers to a crucial dimension of human semiotic cognition.”
The last essay in this section of the book, “The Perception of Reality as Deformed
Realism” deals with the question “what, exactly, does ostranenie deautomatize?” In
this contribution to the book, Miklós Kiss re-evaluates Shklovsky’s highly pro-
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gressive intuition (as he labels it) on the cognitive distinction of “perceiving” as a
bottom-up and “knowing” as a top-down logic. In his exploration of this opposition,
Kiss highlights the discrepancy between the reality of perception and comprehen-
sion on the one hand, and the realism of representation on the other hand. Kiss’
objective is to demonstrate and explore the consequences of Shklovsky’s “cogni-
tive hunch,” which seems to have led him towards introducing the concept of
ostranenie as part of his radically new theory of art. Kiss starts his argument with a
motto taken from Jarmo Valkola, saying that “Our eyes may move like a camera,
but our attention jumps like editing.” By focusing on film narration and the cog-
nitive and perceptual processes it triggers, Kiss argues that the non-linear cogni-
tive processes with which we perceive reality as well as film are so similar that
watching a film that represents its story events out of chronological order should
not be an incentive for deautomatization since it does not alter our built-in non-
linear perceptive and comprehensive operations.
Part four of this book contains two Conversations in the French tradition of the
Entretiens: the first one with András Bálint Kovács, and a second one with Laura
Mulvey. These Conversations are meant to round up the debate in this book. The
first Conversation, between András Bálint Kovács and Laurent Jullier, focuses
once more on the cognitive aspect of ostranenie in relation to film narration.
Weighing the pros and cons of several theoretical paradigms in Film Studies, the
Conversation between Kovács and Jullier primarily stresses narrative defamiliari-
zation and denounces the theory that defamiliarization is easily obtainable by
means of distorting narrative techniques. Instead, Kovács argues that associative
rules other than causality are just as easily applied by the viewer to make sense of
the narrative since people have a built-in tendency to find coherence in narratives.
Viewers tend to resort to associative rules such as similarity or repetition to make
up for a lack of causality that only briefly defamiliarizes the narrative, he argues.
Other aspects of defamiliarization discussed between Kovács and Jullier in this
Conversation pertain to the “knowledge” acquired through defamiliarization as
an alternative to theories by Derrida (différance) and Deleuze (répétition) and some
concluding thoughts on the interdisciplinary nature of ostranenie and the most
productive ways to approach the concept.
The second Conversation, between Laura Mulvey and myself, aims at gaining
more insight into the disruptive and uncanny nature of the early movie-going
experience, deemed highly relevant for the re-reading of Shklovsky’s “Art as
Technique” within its historical context. The powers of the new optical and cine-
matic techniques to “make strange,” and thus to trigger a sudden and strong,
uncanny feeling of defamiliarization in the viewer are here explored by means of
revisiting the past; that is to say, re-reading the seminal texts by Viktor Shklovsky
on ostranenie, and by Sigmund Freud on the uncanny (or Unheimlichkeit). As differ-
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ent as these two texts (and authors) may be, it can be argued that they both deal
with disruptive perceptual processes in that very particular medium-specific mo-
ment in time in which they both were written. One of the objectives of this Con-
versation is to bring the ideas of “uncanniness” and “estrangement” into some
kind of shared framework, in an attempt to better understand the disruptive im-
pact early cinema had on the modes of perception of the viewer and on the way
the “uncanny” experience of a world “made strange” by the new mass medium
may have been an important factor in the shaping of the way people experienced
the modern.





The Cinema of Attractions





First of all, I would like to comment on an expression used in the title of this
article. The phrase “gesture of revolution” is not mine. I have borrowed this
word combination from Aleksey Nikolaevich Tolstoy’s series of articles “Voz-
mozhnosti kino” (The Potential of the Cinema) written in 1924, shortly after his
return from emigration to Moscow.2 On his return, the writer concluded that all
was not well in the new Soviet literature and the emerging Soviet cinema. Litera-
ture was in thrall to an unreflecting fascination with adventure, while cinema was
ruled by the febrile American style of editing.
Let’s follow the reasoning of Tolstoy’s article. Here is what he has to say about
literature:
The contemporary (revolutionary) art, negating ‘psychologism’, affirms activity
instead. But here an error, and often nonsense, creeps in. Let’s take a contem-
porary short story set during the years of the Revolution. What a subject! But
you start reading, and what you get is glimpses of little people, objects, frag-
ments of events and so on. Forward, forward, at any cost. People, objects,
events, going round and hurtling by…3
And here is what Tolstoy thinks of the Soviet cinema and its tendency towards a
rapid succession of short shots:
And it’s the same in the cinema: a fascination with American film editing. A
mad race of shadows on the screen, not even a promise of something better to
come, you’re just sitting there, getting dumber by the minute; where are you
going to get to by going faster?4
Where is the solution? In the new Russia, according to Tolstoy, the old psycholo-
gical prose and the old psychological cinema should be replaced not by the Amer-
ican montage technique, nor by a mindless literary equivalent of action films, but
by a third option – a gesture:
21
If the image passing in front of me on the screen, however wonderfully pro-
duced, however super-American in its editing, full of tricks and so forth, if in
this succession of human shadows I fail to discern the endless, faithful, hu-
man gesture, my gesture, I shall remain indifferent.5 We should not begin
with speed and motion, nor with the triumph of object over spiritual move-
ment, but with the primal gesture. A human gesture.6
Of course, Tolstoy warns the reader, not all gestures are alike. This is not about
everyday gestures, “mendacious, duplicitous, nervously lewd.”7 Whoever finds
the primal gestures will pave the way for the new cinema and new literature. This
qualification – primal8 – is a recurring motif in Tolstoy’s article. What sort of
gestures are they, and how are they different from ordinary movements?
Those are gestures preceding thought and feeling, fundamental gestures, ani-
mal gestures. A cock grouse during the mating season fans his tail out in a
particular way and struts around, all puffed up, close to where the hen is sit-
ting. I assure you that the cock’s train of thought at that moment is certainly
not ‘Fine, I shall fan out my tail and pass by proudly, and surely the hen will
fall in love with me’. No, this is decadent psychology. The cock grouse opens
his tail and puffs himself up and it is from this gesture that he feels a surge of
amorous courage.9
Tolstoy transposes this law of nature to art:
Primal gesture is the starting point for art. The maker of art engaged in the
creative process searches speculatively within himself for those primal ges-
tures. They excite him, and they and only they open the bone casket of the
human skull to his eyes.10
But the artist should look for the primal gesture not only within himself but also
in his times, since this gesture, according to Tolstoy, will be consonant with
whatever determines our era. It is precisely here that the expression “the gesture
of revolution” comes in. Tolstoy introduces it, as Shklovsky would say, through
the device of a riddle. It is still a mystery to us just what sort of gesture it will be,
but Tolstoy has already given it a name:
The revolution has done away with garish outfits and painted blushes. We see
man in his primal gesture. Art must find the gesture of revolution.11
It is this last phrase of Tolstoy’s article that has given me the title for mine. And
now a few words on the content and purpose of the latter. Its main characters are
Dziga Vertov, Viktor Shklovsky and Aleksandr Rodchenko. It would be hard to
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assume that any one of them paid attention to a newspaper call of a former émi-
gré who had fast changed his flag of convenience on return to the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, some of the devices observed by the art and scholarship of the 1920s
can be regarded as possible solutions of the task set by Aleksey Nikolaevich
Tolstoy.
I will thus deal with Shklovsky the theoretician; the director/documentary-
maker Dziga Vertov; and Rodchenko in his photographer’s hat. As for all the
apparent heterogeneity of material, there is a shared quality in the manner in
which Shklovsky used his sources and how Vertov and Rodchenko used theirs –
if we allow ourselves to use the literary term “source” to denote whatever finds its
way on to the documentary film tape and the lens of an amateur’s camera.
The Device of Rotation: An Act Quintessential to Art
To any Russian native speaker, the word ostrannenye (making strange) which
Shklovsky derived from strannyi (strange) looks odd indeed. It is instantly tempt-
ing to familiarize it by dropping one of the two n’s in the middle. Spelt this way,
ostranenye appears to be derived from storona (side) and sounds more like “margin-
alization.”
Most of the time, ostranenye has been spelt with just one n, and Shklovsky him-
self takes the blame for this. In 1983, when speaking of the past, Shklovsky di-
vulged the following secret:
And then I coined the term ostranenye; as nowadays I can admit to having made
spelling mistakes, I wrote it with only one n. I should have written down stran-
nyi first.
And so off it went and has been roaming the world ever since, like a dog with a
torn ear.12
We shall return to Shklovsky’s mistakes in due course, but let’s begin with cine-
ma, and not literature. In Dziga Vertov’s film Kino-Eye (1924) there is an odd
shot which, without context, it would be easy to dismiss as a technical fault – an
incorrectly printed positive. On screen, we see a Moscow street, but shown not as
it should be, but rotated sideways, with the road going up vertically.
This, of course, is no production defect and no mistake. The rotated street is
preceded by the following shots: the intertitle “On the Tverskaya Street”; then a
general view of a street on a sunny day with passers-by, cars and trams speeding
along (fig. 1). Then the intertitle “The same street viewed from a different camera
set-up” (fig. 2). And only then are we shown the same street, with the same trams
and people, but filmed sideways (fig. 3). Nothing except the intertitle anticipates
this turn, and nothing in the rest of the film explains it.
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But even the intertitle hardly explains it all. What is the meaning of this artistic
device, and is it right to speak of meaning and art in this instance? I shall put
forward a few possible answers to this question.
So how should we deal with the rotated image? It seems to me that there are
three possible approaches. First, we can dismiss it as simple trick for trick’s sake
as, on occasion, did the critics, even those most devoted to Vertov, who not with-
out reason regarded Vertov and his cameraman Mikhail Kaufman as incorrigible
trickomaniacs. Second, it is entirely possible that the frame with the flipped street
might make sense in the context of the 1920s theories, for instance, in the context
of the theory of the avant-garde or of the Russian Formalist pronouncements
about the revolutionary nature of all art. Third, we can connect this odd shot to
Constructivist photography, to see if we can find something in Rodchenko’s
photographs that would explain Kaufman’s ways with the film camera.
Let us, for interest’s sake, dismiss the first option. This leaves us with two
explanatory scenarios: Formalist poetics and avant-garde art on the one hand,
and Constructivist photography on the other. Let us explore the former avenue
first. I can think of three instances (each of which could have easily come to
Vertov’s attention) where the gesture of rotating a picture – putting it on its side
or turning it upside down – was recognized and interpreted as an act quintessen-
tial to art. The first features Shklovsky, Chekhov and Levitan, the second, Vasily
Kandinsky, and the third, Chekhov and Shklovsky once again, this time without
Levitan.
The first instance: in a late edition of O teorii prozy (On the Theory of Prose),
Shklovsky cites Anton Chekhov’s letter to his cousin who, like himself, was a
friend and admirer of that extraordinary Russian landscape painter Isaak Levitan.
The aim of the quote is to show that the connection with a theme or motif in the
artist’s work is more a hindrance than help. Shklovsky quotes from the letter
from memory:
Chekhov said: I’m tired, I’ve written a lot, and I’m already forgetting to turn
my stories upside down, as Levitan turns his drawings to get rid their meaning
and to see only the relationships between patches of color.13
Shklovsky’s explanation does not entirely conform to our notions of the Russian
art and literature of the second half of the nineteenth century. Not an art histor-
ian, I am not qualified to discuss the tricks of the trade which Levitan might have
used in his studio. However, going by what Levitan’s pupils and contemporaries
wrote about him, we know that he would roam forests for days and days in pur-
suit of the right plein-air, and that it was Levitan who invented the notion of the
“Russian landscape”; and now we hear that for Levitan, meaning and motif only
got in the way. Furthermore, Shklovsky attributes this assertion to Chekhov, a
writer whose own object-ness inspired much scholarship.
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Let us turn to Chekhov’s letter of 24 November 1887. It does indeed mention
Levitan’s custom of turning his paintings on their side, but Chekhov expresses
differently what Levitan had hoped to achieve by that: “I’m ill. My life is dull, and
I’m beginning to write badly because I’m tired and can’t, like Levitan, turn my
pictures upside down in order to distance my critical eye.”14
There is nothing here about removing meaning or the pure relationship of col-
ors. More likely, it is about self-editing. There is no doubt that both Chekhov and
Levitan represented a type of person we would today call perfectionist, and as
every perfectionist knows, before a piece of work – a painting, a story, or just an
academic article – is handed over, it needs to be put aside for a while (“to distance
the critical eye”) in order to reveal its shortcomings. “Sometimes it’s very difficult
to finish a painting,” B. Lipkin, a pupil of Levitan’s, recalled his master’s words.
“Sometimes you’re afraid to ruin the picture with one brushstroke. So they stand,
‘ripening,’ turned against the wall.”15
However it was, Chekhov had hardly meant what Shklovsky saw in Levitan’s
actions; otherwise, it would be difficult to explain what Chekhov wanted to say by
drawing that parallel between writing a story and painting a picture.
Kandinsky: Discoverer of Abstract Painting
If Shklovsky did indeed see in the example from Chekhov’s letter evidence that for
the artist, the motif is no more than external motivation, this explanation did not
come to him via Levitan, but through the history of art after Levitan; more specifi-
cally, the direction given to art at the beginning of the twentieth century by non-
representational painters, in the first instance, Kazimir Malevich and Vasily Kan-
dinsky.
There is, indeed, a similar episode cited in Kandinsky scholarship, for the first
time in his autobiography. As is generally known, Kandinsky had his own score
to settle with realism. In 1911 he blamed the idols of his generation, Chekhov and
Levitan, for excessive attachment to nature and object instead of making art see
the invisible and the spiritual.16 Shortly afterwards, in a book called Stupeni. Tekst
khudozhnika [Steps. An Artist’s Text] published in 1918 in Moscow, Kandinsky wrote
about himself as the original discoverer of abstract painting and, as is the custom
of discoverers, recounted what precisely became his Newton’s apple. Here is the
relevant passage from Stupeni:
Much later, already in Munich, I was charmed on an occasion by an unex-
pected sight in my own studio. It was getting dark. I was about to go home
having finished a study, still engrossed in my work and in dreams of how I
should be working, when suddenly I saw in front of me an indescribably beau-
tiful picture, glowing with an inner fire. At first I stopped short, but soon I
walked towards this mysterious painting, totally incomprehensible in its exter-
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nal content and consisting exclusively of spots of color. And then I found the
key to this mystery: it was my own painting, standing against the wall on its
side.17
Could this be why Shklovsky thought Levitan’s habit of turning his unfinished
paintings upside down was a way of seeing them as abstract? For what Shklovsky
wrote Chekhov had meant to say about Levitan fits well with what Kandinsky says
about himself, “Generally, I realised beyond doubt that day that object-ness
harmed my paintings.”18
Shklovsky and the Rotated Shop Sign
This is the second parallel to the instance of a rotated street as flipped by Vertov.
Like the first, it comes from representational art or, to be more precise, from the
theory thereof. One more passage from Shklovsky’s book O teorii prozy, this time
from an early edition, will add to our collection of paintings turned on their side.
Here it is not a turned painting, but rather rotated words.
In the early version of the book, Shklovsky also quotes Chekhov, and again
from memory. This time it is not a letter but an idea for a short story found in
Chekhov’s Zapisnye knizhki [Sketchbooks]. Chekhov’s idea, if we were to believe
Shklovsky, was about the eye-opening effect of a rotated shop sign. Shklovsky
refers to this unborn story to illustrate that the effect of defamiliarization, which
as we remember from Shklovsky, is at the heart of all art.
According to Shklovsky, only displaced objects truly reach us. Art is the knowl-
edge of how to displace things:
In order to transform an object into a fact of art, it is necessary to detach it
from the domain of life, to wrest it out from the web of familiar associations,
to turn over the object as one would turn a log in the fire.19
In prose and poetry, Shklovsky continues, the word is the object that needs turn-
ing:
Someone walks along a certain street for 15 years or maybe 30 years. Each day
he reads the sign that hangs above a certain shop: “Nectars of varied colors”
and each time he passes it he asks himself: “Who needs nectars of varied
colors?” Well, one day the shop sign is taken down and put on its side against
the wall. It is then that he reads for the first time: “Neckties of varied col-
ors.”20
Turning the shop sign on its side, Shklovsky continues, is the quintessence of art.
The artist treats objects in the manner of a revolutionary building a barricade:
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The poet takes down all the shop signs, the artist is always the instigator of a
rebellion of things. In poet’s hands, things rebel, discarding their old names
and assuming a new appearance with new ones.21
As we can see, the gesture of turning is a welcome guest in Shklovsky’s theoreti-
cal trope-kit. It is all the more instructive to compare Shklovsky’s account of the
shop sign with the original. Here is Chekhov’s idea in Sketchbooks:
‘A wide selection of nectars’, so read X, walking every day along the street and
continuing to wonder how anyone could trade in nectars alone and who
needed them. And only thirty years later, he read correctly, carefully, ‘A wide
selection of neckties.’22
Those who in their day paid their due to puzzle pages of children’s magazines
will easily see how Chekhov’s original idea differs from Shklovsky’s account. All
the elements of the story’s subject are there, except Shklovsky’s key one. In
Chekhov’s notebook no one takes the street sign down and turns it on its side.
Shklovsky’s memory sneaked into Chekhov’s plot a detail from Kandinsky. Ac-
cording to Chekhov, it is enough to look more carefully at a thing in order to see
it; according to Shklovsky, you need to turn it.
The street turned on its side in Vertov’s film Kino-Eye (fig. 3) can also be
explained by the belief in defamiliarization. In order to demonstrate it, let’s turn
to the third version of events, according to which that particular frame should be
viewed with the avant-garde photography of the 1920s in mind.
The Revolution of Our Visual Thinking
Mikhail Kaufman, brother of Dziga Vertov, was the cameraman in Kino-Eye.
Before he became a cameraman, Kaufman experimented a lot with the photo-
graphic camera. Even afterwards, many regarded him as a photographer: at
times, stills from Kaufman’s films were reproduced as independent photographic
work. The Constructivist artist Aleksandr Rodchenko, known for his bold experi-
ments in photography, was a good friend of Kaufman’s. Both men were often
berated for their attachment to an unusual point of view of the camera. In their
defense, they would say that in order for the camera to see its object, you can’t
take a picture from the “belly-button level,” you need to rotate it.
“Belly-button level” was Rodchenko’s term for the usual point of view, in com-
mon use in photographic studios, as well as in amateur photography. “I find
writing difficult, I think visually, my thoughts come in separate pieces,”23 com-
plained Rodchenko in an article “Puti sovremennoy fotografii” (The Paths of Con-
temporary Photography). I shall quote two excerpts from that brilliantly written
article:
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Fig. 1: Still from Dziga Vertov’s film Kino-Eye (1924). Tverskaya street on a sunny day
with passers-by.
Fig. 2: Still from Dziga Vertov’s film Kino-Eye (1924). Intertitle: “The same street viewed
from a different camera set-up.”
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Fig. 3: Still from Dziga Vertov’s film Kino-Eye (1924). The rolated street.
Fig. 4: Novyi Lef cover photo by Rodchenko.
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Fig. 5: Rodchenko, “Passers-by. A street” (1928).
Fig. 6: “Mystery of the Street,” 1928. Photo by Umbo (Otto Umbehr).
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We do not see what we look at.
We do not see remarkable perspectives and positions of objects.
Accustomed to seeing the ordinary and the inculcated, we must open up the
world of the visible.
We must revolutionise our visual thinking.
We must let the scales called ‘belly-button perspective’ fall from our eyes.
Take pictures from any point of view except from the belly button until all
points of view have been accepted.24
[…]
To sum up: in order to teach people to see from new viewpoints, it is necessary
to photograph ordinary, familiar objects from completely unexpected points of
view and to photograph new objects from different points of view in order to
give them their full representation.25
One of Rodchenko’s photographs, reproduced on the cover of the same issue of
the Novyi Lef magazine which featured the article (fig. 4), is the best illustration of
this manifesto. If we hold the journal normally, it is not easy to recognize in the
photograph a multi-storey building with a fire escape at the front. In order to see
the building, we need to turn the journal counter-clockwise. The recognition has
been hindered, but it is to the advantage of the object. Pure defamiliarization.
Sometimes, a Rodchenko angle (a term used both in photography and cinema-
tography) was crowned with a visual pun. Such is his photograph “Passers-by. A
street” (1928), taken vertically, from top down (fig. 5). This angle turns shadows
into pedestrians and reduces pedestrians to tiny pedestals at the “shadows” feet.
As high-rise dwellers could observe such scenes every sunny afternoon, it was
only to be expected that the idea might occur to more than one photographer, and
indeed, it so happened that in the same year, a former Bauhaus student Umbo
(Otto Umbehr) took two similar photos (fig. 6). Apparently, the sight of shadows
which appeared to be walking all by themselves reminded the German photogra-
pher of the fantastic worlds imagined by Freud or Adelbert von Chamisso, for he
named one “Uncanny [Unheimliche] Street” and the other “Mystery of the Street.”
Yet if there was a photographer who could have claimed to be the first to dis-
cover this visual trick (or sight gag, as such tricks are sometimes called in films),
it was Mikhail Kaufman. Let’s look again at the rotated street from Vertov’s 1924
Kino-Eye (fig. 3). Here, too, shadows walk erect with pedestrians prostrate at
their feet. There was hardly anything uncanny or unreal about Kaufman’s or Rod-
chenko’s walking shadows, however: for a true left-wing filmmaker, as for a Con-
structivist, to see a street in a strange – defamiliarized – way was tantamount to
making it more real.
Sergey Eisenstein, who alternated filmmaking with research and lectures, be-
came famous among his students for an assignment involving composition of a
film sequence. Beginning with a sketch of a quiet street, the task was to turn the
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quiet street into a revolutionary one without drawing in sailors or armored cars.
The solution involved a simple displacement of objects already in the picture:
what was low became high, high became low, the distant came to the fore, and
the near receded into the background.
Eisenstein’s second favorite assignment involved choosing the right gesture.
According to Eisenstein, when actors search for the best gesture to express this
or that emotional state, they should begin their search with a well-chosen word,
not a movement. And why the word? It would do well here to remember once
again Aleksey Tolstoy’s essay on the primal gesture of revolution, from which I
quoted at the beginning of this article. In the essay, among other things, Tolstoy
speaks of words as existing in an evolutionary dependency on gestures:
The first person made the first gesture, and only then attributed meaning to it.
The word, a spoken sound, was the consequence of the gesture of the facial
muscles, perhaps hands, head and body. The fundamental gestures slumber in
our bloodstream, in our consciousness, in our muscles.26
Like Aleksey Tolstoy (and like many before and after Eisenstein and Tolstoy), Ei-
senstein believed that the language of words evolved from the language of ges-
tures. And if this were the case, Eisenstein would say during his lectures on bio-
mechanics, let’s look for the word that has retained the imprint of the gesture
that gave birth to it:
However you represent revulsion, at the basis of it there will always be a mo-
tion of turning away, to the point where you have turned your back on what is
revolting to look at. This word is the same in all languages, aversion in French,
Abscheu in German.27
Let’s follow Eisenstein’s advice and begin the search for the gesture of revolution
in etymology. According to the dictionary, the word “revolution” comes from the
Latin revolvere, to turn. Eisenstein would add that this word is as much a fossil as
revulsion – the gesture that gave rise to it is clearly visible in the word. While the
word “revulsion” retains the imprint of shrinking away, the word “revolution”
bears the impression of turning, as in “turning the picture.” In Eisenstein’s
words, a tram on its rails is a means of transport, while a tram lying on its side
becomes a barricade.
Shklovsky, we may recall, spoke of exactly the same thing: art is a rebellion of
things. We need to turn the log for it to burn better. I think that this is precisely
what Shklovsky did with his sources: he did not misquote them, he turned them
so they would burn.
Translated by Magdalena Hernas
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Ostranenie, “The Montage of Attrac-
tions” and Early Cinema’s “Properly Irre-
ducible Alien Quality”
Annie van den Oever
“Art, perhaps, is measured by its capacity to provide evidence for the falsifica-
tion of whatever theories we arrive at.”
– Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque. Strategies of Contradiction in Art and
Literature, 2006.
Prologue
For quite some time now, it has been apparent that the dominant post-war re-
reading of Russian Formalism within the context of an immanent approach to
literature created a serious misreading of some basic terms, notably “ostranenie,”
and “technique.”1 It was only while preparing this book, however, that it became
clear to me that Viktor Shklovsky’s “Art as Technique” is not the proto-structural-
ist treatise on art as “form,” that many have been eager to suggest.2 On the con-
trary, “Art as Technique” is a true “manifesto,” in the best of avant-garde’s tradi-
tions,3 and its main objective is to re-think art from the perspective of technique,
or as technique, as the title clearly indicates. The manifesto proclaims a revolution-
ary shift in the way art should be studied: from the perspective of techniques and their
perceptual impact, and not as a form to be interpreted. I came to understand that this was
an attempt to rethink the problem of art from the new and “radically unconven-
tional” (Eichenbaum)4 perspective of perception. Shklovsky’s “brash irreverence”
(Erlich) towards tradition5 was really deeply embedded in the avant-garde’s re-
thinking of the perceptual potential of new technologies and techniques, their
evocative and revolutionary powers, their sudden and strong impact on audi-
ences. Even more, I came to understand that this avant-garde project, with which
early Russian Formalism had been so closely connected,6 was itself a crucial part
of what we have come to understand as the tremendous cultural impact of early
cinema in pre-revolutionary Russia. Early cinema studies has contributed consid-
erably to our knowledge from this period.7 However, an urgent and new question
not posed by avant-garde studies or early cinema studies so far is: If Shklovsky’s
manifesto was part of the avant-garde’s cultural response to early cinema, then
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how must we exactly situate and understand its basic premises and characteristics
in relation to it, e.g., its radical opposition to traditional concepts and practices;
its new “theoretical principles” and the implications for arts studies; its key
terms: ostranenie, art, technique – the last term was used to replace the “muddled
term” of “form,” as Boris Eichenbaum already wrote in his retrospective overview
of 1926.8
“Art as Technique” was written December 1916 and was first published in 1917.9
Some crucial passages on perception were already written and published in
1914.10 The essential issues raised in “Art as Technique” were already presented
by Shklovsky to his Futurist friends in a lecture in The Stray Dog in December
1913.11 That was the very year “the general craze for cinema reached its peak in
Russia,” as Yuri Tsivian has noted.12 This provided a very specific context with a
general craze for cinema, and a particularly strong Futurist’s response to it (they
mimicked the techniques of “distortion”) as well as a strong and enduring appre-
ciation for the new (optical) techniques, perhaps more lasting in pre-revolution-
ary Russia and later in the USSR than in the USA, with a re-editing culture as
nowhere else in the world (Hagener).13 Re-read within this very specific context,
it instantly becomes clear that “Art as Technique” is not a sort of research man-
ual, presenting a “formal method” to enhance interpretation, as post-war readers
might have come to think.14 It also becomes clear that it is relevant and necessary
to reread and re-evaluate “Art as Technique” as a manifesto, written in a medium-
specific period in history, not unlike the current one, which means that not art-
works or story worlds but rather the new techniques themselves and their impact
in the perceptual process take center stage, as we can now more easily under-
stand, perhaps, than readers of “Art as Technique” in the 1960s and 1970s.
To historicize the notion of ostranenie, I will re-read “Art as Technique” here in
its historical context. This almost automatically means defamiliarizing it from its
long history of misreading – appropriately in the context of this book. “Misread-
ing” here, however, does not express deprecation, but an acknowledgement that
each re-reading – including this one – has a function in its own context and time,
and that we, passers-by in a medium-specific period of history ourselves, are per-
haps better placed than post-war readers in the wake of classical narrative cine-
ma, to appreciate early cinema’s “properly irreducible alien quality,” which, ac-
cording to André Gaudreault, “traditional film historians have always tried to
paper over.”15
“Art as Technique” needs to be excavated from under that older version of Film
History, which, in keeping with the demands of the institution “cinema,” rejected
and repressed early film’s alien quality – yet this is a quality that we may assume
was still more or less center stage in Russia in 1913, when Shklovsky presented
his thoughts on ostranenie for the first time (the term is often translated as aliena-
tion, estrangement, or defamiliarization, but here it will simply be translated as “mak-
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ing strange”). The excavation of “Art as Technique” is meant in part as a contri-
bution to a New Film History. It is also meant to contribute to the contemporary
desire to integrate Film, Media, New Media, and Avant-Garde Studies. By histor-
icizing this crucial part of (art) theory, the texts on ostranenie may regain much of
their revolutionary impact and contribute to a contemporary convergence of me-
dia theory and practice.
Medium-Specific Period in History
Film historians have pointed out, quite correctly, that the cinema and its pre-
history are too deeply imbricate, ideologically and technologically, for an
abrupt ‘birth of the cinema’ to be conceptually valid. But from the perspective
of the uncanny, the arrival of celluloid moving pictures constitutes a decisive
moment.
– Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second. Stillness and the Moving Image.
To understand the tremendous impact of the new viewing experience, one needs
to understand the deeply alienating experience a visit to the movies was for most in
those days. Many described the experience as exciting and strange at the same
time. The new medium provided movement and thus a sudden taste of the ani-
mated, of life, of the real. Yet seeing this mute, two-dimensional world in a rather
bleak black and white made all this seem slightly ghostly and uncanny, animate
and inanimate at the same time. All was familiar, yet it was “made strange” by the
new “cinema machine.” This seems to be at the heart of the disruptive early movie-
going experience, as Laura Mulvey has argued.16 Remarkably similar observations
can be found in many descriptions (turn-of-the-century) of the movie-going ex-
perience, as Yuri Tsivian has pointed out.17 As Maxim Gorky famously put it in his
often cited critique of 1896, and it is constructive to cite him once again, in an
attempt to evoke the taste of an experience of stupor and excitement at seeing the
first moving images, since 21st-century movie-goers have inevitably lost contact
with this moment in time:
If you only knew how strange it felt. There were no sounds and no colours.
Everything – earth, trees, people, water, air – was portrayed in a grey mono-
tone: in a grey sky there were grey rays of sunlight; in grey faces – grey eyes,
and the leaves of the tree were grey like ashes... Silently the ash-grey foliage of
the trees swayed in the wind and the grey silhouettes of the people glided
silently along the grey ground, as if condemned to eternal silence and cruelly
punished by being deprived of all life’s colours.18
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After more than a century of film, the medium has stabilized into a mimetic tradi-
tion. In retrospect, it is very hard, almost impossible, to understand such experi-
ences and exclamations when viewed from our current perspective, because not
only film itself, but also the viewing practices have changed radically since 1896.
Judging from the responses of those early movie-goers, it seems that for them
seeing moving images (“movies”) was an uncanny experience, “astonishing”
(Gunning) and often even stupefying.19 That these early viewing experiences as
confrontations with the completely “new” were stupefying did not strictly mean
that the viewers were silent all the time. Laura Marcus commented on the “silenc-
ing” effects of the cinema in its early phase in an interesting way. She quotes
Virginia Woolf who, relatively late in life, wrote in her notebooks: “A new art
comes upon us so surprisingly that we sit silent, recognising before we take the
measure.”20 Marcus comments:
It suggests that the “relative” silence of Woolf and her Bloomsbury contem-
poraries on the question of the new art of film is to be understood as a neces-
sary pause – a reticence in the face of the unfamiliar. It by no means connoted
indifference.21
On the contrary, Marcus concludes, the cinema may have resonated throughout
Woolf’s life and writings. Moreover, the Bloomsbury group22 was only relatively
silent: they were silenced or stupefied in the first moment of awe, as one may
assume, but they were rather loud in the hours thereafter: pronounced enough to
be noticed by their contemporaries, who have described their notable presence.
That one was silent in the first moment, yet loudly and vividly talking in the next,
did not necessarily mean one had already found the right words to “frame” the
new experience, as Woolf indicates. In fact, they seem to have needed years be-
fore they could get to terms with the new optical technique and the new experi-
ences it triggered. Of course the most interesting part of this story is how the
impact of early cinema on Woolf and the Bloomsbury Group may be understood
in relation to the modernist revolution in literature and the arts of their days, a
revolution in which Woolf and her group were obviously leading figures.
Within the context of this book, it is interesting and even striking to see that
similar words to the ones expressed by Virginia Woolf in the 1920s were ex-
pressed by Viktor Shklovsky in a memoir dedicated to his friend, the revolutionary
poet Vladimir Mayakovsky, a leading figure in the early Russian Futurist move-
ment, who died in 1930 (he was born in the same year as Shklovsky, 1893). In
Mayakovsky and His Circle Shklovsky, like Woolf, noted that the “new” cannot be
“seen” (understood, verbalized, labeled) in the first moment of confrontation, but
this does not mean that the “new” has, or had, no impact. Ordinarily, it is only
later, as Shklovsky states, that the “new” turns out to have had a revolutionary
impact, which is to say that it had a truly profound and disruptive impact, turning
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tradition upside down. Perhaps this was what the “birth” of the cinema did with
tradition, it shook its very foundations.
As Tsivian has shown in his Early Cinema in Russia and Its Cultural Perception, film in
these early days triggered a true cascade of descriptions and reflections by poets
and novelists on the medium and the new viewing experiences. Interestingly, the
“film shows” not only offered a fascinating experience, they also provided a shared
experience: the masses flocked together to see the new technology. One may ar-
gue that the very fact that it was a shared experience in most cases may well have
deepened the cultural impact of the new medium, much the same as large strikes,
revolts, coups, earthquakes or draughts may be experienced more fully and may
leave a deeper imprint in memory and in the culture, since they not only affect
larger parts of society but may also trigger debate on a massive scale.23 Movie-
going as a shared experience – the going together; the sitting together; the excited
atmosphere of expectation, experienced together – may well have given these
early movie visits the character of an “event.” Moreover, since it was a shared
experience, it also provoked group discussion and public debate, even more so as
the movie experience was in many cases a slightly destabilizing experience. Ac-
cording to Ian Christie and Richard Taylor, it was after the revolution and after
Lenin’s proclamation of the cinema as the most important art “for us” of all the
arts24 that the cinema in the Soviet Union became an ideal battleground for often
very heated debates on all sorts of political and artistic issues. Cinema, backed by
Lenin, could take such a central role in the cultural debate precisely because it
could be turned into a “mass medium,” and as such the cinema could feed most
of the “debates that raged in the 1920s.” In the words of Christie and Taylor:
Cinema’s central position in Russian and Soviet cultural history and its unique
combination of mass medium, art form and entertainment industry have made
it a continuing battle for conflicts of broader ideological and artistic signifi-
cance, not only for Russia and the Soviet Union but also for the world out-
side.25
The years after the Russian revolution was the period in which the cinema was
turned into an institute with the help of the state, which chose to put all its revo-
lutionary powers behind it. About two decades earlier, before World War I and the
Russian revolution, the cultural panorama was quite different. Those were the
years in which, like elsewhere in the Western world, the introduction of the cine-
matograph took place. However, in the 1910s, the debate on the cinema was not
yet “shaped” as it was in the 1920s. The cinema in these very early days triggered
an immense outpouring of reactions in strong and significant ways, clearly in
response to the cinematograph itself as “a new medium.” The responses in Rus-
sia are in many ways indicative of “the period of the discovery of the cinema”
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(Gunning)26 as a “medium-specific period in film history” (Tsivian),27 with a
“medium-sensitive film viewer,” that is, a viewer who:
went to see a film show in order to experience the new medium more than to
see a specific film. In other words, the earliest period of film reception fore-
grounds the attraction of filmgoing itself often over the specific story or con-
tent of the films shown, which may serve as little more than pretexts for a trip
to the cinema.28
Within the broader context of the impact of early cinema on culture in Russia,
several parties and individuals may be singled out as having had an impact on the
debate of the time, some of whom, it may be said, have had a lasting impact in
the field of art (and film) studies:
the Symbolists (with Andrei Bely as a leading figure);
the Futurists (with Velimir Khlebnikov and Vladimir Mayakovsky as leading
figures);
OPOYAZ (or the Russian Formalists, with Viktor Shklovsky as a leading fig-
ure).
Shklovsky was part of the Russian avant-garde, more specifically the Russian Fu-
turists. He was also a member of OPOYAZ and LEF, a group of Formalists and
Futurists, initiated and organized by Mayakovsky in 1923, with its own magazine,
Lef, well-known for its publications by the leading figures of the avant-garde,
Mayakovsky and Shklovsky among them. Ground-breaking essays by the young
Sergei Eisenstein such as “The Montage of Attractions” and “The Montage of
Film Attractions” were published for the first time in Lef, in 1923 and 1924, re-
spectively.
In the following section, I will argue that “Art as Technique,” as the manifesto
of OPOYAZ, and ostranenie, as the manifesto’s most significant term, can best be
contextualized and understood (e.g., its implications for the study of the arts)
within this particular context; that is, within the context of several, partly succes-
sive avant-garde groups in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Moreover, I will argue that
for a good understanding of this very specific historical context, it is essential to
see Shklovsky as part of the avant-garde and to see the avant-garde as a crucial
part of the cultural reception of the cinema in Russia in its early days. The avant-
garde shared and cherished the disruptive and evocative impact of the early cine-
ma experience. Avant-garde poets immediately made use of what the cinema had
to offer by mimicking the fallacies and specialties of the new optical techniques, in
order to produce similar effects. To construct my argument, I will situate the
avant-garde responses to early cinema within the broader context of the cultural
reception of early cinema in Russia.
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“Birth” of the Avant-Garde in a Medium-Specific Period in History
The Symbolists
One of the interesting points of Tsivian’s book on the cultural reception of early
cinema in Russia is that it shows how the Symbolists, a group that was already
well-established in society as well as in literary tradition when the cinema arrived
in Russia, may be said to have played a decisive role in the cultural reception of
early cinema in these days. They dominated the public debate that it triggered.
One may argue that they were in the right position to help shape the discourse
which helped to frame the experience that in itself lacked a distinct “form” be-
cause at that specific point in time no one had yet formulated a distinct frame-
work or the appropriate words to describe what most found “strange,” if not
astonishing or stupefying. The Symbolists, as Tsivian has convincingly argued,
responded to that “unfamiliar” and rather “ghostly” silent world in black and
white that the cinematograph presented by describing or labeling the viewing
experience in terms of an “absence,” “death” or “(dual) identity” and other well-
known motives in poetry and literature. The Symbolists, like all other movie-goers
in those days, were medium-sensitive viewers; that is, the medium itself triggered
their attention initially. The scratches on the reel; the unusual (“deadly”) silence
surrounding the moving and animate figures on the screen; the grayish
(“ghostly”) tones of the world on the screen, bathing in a rather bleak black and
white; the changing size and scale of figures or things moving towards the cam-
era, abnormally enlarged; seeing oneself on the screen or a reversed projection,
presenting a reversed course of events: all that was new and unusual to these
viewers who were not yet used to moving images was linked to a thing or theme
they did know. One could say that they “thematized” the technical fallacies and
specialties of early cinema: “death” would turn up as a theme when the moving
images looked less animated; “doubles” and “double identity” when one saw a
familiar face yet presented in an unfamiliar way, and so on and so forth. Thus, the
typical shock effects of the new, soon to be exploited by early cinema, were channeled
and smoothed along thematic lines and motives one knew all too well. In ascribing
a meaning to “this or that feature of the cinema,” as Tsivian argues, the Symbolists
tended to stay well within “the dominant cultural pattern of the epoch.”29 This
seems to indicate that the “early film reception” worked, at least on this specific
group of medium-sensitive viewers, “by putting new life into old literary clichés,”
as Tsivian put it. “Whatever its immediate cause, more often than not the first
shock of seeing images in motion assumed the form of recognizable cultural pat-
terns.” He labeled these patterns the “tropes of film reception” and concluded
that these “patterns (or tropes) formed a buffer zone between film and culture.”30
This was the way in which the “Symbolist mentality shaped the reception of
cinema in Russia, at least among the urban classes,” as Gunning wrote.31 In
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many ways the Symbolists were in charge of the public debate in this first phase
of its cultural reception. They were the dominant group in the landscape of litera-
ture, and as such they were destined to “frame” the discourse on the new in this
first phase. As the dominant group in literature to speak up, they were also des-
tined to become the nemesis of the avant-garde. They were OPOYAZ’s “hostile
neighbours,” as Shklovsky would later write in his memoir on the Futurist poet
Mayakovsky, Mayakovsky and His Circle.32
The Futurists
The Russian Futurists, among them the poets Khlebnikov and Mayakovsky, were
an essential part of the very early avant-garde movements in Europe, and as such
they had a strong impact on the later avant-garde movements in their own coun-
try and in the rest of the continent. In many ways they were comparable to Filippo
Marinetti’s Futurists in Italy, who manifested themselves from 1909 onwards.33
Their response to the cinema in its early days was quite different from the Sym-
bolists’ response, and their role in the public debate was also radically different:
more disruptive, more captivating, more memorable.
Whereas the “cultural reception” of the Symbolists stayed within the realm of
literary tradition – and sometimes well within its margins, as the word “clichés”
used by Tsivian already indicates – the Futurists broke with tradition in a rather
brisk and bewildering way.34 They entered the scene with great turmoil in 1913,
the very year Russia’s “general craze about the cinema” peaked.35 They indeed
caught public attention after having presented one of their stunningly aggressive
manifestos, A Slap in the Face of Public Taste, in an almanac with the same title
published in December 1912.36 The Futurists chose to bully “public taste,” and
shocking an audience in a direct address was one of their specialties. Provoking
and creating disturbance was an essential part of their poetics and performances.
They wanted to trigger a strong audience response and often succeeded, as news-
paper articles of the time can attest to. According to an influential conservative
newspaper, for instance, the Futurists stood out as “a bunch of half-wits,” in that
“crazy” year when the cinema was also most impressive.37
So by 1913, the Futurists were closely identified with the cinema, and the recep-
tion of two separate, new phenomena overlapped and formed a single image in
the eye of the public, as Tsivian argues. Both cinema and Futurist poetry were
associated with something feverish and vague, with something “incoherent, spas-
modic, senseless,” with the “[u]ngrammatical, asyntactic,” and last but not least,
with that icon of modernity, “the increasingly feverish pulse of the big city.” Tsi-
vian concludes, “these are only some of the features that Futurists and cinema
were found to have in common.”38
Contrary to the Symbolists, who “thematized” the unfamiliar aspects of the view-
ing experience by attributing meaning to them, the Futurists responded to the new
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optical technique itself and to the radically new and disturbing perceptual experi-
ence it created, and mostly with great appreciation for the shock effects. Technol-
ogy and optical, visual and audio techniques and their impact on perception be-
came themselves the real focus of their attention. These were the elements they
took from the new practice of early cinema in order to build a new poetical prac-
tice, one they themselves helped to create. Techniques and the perceptual experience
played a central role. Contrary to the Symbolists, the Futurists’ attention was
caught by the very techniques which had such a strong and sudden impact on the
imagination. They noted that accidental techniques which automatically came with
the new “cinema machine” were able to work strongly on audiences. That is,
dumb techniques with no ingenious intentions behind them whatsoever proved to
be no less evocative, or poetic, or effective than the symbols the Symbolists carefully
constructed in their poetry with the utmost care. This made the Futurists re-think
and reframe technology and techniques, which they now approached from a per-
ceptual perspective. Moreover, the disturbing and evocative potential of technique
(verse), and of techniques in art in general, became a new and very basic interest
for the Futurist poets and for avant-garde artists, eager to renew their use of tech-
niques and to reconsider and change their potential powers over the perceptions
and the imagination of their audiences. According to Andreas Huyssen:
[N]o other single factor has influenced the emergence of the new avant-garde
art as much as technology, which not only fueled the artists’ imagination …,
but penetrated to the core of the work itself. 39
It is obvious that the same goes for the Futurists and the “old” or historical avant-
garde movements of the beginning of the 20th century. As such, the Futurists
could be seen as part of “the avant-garde of technical visioning in history,” to use
Siegfried Zielinski’s phrase,40 since their imagination was indeed fuelled by uto-
pian visions of technology.
In response to the strong perceptual impact the Futurists had experienced in the
cinema (such as strange distortions of vision and other forms of deformation of
the visual, well into the grotesque),41 Futurist poets tried to trigger similar effects
in their poetry by inventing a whole series of poetic techniques one would, in
retrospect, indeed consider to be typically avant-garde. One may think of their
use of the ungrammatical and asyntactic (which were privileged techniques in the
poetics of the Italian Futurists, too) and also of their preoccupation with the visual
aspects, graphics and typography of language, as part of their program of empha-
sizing the autonomous powers of the “self-oriented word” either spoken or printed,
as Vladimir Markov signaled.42 The Futurists experimented with a maximum vari-
ety of letter types and size of letters, and with the equivalent in speech, such as
variety in pitch and loudness. Mayakovsky reciting his poems was a phenomenon
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described by many as a true “event.”43 In short, one can say that they experimen-
ted with new forms of addressing the viewer, listener, or reader to awaken the
“static,” “stupid voyeur” of the traditional art forms (Marinetti).44 An amount of
emotional and psychological disorientation and shock effect – not unfamiliar to
the early cinema spectator – and even an amount of face-to-face aggression might
well have been part of this. Futurist poets sought the confrontation and were after
creating instant and sudden effects, much the same as early cinema, to purpose-
fully shock and thrill their audiences once the first accidental effects of the tech-
nical novelties started to wear off, as Tom Gunning argued.45
Sergei Eisenstein, six years younger than Shklovsky and Mayakovsky.
One may argue that the Futurist poets provided examples for Sergei Eisenstein’s
own art and functioned as a model for his “attractions” because Eisenstein also
meant to “aggressively” attract the spectator’s attention with any element that
might subject the spectator to “emotional or psychological influence” and “pro-
duce specific emotional shocks in the spectator.”46
“I believe that, without Mayakovsky’s LEF, there would not have been such a phe-
nomenon as Eisenstein,” Shklovsky wrote in Mayakovsky and His Circle. “LEF’s
poetry pointed the way for art.”47 Shklovsky wrote this in direct relation to the
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“attractions” in Eisenstein’s The Wise Man, Strike, and The Battleship
Potemkin, which he seemed to consider as an “attraction” in its entirety:
After The Wise Man, he directed Strike, which still had many disconnected at-
tractions; then The Battleship Potemkin – a film that holds together, expressed in
one breath. Here art deals directly with reality instead of propping reality up on
attractions which bear approximate resemblance or parody resemblance to
reality.48
In fact, Shklovsky saw Mayakovsky as a tremendous example for many, not only
for Eisenstein, though it may have been of some importance that Eisenstein was
six years younger than Mayakovsky and Shklovsky, who both started off in differ-
ent ways in 1913, when they were both twenty. The Eisenstein of the montage
film, starting in the 1920s, was really part of a different era altogether. The cine-
ma in the Soviet Union was now institutionalized with the help of the state, and it
had an obvious political and ideological intention, and Eisenstein, too, as he was
supposed to have: “These shocks [intended by the montage of attractions] provide
the only opportunity of perceiving the ideological aspect of what is being shown,
the final ideological conclusion,” he wrote at the end of the paragraph on “attrac-
tions.”49 By then, Eisenstein was part of an art circle that was, and was supposed
to be, effectively political and produced art suited for consumption by the masses,
whereas most, if not all, Futurists had no such intention at all in the 1910s. On the
contrary, they were after creating absolutely nonsensical and incoherent shocks,
the way Marinetti was. They experimented with perceptual impact – full stop.
What they expected from “attractions” and appreciated in them was a dumb and
sudden impact on the imagination, they sought and valued, in Mayakovsky’s words,
“die dumme Plötze der Vorstellungskraft.”50
Mayakovsky and other Futurist poets may be said to have tried to “theorize” the
experience and effects of the sudden, the surprising and the stupefying, and they
did so in their poems as well as in their infamous avant-garde manifestos.51 But
were they good at theorizing? There can be no doubt, however, as to whether
Futurist manifestos had an impact or whether their performances were successful
– if only as scandalous successes. They were unpopular, and they were seen as
“rascals” by many, yet they were seen and heard. Hence, one may well argue that
they, like the Symbolists, had an impact on the public debate of their time and, at
some point, even with some dominance. Of course, 1913 stands out as their year.
The Symbolists were dominant slightly earlier. The Futurists’ impact and perfor-
mance were radically different from the impact and performance of the ones they
chose to see as their “hostile neighbours.” However, one may argue in retrospect
that they, the “rascals,” the Futurists, far more than the Symbolists, helped to
provide a discourse to frame the new “cinema experience” as a truly new and
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modern experience: one of disorientation and disruption. One may even argue
that perhaps, in the long run, they thus provided a new model to frame the utterly
disorienting, disturbing, and even deeply traumatic experience of the Russian
revolution and the grave crises following the revolution (hunger, starvation, loss,
exile). One may argue that there is in fact a recursive principle at work here,
where the new “cinema experience” (a shared experience) offered a new, modern
model to frame the new, modern experience of poetry/art (as a disorienting and
shared experience), which offered a model for the much larger and even traumatic
experience of the revolution. But to follow this argument through would be an
excursion far beyond the scope of this article.
Viktor Shklovsky, c. 1913. Drawing by the famous Russian painter Repin.
“Art as Technique” as an Avant-Garde Manifesto
In 1913, a young Viktor Shklovsky also responded to the “alienating” experiences
triggered by both early cinema and the Futurists. His response, however, was
much more appreciative and sharply articulated than the blunt one that an influ-
ential conservative newspaper provided (“craze,” “half-wits”) in 1913.52 In the
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year the Futurists “bullied” public taste, this “brilliant” young scholar made his
“debut” in The Stay Dog as a “pink-cheeked youngster in frock coat and high
collar” and presented his revolutionary theoretical insights to his Futurist
friends.53
During the years immediately preceding World War I, the prominent artists of
Petersburg frequented an avant-garde cabaret known as The Stray Dog. It was
there, in December 1913, while known as a freshman at the University of Pe-
tersburg, that Shklovsky read a paper entitled ‘The place of Futurism in the
History of Language’. In his talk he maintained that futurist poetry emanci-
pated words from their traditional significance and restored them to perceptibility
by calling attention to their sounds.54
Vladimir Mayakovsky, “Pro Eto” [About that]. I am at the top. Illustration – photomontage
made by Alexander Rodchenko, 1923.
ostranenie, “the montage of attractions” 45
In retrospect, Shklovsky may be said to have provided the theoretical framework
for explaining the impact of such new techniques from the revolutionary new
perspective of perception. It may be argued that Shklovsky came up with the the-
oretical framework the Futurists themselves were not able to provide. It has been
argued by Markov that the Futurists quarreled too much and theorized too little55
– and that they were not half as accomplished as the Symbolists at that point in
time. As Richard Sheldon wrote: “Only Khlebnikov had some training in linguis-
tics.”56 The Futurists were glad to now have a connection with the Department of
Philology at the University of Petersburg, via Shklovsky, which, in effect, made
him an even more interesting “ally.” One may argue that Futurist poetry was
powerful and effective, but that their poetical reflections were not half as compe-
tent as the best-known works by the Symbolists, whose approach dominated the
thinking on poetry and art of the day. It may also be argued that, in the 1910s, the
Futurists were not yet ready to theorize their own radical poetic experiments –
which of course does not imply that their experiments were not interesting, effec-
tive, or successful. From Shklovsky’s own notes on the period (in his memoirs on
Mayakovsky, in Sentimental Journey, and so on), it is obvious that it was his great
friend Vladimir Mayakovsky, whose presence, poetry, and poetics had a tremen-
dous, and even crucial, impact on him as on many others (Eisenstein would be
included in this circle ten years later).57
Shklovsky’s intervention in December 1913 took place exactly a year after the
publication in December 1912 of the almanac A Slap in the Face of Public Taste, of
which Markov wrote:
The aggressive tone of the manifesto and its attacks on everyone from Puškin
to its contemporaries distracted attention from a more important fact. The
idea of the ‘self-oriented word’ (samovitoe slovo) was proclaimed here for the
first time, though at that time its implications and long-range significance
were probably not realized, even by those who coined the slogan. For them it
primarily meant creation of neologisms, but it also implied that “the word as
such” was becoming the main protagonist of poetry, that it was ceasing to be
merely the means to express ideas and emotions and that, ultimately, poetry
could grow directly from language.58
Language (words, sounds) could shock just like the movies, one did not need mean-
ings in poetry to effectively have an impact: this was the discovery the Futurists
presented and labeled here for the first time. In his 1926 retrospective, Eichen-
baum commented on this crucial point in time – crucial to understanding the
development of Shklovsky’s thinking
Even before the formation of the Opoyaz in 1914, at the time of the public per-
formances of the Futurists, Shklovsky had published a monograph, The Resur-
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rection of the Word,59 in which he took exception partly to the [Symbolists’] con-
cepts set forth by Potebnya and partly to those of Veselovsky […] to advance
the principle of perceptible form as the specific sign of artistic awareness
[…]60
Group of Mayakovsky’s friends, from left to right: V. Mayakovsky, O. Brik, B. Pasternak, S.
Tretyakov, and V. Shklovsky; (sitting) E. Triolet, L. Brik, and R. Kushner.
It was in his The Resurrection of the Word that Shklovsky more fully explored and
explained his thoughts on “the perceptibility of form,” though it must be added
that Shklovsky’s rhetoric was not very didactic most of the time: he preferred to
write manifestos on the topic, quite in line with the needs of the time. In The Resur-
rection of the Word he wrote:
We do not experience the commonplace, we do not see it; rather, we recognize
it. We do not see the walls of our room; and it is very difficult for us to see
errors in proofreading, especially if the material is written in a language we
know well, because we cannot force ourselves to see, to read, and not to “re-
cognize” the familiar word. If we have to define specifically “poetic” percep-
tion and artistic perception in general, then we suggest this definition: “Artis-
tic” perception is that perception in which we experience form – perhaps not
form alone, but certainly form.61
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Realizing that most contemporary readers might easily misunderstand Shklov-
sky’s thoughts, Eichenbaum added an explanatory note to the word perception in
his 1926 overview – when they were already misread as “Formalists,” a term they
themselves refused to use without quotation marks.62 Eichenbaum’s explanatory
note shows that they were aware that the new approach to art, from the perspective of
perception, was revolutionary and in fact simply implied the abduction of the tradi-
tional notion of “form.”
Perception here is clearly not to be understood as a simple psychological con-
cept (the perception peculiar to this or that person) but, since art does not exist
outside of perception, as an element in art itself. The notion of “form” here
acquires new meaning; it is no longer an envelope, but a complete thing,
something concrete, dynamic, self-contained, and without a correlative of any
kind.63
Shklovsky had a tendency to rephrase certain problems over and over again,
sometimes in slightly varying formulations. It seems to me that he did so not so
much to repeatedly stress the same point, but rather because it was part of his
unfolding thinking process, which (like Nietzsche) he presented in his work as
such: as something open, never finished, and in connection to life itself. He kept
returning to one or two fundamental problems in particular: the problems of
“form” and “ostranenie.”
In his memoir on Mayakovsky, there are some interesting retrospective notes on
the question of what made him (or them) start to think of the problem of art in
terms of perception/ostranenie as well as on the question of what theories were of
help to them at that point in time. Halfway through Mayakovsky and His Circle,
Shklovsky recalls the first meeting of OPOYAZ:
The first conference of OPOYAZ took place in the kitchen of the abandoned
apartment on Zhukovskaya Street. We used books to make a fire, but it was
cold, and Pyast kept his feet in the oven.64
He adds that “Mayakovsky was already living in Moscow” and “came to Lenin-
grad only occasionally” and that his good friend, the linguist Osip Brik, “used to
come, too.” They discussed collections of writings “by Potebnya’s last pupils,”
Problems of the Theory and Psychology of Art:
In these collections, direct references were made to Avenarius. Avenarius and
Mach dominated the minds of those days. This is what Avenarius wrote on the
principle of economy:
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‘If the soul had inexhaustible power, then, of course, the quantity spent from
this inexhaustible source would hardly matter – except perhaps in terms of the
time necessarily spent. But since its power is limited, one must assume that
the soul will strive to carry out its apperceptive processes in the most expedient
manner, that is, with a relatively minimal effort or, in other words, with a
relatively maximal result.'65
This was of interest to them at that point in time, since they were already quite
aware that they, the Futurist poets, were after something very different in art than
their “hostile neighbors […] the Symbolists and the Machists.”66 As Shklovsky
wrote:
In opposition to the Symbolists, the poets Khlebnikov, Mayakovsky and Vasily
Kamensky put forward a different kind of poetics.
They [the futurists] required of a thing not so much multiple meaning as per-
ceptibility. […]
Part of the work of OPOYAZ was connected with this new poetics. The theory of
“defamiliarization” [ostranenie] was put forward in its name.
This theory originated from an analysis of Tolstoy’s realistic art. In Mayakovs-
ky’s own poetics, there was something that suggested to us the search in that direction.67
Several notes must be added here. First of all, it is unusual that two remarkably
different authors, Lev Tolstoy and Vladimir Mayakovsky, were both topics under
discussion because most people perceived them as hardly comparable. Tolstoy
was Russia’s single most-esteemed and best-read novelist of the 19th century,
while the Futurist poet Mayakovsky was part of the “half-wit” break with tradi-
tion. The search in the direction of perception and ostranenie was suggested by
“something” in Mayakovsky’s poetics, as Shklovsky states. That “something,” I
would like to argue, is what at the time was so hard to put into words, precisely
because it still needed phrasing and framing: it still needed a new theory in order
to get to grips with these completely new and different phenomena in the work of
Mayakovsky. That “something” in Mayakovsky’s work was part of the Futurist
response to the cinema in those days. One needed a theory to frame something
as daringly different as this. It seemed that the “something” could be framed
from the perspective of ostranenie: in art, as in the cinema of the day, things were
“made strange.” This became OPOYAZ’ central statement. Mayakovsky’s work in-
deed pointed in this direction. His work as well as the available theories of per-
ception helped them understand the general role of technique in the perception
of art. It is important to note, however, that, in Shklovsky’s words, only “[p]art of
the work of OPOYAZ” was connected with Mayakovsky and the new poetics of the
Futurists. What they did in their research in this very early phase was use literary
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work to test their new theory of art; Eichenbaum made this perfectly clear in his
1926 retrospective too:
At this time, the Formalists quite naturally used literary works only as material
for supporting and testing their theoretical hypotheses; we had put aside ques-
tions of convention, literary evolution, etc.68
In the earliest meetings of the OPOYAZ group, it must have been Tolstoy, a life-
long favorite of Shklovsky, who could well withstand the first testing of their
hypotheses. In other words, the first research on Tolstoy within the context of re-
thinking art from the perspective of perception and ostranenie turned out to be a
successful attempt to generalize about the perceptual impact of techniques “mak-
ing [things] strange” in art. As such, the work on Tolstoy may well be said to have
provided the theory of “defamiliarization” or, in Shklovsky’s words: “This theory
originated from an analysis of Tolstoy’s realistic art.” Nevertheless, it seems to
me that the “something” that drove them to explore art from the perspective of
perception and ostranenie was found in Mayakovsky’s work. The “something” was
disruptive and “strange”: it was a response to the unsettling, new optical technol-
ogy and techniques the avant-garde proved to be highly sensitive to.
OPOYAZ and the Early Avant-garde’s Rethinking of Technique
OPOYAZ and Shklovsky should not be regarded as part of the later avant-garde of
the 1920s, but rather as part of the early avant-garde with its focus on the reas-
sessment of technique and technology triggered by the very experience of the un-
canny and the strange in the first decade of the century. In this early project of
reframing technique and its role in art, the Futurists played a crucial role. Central
to the early avant-garde’s reconsiderations and experiments was a fascination with
the perceptual potential of optical techniques to “estrange,” distort, disrupt, dis-
orient, and in general, work strongly on the imagination and transform experience:
“Avant-Garde discourse on technology responds to transformations of experience
technology offers,” as Tom Gunning puts it.69
In retrospect, it is rather obvious that Shklovsky and the group assembling
under the name OPOYAZ (soon Brik and Eichenbaum were among its members,
Jakobson would follow almost a decade later, in 1921, and soon after leave for
Prague)70 were part of the early avant-garde which responded to the “attractions”
of the new cinema machine. On the one hand, they thought as avant-gardists, re-
sponding primarily to the strong perceptual impact of the new technology, re-
flecting on it from every possible angle. On the other hand, they responded by
theorizing, something they did exceedingly well. Perhaps, it may be argued, they
did so well because Viktor Shklovsky, avant-garde’s best theorist, was among
them. He explained why and how technology and techniques transform experience.
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Mayakovsky (seated) with Lily Brik, Boris Pasternak (left) and Sergei Eisenstein when they
were all members of the Lef group.
Whereas Mayakovsky and his Futurist friends created a revolutionary practice,
Shklovsky and his OPOYAZ friends provided the conceptual space for framing
and explaining the impact of the new disruptive techniques in the form of a theo-
ry the Futurists themselves were unable to formulate. Shklovsky, OPOYAZ’s “gad-
fly,”71 filled the niche: he successfully theorized on the “sense perceptions” (Tsi-
vian)72 triggered by new techniques in a revolutionary and polemic way from his
lecture in The Stray Dog onwards. Mayakovsky is said to have accepted the new
theoretical input gracefully, while also being puzzled and surprised by it.73 The
Futurists were indeed aware that the “theory” put forward in their baffling mani-
festos was “largely inferior, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to that of their
predecessors, the Russian Symbolists.”74 It is important to note that the new and
revolutionary Futurist practice preceded the theoretical phase instigated by
OPOYAZ by several years.75 The Futurist practice came into being well before 1910,
and well before they presented such manifestos as “A Trap for Judges” (1910) or
their better-known manifesto “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste” (1912).76 The
Futurists’ project emerged early enough in Russia to consider them early avant-
garde, just like Marinetti’s Futurists in Italy who manifested themselves from
1909 onwards.77 What fuelled the early avant-garde’s (the Futurists’ and
OPOYAZ’s) imagination was the acute, disruptive experience of the world trans-
formed by technology, or to use Shklovsky’s words: a world “made strange,” thus
made visible.
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Making the world visible once again by making the world strange (alien, de-familiar),
using techniques in art which disturb and delay our perceptual process: this was the central
statement Shklovsky presented in 1913 and 1914. His friends in OPOYAZ and LEF
would repeat this in the 1920s (e.g., in Poetika Kino). Then, at last, the new phe-
nomenon had obviously lost enough of its “newness” to explicitly attract their
attention. Now they were made to write their essays on the cinema’s techniques
of “deformation,” its “photogenicity,” and so on. One may argue that the 1913
idea of “making visible” by “making strange” (ostranenie) actually described what
most contemporaries at that point in time already experienced. Shklovsky helped
shape and frame the experience. Obviously, they needed time to let it sink in.
Almost a decade later, the idea had grown into “a leitmotif of film criticism in
the 1920s,” as Francesco Casetti wrote:
Stupor, appreciation, expectation. Since its invention, film has provoked de-
bate about its significance and much speculation about what it might contrib-
ute to the new century. The conviction soon emerged that film could make us look
at the world anew. It taught us not only to take a second look at the world, but to
look in a different way. Film set our sense of vision free, restoring it to us with
an invigorating potential. […] Bela Balázs summed it up in a formulation that
would become popular: ‘From the invention of printing, the word became the
principal channel of communication between men…in the culture of words,
the spirit – once so conspicuous – became almost invisible… Now film is im-
pressing on culture a change as radical as that of the invention of the press.
Millions of people each night experience with their own eyes, sitting before the
screen, the destinies of men, their personalities and feelings, states of mind of
every sort, without needing words… Man will go back to being visible.’ Balázs
said it clearly: film restores human visibility, and gives reality back to the
gaze.78
Regardless of the genealogy of the idea, and whether or not it can be traced back
from film criticism in the 1920s to Shklovsky’s reflections on ostranenie in the
1910s, it may be argued that he was the avant-garde theorist of the decade. His
thinking seems to have affected many of his contemporaries, from the Formalists
and the Futurists to Eisenstein and Rodchenko. Moreover, by theorizing on the
relation between technique and art in a radically new way, he envisioned novel
ways of studying art.
Rethinking Art from the Perspective of Technique
If anything, “Art as Technique” is a manifesto, in the tradition of the Futurists:
scanty, brazen, and provocative by its very generic nature.79 With brashness,80
Shklovsky presented his new ideas to the outside world on behalf of a group,
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Alexander Rodchenko, “Steps” – photo, 1929.
OPOYAZ, that was close enough to the Futurists to also be considered as “half-
wits,” but they did not seem to care. With great polemic ardor, Shklovsky as
OPOYAZ’s leading figure presented his (or their) thoughts in the form of a radical
attack on the traditional premises held by the Symbolists and on their idealist
poetics. Characteristically, the manifesto is evocative as well as provocative,
although not very didactic or impressively coherent. The argument presented is
found wanting and hard to follow, though some parts are solid and of lasting
value, in particular the part on “making strange” and its perceptual impact. The
examples Shklovsky came up with have been studied over the decades with some
puzzlement and, at times, even downright irritation.81 No doubt, some of his
arguments are “harsh,” a fact for which Shklovsky himself apologizes, if only in
one particular case.82 They were taken almost exclusively from the fields of litera-
ture (including the folktale) and linguistics, the two fields the members of
OPOYAZ were most familiar with. The choice of examples comes across as rather
grotesque and incomprehensible in several ways. They were said to be chosen
almost randomly, to test their theory, as Eichenbaum wrote.83 In “Art as Techni-
que” they are inserted to merely illustrate his point, as Shklovsky states: “Here I
want to illustrate a way used by Leo Tolstoy repeatedly […].”84 However, these
examples also seem to be chosen to incite and shock the readers, perhaps also to
amuse and entertain them, bombarding them with a bunch of remarkably incom-
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patible examples, taken from Tolstoy and Puškin as well as Gogol; from a collec-
tion of erotic riddles as well as the Decameron and War and Peace. One example is
taken from folk literature and features that memorable passage in which a peas-
ant tortures a bear, a magpie, and a horsefly, while pretending to do something
else to them, next thing we know he is torturing his wife, trying to “shove a stick
up [her] rump,” or so the horsefly assumes, but readers are of course supposed to
know better (the abbreviated versions of “Art as Technique,” available in text
books and on the internet, were keen to leave these examples out). Other exam-
ples are chosen from great literature, and many from Tolstoy:
In War and Peace Tolstoy uses the same technique in describing whole battles as
if battles were something new. […] Anyone who knows Tolstoy can find sev-
eral hundred such passages in his work. His method of seeing things out of
their normal context is also apparent in his last works. Tolstoy described the
dogmas and rituals he attacked as if they were unfamiliar, substituting every-
day meanings for the customarily religious meanings of the words common in
church ritual. Many persons were painfully wounded; they considered it blas-
phemy to present as strange and monstrous what they accepted as sacred. Their
reaction was due chiefly to the technique through which Tolstoy perceived
and reported his environment.85
All examples prove to have an essential point in common: they are all ambiguous,
and they show that, as Shklovsky states:
[ostranenie] is found almost everywhere form is found. In other words, the
difference between Potebnya’s [and the Symbolists’] point of view and ours is
this: An image [form] is not a permanent referent for those mutable complex-
ities of life which are revealed through it; its purpose is not to make us per-
ceive meaning, but to create a special perception of the object – it creates a
‘vision’ of the object instead of serving as a means for knowing it.86
For many reasons, “Art as Technique” could be considered hard to interpret: its
examples are baffling; it is an exploration of something new; it turns traditional
thinking upside down.87 In fact, “Art as Technique” is easier to understand and
appreciate once one perceives Shklovsky’s manifesto as part of a series of avant-
garde manifestos, written in the context of that early medium-specific period in
history, a typical phase of destabilization of form/referent relations similar to our
current one. The new medium clearly presented a challenge to the traditional no-
tions of “form” and “form/content.”88
All the examples in Shklovsky’s quirky text have precisely this in common: they
are all ambivalent and indeterminate in many ways, and thus they may easily trig-
ger a sudden and radical shift in interpretation (e.g., from sacred to monstrous).
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All of Shklovsky’s examples expose the potential “ontological instability of all
mimetic representation”89 in the same way new technologies might: they allow
for an uncanny “re-animation” of the sense of instability that underlies mimetic
tradition. Within this context, it may be argued that the era which made Gorky
stress “the uncanny effect of the new attraction’s mix of realistic and non-realistic
qualities”90 signaled a crisis in the mimetic functioning of the cinematograph as a
new medium. Understandably, the new optical technology (the “cinema machine,”
to use Laura Mulvey’s phrase)91 had not yet established a firm and stable relation
to mimetic tradition, and the new “machine” did not yet function as a proper
medium, that is, as a technological means that can properly transmit meanings, as
I have argued elsewhere.92 Yet proper forms with proper and stable relations to
referents: that the machine in its infancy could not provide. On the contrary, the
technological novelty mostly provided monstrous forms, at least in the first phase
of its monstration (and roughly in the first decade of the last century).93 Hence,
the new optical techniques easily caused ruptures in the viewer’s relation to the
seen and to mimetic tradition, because the new “machine” was not yet function-
ing properly as a medium, and as such it more or less accidentally destabilized mi-
metic tradition, making all that was seen appear “alien” or “strange” (note that
almost all examples given by Shklovsky indeed somehow deal with seeing and the
seen). In effect, the cinema machine may be said to have caused an epistemologi-
cal crisis, a crisis for which the cultural explosion of discourses on the shared dis-
ruptive experience may well be said to have been symptomatic. Within this era
and context, “Art as Technique,” stressing the “strange” quality of the seen and
its impact on perception, in fact hardly stands out as original. Making strange is
basically what the new medium in its first “primitive”94 phase did in the experi-
ence of most of its spectators. In many ways it provided not only a strong and
striking, but also a shared revolutionary experience, in the very sense of the word
Tsivian reconstructs in this book, following Shklovsky, Rodchenko, Eisenstein,
and their avant-garde contemporaries: it turned things upside down. But the new
medium itself being revolutionary, given its impact on culture in the century that
followed, does not make the labeling of the experience as “alienating” revolution-
ary in itself. “Art as Technique,” I would like to argue, is revolutionary for different
reasons. Truly revolutionary, it seems to me, were the implications Shklovsky en-
visioned for art studies. They are rather brilliantly thought through and still sur-
prisingly relevant for art studies today. Starting with what seems an epiphany on
how techniques in general “worked” on audiences perceptually – by “making (the
seen) strange” – Shklovsky launched both an attack against the assumptions held
by traditional scholars on “form” and argued for the removal or “abduction” of
the unfortunate dichotomy of form and content from the field of art, replacing
the muddled notion of “form” by the notion of “technique” (priom).95 Further-
more, he presented a plea for the “autonomous” study of techniques in art, a radi-
cally new approach in art studies, in which technique (technology) and art are in
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fact made synonymous. This may be considered truly revolutionary and indeed
surprisingly relevant for Film and Media Studies today, as it creates the concep-
tual space for studying the responses to, and the (cultural) impact of, new techni-
ques from the perspective of perception. Interestingly, artistic techniques and the
technology that simply comes with the new medium are approached within one
and the same conceptual framework. Their impact may be analyzed, regardless of
the fact whether triggered intentionally by an artist or accidentally by a new tech-
nology that has not yet established a stable position in mimetic tradition as a medium.
Note, moreover, that new techniques and art may be opposed to old techniques and
media because the last two have, and the first two have not, established firm and
stable relations to mimetic tradition. Conceptually speaking, “Art as Technique”
thus opens new ways to reconsider the impact of the “new” in culture. If ever
there was a field that might profit from the abduction of the traditional
(“clumsy”) concept of “form” and its replacement by “technique” apart from the
field of art studies, obviously, it must be the field of film and media studies, be-
cause “Art as Technique” opens up new ways to frame the impact of the new in
culture.96 The notion of “technique” creates a conceptual space to analyze the
effects of both hardware and software, of technology and (artistic) techniques.
This is exactly what makes the term productive and suitable for studies in the field
of the arts and media, in which technology profoundly interferes with the creation
and development of the arts. Shklovsky provided the conceptual tools to describe
and analyze the process of appropriation of new techniques in culture, and he
brought to light that the genealogies of art and technique are intertwined because
they are inherently connected.97
Epilogue
“New phenomena accumulate without being perceived, later they are perceived in
a revolutionary way.”98 Shklovsky wrote these words in his book on Mayakovsky.
On another occasion, Shklovsky wrote that “the new arrives unnoticed.”99 As we
have seen, Virginia Woolf also spoke of how the “new art” came upon her and her
Bloomsbury friends so surprisingly that they sat silent when it happened – to only
comment on it much later. The “new,” as Gunning argued, needs a discourse to be
perceived.100 Hence, very often the “new” cannot be “seen” in its first moment of
confrontation. Only much later can we begin to fully understand the extent of its
revolutionary impact. This also seems to have been the case with Shklovsky, who
nevertheless may be said to have helped provide the discourse to frame the new
and “uncanny” (cinema) experience back in the 1910s by labeling it as essentially
“strange.” Mayakovsky and his Futurist poetry and poetics clearly had a strong
impact on Shklovsky, as his Mayakovsky and His Circle can attest to. That the cine-
ma also had a revolutionary and “modernizing” impact on him (as it had on
Woolf and her Bloomsbury contemporaries) is confirmed by his Hamburg Account,
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published in 1928. Looking back on the previous decades, Shklovsky writes that
the cinema and his work on the cinema “probably modernized me.”
Cinematography got rid of my exclusiveness, simplified and probably moder-
nized me. In my cinematography I see how form is created, how invention is
created out of contradictions and mistakes, and how the consolidation of acci-
dental change turns out to be newfound form.101
Still from Sergei eisenstein’s The Battleship Potempkin.
Shklovsky wrote this almost a decade and a half after his lecture in The Stray Dog.
The cinema modernized his vision on technique. In the 1920s, he wrote that to
him, coming from the field of literature to now make films, all was “new” and
unfamiliar at first. Thus, he could experience, at first hand, how “form” is some-
thing that is “created” from something (and not just out of thin air, as tradition
would have it). He simply saw how artistic inventions were accidentally created
from “contradictions and mistakes” in their dealings with the new techniques,
and how these accidental changes nevertheless could find their way into history
as “newfound form” in a simple process of “consolidation.” This experience
“simplified” him, as he wrote. One may well understand here that he discarded
the traditional (and highly romantic) idea of the “exclusiveness” of the artist as a
creator and a genius who, like God, creates out of nothing, an idea which was
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deeply embedded in the tradition and in the arts.102 The process of modernization
of the arts and art studies may perhaps, in part, be seen as a process in which
artistic creation was now understood in new and modern terms, due to the con-
frontation with the new optical technology and techniques of the cinema.







Ostranenie, Innovation, and Media
History1
Frank Kessler
There are, undoubtedly, many ways in which Viktor Shklovsky’s concept of ostra-
nenie can be used in a variety of fields. Even though the concept was conceived
with regard to literature, right from the very beginning its scope was that of a
general aesthetic principle, and thus, ostranenie has also been adopted by the neo-
formalist approach elaborated by Kristin Thompson (1981 and 1988). In this es-
say, I would like to concentrate on the way in which the concept (or principle) can
be made or has been made productive for work in the domain of film history and,
by extension, for media history in a larger sense, independently of whether or not
the scholars referred to here do indeed acknowledge any debt to Shklovsky’s
ideas.
Ostranenie – An Inherently Historical Concept
As I have tried to show elsewhere,2 Viktor Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie, which
he introduced in his 1917 essay “Art as Technique,”3 works on various levels. It is
used to explain mechanisms of perception and attention as well as the function-
ing of art with regard to everyday experience, the way in which specific devices
operate within a given work of art, and finally, it even opens up towards a theori-
zation of stylistic change. In his famous statement: “And art exists that one may
recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone
stony,” Shklovsky condenses, as it were, his aesthetic credo and, by the same token,
somehow camouflages its complexity.4 Building his argument, Shklovsky first de-
fines the purpose of art, which is “to impart the sensation of things as they are
perceived and not as they are known,”5 and then he explains how this goal can be
achieved: “The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms
difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process
of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged.”6
These basic statements need to be explored further in order to fully understand
their implications. When Shklovsky describes the purpose of art in terms of an
opposition between “things as they are perceived” and “things as they are
known.” he actually introduces a temporality, or diachronicity, which it is impor-
tant to recognize as being the very foundation of the concept of ostranenie, or defa-
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miliarization. While “things as they are perceived” refers in the first instance to
an experience that takes place hic et nunc, the “being known” of things depends
upon a process that precedes that act of perception, and in the course of which
the “knowledge” about the object in question has been accumulated. This is the
process that Shklovsky calls “habitualization” or “automatization.” Or, in other
words, defamiliarization necessarily presupposes familiarization. This means
that in the course of time, the things that surround us have grown so familiar to
us that our perception of them is automatized as it were, and thus, in a certain
sense, they have become “invisible.” When art’s technique has as a result “to
make objects ‘unfamiliar’,” this implies that the artist must have gained some
kind of understanding of the automatized way in which the object is usually per-
ceived, so that the chosen devices can actually work against this. One step further
yet, it becomes possible also for the critic to recognize in what way, at what level,
in what respect, and in what sense such a familiarization or a habitualization has
occurred and how it has been defamiliarized.
Shklovsky’s statements with regard to the purpose of art and the techniques it
employs in order to achieve its goals thus implies a complex diachronic process in
the course of which perception has become habitual or automatized. Conse-
quently, an artist has reached a level of understanding of this process that makes
it possible to work against its grain and to achieve a defamiliarization that undoes
the habitualization. It is important to underscore the fact that this theoretical con-
struction firmly roots artistic creation in History, which makes it by definition
impossible to have a purely immanent conception of a work of art and, more
specifically, its form. This latter concept is introduced as a specification of the
technique of art, which consists in making “forms difficult, and to increase the
difficulty and length of perception.” In fact, by orchestrating this shift that makes
the perceptual dimension of the process dependent on the formal qualities of the
work of art, Shklovsky’s theory moves from a psychological realm – the fact that
we do not really “see” what we have become used to and thus have taken for
granted – to an aesthetic one. To be even more precise, one needs to take the
discussion of this process one step further: Shklovsky’s starting point is the auto-
matized perception of objects in our everyday surroundings that art has the task
to undo by means of strategies that “make forms difficult” and thus intensify,
deautomatize, our perception of them. The dynamics of this process, however,
do not come to an end here. Within the aesthetic realm, the formal means by
which defamiliarization was achieved can themselves fall victim to habitualiza-
tion, because otherwise there would be no need for change in the domain of the
arts, and thus there would be no art history. So artistic techniques – devices – can
also become automatized and will then no longer be able to fulfill their aesthetic
function. This, however, would unavoidably lead to a standstill, which in its last
consequence would mean the end of Art – and so techniques that have become
automatized need to be defamiliarized, or else others have to take their place.
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Form, thus, ultimately is an inherently historical category, and Shklovsky’s ex-
planation of the way in which ostranenie functions already implies, albeit in a more
or less embryonic way, a conception of formal change. Not only is there a neces-
sarily diachronic development taking place that leads to a habitualization of cer-
tain formal strategies, but there is also a specific historical context with regard to
which formal defamiliarization has to be achieved. There is no form outside His-
tory.
Ostranenie and Historical Poetics
This historical dimension, which as we have seen is fundamental to Russian
Formalist theory, made this tradition particularly interesting to the project of a
Historical Poetics sketched out by David Bordwell in the early 1980s. In a pro-
grammatic article, published in 1983 in the first issue of the journal Iris that aimed
to map the “current state of theory,” Bordwell highlights the following aspect:
It is evident that from the start Russian Formalist theory is grounded in his-
tory: the conception of background and foreground, the emphasis on the lit-
erary environment, the openness to the vagaries of the work all refute the
common notion that these critics were ahistorical.7
Along with Kristin Thompson’s neoformalist approach, presented in her analysis
of Sergei Eisentein’s Ivan the Terrible, as well as in her subsequent collection
of analyses,8 David Bordwell’s project, already inaugurated in his 1979 study on
The Films of Carl Theodor Dreyer, constitutes an important and influential strand of
thinking in the field of Film Studies. The work by these two writers can also be
considered the most consequent – and the most consequential – attempts to
make Russian Formalism productive in Film Studies, precisely because of its fun-
damentally historical orientation.
Given the status the work of Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell has ac-
quired in the field of Cinema Studies over the last quarter of a century, consider-
ing also the sometimes fierce discussions and controversies their writings have
provoked, it may seem superfluous to look back into their roots. However, it is
important to emphasize the significance of the scholarly gesture here, aiming at
bridging the gap between “theory” and “history” that continues to exist, even to-
day, in spite of this and many other efforts. The way in which Historical Poetics
and Neoformalism refer to Russian Formalism is admittedly selective, privileging
in particular a number of key concepts, including ostranenie, but also syuzhet and
fabula, background and foreground, the dominant, system, or function,9 are sig-
nificant.10 These concepts are linked to a series of basic assumptions about the
nature of the work of art, constructional principles, and the activities of both the
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spectator and the artist that lead to the “one approach, many methods” governing
the analyses elaborated within this framework.
In Kristin Thompson’s methodological reflections, the concept of ostranenie
plays a rather central role. On a first and, in a certain sense, strategic level, it
allows her to eschew what she calls a “communications model of art,” proposing
instead an approach that places the artwork in a realm that is different from other
cultural phenomena because it must be perceived in a specific way.11 This is an
important methodological choice, as it blocks both an interpretation of the work
in terms of its “message” (and thus also the form/content split) and the use of
linguistic methods and metaphors in the analysis. Quoting the well-known pas-
sage from Shklovsky’s essay “Art as Device,” Thompson concludes: “Art defami-
liarizes our habitual perception of the everyday world […].”12 She also follows
Shklovsky in his reasoning that the perceptual requirements of art are the result
of making form difficult through defamiliarization.13 So, on a second level ostra-
nenie becomes a central concept for the analysis of artistic form. However, form is
an inherently historical concept, as we have seen, and thus defamiliarization is,
thirdly, important for the neoformalist approach in that it makes it necessary to
look at the individual artwork in its historical context in order to be able to ap-
preciate the way in which it defamiliarizes habitualized formal patterns and de-
vices.14 Hence the importance of understanding the norm against which the artist
works in creating forms.
While in David Bordwell’s Historical Poetics the concept of ostranenie plays a
considerably less prominent role, the importance of looking at individual works
against the broader background of historical norms is already highlighted in his
study on the films of Dreyer. In this respect he appears indeed to follow Tynya-
nov’s precept that “one cannot be certain of the structure of a work when it is
studied in isolation.”15 In order to identify what is unique in Dreyer’s work, he
argues here, it is necessary to set it against a background allowing the character-
istic difference of Dreyer to be defined and appreciated.16
This book examines Dreyer’s work as a set of deviations from some historically
defined norm within the same medium. If films frequently jostle our aesthetic
perception, the disturbance often arises from a clash between the film and
dominant practice. That is, our background set can be some other film style.
Although several choices are possible here, I shall pick a background set
which I shall call “the classical Hollywood cinema.”17
The implicit reference to Shklovsky’s concept is clearly discernible here: the terms
“deviation” and “disturbance” in fact illustrate the two-sidedness of defamiliari-
zation as a constructional strategy and an effect produced at the level of recep-
tion. Furthermore, this passage demonstrates that the choice of the classical Hol-
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lywood cinema as a background is a heuristic one, in the first instance. Bordwell
motivates this as follows:
Why this construct? Historically, it is at once proximate and pertinent, central
to a knowledge of the development of cinematic forms. If there is an “ordinary
cinematic usage” for the fifty years of Dreyer’s career, it is the narrative and
stylistic principles of the American cinema. This book attempts to show the
value of situating a filmmaker in relation to a model of typical traits of narra-
tive feature films between 1920 and 1960.18
The heuristics are thus grounded in a historical reflection on the relative domi-
nance of the stylistic and narrative devices developed within the Hollywood film
industry and the fact that this dominance was a given throughout Dreyer’s career.
Bordwell continues by explaining that the “classical Hollywood cinema” he refers
to is indeed an abstraction, and in this respect one might say that the monumen-
tal project he undertook with Kristin Thompson and Janet Staiger, resulting in
their seminal book on this subject,19 is also an attempt to give an empirical foun-
dation to this abstraction (in addition, of course, to the many other merits of this
study).20 There is a risk, however, that a background/foreground constructed in
that way might become itself “automatized.” Taking Hollywood as a norm seems
an obvious and convincing choice, but one that might also block an understand-
ing of other logics at work in the construction of a given film, or group of films.
Explaining the guiding principles of Historical Poetics in his 2008 book, Bordwell
explicitly addresses this point, stating:
By positing alternative norms, our work becomes comparative in a rewarding
way. Instead of the couplet norm-deviation, we can posit competing systems of
principles, operating at roughly the same level of generality. We find varying
norms of narration and style in Hollywood cinema, “art cinema,” Soviet mon-
tage cinema and other modes. […] Although it may be momentarily helpful to
characterize art cinema narration as a “deviation” from Hollywood principles,
it’s more enlightening to characterize it positively, as possessing its own fairly
coherent set of storytelling principles […]. Recognizing that we are engaged in
a comparative exercise allows us to give equal weight to one norm and an-
other.21
Here the sometimes mechanistic tendencies, at least in appearance, of the back-
ground/foreground construction are countered by a more generalized compara-
tive approach. Apart from being a good illustration of the openness towards cor-
rections and revisions claimed by Bordwell for his as well as the neoformalist
approach, these reflections raise the question of to what degree this critique of
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the norm-deviation perspective concerns the concept of defamiliarization as a
whole.
To begin with, one could argue that Neoformalism and Historical Poetics share
with the structuralist semiology of Christian Metz the idea that the system of every
film is constructed on the basis of codes that a filmmaker either adopts, trans-
forms, or works against,22 even though Bordwell and Thompson would hardly
express this in such terms. The main difference here is, however, that the (neo)
formalist analysis proceeds by historicizing the various manifestations of what
Metz describes as codes, and also the way in which the code (the norm) is being
defamiliarized. However, at its most elementary level, Metz in his observation
underlines the fact that every filmic system is by definition singular, and this in a
way also explains the problem that Kristin Thompson had to face when she was
looking for an “ordinary” or “average film” she could use to demonstrate the
complexity of even a standardized movie.23 And indeed, even though the film she
studies here, Terror by Night (Roy William Neill, USA 1946), a Sherlock
Holmes adventure, can hardly be considered to be noteworthy in any way, her
analysis teases out the efficiency it deploys in telling the story, building up at least
some kind of suspense, etc. Similarly, although in a completely different perspec-
tive, Thierry Kuntzel’s meticulous analysis of The Most Dangerous Game
(Irving Pichel, Ernest B. Schoedsack, USA 1932) reveals an unsuspected density
in the opening sequence of an otherwise little known adventure movie.24 Inde-
pendently of the relative artistic value one may or may not ascribe to these films,
what both Kuntzel’s and Thompson’s studies show is that a well-conducted ana-
lysis can, literally, make a film appear “out of the ordinary.” As Kristin Thompson
puts it:
Ordinarily, the average Hollywood film is largely automatized, remaining part
of that undifferentiated mass that we have come to think of as the classical
cinema. In such a case, the critic’s job could be to re-defamiliarize the film –
indeed, to defamiliarize it more than it would have been at its first appear-
ance.25
In this case, the concept of ostranenie takes on yet another meaning, i.e. defami-
liarization now becomes an analytical strategy. This move, however, raises the
question of whether its function to distinguish art from non-art can still be up-
held. If the analysis can defamiliarize an object, and that would actually mean:
any kind of object, then one might say that an acknowledgement of its specific
aesthetic qualities lies, as is often said with regard to beauty, “in the eye of the
beholder.” As a critique of the neoformalist approach, this is in fact only a minor
point, as its purpose can be reached by other means: there are many ways in
which one can avoid a communications model of art. And with regard to this
point, it seems to me the approach via the concept of ostranenie is actually not
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necessarily the strongest one. However, and more importantly, Thompson’s pro-
ductive analysis defamiliarizing an average, or ordinary, film does point out the
usefulness of the concept as a heuristic methodological principle.
There is indeed one dimension of the concept of ostranenie that tends to func-
tion in a more or less schematic way, especially when it is conceived of in terms of
the norm-deviation couplet critiqued by Bordwell in the context of his Historical
Poetics. Considered in such a fashion, ostranenie appears in fact to be too much of
a “mechanical” concept; according to an insightful study by Steiner,26 the central
metaphor in this historical phase of Russian Formalism is the machine, the art-
work being considered in this period by Shklovsky as the sum of the devices that
constitute it. The process of defamiliarization would then function in an equally
mechanical way: the automatized parts of the machine are being replaced by fresh
ones for which, once they themselves have become habitualized, other substitutes
have to be found. However, as we will see in the next section, Shklovsky’s own
conception of this process turns out to be much more complex than that, in spite
of his seemingly mechanistic views on the formal construction of an artwork.
So rather than using ostranenie as a concept functioning in absolute terms, it
appears not only more prudent, but also much more productive to use it as a
heuristic principle, with regard to both historical and textual analyses (though
the Neoformalists definitely would not use the latter term). Constructing a back-
ground against which a film is situated and analyzing it in a basically comparative
perspective can indeed yield interesting results, provided that the choices made
can be convincingly supported. As a heuristic principle, this is not only valid for
cases such as the ones discussed above, where an apparently “average” or “auto-
matized” production is shown to be constructed in an actually rather sophisti-
cated way, but can also serve as a starting point for an investigation into films
that at first sight appear odd, unskillful or even failed.
In my own work, I have tried to make use of such a strategy in order to gain a
better understanding of the rather peculiar way in which text elements are used in
the Dutch film Een telegram uit Mexico (Louis H. Chrispijn, NL 1914). Here
the sheer quantity of written material is indeed amazing: there are 27 shots, 13
intertitles and 7 inserts presenting letters, telegrams and newspaper articles. The
overabundance of these largely expository elements could be seen as some sort of
incapacity of the filmmaker to tell his story without the help of linguistic crutches.
However, a closer look and a more detailed formal analysis show otherwise, as I
have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere.27
The film tells the adventure of a young Dutch colonist in Mexico, who becomes
involved in the troubles of the Mexican revolution (indeed, a contemporary topical
event). His mother and blind father back in Holland anxiously await news from
him, following the reports published in their local newspaper. One day the young
man decides to leave his farm and head home. He wants to inform his parents,
but the messenger simply throws the telegram away. On his way, the hero is
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attacked and pursued by the rebels. At this point, the narration returns to the
parents. A telegram arrives and upon reading it, the mother faints. The father,
unable to read the message, presumes that it is bad news and almost goes mad
with grief. Right at that moment, the door opens and the son enters, safe and
sound. The telegram announced his arrival at the port of Rotterdam.
When compared to the use of written messages in other contemporary films,28
it is not only their quantity that is surprising in Een telegram uit Mexico but
also the fact that in several cases the various letters or newspaper articles shown
as textual inserts are more or less redundant because of intertitles that precede or
follow them. They do have an obvious expository function, but hardly contribute
to the film’s narrative economy. They slow down the flow of the action, interrupt-
ing it time and again by textual elements, which only partly provide the viewer
with new information. Compared to another thriving story pattern of that period,
which presents a similar narrative situation, namely films where a last-minute
rescue occurs thanks to helpers being called by telephone,29 it is quite clear that
both the distance separating the son from his parents and the frailty of the latter
indicate that Een telegram uit Mexico tells a different tale.
This Dutch film therefore appears to depart from existing norms, but in such a
way that the deviation is taken as a shortcoming at first sight. However, once the
seeming incompetence of the filmmaker is identified as a strategy, it becomes
obvious that the focus of the story is not the young colonist, but rather his
parents. The film is not about the adventure, but about the wait, about the hope
and the despair of those who are longing for news from the loved one overseas.
The insistence on the efforts to communicate rather than on the communication
itself is functional for the narrative precisely because it appears dysfunctional with-
in the narrative.
Here ostranenie could serve as a guiding principle for the analysis, insofar as it
allows us to conceive the “strangeness” of Een telegram uit Mexico not as a
flaw, that is as a failed attempt to comply with a historically existing norm of
efficient narration, but as an effort to tell a different kind of story. The reversal of
the traditional perspective assessing films in terms of their appearing “advanced”
or “retarded” with regard to an assumed general development of cinematic
means of expression thus helps us to adopt a more nuanced view on film style.30
Using ostranenie as a heuristic principle, in other words, is by no means linked to a
conception of film history as governed by a process of progression. Quite the
contrary, the concept, when used accordingly, can also lead to an assessment of
stylistic features in terms of their historically embedded functions within a given
film.
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Ostranenie and the Historiography of Cinema
When approaching ostranenie as an inherently historical concept, it should have
become clear by now that this by no means entails reasoning in terms of a simple
norm-deviation mechanism. Shklovsky, it seems, was very well aware of the dan-
gers that a view on the history of the arts driven by an ongoing process of defami-
liarization might bring about. When talking about historical evolution in “Litera-
ture without a Plot: Rozanov,” he proclaims that literary evolution does not follow
the lineage “from father to son” but “rather from uncle to nephew” (and of
course a number of other lineages are conceivable when one lets go of the inher-
ent gender bias: “from uncle to niece,” “from aunt to nephew” or “from aunt to
niece”). The important point here is, according to Shklovsky, that in the history of
literature, often formerly marginal or sometimes also archaic forms are taken up
and can then become central aspects in a later period. So Aleksandr Blok “canon-
izes the themes and rhythms of the ‘gypsy song’,” or Dostoyevsky “raises the
devices of the cheap novel to the level of a literary norm.”31 In terms of a histori-
cal development, in other words, there seems to be a shift, or rather a qualifica-
tion, with regard to the process of defamiliarization. While in his general defini-
tion the focus lies on the simple fact that habitualized forms are made strange in
one way or another, the introduction of a diachronic perspective demands a more
precise characterization of the means by which historical change is brought
about. The answer Shklovsky proposes in this – very brief – allusion to literary
history is remarkable in so far as he actually roots innovation in tradition. The
innovative act then consists mainly in turning to a different tradition, in appropriat-
ing forms or devices that may be automatized in their original context, but be-
come both defamiliarized and defamiliarizing when transplanted into another
realm.
In a certain sense one might argue that in the realm of film history, the French
Nouvelle Vague could be seen as a prime example for a historical development of
the kind Shklovsky evokes. Rejecting the lineage that the dominant French film
industry could offer, namely the so-called tradition de la qualité, the Cahiers du ciné-
ma’s Young Turks not only severely criticized the aesthetic principles of Claude
Autant-Lara and his scenarists, Jean Aurenche and Pierre Bost, but also created
their own family tree based on the politique des auteurs. François Truffaut’s famous
polemical article, “Une certaine tendance du cinéma français,” and the subse-
quent interventions by himself and his fellow critics at the Cahiers represented a
twofold provocation in fact. On the one hand, these young writers attacked those
who were perceived as being the most prestigious and successful French film-
makers, denying them all artistic and moral merits; on the other hand, they
praised a number of Hollywood directors for their creativity, for the coherence
and originality of their world view and for the way they translated their ethics
into film images. The future filmmakers of the Nouvelle Vague, in other words,
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chose for themselves the filmic forms “from the lower stratum of society” (but
not exclusively, as Jean Renoir or Robert Bresson also figured prominently among
the references evoked by Truffaut in his manifesto, even though one could argue
that at that point at least, both filmmakers were marginalized within the French
film industry) they wanted to bring to the fore as their main artistic reference “to
replace the old ones.”32 So here we have a case where, to use Meir Sternberg’s
formulation, it is not “the uncle [who] bequeaths his art to the nephew, [but]
more exactly the nephew looks back to the uncle for his patrimony.”33 The line
of tradition is in fact one that is quite consciously – and strategically! – con-
structed rather than being a given, thus permitting us to polemically reject the
then dominant forms of cinematic style.
Quite obviously, this is but one version of the story, it is but one way to frame
the rather complex historical developments that led to the emergence of the Nou-
velle Vague. In fact, it also leaves out quite a number of aspects pertaining to the
broader socio-cultural environment in France in the late 1950s, the organization
of the French film industry, the internal tensions in the field of French film criti-
cism, etc. So in this respect the caveat formulated by David Bordwell needs to be
taken into account, and could even be broadened towards these other factors I
just mentioned:
Moreover, we don’t have to postulate every historical change as a deviation
from a norm. I have already suggested that we can often think of changes as
driven by problems, some inherited from tradition, others devised by the film-
maker. There are as well many ways to realize norms, some obvious, some
subtle. The most striking stylistic changes in film history often don’t stem
from absolute innovation, but rather from a recasting of received devices.
Welles’ deep-focus staging in Citizen Kane is a famous instance, but we
could say much the same of Godard’s cutting in Breathless [À bout du
souffle] (1960), which recasts orthodox continuity principles (matching on
movement and eyelines) into new patterns, to new effect. An innovation is not
necessarily a deviation.34
Historical change is indeed a multi-causal phenomenon, and so its complexities
clearly should not be simply boiled down to a mechanics of norm and deviation.
In fact, one of the strengths of Shklovsky’s notion of historical development in
terms of a complex interaction between dominant and minor traditions is the
avoidance of a linear model of historic progression. On the other hand, however,
it is clear that the knight’s move – to quote Shklovsky’s famous metaphor – can-
not provide a universal principle of literary or art history either. Yet, the theory of
innovation that emerges out of the concept of ostranenie is worth taking a look at.
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The conception of innovation inherent in the process of defamiliarization is in-
deed a complex one. It rests upon an interplay between the perceptual realm and
certain conscious formal choices the artist makes. Perceiving a device, a type of
narrative construction, a configuration of elements as having become habitual
presupposes a familiarity with them that necessarily reaches back into the past.
This is the fundamental diachronic dimension governing the process. But the
choices made by the artist do not imply something like a creatio ab nihilo but
rather, as Shklovsky’s remark on the historical evolution of literary style shows, a
taking up or appropriation of features that are part of a tradition, albeit a minor,
or “lower,” and non-canonized one. Or even, as Bordwell’s comment on
Godard’s À bout du souffle [Breathless] suggests, canonized devices can
be recast by a filmmaker in ways that defamiliarize them (even though one might
add here that Godard’s take on continuity editing is in any event also shaped by
his own film historical erudition acquired in ciné-clubs and at the Cinémathèque
française, he looks at it, as it were, through an experience of half a century of
editing practices).
It may indeed be the case that the Shklovskyan model is interesting in particu-
lar with regard to such moments of historical change that are in a way overdeter-
mined by political or generational ruptures, since artists joining ranks in order to
precipitate change generally look at such times for a lineage that suits their pur-
pose. The young directors of the Oberhausen Manifesto, and more generally the
rather diverse group of filmmakers labeled New German Cinema, not only de-
clared the death of papa’s cinema, but actively searched for points of reference
elsewhere: in German film and literature of the 1920s from Murnau to Brecht, in
the work of Hollywood directors understood as auteurs such as Douglas Sirk or
Nicholas Ray, and clearly also in the stylistic and narrative experiments of their
Nouvelle Vague contemporaries. Similarly, the young Soviet filmmakers made a
clean break with the mise en scène practices and the slow editing pace of the
directors from the Tsarist period such as Jevgenij Bauer or Jakov Protozanov, turn-
ing instead to the fast editing rate of the American cinema, emblematized in the
father figure of David Wark Griffith (a father figure from whom they also dis-
tanced themselves in terms of politics and ideology).35
While offering at least a number of insights into the way a historical current or
movement constructs itself discursively against a previously dominant one (ob-
viously, such denominations are anything but innocent and also require a tho-
rough historical critique), this is evidently a limited perspective. There are impor-
tant other factors that stay outside the scope of such an approach, as the
economic, political, social, legal or institutional environments that frame and
shape, promote and support, enable and channel such developments, and of
course also the technological conditions that provide opportunities and open
new possibilities or, as in the case of the young Soviet cinema, force us to look
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for alternatives and stimulate experimentation in a situation where there is a gen-
eral shortage of equipment and material.
So, looking at the history of style in terms of lineages, following Shklovsky’s
suggestions, can offer an interesting but necessarily very limited perspective that,
in addition, does not provide an equally productive approach in all cases of his-
torical change. Even so, this again reveals the potential productivity of the concept
of ostranenie as a heuristic tool. With regard to a diachronic perspective, it thus not
only focuses on stylistic innovation as such, but also takes into account the ori-
gins of the new forms coming out of a different tradition, and specifically out of
the undercurrents of popular culture, which often escape the attention of conven-
tional historical inquiry. In that respect, one might add, such an approach is al-
most inherently a non-teleological one.
From such a point of view, one could even claim that in the historiography of
film (or, for that matter, of any art or medium), scholars will often have to defa-
miliarize the dominating and canonized versions in order to open up new fields
of inquiry, to look at phenomena in the light of new questions, or to shift focus.
This may take many forms, as the so-called New Film History of the 1980s has
amply demonstrated. Moving from the groundbreaking highlights and master-
pieces to the anonymous mass production – as Bordwell, Staiger and Thomp-
son36 did with regard to Hollywood, or Michèle Lagny, Marie-Claire Ropars and
Pierre Sorlin37 did in their large-scale study on French cinema of the 1930s – is
part of such an enterprise, as are the various initiatives to write film history from
the viewpoint of marginalized or neglected groups, or the manifold investigations
into early cinema that were launched at an international level after the Brighton
FIAF conference in 1978.
This latter body of work is particularly interesting when looked at in the light of
Shklovsky’s concepts. Traditional historiography saw early films as “primitive”
and was interested only in those features that could be seen as forerunners an-
nouncing the artistic potential of the medium that would be realized many years
later in both classical narrative cinema and the European art cinema of the 1920s.
This way of looking at the beginnings of cinema only changed in the 1980s and
1990s, when scholars such as Noël Burch,38 Tom Gunning39 or André
Gaudreault40 took a different approach and tried to understand the formal fea-
tures of early films in light of the 1960s and 1970s avant-garde practices or the
dys-narrative experiments of modernist films. Schooled by such viewing experi-
ences, they did not look for the first manifestations of the narrative conventions
of classical film (they abolished altogether, in fact, the quest for “firsts” that
drove traditional historiography to a large extent), but rather tried to understand
the logic proper of these films, a logic that was then described in terms of a
specific “Primitive Mode of Representation” by Burch, or a “cinema of attrac-
tions” by Gaudreault and Gunning. The relationship between early cinema and
the later avant-garde worked both ways, in fact, as demonstrated by the rework-
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ing of early films by experimental filmmakers (Tom, Tom, the Piper’s Son by
Ken Jacobs, Eureka by Ernie Gehr) as well as by the lectures given by Stan
Brakhage on Georges Méliès or David Wark Griffith.41 So looking at early cinema
from the viewpoint of the avant-garde, in spite of the anachronistic perspective
that this might engender, proved to be rather productive for an understanding of
the specific difference, or otherness, of this mode of representation even though,
obviously, there is always a whole bundle of factors that come into play in such a
process.42
With this kind of consideration, Shklovsky’s original concept seems rather dis-
tant. This does point, however, to the fact that the fundamental principle (or
“bedrock idea,” as Meir Sternberg calls it)43 of defamiliarization can take a variety
of shapes, and that it can be used as a strategic or heuristic tool with regard to a
whole range of issues. Here it appears, to be more precise, as a specific – and in a
way voluntaristic – kind of foregrounding, a term coined by the Czech structural-
ists that Sternberg sees as one of the “resurgences” of ostranenie.44
So it may be less surprising that one can indeed observe a reappearance of this
principle in more recent attempts to theorize processes in media history in light
of the developments brought about by the new digital media and their various
manifestations.
Ostranenie and the Historiography of Media
So, how can the idea of defamiliarization be made productive when looking at the
history of media? Several authors such as Tom Gunning, Jay David Bolter, Ri-
chard Grusin, and Isabelle Raynauld approach the question of the historical de-
velopment of a medium by distinguishing two different logics that appear either
alongside each other or in a diachronic sequence, namely one that foregrounds
the technology and one that foregrounds the “content.” This latter type of func-
tioning is in fact often addressed as “transparency,” that is, as a form of expe-
riencing a medium where the process of mediation itself is not perceived as such
and thus has become “invisible.” Obviously, this so-called transparency of a me-
dium is actually always a constructed one (or to use the terminology of a period
when this issue was a centerpiece of film theoretical debates: a coded one). And
here the concept of ostranenie as defined by Shklovsky does reappear, in particular
its inherent historicity. The transparency, which cannot manifest itself in ways
other than a “having-become-transparent,” indeed implies that the use of the me-
dium as such has become “evident,” thus presupposing a diachronic dimension
in the very core of such a logic.
Proposing a historical approach to old technologies by “re-newing” them, that
is, by looking at them from the viewpoint of their once having been newly emerg-
ing technologies, Tom Gunning chooses not only a somewhat defamiliarizing
perspective on media history as such, but also considers the deconstruction of
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the processes of habitualization in the functioning of a medium as a crucial start-
ing point for its historical appreciation.45 In terms astonishingly similar to
Shklovsky’s formulations, Tom Gunning remarks: “When a tool works, we pay
no attention to it; it seems to disappear.”46 This leads Gunning to an analytical
perspective that somehow resembles Kristin Thompson’s strategy with regard to
the so-called “ordinary film” discussed earlier. He calls here, in other words, for a
defamiliarization of a technology that has become familiar:
To imagine an old technology as something that was once new means, there-
fore, to try and recapture a quality it has lost. It means examining a technology
or device at the point of introduction, before it has become part of a nearly
invisible everyday life of habit and routine. But it also must mean examining
this move from dazzling appearance to nearly transparent utility, from the
spectacular and astonishing to the convenient and unremarkable.47
Looking at old technologies as devices or media from the viewpoint of their once
having been experienced as novelties is indeed an important methodological
choice. It means looking at their potentialities not in retrospect, from a position
where their future has already been realized, but as a set of promises, or potenti-
alities, which the contemporaries projected into them. But even their normal
functioning in itself is not something that is taken for granted. Quite the contrary,
it provokes what Gunning calls “a discourse of wonder [that] draws our attention
to a new technology not, simply as a tool, but precisely as a spectacle, less as
something that performs a useful task than as something that astounds us by
performing in a way that seemed unlikely or magical before.”48 For those who
witness the manifestations of a new media technology in the period of its emer-
gence – it being put to use in what Charles Musser with regard to cinema has
called its “novelty period” – the simple fact that it does or shows what it is sup-
posed and announced to do or show is a marvel.49
It is in this respect that Gunning remarks that, as far as the cinema of attrac-
tions is concerned, one can state that the technology itself constitutes the main
attraction for the first viewers of the various devices presenting animated photo-
graphies.50 Similar things can be said about most other media as well: one may
think of the voices almost “magically” travelling along telephone lines or through
a space interestingly referred to as ether, or of television with its possibility to
transmit live images from events elsewhere. And even the rather recent introduc-
tion of the mobile phone showed signs of this phenomenon, even though this
technology became a habitualized tool in a very short time. How else can we
explain the story (perhaps fabricated) of people in Italy walking around with woo-
den dummies pretending to partake in the wonderful universe of mobile commu-
nication.
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Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin discuss the two ways of experiencing a
technology presented by Gunning in terms of a historical configuration that oc-
curs diachronically, moving from wonder to invisibility, as two synchronic “logics
of remediation,” one of which they call “immediacy,” the other “hypermediacy.”51
The first one aims to make the medium “disappear,” while the other one stresses
mediality, that is, it foregrounds the processes of mediation in one way or an-
other. For Bolter and Grusin, however, this is not a matter of a medium’s func-
tioning being perceived differently over time. These logics of remediation are
conceived of as modes which are inherent to a medium or, to be precise, as cer-
tain specific uses that media are put to. According to them, all sorts of “immer-
sive” media inherently strive for immediacy. The viewer or user is supposed to no
longer perceive the fact that there is a technology that makes communication or
various forms of experience and interaction possible. Hence the statement: “Vir-
tual reality is immersive, which means that it is a medium whose purpose is to
disappear.”52 Bolter and Grusin also use the term “transparency” to describe this
phenomenon. Obviously, a medium never simply disappears. Its technological
design, its affordances, but also its limitations clearly shape the ways in which
the viewers, or users, can experience or interact with it. So there is always a level
at which the mediality manifests itself. Hypermediacy, on the contrary, refers to a
visual style refusing a unified representational space. Bolter and Grusin’s example
here is the “windowed” computer interface or the multi-layered information
streams that run across the television screen in news programs such as those
offered by CNN. The viewer or user is continuously confronted with different
forms of mediations, often appearing simultaneously, so that there is no way
these can all become merged into the experience of a closed and homogeneous
representational universe.
Bolter and Grusin thus conceive immediacy and hypermediacy as two different
strategies in media history, both of which are based on remediation. Contrary to
the conception presented by Gunning, the transparency effect of immediacy is not
due to a process of habituation, automatization or canonization, but rather one of
two possible ways in which media do function. Both are in fact equally valid, their
relationship is neither one of familiarization and defamiliarization, nor one of
norm and deviation. They are not even to be taken as characteristic manifesta-
tions of a medium. While television may sometimes strive to achieve a maximum
effect of immersion by presenting itself as a direct-access medium to an event
happening simultaneously or by inviting forms of para-social interaction between
the viewers and people on the screen, other formats display hypermediacy, such
as the CNN newscasts in combination with stock market and other information
running across the bottom of the screen and maybe even additional windows
showing an anchorperson addressing a journalist.53
Nevertheless, the concepts used by Bolter and Grusin are useful in our context
in so far as they show that what is at stake here is not so much a general develop-
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ment of media from hypermediacy to immediacy, or from wonder to invisibility,
but rather the issue of specific forms or uses to which media can be put. These,
too, are subject to historical change, often because of an older medium’s confron-
tation with an emerging new one, which may change the entire mediascape and
bring about new forms of intermedial relationships. Television in the age of the
internet does look different from television in the 1950s, and this also affects the
medium’s use of forms of immediacy and hypermediacy. However, in the defini-
tion of a medium that Bolter and Grusin give, there seems to be a certain privilege
accorded to the reality effect associated with immediacy:
What is a medium?
We offer this simple definition: a medium is that which remediates. It is that
which appropriates the techniques, forms, and social significance of other me-
dia and attempts to rival or refashion them in the name of the real.54
It is not quite clear in how far such an appropriation of a medium by another one
“in the name of the real” entails that representational strategies which fore-
ground hypermediacy are in fact to be considered less central to such a process.
In any event, introducing the “real” as a teleological category here does suggest
exactly this to some extent.
In an article drawing upon both Gunning and Bolter/Grusin, Isabelle Raynauld
discusses what Gunning calls a “move from dazzling appearance to nearly trans-
parent utility”55 in terms of “opacity” and “transparency”:56
We thus state that, following the ideas of Grusin, Bolter, and Gunning, an
emerging medium has to go through a period of opacity during which its ma-
teriality is so visible that, literally, it makes the content disappear. However, as
the viewers or users become more competent, this opacity is reduced and ulti-
mately turns into a transparency that allows the content to become fully visi-
ble.57
Again, the way in which Raynauld describes the phenomenon she undertakes to
deal with appears quite similar to Shklovsky’s formulations on ostranenie. Again, it
is habituation, here associated in an interesting way also with the users being
increasingly competent in the manipulation of a device or the interaction with a
medium, that leads to its becoming, or at least appearing, more and more trans-
parent. In Raynauld’s analysis, however, this does not concern artistic devices or
styles, but – in accordance with Gunning’s ideas – the process an emerging me-
dium undergoes, from flaunting mediality to striving for transparency. According
to Raynauld, this process is reflected also in the different textual forms media
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adopt, as she illustrates with examples from early films and from multi-media
CD-ROMs.
So bringing these ideas together, one could argue that the media historians
referred to here do see transparency, or invisibility, as the result of a diachronic
process of familiarization with the workings of a technology on the one hand,
and also a strategy that is particularly important with regard to all forms of viewer
or user involvement from simple interactions to immersion on the other. While
such transparency is always relative and only functions on the basis of certain
codes and conventions, its effects can indeed be observed on many levels. Hyper-
mediacy or opacity, then, is either a strategy foregrounding mediality by means of
certain formal or technological devices, or it is linked to a specific phase in the
development of a medium, namely the period of its emergence. Formulated by
Gunning in terms of both a perspective for media historical research adopted
deliberately – “to imagine an old technology as something that once was new” –
and a characteristic feature of a medium in its “early” period, it seems indeed that
technological innovation in the realm of media (but clearly not only there) does
produce an effect of “strangeness” that needs to be analyzed.
This, however, is different from the conceptions proposed by Shklovsky, in
spite of certain quite obvious correspondences. While the “stoniness of the stone”
is revealed afresh through art after having become invisible in a process of habi-
tualization, the foregrounding of the “mediality of a medium” is linked to its
emergence and then disappears as viewers or users become increasingly familiar
with its workings. While ostranenie refers to a diachronic and in essence also his-
torical process in the course of which the familiarized becomes defamiliarized
through the work of the artist, the media historical perspective seems to work the
other way round. The non-familiar, the novelty that characterizes the emerging
medium, provokes wonder and dazzles those who encounter it for the first time.
Once this effect has worn off, the utilitarian aspect of the media technology
comes to the fore, and then it is experienced as some kind of a “transparent”
carrier for the semiotic material that it mediates.
So the question arises of whether these two processes are somehow related, or
whether they belong to two incommensurable logics. The common denominator
here is of course the phenomenon of innovation. In both cases the new is indeed
characterized in terms of a specific kind of visibility that is due to its differential
quality. But then they seem to part ways. While the differential quality in the case
of artistic innovation is the result of a defamiliarization of habitualized forms –
however complex this process may be in terms of its relation to tradition, the
recasting of existing devices, etc. – it is less obvious in relation to what other
phenomenon a media novelty is perceived as. Here the concept of remediation
might be a productive one. As Bolter and Grusin state, a medium “appropriates
the techniques, forms, and social significance of other media and attempts to
rival or refashion them in the name of the real.”58 Leaving aside this last point,
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which may be too apodictic a formula, this remark opens up the field towards
intermedial relationships and the possible diversity of what André Gaudreault
has called “cultural series.”59 So here technological innovation should be ana-
lyzed with regard to the broader mediascape in which it occurs. And in this res-
pect one could indeed reframe or rephrase Tom Gunning’s argument and say that
not only the “move from dazzling appearance to nearly transparent utility, from
the spectacular and astonishing to the convenient and unremarkable” needs to be
examined, but also what one might call – to coin a new phrase for the occasion –
“the newness of the new,” which means that one also has to defamiliarize novelty
itself.60
Ostranenie – To Be Continued
Following the adventures of Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie, from literary theory
and history into issues of film and media history, reveals both its problems and its
potentials, its limitations as well as its merits. When taken as a general principle
governing all processes of artistic innovation, there clearly is the danger that it
may turn into a mechanistic and axiomatic explanatory instrument. Its strengths,
on the contrary, seem to lie in its heuristic qualities. These, as we have seen, can
work on a number of levels. To begin with, one may indeed consider defamiliar-
ization a fundamental analytical strategy allowing us to interrogate and to proble-
matize seemingly self-evident or well-understood phenomena. Whether Kristin
Thompson studies so-called “ordinary” films or Tom Gunning looks at old tech-
nologies from the viewpoint of their once having been novelties, such cases show
that defamiliarization results from a choice made by a scholar when deciding how
to approach an object. It functions as a research strategy in a slightly different, yet
similar way when David Bordwell looks at Carl Theodor Dreyer’s films against the
background of classical Hollywood cinema. Conceiving of defamiliarization in
such a way, however, is quite different from Shklovsky’s original definition,
which refers to aspects that are immanent to a given work of art and which in
fact are an essential feature of its aesthetic quality.
It could actually be argued that Shklovsky’s conceptualization of art is indebted
to a modernist aesthetics that stresses aspects such as formal complexity, pro-
longed perception, and the foregrounding of materiality. In that sense, ostranenie
is fundamentally two-sided, as it resides in the form of the artwork itself, while
also needing to produce a corresponding effect during the act of reception. Defa-
miliarization, in other words, is always “in the eye of the beholder,” and by this
very token it reveals itself as an inherently historical phenomenon. Any defami-
liarizing device is bound to turn into a habitualized one as time goes by, so to the
readers or viewers of later generations, it may indeed appear as an utterly con-
ventional feature. And this also means that at its very foundation, it is a relative
one. So if there is, as Meir Sternberg affirms, a “bedrock idea” at the core of
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Shklovsky’s concept that has turned out to be so very successful, one must also
accept that it is one that cannot escape historicity and thus relativity.
In any event, for Shklovsky the work of art is anything but a transparent render-
ing of the outside world, let alone a representation according to the norms of a
classic ideal of beauty, as he also points out in his novel Zoo, or letters not about love.
Here he distinguishes two ways of approaching art: the first one takes the tradi-
tional stance of considering art as a window upon the world; the other one, in
contrast, sees art as the relation between its formal elements. (One recognizes
here his notion that the artwork is a sum or, as he would say later on, a system of
devices.) And so he concludes that if art is to be considered as some kind of a
window at all, then the only way to do so is to conceive of it as a painted window.
Apart from being a very insightful and elegant description of what is at stake in
formalist theory, this remark also points to the very important issue of the ever-
present mediality. The critical stance that Shklovsky makes here can serve as
something like a constant memento with regard to the reflections by Gunning and
Raynauld on media history and the concepts of immediacy and hypermediacy
proposed by Bolter and Grusin. Obviously – and no one among the authors
quoted here says otherwise – conceptions of the workings of a medium in terms
of “invisibility,” “immediacy” or “transparency” are not meant to deny the fact
that mediality never actually disappears. However, it is indeed worth remembering
that one should never lose sight of the crucial role played by media technology.
The window opening on our computer screen may no longer be a painted one,
but it is no less artificial.
Rather than a conclusion, I can offer an observation, a question, and a sugges-
tion. First my observation: however critical one can be of Shklovsky’s concept –
the phenomenon of automatization and ostranenie – the problem of transparency
and mediality made visible, as well as the processes of normalisation and devia-
tion from an existing norm, obviously still haunts our debates in media history on
different levels. The question now is whether a conceptualisation in these terms
does indeed help us to understand these phenomena better. My suggestion is
then to never cease to defamiliarize defamiliarization.
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Knight’s Moves: Brecht and Russian
Formalism in Britain in the 1970s
Ian Christie
I was referring to a production detail when Tretyakov corrected me, remark-
ing: ‘Yes, that is an estrangement [Verfremdung]’ and looked conspiratorially at
Brecht. Brecht nodded. That was the first time I had met the expression Ver-
fremdung. I must assume therefore that Tretyakov provided Brecht with the
term. I think that Tretyakov had reshaped the term originally formulated by
Shklovsky, ostranenie, ‘distancing,’ ‘alienation.’
– Bernhard Reich1
The problem is that ideologies of art are forever swamping and waterlogging
the distinct practice of art itself.
– Peter Wollen2
Today, the genealogy of the concepts of Viktor Shklovsky’s ostranenie and Bertolt
Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt can be traced and compared with comparative ease.
Most of the founding texts, originally in Russian and German, have long been
translated into French and English, and a large secondary literature exists, conti-
nuing to analyse and contextualise them. They have, in Zygmunt Bauman’s
phrase, “become settled in scholarly and common vocabularies,” seemingly on a
more or less permanent basis.3 But it was not always so. In the 1960s and 1970s,
both formed part of an assertive new vocabulary that was embraced by members
of a generation keen to declare their intellectual, and indeed political, indepen-
dence. By no means all of this generation would join the “New Left” or mount the
barricades of May 1968, but such overtly political phenomena were part of a wider
movement which can perhaps now be interpreted as a revolt against the menda-
city and manipulation of the Cold War. So to lay claim to concepts that originated
in Russian and Marxist culture was itself a significant gesture of revolt.
Bauman’s discussion of how once-novel concepts are normalised occurs in the
context of his exploring how the shock of the First World War led European
thinkers to promote a new study of “generations.” That concept continues to be
used in scholarly discourse, although without the same immediate reference or
urgency as in the years after 1914-18. It has become what he calls an “echo
word,” reverberating long after the crash that caused it has died down.4 This
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reminds us that critical concepts are not merely functional tools, readily available
and selected or discarded according to utility. Their introduction is typically cir-
cumstantial: announcing a response to new conditions, an attack on the status
quo, a new insight or challenge. Later, they may be more carefully analysed, but
grasping why ostranenie and its cognates (“alienation” and “distanciation” or “de-
familiarisation”) became so central to a revolution in aesthetics and culture in the
1960s and 1970s is an important contribution to understanding the intellectual
regime that produced the one we still inhabit.
It also helps illuminate an important cultural moment when cinema was finally
accepted as part of the wider contemporary culture – when films began to be
“taken seriously” by a generation to which they spoke more directly than works
in the traditional art media. There was indeed a subterranean connection at work.
The same “Formalist” aesthetics that originally promoted ostranenie had also made
a vital contribution to early Soviet film theory and its key concept of “montage” –
another mot clé that echoed down much of the twentieth century. When the Rus-
sian avant-garde filmmakers Lev Kuleshov, Vsevolod Pudovkin and above all Ser-
gei Eisenstein defined their film practice as based on the linking or collision of
shots in montage, this was widely understood as a technique, or “device” in the
Formalist sense, which challenged the apparent naturalism of the filmic image
and so made it capable of artistic composition. But although montage enjoyed
considerable cultural prestige in the 1920s and 1930s, in the visual arts and litera-
ture as well as film, after World War Two it seemed distinctly less relevant to the
new kinds of cinema that had emerged from the war, almost all of which claimed
some form of “realism.”
Writing in 1955, the French critic André Bazin drew a sharp distinction be-
tween the era when “montage was the very stuff of cinema” and what he identi-
fied as a new phase that began in the early 1940s, when it became one among
other resources in a “revolution in the language of the screen.”5 By the early
1970s, however, this revolution had led to a situation where “realism” itself
seemed to have become a debased concept, used “without question or reflection,”
as an editorial in the British journal Screen stated in 1971.6 To challenge such flac-
cid notions of realism, it seemed timely to the generation of May ’68 to investigate
more closely the debates that took place in Russia in the 1920s before “socialist
realism” was imposed as the official Soviet aesthetic in the following decade.
Screen has chosen in this number to reproduce the debates and ideas of Soviet
artists and film-makers of the 1920s for those debates are reflections upon and
struggles with notions of ‘realism’ which Screen regards as crucial to any under-
standing of the cinema in the past and at the moment.7
What we will not find in later, more academic discussions of ostranenie is this early
sense of discovery, expressing a belief that lessons could be learned from the
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experiments of the Soviet 1920s that would inform a contemporary “politics of
film.”8
The revolution in cinema that Bazin hailed had entered a new phase around
1960, when a series of formally complex and often reflexive films commanded
wide cultural attention. At this climactic moment in international “art cinema”
(as it came to be known), a group of mainly French films seemed to focus on
issues of narrative and “film language.” These included Jean-Luc Godard’s prodi-
gious output from À bout de souffle (1959) to Deux ou trois choses que
je sais d’elle (1966), together with Hiroshima mon amour (Alain Resnais/
Marguerite Duras, 1959), L’avventura (Michelangelo Antonioni, 1960), L’an-
née dernière à Marienbad (Resnais/Alain Robbe-Grillet, 1961), and
Chronique d’un été (Jean Rouch/Edgar Morin, 1962).9
Such films demanded new reference points and a corresponding vocabulary for
discussion, which began to be supplied by the emergence of a new strand in the
cultural industry of publishing. In addition to the “little magazines” that had
formed the backbone of Modernism in all the art-forms since the early twentieth
century, and which now included many devoted to film, paperback book publish-
ing expanded rapidly during the 1960s to provide a range of provocative texts that
addressed an emerging new market. Eric Hobsbawm10 noted the dramatic
increase in student numbers in Western Europe and the United States during
the 1960s which would fuel the revolutionary movements of May 1968. Perhaps
less known is how this also created a new mass intelligentsia for whom, as a
“media generation,” the processes of representation and mediation formed a
self-evidently important field of concern. Authors as diverse as Marshall McLu-
han, Roland Barthes and John Berger quickly became international figures
through innovative ways of presenting their ideas about “mediation.” In many
cases, they were explicitly reviving ideas that dated from the pre-war era, such as
those of Harold Innis, Ferdinand de Saussure and Walter Benjamin. New paper-
back imprints were quick to enter the field and, in doing so, create a new market
for “ideas.”11
Books about cinema formed an important part of this publishing explosion,
many of them dealing with film in terms which would transform the cultural
landscape in Europe and the United States. With the cult of directors established
by French journals (and by Bazin) and enthusiastically adopted by young British
and American cinephiles, series such as Cinéma d’aujourd’hui in France and Cinema
One in Britain provided commentaries on both classic and contemporary directors
that drew on a wide range of references – for instance, Hegel was offered as a key
to understanding Godard in Richard Roud’s 1967 book on the filmmaker, at a
time when he was virtually ignored in Anglo-American academia – to elucidate
what was claimed with increasing confidence to be “the language of our time.”12
Without the simultaneous explosion of “new wave” cinema and the accompa-
nying burst of culturally ambitious commentary and publishing that challenged
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conventional intellectual traditions, the legacy of Russian Formalism may well
have remained known only to Slavic scholars.13 Instead, we find the leading pro-
moter and theorist of “new American cinema,” P. Adams Sitney, invoking
Shklovsky’s “Art as Technique” as the “historical origin” of what he labelled
“structural film” in an influential article from 1969.14 And when Cape Editions
published a translation of Vladimir Mayakovsky’s engaging pamphlet How Are
Verses Made? in 1970, this provided an attractive object lesson in Formalist method
at the very moment when the achievements of the early Soviet avant-garde were
being rediscovered.15 The delayed influence of ostranenie, in fact, became a prime
instance of Shklovsky’s own concept of the “knight’s move” – history following
indirect or crooked lines of transmission.16
One such detour was the adoption of the Russian Formalists’ ostranenie by the
German Communist Bertolt Brecht in the mid-1930s, and its subsequent emer-
gence twenty years later in advance of any wide knowledge of its origins. What
Shklovsky and his colleagues had developed as both a critical and a compositional
method in the 1910s and 1920s was taken up by Brecht in 1935 to theorise his
concept of “epic” theatre, as recorded by Reis (above). It was then invoked by
filmmakers and critics in the 1960s to explain the reflexivity that characterised
much “new wave” film. A decade later, in the mid-1970s, with Brecht more fully
assimilated in his own right, attention turned towards the Russian avant-garde
culture to which the Formalists had belonged, and more of the original Russian
texts began to appear in English translation – giving rise to a vigorous debate
about the pedigree and implications of ostranenie. Much of this centred on the
British film journal Screen, which has come to be regarded as the crucible of mod-
ern Anglo-American “film theory.” What would ultimately prove most controver-
sial in Screen’s new matrix of “theory” was the adoption of a psychoanalytic orien-
tation strongly influenced by the discovery of Jacques Lacan’s neo-Freudian
linguistic turn and by Louis Althusser’s conception of ideology. But however in-
fluential and fashionable they would become, much of the original scaffolding for
a new theoretical perspective on cinema came from the earlier appropriation of
Brecht and the Russian Formalists, and from efforts to situate these in relation to
other Anglophone discoveries of the 1960s and 1970s, notably the early philoso-
phical writings of Karl Marx and the sophisticated Marxism of Walter Benjamin.17
What follows here is a closer examination of the processes by which Brechtian
“alienation” and Russian Formalism became powerful influences on a new West-
ern critical vocabulary that took shape in the 1970s. The motivation for their revi-
val was not scholarly in the first instance. These concepts had emerged from
“struggle” and might therefore serve in another struggle to create art or “work”
that would provoke, inspire, teach. The fact that they appeared to be technical,
even forbidding, and uncontaminated by association with entertainment or tradi-
tional aesthetics was seen as a virtue. And, in the spirit of the times, a “correct”
political interpretation was sometimes in conflict with more scrupulous attention
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to the circumstances of their origins. But such information was sparse in any
event, much of it still embargoed by political disfavour and hampered by slow
and irregular patterns of translation. (And by looking at the order of reception,
we will be abandoning any claim to an objective overview, instead tracing the
sequence of ideas backwards and forwards, like Shklovsky’s roaming knight.)
Brecht Reaches Britain
Coming to terms with the legacy of Brecht in post-war Britain was complicated by
the Cold War and by severely limited access to both performances and his writ-
ings. In the 1930s, there had been a lively appreciation of his work, especially the
plays using music, with performances at Sadlers Wells and on BBC radio. But
after his arraignment by McCarthy’s witch hunting HUAC in America and subse-
quent return to live in East Germany, an interest in Brecht acquired an almost
inescapable political dimension. Behind the scenes, the British government
worked hard to frustrate any visits by his Berliner Ensemble to Britain, and the
first of these only took place in September 1956, a month after the playwright’s
death.18 Yet between this and the company’s second visit a decade later, a consid-
erable culture of “Brechtianism” grew up in Britain – no doubt fuelled in part by
the appeal of an artist considered politically controversial.
This was probably less due to an intellectual or even political interest than to
the desire of theatre practitioners to engage with an almost legendary figure in
modern drama, and to experiment with Brecht’s ideas about staging and acting.
Among radicals, Joan Littlewood had produced Brecht in the 1930s and appeared
in Mother Courage and her Children in 1955 at her pioneering Theatre Royal in East
London. And another left-wing actor-manager, Bernard Miles, staged an equally
notable Life of Galileo at the Mermaid Theatre in 1960. However, the young produ-
cer William Gaskill became fascinated by Brecht’s aesthetic and successfully pro-
duced The Caucasian Chalk Circle in 1962, before delivering a Mother Courage at the
National Theatre which confirmed many stereotypes of doctrinaire drabness.19
Not until the Berliner Ensemble’s return to London in 1965 would such prejudices
be challenged by the evidence of a living Brechtian practice.
But perhaps more significant was a considerable number of new English plays
that showed the influence of Brecht in their desire to be “realistic without being
naturalistic” – as John Arden described his pacifist “un-historical parable” Sergeant
Musgrave’s Dance (1959).20 John Osborne, popularly associated with British thea-
tre’s “kitchen sink” naturalism after his Look Back in Anger, adopted Brecht’s epic
form for Luther (1961). Robert Bolt’s highly successful A Man for All Seasons (1960),
dealing with the trial of Thomas More on grounds of conscience, featured in its
original stage version a “Common Man,” who acts as a kind of Brechtian chorus.
And even Lionel Bart’s immensely popular Dickens musical Oliver! (1960),
strongly influenced by his earlier mentoring by Littlewood, owed much of its in-
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itial impact to a striking skeletal set designed by Sean Kenny, which brought
Brecht’s radically simplified staging to the popular London – and later Broadway
– stage.
The influence of Brecht was suddenly apparent in both experimental and main-
stream Anglophone theatre, and producers, actors and critics on both sides of the
Atlantic were struggling to interpret Brecht’s strictures on naturalism and his
much-debated “alienation effect.” The Verfremdungseffekt had become part of
Brecht’s evolving theory during or immediately after his first visit to Moscow in
1935. There, he had seen a performance by the Chinese actor Mei Lan-fang and
been in contact with members of the early Soviet avant-garde, including Sergei
Tretyakov and Sergei Eisenstein, who were well versed in Formalist poetics, even
though this was now heavily proscribed under “socialist realism.” According to
John Willett, Brecht admired Mei’s “detachment” and his “[making] it clear that
he knows he is being observed” and began to theorise his “V-Effekt.”21 Willett’s
The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht, and Martin Esslin’s Brecht: The Man and His Work both
appeared in 1959, and served as valued guides for the first generation of British
and American Brechtians.22
From the start, English-speaking champions of Brecht had to contend with the
problem of translating his Verfremdung, an invented word related to Entfremdung,
which has usually been translated as “alienation” or “estrangement” when used
by Hegel and, in his early writings, Marx. In fact, there are two similar terms in
German philosophical language, Entfremdung and Entzauberung: the former often
translated as “estrangement” and the latter as “alienation.” Thus, for instance,
Marx’s Economic and Political Manuscripts of 1844 appeared in English translation in
1961 with the following usage:
If then the product of labour is alienation [Enttäusserung], production itself
must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In
the estrangement [Entfremdung] of the object of labour is merely summarised
the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labour itself.23
The issue could be further complicated by noting that both of these German
words are originally themselves derived from the English word “alienation,” used
from the fourteenth century onwards in a theological sense (estrangement or se-
paration from God), as was explained by another important thinker of the period,
Raymond Williams.24 But whatever precise meaning or implication is attached to
the term since Hegel, in Marx’s and indeed Freud’s uses, “alienation” has ac-
quired an unmistakably negative implication – a “lack,” that which is to be ended
or overcome. So although “estrangement effect” may well be closer to the inten-
tion behind Brecht’s coinage, this has generally been translated into English as
“alienation effect,” usually with some attempt to explain that the implication was
not necessarily intended to be pejorative.
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The result was, and perhaps continues to be, a belief that Brecht wanted an
artificial and potentially anti-dramatic effect. How much this problematic term
and the mystique that grew up around it has coloured attitudes to the playwright
should not be underestimated. An otherwise enthusiastic 1962 review of The Cau-
casian Chalk Circle in a popular British newspaper, having found the production
genuinely moving, crowed “What price the ‘alienation effect’ now?”25 Similar
scepticism or confusion about Brecht’s concept has persisted: as recently as 1998
an American review of The Threepenny Opera referred to Brecht’s “intention to ‘alie-
nate’ audiences... and implicate them in the crimes of society.”26
While Brecht had become a live issue in Anglo-American theatre in the early
1960s, his relevance to cinema was initially less obvious. Brecht’s own involve-
ment with film had been intermittent, and initially contentious, when he initiated
a lawsuit against Pabst’s 1930 film of his Threepenny Opera. Only the colla-
borative Kuhle Wampe (1932), about a camp of this name for unemployed peo-
ple on the outskirts of Berlin, fulfilled his aspirations for a politically effective
cinema. Living in Hollywood in the 1940s, he had little opportunity to make any
equivalent contribution to American film, apart from Fritz Lang’s anti-Nazi
Hangmen Also Die (1943). It was initially through allusions by Godard, whose
influence was infectious, that Brecht began to be seen as a point of reference for
the new reflexive or “distanced” cinema of the early 1960s. From the theatrical
tableaux of Vivre sa vie (1962) and bare parable style of Les carabiniers
(1963) to the direct quotation of Brecht by Fritz Lang in Le mepris (1963),
Godard did more than anyone to make Brecht a pervasive presence in the “new
wave” cinema culture of the 1960s.27 Even before taking an explicitly political turn
in 1967, he was making frequent use of quotations from Brecht – as when Marina
Vlady in Deux ou trous choses que je sais d’elle (1966) recalls “Old
Brecht [saying] actors must quote” – and a range of distancing and framing de-
vices intended to translate Brecht’s model for “epic” theatre into cinema terms.28
When Godard came under the influence of Maoism in 1967-8 and threw him-
self into the ferment of May 1968 (demonstrations with a commitment to deper-
sonalised “agitational” filmmaking), his avowed model was the observer of “life
caught unawares,” Dziga Vertov, by then considered more radical and truly “com-
munist” than Eisenstein. Godard’s films of these years combined deliberately
simplified technique and “non-acting” with highly provocative political slogan-
eering, and for the most part failed to reach either militants or former admirers
of his work. But with his return to feature-length films, the ironically titled Tout
va bien (1972), Brecht was apparently once again the model for a de-mystifica-
tion of filmmaking within a capitalist society. Indeed, a number of other contem-
porary filmmakers were now identified as “Brechtian,” and the way was open to
reassess Brecht’s contribution to the cinema of the past, as well as his presence in
such current films as Straub-Huillet’s History Lessons (1972) and Oshima’s
Dear Summer Sister (1972). This became part of an ambitious project by the
knight’s moves: brecht and russian formalism in britain in the 1970s 87
editorial board of Screen during 1973-5, which began with a special issue of the
journal, “Brecht and a Revolutionary Cinema” (summer 1974), followed by a con-
ference held during that year’s Edinburgh Film Festival, with transcripts of the
conference sessions and additional articles appearing in the Winter issue of
1975-6, entitled “Brecht and the Cinema/Film and Politics.”
The issue that united these discussions of films and practice from the 1930s to
the 1970s was that of representation and the treacherousness of different modes of
self-proclaimed “realism.” Thus, for example, Colin MacCabe argued in his influ-
ential 1974 essay “Realism in the Cinema,” subtitled “notes on some Brechtian
theses,” that Brecht had been typically “recuperated” during the Cold War period,
and especially in Britain.29 This meant that he was seen primarily as a satirist of
capitalist society, with his “alienation effects” becoming “pure narcissistic signals
of an ‘intellectual’ work of ‘art.’”MacCabe proposes the contrast between Lindsay
Anderson’s O Lucky Man! (1973), “an explicitly Brechtian film” that “pretends
to offer a tableau of England” while merely providing the spectator with a superi-
or view of national stereotypes, and Godard’s similarly panoramic view of France
in Tout va bien, where “the tableaux are used to reflect the contradictions with-
in the society.” Here was a case study of productive versus de-politicised Brech-
tianism; and by way of historical parallel, the same issue of Screen included Walter
Benjamin’s 1931 attack on the “left-wing melancholy” of the poet Erich Kästner.
The centrepiece of this issue is a group of articles about the then little-known
Kuhle Wampe. But these were followed by an important debate contained in
two articles that dealt explicitly with the relationship between Shklovsky’s ostrane-
nie and Brecht’s Verfremdung. In the first, Stanley Mitchell set out to “specify the
relationship between Shklovsky’s notion of ostranenie (making-strange) and
Brecht’s Verfremdung, which has immediately the same meaning.”30 He starts
from the observation that Shklovsky’s original insight was “purely aesthetic,”
claiming that the proper role of art is to de-routinise, to “make strange” the fa-
miliar, and hence to “refresh our perception,” a polemic aimed at both the tradi-
tional Russian aesthetics of literature as moral guidance and at Symbolist trans-
cendentalism. Nearly twenty years later, after Formalism had been proscribed
under Stalin’s regime, Brecht would ask, “if the world could be shown differ-
ently... could it not be differently made?”31 What links the two concepts, Mitchell
suggests, is that they capture the theoretical imagination because they “strike at
their objective homonym, i.e. the alienation of consciousness which is the reflex
of capitalism.”32
Here Mitchell invokes the historical underpinning behind Brecht’s term. If, ac-
cording to Marx, labour under capitalism produces alienation, and if capitalist
entertainment seeks to distract from, or domesticate, such alienation, then the
“resisting consciousness” seeks to “make alien the alienation.” Both concepts,
Mitchell notes, were formulated in times of crisis, ostranenie during the First
World War and on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and Verfremdung
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amid Hitler’s “fascist counter-revolution.” The former, even if at first “only” an
aesthetic position, would effectively be politicised in 1920s Soviet Russia by the
Constructivist and Productivist artists of Lef and other groups, while the latter was
intended to “shock people out of a passive-fatalistic acceptance of authoritarian
politics.”33
Ben Brewster’s response to this account, while accepting its general trajectory,
sharply challenged the implication that Russian Formalism remained essentially
“neo-Kantian” since this would leave it open to the charge of idealism from a
Marxist standpoint. Quoting Shklovsky’s contemporary and founder of the Mos-
cow branch of the movement, Roman Jakobson, he refutes the charge that For-
malism advocated art for art’s sake and argues that “the Marxist Formalists were
attempting to inscribe their practice within the terms of... cultural revolution,
surely an authoritative concept of Marxism-Leninism.”34 The issues at stake here
may seem relatively theological at this distance in time, although they reflect the
intense doctrinal debates with the Left that followed the disappointment of 1968
and subsequent period of industrial and political turmoil in Britain. What mat-
tered was the vindication of Formalist analysis as a legitimate tradition of work
towards “cultural revolution.”
The Return of “Formalism”
Russian Formalism was certainly a topic of lively interest in 1970s Britain after its
long history of controversy since the late 1920s. No less than Brecht’s “alienation
effect,” it had acquired a problematic political ballast by the 1960s. Its most fre-
quent use was as a blanket term of condemnation during the Stalin era, applied
indiscriminately to any artist or movement deemed to be deviating from the
orthodoxy of Soviet Socialist Realism. In 1928, Eisenstein had dismissed Vertov’s
work in 1928 as “formal trifles and mischief with the camera,” implicitly making
use of the already prevailing attitude of hostility towards whatever seemed overly
concerned with form rather than substance. During the show trials of the late
1930s, it became part of the litany of accusation that preceded many arrests, and
Sergei Tretyakov was one of the intellectuals executed on specious charges of
espionage in 1937. After the ferocity of the Purge, “Formalism” could not be dis-
cussed openly, although Shklovsky’s 1940 biography of Mayakovsky – who had
become an icon of Stalinist culture after his suicide – boldly argued that “ec-
centric art could be realistic art” (with “eccentrism” serving as a code for various
forms of non-realist art).
After Stalin’s death in 1953 and the programme of relative liberalisation under
Khrushchev that came to be known as the Thaw, Western interest began to grow
in the hothouse of avant-garde activity that preceded and followed the Russian
revolutions of 1917. Much of this interest was centred on the visual arts and on
film, with the Constructivist and Lef groups a particular focus for new scholarship
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and translation. Translations of texts by Eisenstein and Vertov began to appear in
the 1960s, and two of their most obviously “Formalist” films – Eisenstein’s The
Strike and Vertov’s The Man With a Movie Camera – started to circulate
widely in film societies and colleges, lending substance to the idea of a revolu-
tionary cross-media avant-garde, which saw no contradiction between formal in-
novation and political agitation. When Godard joined the striking students and
workers in Paris in 1968, he and his associates adopted the emblematic nom de
guerre of the Dziga Vertov Group. In Britain, similar links would be made between
contemporary politics and the independent filmmaking groups, such as the
Berwick Street Collective, who maintained an interest in Soviet cinema through
their association with Chris Marker’s Slon and by making an English version of
Marker’s The Train Rolls On, about the agitational and satirical films of Alex-
ander Medvedkin.
A major exhibition of Russian avant-garde art at the Hayward Gallery in Lon-
don in 1971 provided a focus for the post-war generation’s new engagement with
the experimental period of Soviet culture. Work by artists belonging to the rich
ferment of groups that included Futurists, Suprematists and Constructivists
stimulated broad interest in the Soviet artists who had emerged before the Bol-
shevik Revolution and who in many cases rallied to support it, before the majority
found themselves at odds with the authoritarian regime imposed by Stalin in the
1930s. And a reminder that the Khrushchev Thaw was over came when a number
of promised works were withheld by Soviet authorities from the Hayward exhibi-
tion. Meanwhile, a film commissioned to accompany the exhibition, Art In
Revolution by Lutz Becker, helped make connections between the Russian vi-
sual artists of the 1920s and the filmmakers. Many of them had been well-known
internationally since the 1920s – Pudovkin and Eisenstein were by far the most
famous of all Russian “revolutionary” artists – and their writings as well as their
films had long been available.
However, by 1970 these had long been associated with an unsophisticated sup-
port for the Soviet regime – a position that many in the New Left would regard as
equivalent to “vulgar Marxism.” What began in the early 1970s was a process of
exploring the diversity of Russian Modernist culture that would bring to light a
wide range of hitherto unknown artists and scholars – including the various
Formalist critics, many of whom became involved with cinema, visual artists who
were also title and set designers, and pioneering literary theorists. Through trans-
lations published in Screen, starting with a pioneering special issue on Soviet film
in the 1920s that coincided with the Hayward exhibition (12.4, winter 1971-2) [fol-
lowing the special issue of Cahiers, “Russie années vingt,” 1970] and a later issue
largely devoted to the critic and “factographer” Osip Brik and in Twentieth Century
Studies, a journal more aligned to the visual arts (7-8, December 1972), an impor-
tant body of early theoretical analysis of cinema became available, and soon fed
into the burgeoning activity of contemporary theorists.
90 ian christie
Probably the most influential of the newly discovered Russian Formalists was
Vladimir Propp, whose Morphology of the Folktale quickly became an inspiration for
those seeking to apply structural analysis to popular cinema. But essays by Boris
Eikhenbaum were equally important in suggesting a new field of inquiry into “in-
ner speech” in cinema.35 The discovery that Eisenstein had been in close contact
with such figures in Soviet psychology as Lev Vygotsky and Alexander Luria,
whose work was also belatedly being translated, gave fresh impetus to Eisenstein
studies, rescuing him from an association with Stalinist culture that had been
fostered by the wide circulation of Alexander Nevsky during and after the
war. In the 1970s, a “new” Eisenstein began to emerge, located at the centre of
diverse 1920s avant-garde networks and strongly committed to sophisticated
theoretical speculation.36 As we have noted, however, it was Vertov, the prophet
of the “kino-eye,” who seemed a more attractive role model than Eisenstein for
the revolutionaries of 1968 and their immediate successors, seeking to build a
radical independent film practice in the 1970s.
Penthesilea (1974) by Laura Mulvey and Peter Wollen, ‘posing the question of film as text’.
What was the relationship between these exemplary models from the past and
current practice? Theorists grouped around Screen generally agreed that, in Ste-
phen Heath’s words, it was “not a question of defining an essential ‘Brechtian-
ism’ and then casting around for films that might agree with it.”37 Rather, the
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aim should be to use “the emphases of Brecht’s theory and practice as a means of
grasping, understanding, helping to resolve difficulties related to the artistic and
ideological intervention of film.”38 Despite the wish to avoid setting up exemplary
works as models, there was clearly an unofficial pantheon – Godard, Straub/Huil-
let, Oshima – with a number of historic works associated with key foundation
figures also subject to privileged exegesis, including the newly validated early So-
viet works and Kuhle Wampe. But were there British examples to set alongside
these?
Distanciation in Practice
Two films in particular showed the impact of “theory” in mid-1970s Britain. In-
deed, neither would be fully comprehensible without some knowledge of what
shaped their much-debated “difficulty.” The Nightcleaners (1975) had be-
gun as one of a number of films linked to the emerging Women’s Liberation
movement, in this case supporting a campaign to secure better conditions for
office cleaners. But having gathered interviews and clandestinely shot footage of
the cleaners at work, the Berwick Street Collective did not produce a cinéma-verité
style portrait of the cleaners and their struggle but a feature-length work that
refused overall narrative and fragmented its material.39 Techniques used included
refilming (to produce a grainy “second-order” image), retaining footage normally
discarded, such as the clapper-board, and the repetition of shots. The most strik-
ing compositional technique is the use of black spacing to separate individual
images. Two of the film’s leading supporters, Claire Johnston and Paul Willemen,
discussed this in their presentation at the Edinburgh “Brecht and the Cinema”
event:
The black spacing re-focuses our attention on the editing work, but the alter-
nation between image/black spacing/image also serves as an analogy for the
composition of the image band itself, for this consists of a series of separate
images. The ‘blind spots’ between them, normally invisible [...] are re-intro-
duced by the marked interruption of marked groups of images.40
Developing this analysis of the semiotic implications of the black spacing, John-
ston and Willemen went on to suggest that it strikes at the usual “plenitude” of
the film frame, which is the basis of its claim to transparency, to present an ana-
logical “truth” about the world (“the truth 24 times per second,” as Godard had
said in his pre-Marxist period). By interrupting this “illusion of homogeneity,” the
filmmakers were, they claimed, “re-introducing contradiction into the frame” and
were also alluding to the “absent” images that could not be filmed. Above all,
they argued, such strategies gave the spectator “an incentive to think.”
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In Edinburgh, The Nightcleaners fulfilled an important role as a putative
British “Brechtian” film, which was itself an issue of lively debate. Johnston and
Willemen drew attention to the film’s Brechtian treatment of the workers it
shows, “not only as a member of a class but also as an individual” and to “the
use of what Brecht called ‘quotable gestures,’ such as the slow motion gesture of
the black woman hoovering an office,” which is repeated.41
Brecht had become the touchstone for a contemporary political cinema, as he
had been for theatre in Britain a decade earlier. But the “devices” used in the film
could equally be considered a revival of those used by Soviet avant-garde film-
makers in the 1920s, which had attracted the attention of Formalist critics seeking
validation of their theories in revolutionary practice. Screen had already published
two unfilmed scenarios by Mayakovsky in the “Soviet Film 1920s” issue in 1971,42
which were introduced by Peter Wollen, whose influential Signs and Meaning in the
Cinema had first brought Brecht and a “reinvented” Eisenstein together as models
for a Modernist political cinema. Mayakovsky’s scripts made extensive use of fil-
mic tricks, ranging from reverse motion to animation combined with live action,
to “defamiliarise” what he saw as cinema’s automatism. Wollen stressed the po-
tential to “learn from Mayakovsky as we can learn from Eisenstein or Dziga
Vertov”43 and would soon put this advice to good use in his own practice. Mean-
while, the complex reworking of the image in The Nightcleaners also bore a
considerable formal similarity to the work of such American avant-garde film-
makers as Stan Brakhage, Ken Jacobs and the “structural filmmakers” identified
by Sitney, albeit few of them would have claimed any left-wing political motive for
their “defamiliarisation.” And it was American independent film that would influ-
ence the period’s other exemplary film.
Penthesilea (1974) marked a deliberate blurring of the difference between
creative and critical activity and a first step into production by the critics Laura
Mulvey and Peter Wollen, made while they were working in the United States.
The film’s ostensible subject is the legend of the Queen of the Amazons, but this
is no more than a starting point for a series of five tableaux, each presented in a
different filmic form, which simultaneously explore the myth of the Amazons as
strong, militant women, and the history of forms of representation that make
speaking about/by women possible. Thus, after the first tableau showing Hein-
rich von Kleist’s play Penthesilea performed by a mime troupe, later sections
include painted images, archive film, video and direct address to camera. Unlike
The Nightcleaners, Penthesilea had an explicit ambition to bring to-
gether the widest possible range of cultural references and practices, including
anthropology, psychoanalysis, film theory and feminism, to present them in a
“diagrammatic” form. In a 1974 interview with the filmmakers in Screen, Wollen
spoke of Penthesilea as “posing the problem of film as text rather than as pure
representation”44 and argued for their film as a contribution to theory, intended
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primarily for a “cadre” or initiated audience, as distinct from what would have
been appropriate in an agitational or propaganda film.
Wollen was already one of the British film theorists most involved with reasses-
sing early Soviet culture and Mulvey had been writing feminist art criticism before
they became filmmakers. In doing so, they opened the way for a rapprochement
in the mid- and late 1970s between avant-garde filmmakers, who were in some
cases also theorists, and their more Hollywood-oriented contemporaries, now in-
fluenced by the radical turn taken by Godard and Cahiers du cinéma. In 1975, Mul-
vey’s celebrated Lacanian essay on “Visual Pleasure” ultimately called for a re-
orientation towards new pleasures, beyond those of traditional Hollywood, how-
ever cleverly this might be “deconstructed” or read against the grain. And in the
following year, Wollen’s essay “The Two Avant-gardes” invited adherents of both
the Modernist tradition and the Brecht-Godard-Straub/Huillet camp to consider
their common interest in foregrounding the conventions and material of film, in
a spirit that directly evoked the original Formalist links with Futurist and Con-
structivist artists in Russia. In another creative superimposition, like that of “alie-
nation,” “materialism” became a common issue for avant-garde and political ra-
dicals. Mulvey and Wollen would continue their parallel careers as critics and
filmmakers, making Riddles of the Sphinx (1978) and Amy! (1979) after
Penthesilea, both continuing to put into practice a range of neo-Formalist
strategies. The films were highly reflexive and “literalist,” drawing attention to
film language and technology, combining fiction and documentary, and making
use of mimetic forms and devices to “retard” and defamiliarise the perception of
the everyday and of history.
Artist filmmakers associated with the London Filmmakers’ Co-operative, such
as Malcolm Le Grice, Peter Gidal and Lis Rhodes, already familiar with the canons
of Modernism and Conceptualism, directly addressed aspects of film form and
materiality/“textuality” in their work during the 1970s and early 1980s. Le Grice
made three highly reflexive feature-length films between 1977 and 1981, which
explored the construction of filmic space, time and identification, focusing atten-
tion on the production of narrative out of perceptual paradoxes.45 The fact that
these shared an English suburban setting, rather than the more exotic locations
of L’année dernière à Marienbad (Last Year at Marienbad) or the
American wilderness of Brakhage, aligned them with the Modernist literary tradi-
tion of Joyce and Woolf. Feminism also became a distinctive influence on British
avant-garde filmmakers, in works as diverse as Lis Rhodes’ structuralist Light
Reading (1978), Sally Potter’s deconstructed melodrama Thriller (1979), and
The Song of the Shirt (Sue Clayton and Jonathan Curling, 1979), an epic
exposé of the exploitation of women in the nineteenth-century garment trade that
mingled genres in Brechtian style.
Although little of this work offered easy identification or traditional pleasures
to viewers, many of the texts and films would become part of the foundation
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corpus of the new academic discipline of film studies. The cultural politics of the
1960s and 1970s frequently invoked doctrines and conflicts of the interwar years
as a touchstone of revolutionary purity. Thus, the Russian Formalist critics and
the avant-garde artists linked to them had to be defended against charges of ide-
alism or a failure to grasp Marxist principles. Equally, the fact that many of these
critics and artists were denounced and persecuted in the USSR – and especially by
Stalin’s opponent, Trotsky – had to be explained in such a way that did not simply
reinforce Cold War anti-Sovietism.46 By the late 1970s, however, a major revision
of traditional interpretations of the early Soviet era was underway, which went
some way towards recognising the relative autonomy of the aesthetic that had
been asserted by both Marx and Engels. The films and writings of Eisenstein and
increasingly Vertov continued to dominate, but in 1979 a retrospective of Soviet
“Eccentrism” at the National Film Theatre in London opened up new perspectives
on the relationship between Formalism and early avant-garde filmmaking.
This series included films by the FEKS group, led by Grigori Kozintsev and
Leonid Trauberg, by Lev Kuleshov and members of his workshop, including Boris
Barnet, by the long-despised pre-revolutionary veteran Yakov Protazanov and by
Alexander Medvedkin. Many of the films were comedies, or included comic ele-
ments, and parody was also a recurrent feature. This display of “another kind of
Soviet cinema,” as the season’s planner John Gillett described it, challenged the
monolithic view of Soviet montage cinema and showed films that were interact-
ing with contemporary reality, and with a wide range of other texts, from both
past and present. To accompany the season, a booklet of translations was pub-
lished, FEKS, Formalism, Futurism: ‘Eccentrism’ and Soviet Cinema 1918-36,47 which in-
cluded writings by filmmakers and critics of the time, as well as the introduction
to a French translation of the 1927 booklet Poetika Kino.48 Not only was this alter-
native canon of Soviet cinema welcomed as a corrective to the traditional canon
that had been established in the 1920s, but the articles by Shklovsky, Tynyanov
and others made clear what had passed between filmmakers and critics in the
1920s.
Kozintsev recalled the FEKS group’s experience of working with Tynyanov on
The Overcoat:
For us this project became vitally important. A strange thing happened to us;
at a time when we were exclusively devoted to the cinema... we plunged into
Gogol’s stories – and found it impossible to tear ourselves away. Immersing
ourselves in a book written at a time when cinema did not exist, we discovered
something new about the expressive possibilities of the screen... We were
learning one of the most complex procedures in the art of the filmmaker –
how to read that art.49
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In later years, both Kozintsev and Trauberg, understandably, would play down
the influence of Formalism on their work. But in 1928, Shklovsky provided a clear
rationale for Eccentrism as, effectively, Formalist poetics in action:
Eccentrism is based on the selection of memorable moments, and on a new,
non-automatic, connection between them. Eccentrism is a struggle with the
monotony of life, a rejection of its traditional conception and presentation.50
Another contributor to the 1928 anthology, Vladimir Nedobrovo, carefully distin-
guished the FEKS group from the “Eccentrism of the music hall and the variety
theatre,” which is associated with Marinetti’s Italian Futurism. Instead, he ar-
gued, using Shklovsky’s terminology:
The FEKS try to convey the sense of an object ‘through vision and not through
consciousness.’ Their Eccentric concept is one of ‘impeded form.’ Impeded
form extends the period of time taken by the audience to perceive an object
and complicates the whole procedure of perception.
The FEKS work on the alienation of the object. Alienation – the extraction of
an object from its automatic state – is achieved in art by various methods
[which] Shklovsky has demonstrated in his Theory of Prose.51
Narboni’s preface to the French translation of Poetika Kino acknowledges the dif-
ferences between various Formalists, notably Jakobson and Shklovsky, leaders of
the Moscow and St. Petersburg groups, respectively. But it also stresses the con-
tinuing value of the fabula/suzhet distinction, here construed as “material” and
“construction,” and links Eikhenbaum’s ideas about film and inner speech with
Christian Metz’s then-contemporary conception of film as “signifying practice.”
Narboni quotes Tynyanov to explain this process as a way of rebutting Bazin’s
charge against montage cinema:
The film’s ‘play’ enables the spectator to read it: s/he has been ‘introduced into
the action,’ as Tynyanov says, and is thus ‘edited.’
In spite of loose terminology and mentalist presuppositions, this is a very long
way from the idea of the cinema (and particularly a cinema of ‘montage su-
preme’ and ‘sovereign manipulation’ [Bazin’s phrases]) as hammering home
to the impotent and passive spectator its univocal (and of course politically
‘directed’) significations.52
Leaving aside the internecine controversies of the period (between Cahiers and
Cinéthique, and Cahiers and Positif), what remains clear is the leading part played by
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the rediscovery of Formalist writing about the cinema in moving beyond Bazin to
create a new kind of discourse about film.
The 1980s would see widespread and varied uses of Formalist approaches to
the filmic text, as the writings of Shklovsky, Jakobson, Tynyanov and Eikhenbaum
were assimilated. Much of this influence would be mediated through French
theorists, notably Roland Barthes, Christian Metz and Gerard Genette, who had
been among the first avid readers of the Formalists in translation during the
1960s. The many full-scale semiotic analyses of single films that appeared during
the 1980s, and the studies of narration and its historical modes in Hollywood by
David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, can all be counted as descendents of the
key Formalist insights of the 1910s and 1920s – insights which had to wait for a
later historical conjuncture to achieve their wider impact and development.53
Brecht and Eisenstein, a photograph taken by Sergei Tretyakov in 1932.
When Shklovsky gave the title Knight’s Move to a collection of occasional writings
in 1923, he explained the significance of the title: “The knight is not free – it
moves in an L-shaped manner because it is forbidden to take the straight
road.”54 Formalism was forced underground, or into emigration, to be rediscov-
ered, along with Marx’s early writings and the shrewd dialectics of Benjamin and
Gramsci, at a time when Western intellectual life needed new bearings, new ways
of understanding the rising tide of post-war “mass communications.”55 Near the
end of his life, Brecht argued that “fake solutions in the arts must be combated as
fake social solutions” – to which he added, “not as aesthetic mistakes,” since he
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was writing in 1953 to protest against the continued stigmatizing of “Formalism”
by the Stalinist leaders of the GDR.56 Formalist analyses, like Brecht’s advice on
showing “how things really are,” were not prescriptive formulae but invitations to
demystify and to experiment. They also offered hope, as did Benjamin and
Gramsci, to a generation that felt stifled by resurgent consumerist capitalism that
cultural struggle mattered.
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Ostranenie in French Film Studies:
Translation Problems and Conflicting
Interests
Dominique Chateau
When one thinks of the use of a concept in a given context, like the corpus of a
discipline, one refers either to the linguistic sign (word or expression) which de-
notes this concept or to the conceptual content which is embedded in the sign,
and perhaps even to the ideas the term evokes. If, moreover, the question is about
importing the concept into a foreign language, it complicates matters further: we
not only have to consider the occurrence of the original word in the new context,
but also its translations as far as they are explicit. In our case, the French Film
Studies form the context in which the concept ostranenie will be explored. Even
though the context is narrow, the body of written texts on the subject of film is
rather extensive. Remarkably, these writings do not refer to ostranenie as such, or
so rarely that using this word seems to be superfluous, when we focus on the
word itself, and infinite, when we consider the series of more or less close trans-
lations. To give an extensive analysis of this subject is far beyond the scope of this
paper, and I shall therefore restrict myself to a few relevant observations.
French Discovery of Formalism
First of all, the absence or the rarity of the word ostranenie in French Film Studies
has something to do with the general characteristics of a French habitus. One
must be wary of clichés, but it is clear that French culture has a strong centripetal
tendency which manifests itself in the difficulty with learning foreign languages.
We may presume that this is because the genius of the language offers a kind of
resistance to alteration based on an old political centralism.1
Nevertheless, the concept behind ostranenie found a place in several French
books, primarily in works on literary criticism, but the word itself was rarely used
in reference to the concept. As a result, there was a proliferation of proposals for
the translation of the word: défamiliarisation, estrangement, singularisation, differencia-
tion, and so on. With regard to this proliferation, contradictory ideas come to
mind. If just one word could involve so many linguistic variations, it is probably
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because its original semantic content is vague or ambiguous. But the reverse is
also true, in so far as we can surmise that the dispersal of the French translation
proceeds from the exclusion of the original word.
In the narrower context of French Film Studies, we once again see this kind of
dispersal. An obvious reason which explains why there was such a dispersal of
linguistic variations is that the writings in this field were influenced by the extent
of knowledge the authors had about Russian Formalist theories, which was not
first-hand but second-hand knowledge, refracted by the choices of translation. It
was Tzvetan Todorov who provided the French with the first translation of Viktor
Shklovsky’s “L’art du procédé” (“Art as Technique”), and thus set in motion a
process of translation that would prove to be anything but simple and straightfor-
ward. In his anthology of Formalist texts entitled Théorie de la littérature (1965),
Todorov chose the word singularisation without clarifying his choice of word.2 Pre-
viously, in the passage of “La théorie de la ‘méthode formelle’,” where Boris
Eichenbaum refers to Shklovsky’s conception, we find only a very short footnote
attached to the first occurrence of the French word singularisation.3
The French word singulier has several meanings that we can translate in English
by odd, strange, remarkable, rare, unique, singular or single. As an abstract word,
singularité denotes a quality of uniqueness or signifies that which is rare, strange,
and original. The verb singulariser means to be distinguished from others, while se
singulariser means to be noticed by some uncommon or strange character. It fol-
lows that the neologism singularisation is ambiguous: it can refer to both an effect
of uniqueness or strangeness. In a way, something strange can also be considered
unique, but the contrary is not true: fingerprints are unique but not strange.
Moreover, according to Shklovsky’s definition, ostranenie means an effect of stran-
geness produced by the transformation of a common object, and by a device ap-
plied to its form. The result is that perception becomes compromised because it
forestalls interpretive closure; it is difficult to make sense of what we are seeing.
Todorov’s anthology lacks the kind of critical elaboration in which the translation
of ostranenie by singularisation would have been justified. Such an elaboration would
have been beneficial for a better understanding of the word and for the discussion
about the ambiguous nature of the concept. To fully understand ostranenie, one
has to accept that ambiguity is an essential part of the equation: a part that, in
effect, keeps stirring up various debates surrounding the concept.
Knowing the difficulties Todorov is faced with in translating ostranenie into
French, it stands to reason that other languages might encounter the same prob-
lem. Comparing different languages and their choices of translation could indeed
be fruitful for the debate on the concept. According to Pere Salabert from the
University of Barcelona,4 the Spanish translation of ostranenie is extrañamiento,
which means: what has the condition to be or to feel (ñamiento) on the outside, or
alien (extra). In this case, the ambiguity of translation leaves room for ontological
overtones. For example, te extrañado means “I missed you,” or more literally, “you
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remained outside of me.” These derivations also call to mind figures of speech in
which a word or a phrase is often used that diverges from the normal or literal
meaning. It is well known that figures of speech are sometimes designed to clar-
ify the thought while, at other times, they render it ambiguous through the inter-
play of literal and figurative meanings. Whether in French or in Spanish, the
translation of ostranenie defies explicitness of meaning; acknowledging its ambig-
uous nature will help understand one of its subtleties.
A Challenge for Structuralism?
In the 1960s, the French structuralists (Brémond, Barthes, Genette, among
others) incorporated several Formalist concepts into their theories, but ostranenie
or its translations have somehow failed to catch their attention. This disregard of
the concept is probably due to the influence of Roman Jakobson on the French
intellectual stage. In the Preface of Théorie de la littérature, he is hasty in criticizing
the idea of ostranenie:
One would be wrong to identify the discovery, or even the essence of “forma-
listic” thought in the cliches about what art is supposed to do, which would be
to look at things afresh, to deautomatize them so they become surprising (“os-
tranénie”); while, in fact, the essence needs to be located in the poetic lan-
guage. In the dynamic relation between the signifier and the signified, as well
as between the sign and the concept. 5
The second part of this assertion is very significant, insofar as it indicates a very
precise direction for research as explored by European linguistics and structural-
ism. That is, it indicates a shift away from Shklovsky and ostranenie towards a
specifically Jakobsonian-linguistic research agenda.
This shift in research agenda has been noted by other scholars as well. Meir
Sternberg, in a text where he revisits ostranenie “from the viewpoint of narrative
theory and history,”6 for instance, writes that “Gérard Genette’s Narrative Discourse
[…] and Roland Barthes’s S/Z […] never refer to ‘ostranenie’ and hardly ever to its
originator, as if following Jakobson’s example.”7 Sternberg is particularly inter-
ested in revealing the implicit impact of Shklovsky’s theories on structuralist
texts:
[…] Genette’s Narrative Discourse […] proves to be on the whole a zealous
rehearsal and ramification of Shklovsky, indeed far more so than certain des-
cendants within Formalism itself. All the essential premises that we have ex-
trapolated, complete with some further Shklovskian aids and hallmarks, now
reappear [...] In the modern afterlife of estrangement, Genette’s Narrative Dis-
course is the widest-ranging and, for better or worse, most comparable rever-
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sion to [Shklovsky’s] The Theory of Prose, yet far from the only one. It in turn
finds assorted echoes, analogues, variants among contemporary inheritors,
even outside its Structuralist persuasion and line of influence.8
As for Barthes, Sternberg argues, “in his S/Z, the opposition of the familiar to the
defamiliarized reappears in the guise of the ‘readerly’ (lisible) vs. the ‘writerly’
(scriptible) text.”9 Sternberg’s purpose is very precise and interesting, and the
way he insists on emphasizing the complete concealment of ostranenie in structur-
alist texts is certainly very convincing.
Another scholar who alludes to Shklovsky and the concept of ostranenie but re-
frains from calling it by its proper name is Tzvetan Todorov. In his introduction
of Théorie de la littérature, Todorov merely mentions that “thirty years later, the
information theory resuscitates Shklovsky’s theses by explaining that the informa-
tion received by a message decreases as its probability increases.”10 This remark
suggests a comparison with Umberto Eco’s open work thesis, which states that
the poet introduces organized disorder in the linguistic system to “increase its
capacity of information.” Within this context, Eco stresses that the concept of
ostranenie denotes “making strange, making different, to be detached from hab-
its.”11 The “effect of strangeness” Eco refers to, however, must not be con-
founded with the Baroque principle of substituting the complex for the simple.
Thus, the incorporation of Formalist concepts in structuralist theories may not
have done much for the clarification and proliferation of the term ostranenie, but it
did show that the concept itself warranted discussion within a structuralist con-
text. On the rare occasions the term was actually used, however, the translation
proved to be as precarious an ordeal as it was to fully grasp the complexity of
ostranenie.
Terms, Competition, and Ideology
Within the French vocabulary of theory, ostranenie had to face the competition of
two concepts: Brecht’s Verfremdung and Freud’s Unheimliche, which translates as la
distanciation et l’inquiétante étrangeté, respectively. These two terms contain the idea
of a distance from the familiar, but not without ambiguity. In this case, we again
witness the effect of refraction produced by the translation, which, for example,
can be measured by the subject matter in Film Studies that the two terms have
helped to develop. Within Film Studies, a particular film genre seems most suita-
ble for the implementation of the concept. Das Unheimliche, translated by l’inquié-
tante étrangeté (literally, worrying strangeness), for instance, suits the genre of fan-
tasy films very satisfactorily; while ostranenie seems more appropriate for the
specific kind of film where the fantasy effect proceeds less from a transcendent
origin (the supernatural) than from a way of making the familiar world look
strange and unreal.12 Although the concept of ostranenie appears in some texts
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about fantasy films, the Freudian reference is used more frequently and exten-
sively. Concerning la distanciation, this translation of die Verfremdung has led to con-
fusion with the Kantian interpretation of disinterestedness or the idea of a psychic
distance in aesthetical experience. The complications of this confusion are ad-
dressed in Bourdieu’s analysis of pure aesthetics as opposed to popular aes-
thetics.13 Instead of interpreting distanciation as a formal device that aims to trans-
form the perception of the viewer (this is, for Brecht, the true meaning of
Verfremdung) in a way that can be compared to the effect of ostranenie, Bourdieu
considers distanciation an intellectual strategy aiming at the absorption of popular
art in the intellectual way of experiencing art.14
The underlying ideology which determines this position can also explain the
suspicion that hangs over ostranenie in French Film Studies. In 1970, the well-
known French magazine Cahiers du cinéma (no. 220-221) published a special issue
entitled Russie années vingt. In this issue we find two translations of Russian Form-
alists’ texts extracted from Poetika Kino: Yuri Tynyanov’s “Des fondements du ci-
néma” (The Fundamentals of Cinema) and Boris Eichenbaum’s “Problèmes de la
ciné-stylistique” (Problems of Cinema-Stylistics). We should first emphasize the
great impact these original translations had at a time when the magazine pursued
a theoretical ambition that was abandoned later. At the same time, however, it is
clear that the prevailing intellectual atmosphere of criticism surrounding this
publication, which saw a transition from neo-Marxism to deconstructionism, led
more to an evaluation of the contextual links of these texts with the Soviet cinema
than to consider them as useful analytical tools. According to François Albera,
Russie années vingt was a “rediscovery of the soviet revolutionary cinema […],
which, at this time, was competing with Cinéthique for leadership on the ‘marxist-
leninist theory’.”15 Here, Formalism aroused a suspicion similar to that it had
suffered in the context of Socialist Realism. Jean Narboni, in his introduction to
the texts, poignantly emphasized:
Jakobson’s reply, with regards to the correct Formalistic method of analyzing
the true essence of the work, indicates that the focus should be on the relation
signifier/signified because that is all that distinguishes a Formalist ‘jamming’
from a possible practical materialism.16
One notices not only the reference to but the reverence towards Jakobson, as well
as the confident manner in which he relates Jakobson’s critical position on the
correct way to study a work of art, as if in agreement. Narboni continues his
argument:
The influence of Shklovsky’s theses on the necessity of “deautomatizing” the
perception by devices of “ostranenie,” a necessity refuted by Jakobson and
abandoned by Shklovsky himself (cf. Interview with Vladimir Pozner, in Les
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Lettres françaises, 17), was considerable in Russia during the 1920s […]. Within
the context of Formalism, however, Shklovsky’s theories were criticized of
being insufficiently capable of describing the dynamic relation between the
signifier and the signified, of focusing too much on the “stylistic effects” level
and on the superficial changes, and of lacking a subversive approach to the
poetic language.17
Clearly, the intellectual atmosphere of criticism during this period did not allow
for a favorable reception of Shklovsky’s theories, and the reverence towards
Jakobson by scholars such as Narboni did not help either. Dismissing the accu-
racy and importance of Shklovsky’s theories was not enough, it seems, it reads as
if he needed to be exorcised, removed from the authoritative field of French Film
Studies.
Shklovsky in the French Literary Circle
In contrast, Shklovsky’s interview with Vladimir Pozner two years earlier, in Les
Lettres françaises which was directed by Aragon,18 showed a much more appreciative
acknowledgment of Shklovsky’s ideas. The French intellectual field in which it
took place consisted of two intellectual circles in which Russian Formalist texts
were received more eagerly this time around. In a very recent text, Frédérique
Matonti gives a comprehensive account of the reception of such Formalist texts
in French structuralism by studying their political reception. She writes, “It
seemed as if these two stories, intellectual and political, formed a sort of ring of
Moebius where the two faces are indiscernible together […].”19 The intellectual
reception was represented by the circle of Tel Quel, in which Gérard Genette
played a mediating role between Philippe Sollers and Tzvetan Todorov, and the
political reception was represented by the circle with Louis Aragon at the helm.
Before appearing in Todorov’s Théorie de la littérature,20 Shklovsky’s “The Art as
Device” actually first appeared in the magazine Tel Quel. The following year, there
was a new Tel Quel meeting of which Léon Robel gives the following account:
I saw Chklovski [Shklovsky] for the first time in 1967. Not in Moscow, but in
Paris. […] That afternoon, he had an appointment with the Tel Quel team in the
Éditions du Seuil. He asked me to go with him and to act as his interpreter. We
joined Sollers, Kristeva and the other “telqueliens” in an office, Vladimir Poz-
ner was there as well […]. Chklovski started speaking of the book on which he
was working, The Rope of the Bow. And it was certainly a challenge to follow and
rephrase his excitable and fiery monologue concerning “The March of the
Horse.” It was difficult to make sense of his oblique and rambling way of
expressing himself, but I did the best I could. I was exhausted, but the audi-
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ence asked for more, and it was decided that the interview would continue at
home the following day.21
That same year, another influential meeting would take place. This time within
the political arena, which was centered around Louis Aragon, the director of Les
Lettres françaises and which involved Pozner and Shklovsky in a one-on-one inter-
view. Aragon, a member of the PCF [French Communist Party] and supporter of
the International Communist movement, was very interested in what Shklovsky
had to say because, “[...] publishing the formalists or widening their audience
[was] part of a strategy of destalinisation.”22
When it comes to the political reception of Shklovsky, we immediately notice
the change of heart towards the appreciation of Shklovsky’s theories. Unlike the
Structuralists, influenced by Jakobson, this political circle greeted the notion of
ostranenie with enthusiasm. Antoine Vitez, a major French stage director and Ara-
gon’s secretary, for example, underlined that Brecht forgot ostranenie in his defini-
tion of Verfremdung,23 while Jean-Pierre Faye said that a pole was missing “between
Shklovsky and Brecht, between ostranenie and the ‘V. effekt,’ a pole that would be
both ‘formalist’ and ‘marxist’.”24
When one reads the interview between Shklovsky and Pozner, it would be in-
correct to suggest, as Narboni did, that Shklovsky somehow abandoned his own
notion of the necessity of deautomatizing the perception by devices of ostranenie;
in fact, Shklovsky reaffirms his justification of ostranenie:
[T]his term of estrangement [written as étrangement] was a fitting term. Actu-
ally, it was not even a term, it was a feeling. […] It was a feeling that the con-
nections of the past world were false connections and that the world itself was
real, but needed to be rebuilt, and seen afresh. And in order to be seen, it
needed to be moved [déplacé]. What one said about the picture, the trope, the
naming of an object by an unusual word; these only describe a particular case
of estrangement.25
Shklovsky continues with the idea that there are two methods of thought. A scien-
tific one, consisting of concrete definitions; and an artistic one, consisting of
numerous and often contradictory definitions, “like Picasso moving [déplaçant]
the shapes of the objects as if he was turning them around.”26 The repetition of
déplacer in this text recalls Freud, especially with regard to Freud’s key term “dis-
placement,” that is, the move of the psychic accent, during which “indifferent
experiences take the place of psychically significant ones.”27 The artist, according
to Shklovsky, performs this move in order to rebuild the world, at least, on pa-
per… Furthermore, Shklovsky stresses that “estrangement is not a game, but a
way to touch the world.”28 At the end of the interview, Shklovsky justifies his
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interest inr cinema, proclaiming that cinema offers “a new key to transform rea-
lity in art.”29
Thus, ostranenie was a powerful device that could change the way the world was
perceived, and was therefore a necessity. Although Shklovsky justified ostranenie as
a key term, he did admit that he felt that the notion of estrangement underesti-
mated the emotional dimension of art.30
Reception in French Film Studies and Aesthetics
As Shklovsky already mentioned, cinema was the perfect art form in which the
devices of ostranenie could transform reality. Let us now return to the cinema to
see how Shklovsky and the concept of ostranenie were perceived, criticized and
translated within the context of French Film Studies. In a passage of his substan-
tial book on Eisenstein (Que viva Eisenstein, 1981),31 Barthélemy Amengual ex-
presses his view on the benefit of Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie for Film Stud-
ies by exploring the way Eisenstein makes use of the concept. As a critical reader
of Todorov’s Théorie de la littérature, Amengual observes:
[T]he theory of liberation from the perceptive automatism that the writer
[Shklovsky] calls the “estrangement” (ostranenie), the singularisation of what is
shown [under] the crucial concern, for Eisenstein, of the angle, the most
meaningful point of view, of the rhythmic or visual punch [“striking force”],
of the most suggestive and disturbing composition within the frame.32
Unlike Narboni, Amengual is not constrained by an underlying ideology; in fact,
he is rather open-minded about the so-called Formalist perspective, without
being embarrassed by the Formalist label. He is simply concerned with the artistic
power of the form. Although Amengual is more appreciative of Shklovsky, the
scope of his reference to ostranenie is occasional and limited to the parallel he
draws between Eisenstein and the Formalists.
More recently, François Albera published two books in which the concept of
ostranenie is more positively and accurately addressed: Les formalistes russes et le ciné-
ma (1996) and L’Avant-garde au cinéma (2005). In the first book, in which we find
the first complete French translation of Poetika Kino, he reminds the reader of the
Formalist distinction between the prosaic language and the poetic one: “the latter
distorting the former, giving to it a new function by making it strange (by keeping
it at a distance).”33 Albera uses the neologism étrangéifiant to refer to the phrase
“making strange” and distanciant to refer to “keeping at a distance.” Again, we see
that resorting to neologisms is a favorable option. In the second book, Albera
enumerates some Formalist devices such as construction, déformation, distancement,
déplacement34 to show the range of possible references to the “making strange”
element of ostranenie. Apart from the interest in and the usefulness of these two
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books, one can see that the difficulty of determining the translation and hence the
meaning of the word ostranenie remains a complicated matter in French Film Stud-
ies.
We have seen the way translation problems and conflicting interests have made
the acknowledgment, understanding, and use of the term ostranenie, and thereby
the debate about the concept, rather problematic. With regard to the problems of
translation, I would like to make a couple of suggestions. The first is that the
French translation of ostranenie is disappointing because it becomes either con-
flicted or sophisticated. The problem seems to be that something always gets lost
in the translation. We have established that the purpose of art is to make us see
things afresh, differently, it goes without saying that the most suitable translation
of ostranenie will be the one by which we gain the most. That is, the one that
comes closest to the essence of ostranenie without being burdened by underlying
connotations of some sort. Defamiliarisation, for example, indicates a loss in the
order of what is or sounds familiar, yet this term does not really specify what the
result of the process of defamiliarization exactly is. That result is best indicated by
the term estrangement, if it were not for the old-fashioned connotation it carries, or
by étrangéifier, if it were not for the sophisticated connotation it has. Distanciation or
distancement, for their part, may be confused with Verfremdung. While Differentiation
is too neutral. And so on and so forth.
One could go in other directions as well. I suggest, for example, studying the
possible analogy between ostranenie and Arthur Danto’s The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace, awkwardly translated into French as La transfiguration du banal. Inter-
estingly enough, the device of displacement is central to Danto’s idea of the com-
monplace.
On the back cover of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, we find an endorse-
ment that perfectly illustrates the subject at hand: “Danto proposes art as a meta-
phor of the commonplace. Art makes obvious things odd; it paradoxicalizes the
ordinary; it defamiliarizes. Danto’s book is fun…”35 This is not the philosopher’s
vocabulary, of course, but we can be tempted to credit him with it. Surely no
formal device applies to the objects that Danto considers, like Duchamp’s Fountain
or Warhol’s Brillo Boxes. In this case, the familiar object remains familiar, but its
displacement in the art world gives it a radical new meaning. As we know, Danto
rejects the Institutional Theory of Art (an object is a work of art if some institution
decides to agree to its exhibiting) because it:
[L]eaves unexplained, even if it can account for why such a work as
Duchamp’s Fountain might have been elevated from a mere thing to an art-
work, why that particular urinal should have sustained so impressive a promo-
tion, while other urinals, like it in every obvious respect, should remain in an
ontologically degraded category.36
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Thus, Danto confirms Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie when he acknowledges
that this transfiguration of the commonplace, triggered by the displacement of
an everyday object in the sacred space of a cathedral-like museum hall and de-
fined as an ontological change, makes us aware of the art structures and makes
explicit a way of Weltanschaung.
Finally, with respect to Danto’s Hegelian sensibility, it is commendable to take
the propositions of the German philosopher into consideration. Particularly, in
regard to resolving the problem about the contradiction between the idea of the
pictorial transfiguration, which presupposes that the objects which are pictured
have a certain nobleness, and the existence of a painting abounding in simple
objects. With regard to the latter, take a look at the following description of a
Dutch painting: “velvet, metallic luster, light, horses, servants, old women, pea-
sants blowing smoke from cutty pipes, the glitter of wine in a transparent glass,
chaps in dirty jackets playing with old cards.”37 This description “has recreated,
in thousands and thousands of effects, the existent and fleeting appearance of
nature as something generated afresh by man.”38 Therefore, the solution Hegel
proposes combines the renewal of the perception of the commonplace with the
accent on the plastic aspect of the things:
[T]his pure shining and appearing of objects as something produced by the
spirit which transforms in its utmost being the external and sensuous side of
all this material. For instead of real wood and silk, instead of real hair, glass,
flesh, and metal, we see only colors; instead of all the dimensions requisite for
appearance in nature, we have just a surface, and yet we get the same impres-
sion which reality affords.39
Concluding Remark
It seems there are many ways in which the term ostranenie can be appropriated and
translated. Perhaps the best suggestion is to recommend using the word ostranenie
itself with an explanation of all the nuances involved; that is, acknowledging the
distance vis-à-vis the familiar which is not abandoned but transfigured by a for-
mal device defining the gap as poetic or stylistic. Defining ostranenie as a rhetorical
figure, Genette writes “between word and meaning, between what the poet has
written and what he thought, grows a distance, a space, which, like any space,
has a form.”40 A closer look at the terminology used in this case will verify, once
again, the precarious nature of ostranenie. The French word for distance is écart.
The verbs écarter and déplacer are very close in meaning; both are also close to the
device of displacement as described here. That is why we have seen both transla-
tions used time and again by various scholars writing on the subject, all trying to
define a concept that seems to defy definition. What is at work is not the prede-
fined distance we find in rhetoric, in the narrow sense of the scholarly technique
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of writing, but rather a discovered, invented and personal poetical divergence dy-
namically changing the structure of meaning and creating a new form.
Or better still, a concept as dynamic and ambiguous as ostranenie deserves to
remain so. Perhaps we need to follow Shklovsky’s example and defamiliarize the
term yet again by reversing the cunning “choice” he made in spelling ostranenie
without the extra n. In the interview with Pozner in Les Lettres françaices, Shklovsky
recalls how he was visited by the collaborators of the Soviet encyclopedia on the
eve of the 50-year anniversary of the term. These men were eager to know why he
wrote ostranenie with a single n, to which Shklovsky replied, “I wrote it like that for
just one article. This is how I wrote it; let the word live thus,”41 dismissing the
matter lightly, but knowing full well what his little misspelled “trick” had brought
about. The erroneously spelled ostranenie survived and was handed down from
scholar to scholar, from text to text. It is only fitting then to restore the term to
its correct spelling, and thus defamiliarize the now well-known term ostranenie by
using the word ostranennie, with that extra n, as is done in the title of this book.
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Christian Metz and the Russian
Formalists: A “Rendez-vous Manqué”?
Emile Poppe
When Roland Barthes was asked why he scarcely wrote about the cinema, he
admitted that, for him, cinema was a subject that posed serious problems, since
the medium was too slick, too slippery.1 And when Christian Metz was asked why
he had not made more analyses of specific films, he replied in the same manner:
that he was indeed a little apprehensive of the “amiable and slippery aspects of
the film texts.” But, “not of the great amount of codes!”2
Mastering this “slippery” material was also what the Russian Formalists were
hoping to achieve. They proposed to subdivide and articulate the film into mini-
mal units.3 Drawing from a linguistic background, they were principally inter-
ested in the problem of film as a language: in what they called cine-language.4 In
retrospect, the rediscovery of early Russian Formalism by the French Structural-
ists in the 1960s – thanks to French theorists such as Tzvetan Todorov and Julia
Kristeva, who both have an East-European background – can be interpreted as a
sort of “rendez-vous manqué” for film semioticians, since the rediscovery for
them came too soon. Firstly, one should not forget that, from the 1950s onward,
Vladimir Propp was already a central figure in French structuralism, especially in
Greimasian semiology. Secondly, the central concerns of French structuralism in
those days were in part already formed by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss,
whose close connection to Roman Jakobson is well known; their article on “‘Les
Chats’ de Baudelaire” from 1962 is renowned.5 Moreover, it must be noted that it
was the theoretical work of the professional linguists not concerned with film − the
work that had a major influence on French structuralism and on Lévi-Strauss −
that found its way into film theory. Christian Metz, for instance, discusses at
length his debt to Jakobson in “Metaphor/metonymy or the Imaginary Referent,”
which is a key chapter in The Imaginary Signifier (1977). Similarly, Jakobson’s cele-
brated definition of poetic language as the projection of paradigmatic relations
onto the semantic axis found a confirmation in Bellour’s analysis of classical Hol-
lywood narratives, and it was given a reference to the “textual volume,” although
Bellour’s more obvious source is Metz’s “Grande syntagmatique.” And last but
not least, Jakobson’s essay on “Categories of the Russian Verb” proved a fertile
impulse for film narratology.6
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Ironically, the linguists among the Russians Formalists had a far deeper impact
on film theory and film semiotics in those days than scholars like Viktor
Shklovsky and Boris Eichenbaum, who came from the field of literature and who
were more preoccupied with finding a theoretical approach to cinema. They seem
to have had hardly any influence at all! Especially the so-called “Prague period”
(1920-1939) and the Semiotic period (1939-1949) of Jakobson’s work7 – as well as
the work of the Danish linguist/semiotician Louis Hjelmslev – have had an impact
on the writings and thinking of Christian Metz. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, in
the first part of his oeuvre, before Metz was exploring the psychoanalytical ap-
proach to cinema,8 he was essentially preoccupied with topics which were also
central issues in the texts of the Russian Formalists, e.g., cinema as language and
the notion of the minimal unit. But where Eichenbaum suggested “[…] that shot-
by-shot analyses would enable investigations to identify various kinds of film
phrases,”9 Metz approached these problems in terms of “codes” embedded in a
structural network, which determined the categorization and division of the so-
called “minimal units.” Metz dedicated the entire chapter IX in his Langage et cine-
ma to this problem:
A minimal unit – or a specific type of articulation integrating several units each
of which is, in its place, minimal […] – is never what is characteristic of a
language, but always of a code. No minimal unit (for specific systems of ar-
ticulation) exists in the cinema: such a unit exists only in each cinematic
code.10
One now wonders why Metz did not make an explicit reference here to what the
Russian Formalists proposed on these matters. Remarkably, he does not explicitly
acknowledge the Russian Formalists’ contribution to the topic. In fact, most of
the time he refers to them only in a rather cursory and general way. For instance,
in his “Problèmes de dénotation,” the text in which he develops his grande syntag-
matique, Metz does mention several Russian theorists, artists, and directors (Ser-
gei Eisenstein and Vsevolod Pudovkin among them who, at the time, were still
seen as part of the Russian Formalists in France), yet in a rather loose and disor-
derly way:
Among the authors who have devised tables of montage, or classifications of
various kinds – or who have studied separately a specific type of montage – I
am indebted notably to Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Kuleshov, Timochenko, Béla Ba-
lázs, Rudolf Arnheim, André Bazin, Edgar Morin, Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Jean
Mitry, Marcel Martin, Henri Agel, François Chevassu, Anne Souriau….and one
or two others perhaps whom I have unintentionally overlooked.11
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Additionally, in his Langage et cinéma, in the chapter where he studies the paradig-
matic and syntagmatic axes, Metz refers to Jakobson (and his analysis of the poe-
tical language) and Propp.
The Russian Formalists, with whose “functionalism” one is well acquainted,
claimed that the true meaning of a literary element depends exclusively on its
position […] in relation to all other elements of the text or of a larger pluri-
textual ensemble (that is to say on its function, in their terminology): its para-
digmatic status and its syntagmatic status are thus closely intertwined […]12
Despite references to articles by Boris Tomashevsky and Yuri Tynyanov, which
were reprinted in Tzvetan Todorov’s Théorie de la littérature,13 Metz was clearly
more concerned with the work of Propp and Jakobson. Furthermore, when Metz
refers to the Russian Formalists, he mostly has Eisenstein in mind. Apparently,
the rather “late” rediscovery, in France, of influential writings by Eichenbaum,
Tynyanov and Shklovsky was the reason that their names were notably absent in
Metz’s work. It must be noted, however, that Metz is not the kind of person who
fails to give credit where credit is due. When asked by Raymond Bellour whether
Metz’s Essais sur la signification au cinéma could be considered as the first writing on
cinematographic semiology, Metz replies:
[…] it is not the first work in which we find observations on the nature of
cinematographic semiology. Several contributions by the Russian Formalists
have dealt extensively with the problem of “meaning” in cinema. I am thinking
of the collection Poetika Kino (1927), with contributions by Shklovsky,
Tynyanov, and Eichenbaum, but also of some passages from works by re-
nowned film critics and theorists such as Eisenstein, Arnheim, Balázs, Bazin,
Laffay, Mitry, and the, perhaps somewhat less obvious choices, Cohen-Séat,
and Morin. These authors (and other names who presently may have slipped
my mind) all have posed relevant questions about “meaning.”14
This may well be Metz’s only reference to Shklovsky…Typically, Metz situates his
work in a large tradition, not forgetting to pay hommage to the work done by wri-
ters of earlier generations, while putting his own approach into perspective at the
same time.15 In 1972, Metz specifies that he now wishes to extend his list of
names to recognize the importance of the Russian Formalists. Metz does so in a
footnote, added to his text “Une étappe dans la réflexion sur le cinéma” originally
published in 1965:
I would like to take this opportunity to express an adjustment of appreciation.
The writings of Jean Epstein, despite being acutely insightful, now come
across as confusing, exalted, and terribly idealized, while the writings of the
christian metz and the russian formalists: a “rendez-vous manqué”? 113
Russian Formalists, yet to be discovered back then, have made an important
contribution to the study of film [in the meantime], thanks to the interest in
these writings by Cahiers du Cinéma.16
In his conversations with Raymond Bellour, Metz refers once again to the publi-
cation in the Cahiers du Cinéma. The magazine published a “special” about Formal-
ism, Russie Années Vingt, in May / June 1970, with translations of texts by Tynyanov
and Eichenbaum from Poetika Kino. In additional issues, several texts by Eisen-
stein were translated as well.
One may wonder how Metz would have responded to Russian Formalists such
as Shklovsky, Eichenbaum, Tynyanov, and others had he known about their texts
earlier. I tend to assume it may have been similar to Metz’s response to the aes-
thetics of Jean Mitry, who himself can be said to have been closer to the ap-
proaches and problems posed by these Russian Formalists, in as far as they fo-
cussed on the aesthetic dimension of film. Obviously, Metz is interested in the
linguistic aspect of the cinema, and not so much in the aesthetics of film. His
main focus of attention, particularly in his psychoanalytic phase, is not film, but
the cinema and the cinematic apparatus. His distinction between cinema and film is,
as we know, crucial in Metz’s work. For all these reasons, it is quite understand-
able that his research had far more affinities with Jakobson’s work than with
work by Russian Formalists such as Shklovsky, Eichenbaum, or Tynyanov. How-
ever, I do not want to dismiss the similarities and overlaps between the work by
the Russian Formalists and that by the Structuralists. At least in one domain they
had the same concerns.
With the Russian Formalists, the recourse to linguistic notions was part of a
cultural strategy: to help break down the division of high culture and popular or
folk culture, by developing methods of analysis which could be seen to apply to
both with equal success. This agenda may well explain why their writings were
“rediscovered” in the 1960s, when, thanks to the pervasive influence of Structur-
alism, a similar agenda took shape in the fields of study of “mass-cultural arte-
facts.”17 By the 1960s, this type of research no longer needed to be a strategic
target on the scholarly agenda, since it was there now, and it was simply consid-
ered a fact for semioticians and structuralists such as Metz, Barthes, Eco, and
others. One might therefore say that the rediscovery of the Formalists came too
late to be of specific strategic value in the debate on high and popular culture.
In retrospect, making up the balance, one may conclude that, obviously, there
was a connection between Russian Formalism and French Structuralism. More-
over, theoreticians such as A.J. Greimas, Metz, Lévi-Strauss, and others have un-
doubtedly seen the structuralist enterprise in the light of Russian Formalism.
However, there is an important restriction to be made here. The Structuralists
saw themselves working in the footsteps of Propp, Jakobson, and Trubetskoy; it
must be stressed that the other members of the group – Eichenbaum, Tynyanov,
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and Shklovsky – played a far less important role for the structuralists. One reason
is that studies by Eichenbaum, Tynyanov, and Shklovsky were not accessible at
the right time. Yet another reason, and perhaps a more important one, is that
Eichenbaum, Tynyanov, and Shklovsky were principally concerned with aesthetical
problems. Metz, a semiotician in the Structuralist tradition, can be said to have
opted, as these Formalists did, for a theoretical and systematic approach to film in
opposition to a normative aesthetical approach. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious
that Metz and the Russian Formalists worked on different levels. Whereas the
mentioned Formalists were more concerned with problems that Metz would situ-
ate on the filmic level (e.g. the notion of ostranenie and the problem of devices),
Metz himself worked almost exclusively on the cinematographic level, the cinemato-
graphic codes, and codification. On that level, a term like “ostranenie,” having a
rather broad meaning,18 could not easily have been made operational. Even if
Metz would have known the term, it would not have been suitable for his own
approach. Yet, from his remarks and annotations on his previous work, we can
deduce that he must have regretted not having known the writings of the
“literary” branch of the Russian Formalists earlier.










Should I See What I Believe?
Audiovisual Ostranenie and Evolutionary-
Cognitive Film Theory
Laurent Jullier
In my contribution to this book, I aim at exploring the potential contribution of
evolutionary-cognitive psychology in the study of defamiliarization in cinema. In-
terdisciplinarity being at the core of the study, an epistemological preamble is
necessary before analyzing what cognitive psychology has to say about the ques-
tion of perception. The findings will then be transposed to the question of per-
ception of the cinematographic spectacle: before being able to know what may be
defamiliarizing in a film, one has to wonder whether the whole cinematographic
process itself is not defamiliarizing. Three sections will then be devoted to audio-
visual ostranenie, based on three common distinctions in perception psychology:
– defamiliarizations dealing with the processes of automatic recognition of vi-
sual forms (bottom-up);
– defamiliarizations dealing with the routines associated with the exploration of
the environment by the whole body;
– defamiliarizations dealing with high-level cognitive processes such as opi-
nions and beliefs (top-down).
More generally, this contribution is based on a biocultural approach,1 i.e., it is
neither “universalist” nor “culturalist” but rather explores the interactions be-
tween the body – including the “embodied mind” and its perceptivo-cognitive
routines – and the cultural products circulating through different periods and in
different places.
Epistemological Background
For a film scholar, resorting to psychological tools amounts to entering a disci-
plinary field which, like all others, is a place of scientific debate. It is thus impor-
tant for this article to rely on consensual tools or, in the opposite case, to stress
they are debated among specialists. Besides, caution is of the utmost importance
when one exports notions from one field of study to another, especially as earlier
links between the fields of psychology and cinema are rather uncommon in the
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history of sciences. Until recently, professional psychologists have indeed paid
little attention to cinema, except for Münsterberg2 and the Franco-Italian staff of
the Institut de Filmologie.3 The advent of Evolutionary-Cognitive Film Studies in
the mid-1980s4 partly changed the situation as professional psychologists
(J. Hochberg, N. Frijda…) started to work with involved film scholars (David
Bordwell, T. Grodal, Gr. Currie…), and several meetings could take place within
the frame of associations (i.e., the Center for Cognitive Studies of the Moving
Image) or new journals (i.e., Media Psychology, published by Routledge since
1997). In parallel, experiments based on film screenings were made possible by
the development of cerebral localization, enabled by the technical progress made
in the field of medical imaging.5
Yet, reciprocal mistrust is still often at play. For reasons too complex to be
explored here,6 Film Studies often openly rejects the use of psychological tools,
while their success cannot be denied. Conversely, psychologists are suspicious of
Film Studies for a simple reason: the noblest situation in cinema, namely the
screening of a narrative feature film, is based on such a variety and complexity of
variables (in the auditorium as well as on the screen) that cinema is not a suitable
object offering the opportunity to observe daily life more simply through reduction.
Indeed, the spectator is almost entirely free in front of a screen.7 The only two
exceptions with regard to this freedom are automatic recognition (of apparent
movements on screen, of human figures, of colors, of memorized objects…) and
audiovisual anchoring (namely the ventriloquist effect made possible by the con-
current use of both screen and loudspeakers). Unsurprisingly enough, the few
psychologists resorting to cinema in their research favour these two types of
bottom-up psychological processing. Yet interdisciplinary attempts should not be
abandoned, especially as the approach is easier from Film Studies to psychology
given that most mechanisms at play in daily life can be found in a film sequence.
The Bases of Perception
To study the process of defamiliarization, one first has to examine how the feel-
ing of the familiarity of things emerges in one’s mind. Every day, all over the
world, hundreds of millions of people spend a considerable amount of time in
front of a screen where they are told stories. But what emerges from this screen
is just photons (read as images) and air vibrations (read as sounds): in no way
does this screen data form an autonomous whole including the necessary tools to
be deciphered. If these audiovisual stories are so successful, it is above all because
they are understood, and they are understood because they appeal to a perceptivo-
cognitive knowledge acquired in real life. This very knowledge transforms physi-
cal objects – photons and air vibrations – into a story which will be cognitively
constructed and potentially experienced as thrilling, enlightening, amusing, etc.,
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if one accepts being emotionally involved. The main question is then to know
how this knowledge is formed before the screening starts.
Psychologists more or less agree on the model separating the individual path
from the common path: what we know about the world individually is stored in
episodic memory, while what we all know about the world – the knowledge we
share as human beings, except if we suffer from a specific deficiency – is stored in
semantic memory. This common knowledge itself can be divided into two strata
describing our two modes of reading the surrounding world:
– A perceptive, bottom-up reading of the world, in which forms are automati-
cally imposed upon us. Ecological or naturalist psychology defends the inde-
pendence thesis, namely the primacy of the bottom-up reading over the cognitive
top-down reading, following J.J. Gibson in the case of visual perception.8 One
of the best-known scholars in this tendency is Z. Pylyshyn; for him “visual
perception is best viewed as a separate process, with its own principles and
possibly its own internal memory, isolated from the rest of the mind except
from certain well-defined and highly circumscribed modes of interaction.”9
J. & B. Anderson hold a comparable position in the field of Film Studies.10
The most interesting aspect of Pylyshyn’s theory, at least for a film scholar, is
that among the “own principles of perception” there is a “visual index that
individuates objects” so “focal attention is directed to objects in the visual
field rather than to locations.”11 This may contribute to explaining why, since
the very beginnings of cinema, the spectator has been accepting the use of
lenses with a focal length different from that of the human eye, and which
should normally provoke a defamiliarization effect by modifying spatial rela-
tions between objects, or between objects and their environment, while the
phenomenon itself is quite unusual and only occurs with extreme distances:
either very short ones, provoking trapezoidal distortions of objects near the
frame; or very long ones, flattening all objects on the horizon.12
– A cognitive, top-down reading of the world, in which we are the first to im-
pose upon the world the forms we are used to. Constructivist psychology de-
fends the continuity thesis, namely the fact that perception is permeable to cog-
nition, and thus a top-down reading is preferred, following H.L. von
Helmholtz.13 One of the best-known scholars in this tendency is Irvin Rock.14
Here, “perceptual processes are applied to the transformation of representa-
tions originating in occurrent optical input, [when] cognitive processes are
applied to the transformation of representations drawn from the preexisting
knowledge base.”15 This theory is much more successful than the first one in
Film Studies as it is more compatible with culturalist approaches.
All disciplines dealing with images are full of such oppositions. For instance, in the
academic field of aesthetic theories of painting, the difference between the anti-
interpretativist, surrogate paradigm (held by A. Danto) and the interpretativist,
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symbolic paradigm (held by N. Goodman) resembles the difference between the
naturalistic approach and the constructivist approach: the surrogate paradigm
“claims that seeing a pictorial representation of an object is, with qualifications,
like seeing the object itself,” while the symbolic paradigm “focuses attention on
syntactic and semantic features of pictures.”16 Must we choose between these two
tendencies? No. First, the difference between them is not as significant as one may
suppose: in fact, the independence thesis “applies only to the perceptual system
[because] no one disputes that the preperceptual and postperceptual systems are
greatly influenced by cognitive factors.”17 In psychology, numerous attempts have
been made to try and reconcile these two trends, if only because both automatic
recognition and imposition of figures are part of daily experience.18 U. Neisser
and H. Gardner19 are important figures of this reconciliation trend, and like
Hilary Putnam, they consider that Kant was its pioneer (Kant “built a system
where the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world”).20
Another reconciliation figure, less famous but maybe more interesting as far as
Film Studies is concerned, is the late neuroscientist Francisco Varela, who sup-
ported the theory of sensorimotor contingency. Let us take the case of color recogni-
tion: the same wavelength can be interpreted differently by different people ac-
cording to the context and the mental categories accessible to them, some of
them cultural and some universal. Knowledge is neither the reflection of a for-
merly given world nor a simple product of our representations – here the color is
in the relation between the world and perception. Both the world and the perceiv-
ing subject “determine one another” because cognition is linked to “the fact of
having a body endowed with various sensorimotor abilities”21 (the subject being
an actor at the same time). Indeed, animals have to move to find food, whereas
plants take it directly from the soil in which they grow. The aim of perception is
thus first to extract useful information from the environment, useful in terms of
actions to be envisaged. Only our surviving ancestors, those who perceived the
world in a utilitarian way, transmitted their genes to us, which allows us to speak
of perceptual veridicality.22 In this sense, perception does not exactly construct the
environment, but it selects information through expectations which are acquired (as
all pre-school teachers know) by moving around and manipulating objects – what
psychologists call enaction, i.e., the idea of experience as an activity of encounter-
ing the world. The acquisition of these expectations is based on the distinction
between egocentric and exocentric information,23 and this distinction can be
found in cinema with such classical features as shot-reverse shot and point-of-
view editing.
The last point is episodic memory, which stores the opinions, beliefs and
stereotypes we use. Even if there are actual links between automatic reactions to
the world and one’s personal opinion on it – these links are the main research
object of a branch of psychology called Socio-intuitionism24 – it is not the object
of inquiry of this present study. It is time we leave the privileged field of Cogni-
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tive-Evolutionary Psychology to enter that of social psychology, anthropology and
sociology.
Film stills 1 A classical shot-reverse shot in The Mask (Chuck Russell, 1994) Left: Tina
(Cameron Diaz) ‘as seen’ by Stanley (Jim Carrey). Right: reverse-shot. The optical point of
view is exocentric (we sit at the desk with the main characters, but we are not supposed to see
what they perceive), when the ethical point of view is egocentric (the asymmetrical shot-reverse
shot provides useful information on the character’s thoughts: Stanley’s gaze is on Tina alone
and lacks a depth of field, as if she was a unique and unreachable goddess; on the contrary,
Tina is including herself in her gaze on Stanley, indicating she is seduced and already imagin-
ing her life with him, as suggested by the old couple seated in the background.
In Front of the Screen: The Reality Effect
Before wondering whether there are particular films or figures which defamiliar-
ize us in cinema, we should wonder whether the defamiliarizing effect does not
come from the fact of watching films itself, especially as cinema offers flat images
with neat edges and full of cuts, which, on the face of it, does not look like the
sensorial experience we have of the world surrounding us. This possibility will be
rejected right away:
– we are used to flat images as we do not have the ability to see in relief (we see
2D images in a 3D world, namely we see in 2.5D as cognition specialists
say);25
– the blurred edges of our visual field constantly run into vertical and horizontal
lines restricting it, and the screen – except if very small or situated quite far
from the spectator – allows both types of vision (foveal and peripheric) to be
called upon;26
– we are not bothered by the presence of cuts as we resort to them in real life as
well: each time our eyes move to focus on something else, we are practically
blind – the nervous message drops to 10% of its value – for two-hundredths of
a second.27 This is our private way to have space and time cut in “shots,” and
we proceed this way as fast as in a MTV music video: “the eyes typically move
between two and five times per second in order to bring environmental information
into the foveal region of clearest vision.”28
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Moreover, perception itself includes all the possible optical distortions, being
both object-related – for instance when you recognize an object you can only see
a part of – and aspect-oriented – for instance with ambient lighting, or the angle
from which a surface is viewed.29
But maybe one should place permanent defamiliarization, if it ever exists, in
the category of top-down processes, in the “duality of information,” to use
J.J. Gibson’s words,30 i.e., the impression of being both in front of the world (I
believe in it, I am afraid, I am laughing…exactly as in reality) and in front of an
image (I do not believe in it, I know these are just light spots and sounds). This
position cannot be held for reasons linked to enaction, which we have already
discussed above: in front of a screen, motricity is weak, and as Th. Stoffregen
wrote, “viewing of films is partially open-loop (not responsive to perceptual infor-
mation), whereas viewing of the depicted events (if we are really in front of them)
is wholly closed-loop, or controlled with reference to perceptual information.”31
When we are absorbed by the plot, or simply interested in what unfolds before
our eyes, the computational investment (“what is going to happen now?”) and the
self-management of emotions (“I wish he could come on time!”) overflow the
sensori-motor reactions to the screen data. “Rather than being drawn into the
film (the depiction, as such), viewers are drawn into the story, that is, into the
events that took place in front of the camera.”32
In Front of the Screen: Perceptive Defamiliarizations
Cinema has two ways of defamiliarizing us: (1) by showing us the world as it is
and as we cannot see it because we are enslaved to the limits of our senses (by
showing us the world “before we look at it,” to quote M. Merleau-Ponty’s famous
formula on Cézanne’s painting); or (2) by showing it in a way that is different
from the way we see it daily.
M. Szaloky reminds us that the first option, also called the platonico-phenom-
enological option, is favored by such authors as S. Kracauer, S.M. Eisenstein,
A. Bazin, C. Metz, or G. Deleuze. “Unnegociated presence… virginal purity…
pure state” are all metaphors used by these authors to say that cinema reveals the
Real.33 The problem lies in the fact that their theories are founded on the me-
chanical nature of the film medium, which is based more on a belief than on
reality. The cinematic apparatus is molded on our body and our perceptivo-cogni-
tive dispositions – it does not come out of the blue and is not the product of a
mysterious type of “mechanics” independent from the human being either; from
Kracauer to Deleuze, nobody relies on Darwin to form an idea of perception as it
has evolved in man. Cognitive psychology is all the less inclined to validate this
belief in the revelation of a “pure Real” as it intricately links cognition and emo-
tion, and even sometimes pleasure and truth, as with a recent experiment carried
out by S. Harris.34
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Let us then examine the second option, for which psychology will provide bet-
ter heuristic services. To show us the world differently from the way we see it and
listen to it every day, cinema can mislead our perceptive routines as cognitive
psychologists describe them. To focus on vision only, here are a few examples of
these routines, concerning the spatial distribution of objects in their environ-
ment:
– most objects in the world do not fly but rely on a dense physical support;
– they tend to exist in a continuous way;
– they are rather rigid, which means that all their parts move together;
– they are rather opaque and partially hide the objects situated behind them;
– a moving object tends to progressively hide and reveal the one in front of
which it is moving.
At all times, or at least since Méliès, cinematographic defamiliarization has been
challenging the first two routines: flying objects, people or objects suddenly ap-
pearing or disappearing or spiriting away are great classics. The second rule also
explains why the action match cut without continuity, an editing figure initially
prohibited in classical Hollywood cinema, has now eventually become hegemonic
in films for the general public, music videos and commercials; it seemingly vali-
dates the rule of continuous existence without bothering whether a higher-level
cognitive reasoning will later have to correct this reading. Hollywood banned it
because of this very submission to bottom-up processes which one was afraid
would compete with diegetic absorption.
The third rule was especially challenged by Golden Age Hollywood cartoons
and their characters distorting themselves like accordions while running or fall-
ing – surrealist painting, at the time, did the same in its own way, for instance
with Dali’s “melting watches.” Even today, at a time when the progress of digital
imagery allows the making of photorealist non-rigid bodies, mainstream cinema
is reluctant to resort to them beyond the realm of science fiction (Reed Richards’s
elastic character in Fantastic Four, 2005). As for denied opacity, it is also con-
fined to fantasy and science fiction (Susan Storm’s character in the above-men-
tioned film). The fifth rule, also called interposition rule, cannot be challenged
without denying the distinction between figures and the backgrounds behind
them, which explains why it can only be generally found (with the exception of
surrealist painting once again) in non-figurative experimental cinema (for in-
stance, in Hans Richter’s short films where a geometric figure perceived as being
“in foreground” slides “in the background”). Yet some examples can also be
found in more popular types of art: the most striking of them may be George
Herriman’s famous comic strip Krazy Kat (1913-1944), which sometimes trans-
forms a background object – for instance the sun – into a concealing object.
Figurative cinema, and even cinema for the general public, can also play with
these routines of spatial distribution, but on a smaller scale – for instance by
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Film still 2 Zazie dans le métro (Louis Malle, 1960). When the police rushes into the
café Zazie and her friends have started wrecking, the policemen are moving towards the camera
– and indeed the size of their image is growing on the screen – but they do not hide what is
situated between them and the camera, even when they are quite close! On the film still, one
can see the privates appear bigger than their squadron chief in spite of the fact that he is
supposed to be in front of them! The technique of inlaying was then a little basic, so that the
spectator immediately perceives the special effect, but the whole is still quite defamiliarizing, so
much that even today, at a time when compositing would allow a perfect special effect, this
figure remains quite uncommon, even in music videos, which rely less than narrative feature
films on the obligation to conform to perceptive routines.
modifying the two monocular optical indices specific to moving objects, namely
(1) variable size (rule: the familiar size of an object changes with the latter moving
away or forward) and (2) movement parallax (rule: what is in the foreground
appears to be moving faster than what is farther away).
Defamiliarizations Linked to Enaction
Sometimes the cinematic apparatus solicits the spectator’s body entirely, but not
so frequently. J.J. Gibson wrote: “when the camera pans, the viewer might per-
ceive her head to turn.”35 But when asserting this, he underestimated the impor-
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Film still 3 Human Nature (Michel Gondry, 2001). Lila (Patricia Arquette) is singing
while walking in the forest. But neither the trees in the depth of field, nor the branches between
the camera and the actress move at the “right” speed. Whereas, since the 1930s, the job of
cartoon-makers has consisted in imitating the movement parallax induced by cameras in a
situation of lateral tracking (that is why former Walt Disney Studios animator Ub Iwerks
designed the first multiplane camera in 1933), Michel Gondry does his utmost to make the
background unfold behind the actress at the wrong pace, thus making us feel they are on two
moving walkways going at different speeds.
tance of enaction, the fact that “the act of perception depends upon movement of
the perceiver.”36
How to choose? From one point of view, one must not exaggerate the matter of
body movement when seated in front of a screen:
From visual information alone we have no trouble noticing self motion even
when we are being moved passively. [That is why] performance and experi-
ence in flight simulators is only marginally improved when body accelerations
are imitated by putting the whole simulator on a moving platform.37
From another point of view, one has to recognize that the process easily affects
the entire body at times, especially when it reproduces some movements driven by
bottom-up mechanisms (tracking shot made by a camera equipped with a short-
focal-length lens), or even some situations driven by top-down mechanisms (the
hero wants to escape as the monster is approaching, but does not manage to do
so). The run and gun style may also be quoted: for the last few years it has been
“shaking up” spectators by offering images taken by a cameraman running due to
imminent danger (The Blair Witch Project, [REC], Cloverfield).
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Yet discovering one’s body, either because anti-gravitational muscles are at play
or the inner ear transmits feelings of loss of balance (when it was released, Clo-
verfield specified, “Please note certain sections of this film may induce motion
sickness”), does not necessarily mean being defamiliarized, except maybe for
crazed intellectuals not quite used to moving. The sense of defamiliarization is
probably stronger not in these run and gun movies, but in the strange sequence
of Maya Deren’s famous experimental film Meshes of the Afternoon, in
which the actress (Maya Deren herself) is staggering up a narrow staircase and,
each time her shoulder hits one of the walls along the stairs, the camera rocks in
the same direction, as if the whole house was unstable.
Film still 4 Meshes of the Afternoon (Maya Deren and Alexander Hammid, 1943).
A casual postmodern device consists, at least since Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park (1993),
of shaking the camera when something big walks or runs near it. It can be seen as a way for
computer-generated images to “gain weight.” It conforms to our ordinary experience and our
“naive physics.” In this case, however, the link between Maya Deren’s unstable body and the
camera tripod creates a “worrying strangeness” (according to the film’s Freudian atmosphere),
causing “unmotivated” (as far as naive physics is applied) Dutch angles.
Arts or media, like installations or video games, which include a part of free ex-
ploration by the body, are likely to defamiliarize the spectator through motion.
What about cinema? When Alva Noë speaks of an art “which provides perceivers
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an opportunity of self-aware enactment” (what she calls experiential art),38 she re-
fers not only to installations, but also to the work of hyperrealist painter Chuck
Close. In front of his work, the viewer can move to “understand” how shapeless
pixels (when viewed close-up) form a photorealist face (when seen at a distance).
Philippe Parreno and Douglas Gordon’s film Zidane, a 21st Century Por-
trait has a go at it through the close-up of a refilmed display: we are shown
pixels, but we are not the ones who decide to take a step forward to see them –
the experience is different and less defamiliarizing this time. What is defamiliariz-
ing about this film is simply to see a football player filmed while he is not playing
football – but this has to do with artistic innovation more than defamiliarization.0
Let us turn instead to something simpler and the focus of less media attention,
namely a gesture made “against nature” by the actor’s body. All the flying bodies
of kung-fu films made in Hong Kong may be quoted, but there are so many of
them – and the cables holding the actors are so “visible” even when they have
been erased by cable removers – that they have eventually lost their strangeness.
A very simple example taken from Drifting Clouds (Kauas pilvet karkaa-
vat, by Aki Kaurismäki, 1996) is much more interesting to explore. At the begin-
ning of the film, Lauri (Kari Väänänen), a tram driver, is so sure he will get a
promotion when his boss asks to see him that he buys a huge television set on
credit before the meeting. We later see him coming back home and fainting when
his wife (Kati Outinen) asks him about the meeting, and we understand that in-
stead of getting a promotion he has been fired. The defamiliarizing element
comes from the fact that Kari Väänänen is seen falling flat on his back, without
his hands breaking his fall. This transgression of a motor schema deeply buried
in early childhood is at first striking even if half a second later its effect is tem-
pered by cognitive reasoning (what you need is just a mattress on the floor and a
cameraman not focusing on the actor’s feet!).39
Yet some cases are worth quoting, where defamiliarization relies on a “subver-
sion” of enaction routines; they are often marked by non-intentionality (awkward-
ness, indifference or technical limitations sometimes play a role). Most of the
time, the films we see do have a biomechanical veridicity: they give a correct de-
piction of body movement, allowing the famous “mirror neurons” to fire. If “see-
ing the biological movement of a human hand reach and grasp a target prompts a
human observer to represent the agent’s motor intention by automatically match-
ing the perceived movement onto her own motor repertoire,”40 then this is simi-
lar in real life and in front of a screen.41 Meanwhile, some animated cartoon char-
acters or computer-generated creatures (especially if not generated using motion
capture or performance capture devices) can perform non-veridical movements,
forbidding any automatic matching. The same holds for some amateur films in
which the cameraman takes a long time panning (or the editor takes a long time
cutting) to show us what a character sees on screen (or what provokes the reac-
tion of a character on screen): it misleads our motor habits (like turning one’s
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head to see what someone else can see and which, from his or her reaction,
seems so interesting – a very early habit in one’s life as babies turn their head to
look at what their own mother is looking at from the age of two or three months).
It goes without saying that Dogma films attempt to reproduce this type of “de-
layed reaction” (on the part of the cameraman or the editor) to provoke a volun-
tary type of defamiliarization.42
Our enactive habits also give us a good knowledge of naïve physics, especially
concerning the laws of causality. This is the reason why defamiliarization in cine-
ma rarely operates at this level, and why “the fictional worlds that have been cre-
ated by film directors are mostly natural law abiding” and lack “violations to nat-
ural event perception.”43 Yet examples of defamiliarization linked to enaction will
be found in exploratory scenographies allowed by the new cameras that accompa-
nied the development of postmodern cinema in the last thirty years (Steadicam,
Louma, Technocrane, Air Track Cam, Flying Cam). To explore a new space, we
move around, turn our head and glance around as we are walking. Locomotion
entails rather irregular movements of the head which our perceptivo-cognitive
system has integrated and corrects to stabilize the visual scene. This is why chil-
dren suffering from motion sickness are advised to watch the unfolding land-
scape from the car as this allows a better matching between the sensation of
moving and the visual information. But the first time cinema spectators watched
scenes shot in Steadicam (for instance in Rocky or The Shining in the late
1970s), defamiliarization was obvious: indeed, the Steadicam is specifically de-
signed to limit the irregularities of human locomotion. Its images thus produced
an impression of strangeness, before becoming familiar themselves. Nowadays,
most films and television series make extensive use of this technique, it having
lost its defamiliarizing effect.
Another example of defamiliarizing, then familiar, exploratory scenography is
the 360° travelling shot around Trinity in the opening sequence of The Matrix.
The effect is defamiliarizing because Trinity is frozen in her movement: this
forces the spectator to separate the time of exploration (allocentric count) from
the time of events (exocentric count), which never happens in reality (events con-
tinue to follow their temporal course whatever the speed at which we explore the
environment). Here I apply to the category of time the duality allocentric/exo-
centric that Alain Berthoz applies to the category of space.44
Lastly, our enactive habits, aided by the fact that our eyes are situated in front
of our head and that our body is built according to a vertical bilateral symmetry,
encourage us to lateralize our visual environment. We make a distinction between
what is in front of us and what is behind us, as well as between what is on our
left-hand side and what is on our right-hand side. This lies at the core of the 180°
rule in the classical Hollywood style, which can also be found on television when
cameras broadcasting a football match are all on the same side of the field (or
else the goals could not respectively be postulated at the correct place). Once
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again, Zazie dans le métro subverts this system of expectation of respective
positions:
Film still 5 After the expected establishing shot, which situates the scenography of the first
dinner between Zazie (Catherine Demongeot) and her uncle (Philippe Noiret), on her left-hand
side, a right-left pan starting from the uncle eventually centers on Zazie, followed by a cut
which brings us back to the uncle for a left-right pan this time. Our initial reaction is, “there
is a new guest, or a part of the decor is worth looking at, which explains this pan”…but
actually here is Zazie again. She has “moved places,” against our expectations at the moment
of the establishing shot, which of course creates a defamiliarizing effect (an object cannot be in
different places at the same time, at least not on a non-quantic scale).
Beliefs and Opinions
To evoke defamiliarization at this “higher” level of human consciousness, where
sociology is important as people’s habitus is at stake, psychology can offer a few
interesting tools, among which the meme is one. This term has been coined by
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins: a meme is a unit of human cultural trans-
mission analogous to the gene, which is a kind of replicator.45 The most famous
example is when we have a song in mind and we hum it without even noticing,
thus spreading it all around us, among the people we meet – which can be de-
scribed using the epidemiologic models of virus propagation. One may imagine
cinematographic memes, for instance a famous quote dropped in a conversation,
behavior admired in a hero or, more simply, as anthropologist Marcel Mauss had
noted in the 1930s, a way of walking seen on the screen and immediately adopted
when we walk in the street because we think it is smart.46 The existence of a
“Famous quotes” section on the IMDb site would be, in this respect, comparable
to the sneezing provoked by the flu virus of a contaminated person: they are in
both cases “inventions” they have “designed” to replicate themselves more effi-
ciently (if one accepts the questionable idea that quotes and viruses have an “in-
tention to reproduce themselves”!). A fine example of epidemiologic study could
also be based on the postmodern style, which is particularly fond of allusions,
innuendos and quotes from one film to another, for instance the Shrek or the
Kill Bill series, which quote dozens of films and are themselves quoted in
other films.47
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As far as memetics is concerned, two types of defamiliarization are possible,
corresponding to two components of meme replication.
– A type of defamiliarization through internal mutation, on the model of the
Darwinian genetic algorithm.48 For instance, numerous film extracts are “re-
plicated” very rapidly on YouTube™, but with poor quality, sound, and im-
age, which pushes spectators to pay more attention to their narrative qualities
(for example) than to their plastic qualities; or they are broadcast without their
title or with wrong information on the production date and on the actors,
which may induce a strange reading of them.
– A type of defamiliarization through external mutation, due to an imperfect
duplication on the part of the imitator.49 For instance, when Spike Jonze
quotes a scene taken from Les Parapluies de Cherbourg in his music
video for Björk’s It’s oh so quiet in 1995, he erases all the metaphors of
the scene to keep only the plastic qualities of the visual idea.50
Moreover, one may also advance the idea that memes lose their virulence over
time, exactly in the same way organisms develop defenses against viruses. For
instance, Maya Deren’s film Meshes of the Afternoon includes two effects
directly taken from Méliès:
– the instantaneous transformation of an object into another (a key is trans-
formed into a knife);
– the duplication of an actor through multiple expositions (as in Méliès’s
L’Homme-orchestre, in which Méliès films and duplicates himself, or the
actress enters a room where she already is).
But the spectator no longer reads these effects in the way he did in Méliès’s time:
he reads the transformation of the key into a knife as a metaphor (“opening a
locked up place is dangerous as one may get hurt”), which is less defamiliarizing
than a transmutation; he also reads the multiple exposition as a metaphor for the
“possible selves” of the actress or the multiple parts society compels her to play.
Conversely, what may have been read as “normal” in Méliès’s time may appear
defamiliarizing today: thus, the inflating head of L’Homme à la tête de
caoutchouc may have been read as “an inflating head” by contemporaries,
while for the twenty-first-century spectator familiar with tracking shots, it is
above all a head we move closer to, not an inflating head.
Of course, as can be seen here (since Méliès’s films were quite popular while
M. Deren’s are confined to art theaters and museums), the sensation of being
defamiliarized is conditionally linked to generic knowledge. What follows is still an-
other example:
– if the unfolding of the film is inverted and people suddenly start walking back-
wards in a film for the general public (this is what happens in Claude Miller’s
Dites-lui que je l’aime), the spectator will very likely be defamiliarized;
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– if the unfolding of the film is inverted and people suddenly start walking back-
wards in an experimental film (this is what happens in Júlio Bressane’s film O
Mandarim), the spectator will very likely find this normal and will not be
defamiliarized in the least.
Film still 6 L’Homme à la tête de caoutchouc (Georges Méliès, 1901). Méliès used
multiple exposure and “matte painting” (the term did not exist) in order to insert the tracking
shot of his own head. Since the “compositing” (another modern word) is not perfectly locked,
the head’s image is a little shaky, which now helps to see the so-called “inflating” (exocentric
reading of the scene) as a move toward the head (egocentric reading of the scene).
At last, the possibility of being defamiliarized is linked to genetic knowledge, namely
the spectator’s technical knowledge about filmmaking. Let us take the example of
the magic distortion of bodies in fantasy films. Today, it seems difficult to believe
that the contemporary spectators of Abel Gance’s La Folie du Docteur Tube
(1916) would have read the optical distortions of the film as visual traces of dis-
torted bodies, the special effects being so obvious (the camera is simply shooting
distorting mirrors that can be found in any funfair; besides, the decor itself is
distorted – not only the bodies in it). But another more recent example will help
us better understand the process: the magic potion that the main characters of
Jean-Marie Poiré’s Les Visiteurs (1993) drink is here again supposed to distort
their bodies. Unlike Gance, Poiré did not simply film basic mirrors, but resorted
to a state-of-the-art technology in 1993, namely warping. But warping is a soft-
ware distorting 2D images, while we are now used to witnessing distortions of 3D
images. As a result, a non-intentional type of defamiliarization occurs, as in La
Folie du Docteur Tube: what we see is not the distortion of bodies, but of
images. The same could be said about Chuck Russell’s The Mask (1994).
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Film still 7 “Old fashioned” image warping in The Mask. Elastic scraps of flesh are now
seen as 2D-parts of the image, rendered using some kind of Photoshop™ Smudge Tool, and
no longer as parts of Andrew’s face in spite of the fact The Mask is only fifteen years old.
The Importance of Interpretative Caution
Resorting to psychological tools (but resorting to the tools of reception sociology
would yield the same type of results) encourages us to be aware of generalities.
When a film introduces defamiliarizing elements, neither their reading nor their
effect is easily predictable from a film scholar’s point of view for four main rea-
sons:
(1) Both cinema and television are audiovisual media: they provide second-hand
perceptions, and it is always possible to attribute the defamiliarization effect to
the medium itself. For instance, a shot filmed in slow motion, by modifying the
perception we have of human locomotion, can obviously teach us things we ordi-
narily miss about this type of locomotion (the trembling of chairs or the irregular
rhythm of a foot). But it also teaches us much about cinema itself, proving there
is no obligation to respect the convention according to which the rhythm of the
recordings should be identical with the projection of the fixed images composing
the film.
Because of this possibility to reflect on the medium itself, some theoreticians
have shown the affinities existing between Shklovsky’s defamiliarization and Der-
rida’s différance. Yet, for reasons too complex to be explored here,51 evolutionary
psychology and most “Darwinian” disciplines, broadly speaking, radically reject
the concept of différance,52 as they would deny the validity – if they had to reflect
upon it – of the vision of “automatic and empty perception” developed by Russian
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Formalists as opposed to “aesthetic perception” obtained through defamiliariza-
tion. Quite similarly, defamiliarization may be attributed to the film’s author with-
out necessarily having an impact on our way of perceiving the world. For in-
stance, if the sound transgressions of Godard’s films eventually produce a
Verfremdungseffekt, it is above all because they are perceived as ways of questioning
the artistic habits of mainstream cinema.53
(2) Both cinema and television are also narrative arts and, as such, are likely to
resort to stylistic metaphors; a discursive practice which consists in commenting
on historical events.54 The comment may be defamiliarizing. This is particularly
obvious with the constructivist approach used by Dziga Vertov. Here are three
examples taken from Vertov’s Enthusiasm!
– Defamiliarization through Dutch angles (which we do not usually do as we
prefer the line passing through the center of our eyes to be parallel to the
ground, and which we are not quite used to seeing in cinema): three frames
show a church, each one leaning more and more towards the right; a stylistic
metaphor for “religion is falling to pieces;”
– Defamiliarization through a rotation around the vision axis (another thing we
seldom do, except on a merry-go-round in a funfair): a pope is filmed from
below, then through a pan shot around the axis of the lens, he literally turns a
somersault; a stylistic metaphor for “let’s overturn religion;”
– Defamiliarization through a modification of the speed at which events occur
(a thing impossible to impose upon direct perception, and only to be envis-
aged with our remembrances or anticipations): when workers leave for work,
they are filmed in fast motion; a stylistic metaphor for “these workers are
eager to go to work.”
(3) If defamiliarization is not expressed through a stylistic metaphor, it may be
limited to a reflexive (or autotelic) effect. Viktor Shklovsky saw it this way: to
him, it had to draw attention to the perception process itself (metaperception) as
an aesthetic process that would underline the artfulness of the work55 (an ideal that
contemporary art was to realize under various forms since the avant-garde from
1910 onward, especially by “preventing the execution of sensorimotor routines to
which objects used in an ordinary way are submitted”).56 Viewed in this way,
Shklovsky’s conception is a kind of romantic radicalization of aesthetic judge-
ment according to Kant.57
Nothing says (and neither does Shklovsky)58 that defamiliarization will work as
the Soviet film-makers of the 1920s, especially Dziga Vertov, hoped it would
work, namely as a correcting tool able to change the inegalitarian tsarist vision
anchored in the perceptive habits of people. During these years, French writer
Marcel Proust used the metaphor of the “optical instrument” to point out this
“correcting” effect of art, especially the modifying action of great artists on our
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vision of the world, likely to open up our eyes once we come back to daily life. But
an optical instrument is supposed to follow our main perceptivo-cognitive rou-
tines; if it does not do so, it will be unable to defamiliarize us, one way to “ex-
plain” the “failure” of Robert Montgomery’s Lady in the Lake.
Film still 8 Lady in the Lake (Robert Montgomery, 1947). This famous film – famous at
least in the academic world – provides more unbelievability than defamiliarization. Adrienne
Fromsett (Audrey Totter) is supposed to speak to Phillip Marlowe (Robert Montgomery), but
she keeps looking at the camera, since the entire movie is supposed to be shot using the “sub-
jective camera” device. Adrienne seems to believe in the “Venus effect,”59 but we cannot accept
such a violation of our perceptivo-cognitive routines.
However, some scholars assert that the search for “optical instruments” is not the
only way to achieve defamiliarization. As demonstrated by M. Szaloky, film scho-
lars such as R. Arnheim, B. Balázs and S. Kracauer, who borrowed the estrange-
ment theoretical tool from Shklovsky, used it with regard to the “disinterested
perceptual polymorphy of the Kantian beautiful.”60 In those cases, perceptivo-
cognitive routines do not apply anymore.
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Film still 9 The Man with the Movie Camera (Dziga Vertov, 1929). We see both the
typist and what the typist sees. We can read the image as a simple dissolving view or a double
exposure, attributing the defamiliarization effect to the medium itself (1). Or, we can call it a
stylistic metaphor of “self-seeing” (or “sense of selfhood”), which according to Charles Taylor is
one of the two distinctive characteristics of the modern age62 (2). Or, we can admit that such a
shot underlines the artfulness of The Man with the Movie Camera, preventing the
execution of the sensorimotor routine which separates egocentric perception (I see the keyboard
of my machine when I work on it) from exocentric perception (I see the typist when she works
in front of me) (3). What will happen the next time I use a typewriter or the next time I meet a
typist at work? Since the cognitive script which aims to differentiate one’s self, objects and
others in the world is a condition of survival, I cannot expect to forget it in order to simulta-
neously combine egocentric and exocentric perception (4). At least, from a Darwinian point of
view, we may well consider this shot from The Man with the Movie Camera in light
of the fact it makes us think about our adaptability.
(4) Nothing suggests either that defamiliarization, if it ever succeeds in the sense
supported by Vertov, lasts beyond the time of the screening, and that once we go
back to our occupations, we recognize all the surprising things the eye-camera
told us about this world when we were sitting in front of the screen in the real
world. Of course, Vertov showed the steel workers he filmed in Enthusiasm!
what their work looked like from the plant’s ceiling; but did they continue to see
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themselves in this way once the film was over and the Kino-Train left for new
adventures? It seems unlikely they did. What is likely to last is a sort of perceptive
relativism: one of the most famous examples used by Shklovsky to illustrate the
concept of defamiliarization is Kholstomer [“The Horse”], a Tolstoy short story
presenting the world through an old castrated and fallen horse, a narratological
technique often optically translated by audiovisual media that loves “putting us in
somebody else’s shoes,” for instance through the use of shot/reverse shot. Yet
when reading this text, one has to be quite broadminded, like Shklovsky, about
the concept of defamiliarization61 as the anthropomorphism of narration is patent
in it (the old horse’s social destiny is much like in Kubrick’s Barry Lyndon,
1975), and strictly perceptive differences are very rarely stressed (ethology was
founded quite a long time after the writing of this text). According to a psycholo-
gist, this short story simply comes close – like shot-reverse shot – to the “decen-
tering” process, a concept developed by Jean Piaget and referring to the capacity
to put oneself in someone else’s shoes, which appears during the “age of reason.”
An instance of a slightly excessive optimistic belief in the virtues of cinemato-
graphic defamiliarization can be found reading the already quoted Peter Wuss’s
essay, “Analyzing the Reality Effect in Dogma films.” In a first step, the author
confers to Dogma films the power to show the failures of the society in which
they take place: “These films do not just present critical observations of human
behavior, but rather show a borderline syndrome of the entire society.” In a sec-
ond step, he explains that Dogma films lead to such an achievement because they
use multiple defamiliarizing devices, the most obvious of all being a special way
to shoot with handheld cameras. Since the cameramen “walked onto the set with-
out final instructions as to what exactly would happen during the scene and at-
tempted to orient themselves to the action as it happened,” it leads to an “extra-
ordinary visual form which provokes [on the spectator side] orienting reactions
that intensify the impression of authenticity.” Not only does Wuss fall into the
reflectionist trap63 by extrapolating from characters to the whole of society, he
also postulates that the spectator is an extraordinarily cooperative person reading
the defamiliarizing “awkwardness” of cameramen as a proof of authenticity (not
artificiality). As we have just seen, this figure may be read in a purely formalist
way as a reflexive submission to the specifications of Dogma (which replaces die-
getic illusion with the awareness of being faced with a style exercise), or else as a
stylistic metaphor illustrating the characters’ lack of balance and foresight in a
classic way. It is always dangerous to state “the spectator” is safe, except when
dealing with the bottom-up level of direct perception. In all other cases, one must
not forget the spectator can be a “pervert” (Staiger) or a “poacher” (Jenkins).
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Conclusion
Audiovisual defamiliarization is the type of issue which had better be approached
in an interdisciplinary way as it includes bodily, mental, cultural and social di-
mensions. To know when defamiliarization operates, one first has to know what
is familiar, and within the familiar, what is familiar for oneself only, or for a
whole body of persons, or for the whole of humanity. Evolutionary-Cognitive Psy-
chology may serve here to understand why such or such figure is perceived as
weird or completely unacceptable, in which case we take refuge in a reflexive
reading of the image. If there is too much estrangement, we cease to see the
“objects” through the image, in spite of the fact we know it is made of pixels,
preferring to see the image as a collection of pixels. If, however, defamiliarization
is partly present in or not too “bottom-up” to be “rejected” by our perceptivo-
cognitive system, it may challenge our habitus, namely our acquired scheme of
perception and cognition.
This type of defamiliarization is not confined to modern art or to the avant-
garde. One of the branches of Evolutionary-Cognitive Psychology which deals
with aesthetics has been underlining it for a long time, as can be seen by reading
Ellen Dissanayake, whose famous book What Is Art For64 opens on this very simple
statement: arts are a cultural phenomenon, while Art is a biological priority. Dis-
sanayake aims at going beyond the modern occidental definition of art, which
states that the latter should not be useful and should exist for nothing except
itself (art for art’s sake), and that it should appeal to the disinterested consump-
tion of people of taste; this definition cannot be expected to have anything but a
sociologically and historically circumscribed validity as it does not take human
evolution into account.65 On the other hand, one can say art serves many pur-
poses, among which defamiliarization is but one, either through innovation or
meta-perception.66
Of course, however essential the interdisciplinary approach may be, it will not
avoid conflicts. Some of its dimensions are clearly defined and can be attributed
to a specific discipline: the issue of style to aesthetics, that of shape perception to
psychology, and that of interpretative habits to reception sociology, for instance.
But all of this is not always that simple. The concept of defamiliarization lies at
the heart of a quarrel between, on the one hand, the culturalists-constructivists
(who think our perceptive habits themselves are structured by our social habitus,
or even our language, as the theories involved in the Linguistic Turn would have
it) and, on the other hand, the universalists-ecologists (who think our perceptive
habits are the product of an evolution in which the modern era, even when the
appearance of verbal language is included, is quantitatively of little importance).
If “I can see only what I believe” (a constructivist vision in which human beings
tend to select in their environment what they already know they can find), no
defamiliarization will be able to challenge my habitus as, literally, I will not per-
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ceive it. If “I believe only what I can see” (an ecologist vision in which human
beings tend to dictate the qualities of objects in their environment by their
senses), defamiliarization may challenge my habitus, but I will tend to attribute it
to the mediation process between objects and myself. Yet these observations
share a common point: in both cases, for defamiliarization to have a chance to
operate, it will have to be repeated many times.67
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On Perception, Ostranenie, and
Specificity
László Tarnay
In my contribution to this book, I would like to hint at a possible lineage of the
concept of ostranenie (остранение) in aesthetic and film theory from the Russian
Formalists to the present day. My approach is basically conceptual and unorthodox.
My particular aim here is to define a golden thread for the conceptual labyrinth that
would lead from Shklovsky’s idea – both theoretically and historically – to what I
take to be a fundamental challenge to the theory of the moving image, namely the
arrival of the newest digital technology of simulation. And I hope to be able to
unpack the meaning of ostranenie without forcing the original concept too much
and incurring the wrath of orthodox criticism.
A related but much more ambitious aim would be to show how fruitful the use
of ostranenie can be if it is subjected to a historically “tainted” conceptual analysis
during which a couple of concepts are woven together from various fields such as
the history of art, the development of cinematography, the philosophy of aes-
thetics, cognition and formal analysis (structuralism). The conceptual web that
would thus result could prove how the many-sidedness and flexibility of ostranenie
works and how much it may have contributed to forming the theory of arts and
culture in the last hundred years or so. The accomplishment of this task, how-
ever, requires the format of a book.
Focusing on the particular challenge that moving images pose to film theory,
we understand that moving images are consistently charting never experienced
fantasy worlds of an entirely different substance than our everyday reality. We as
viewers whole-heartedly indulge and immerse ourselves in them and point to film
theory to explain our indulgence and immersion. In this paper I hope to be able to
show that ostranenie is a useful tool to come up with such an explanation. My key
insight in defining the required golden thread is that the fantasy worlds the mov-
ing images simulate for us are no less “realistic” than the world that surrounds
us, with the very important condition that realism here constitutes the realist
functioning of the senses: what we take to be real depends first and foremost on
the nature of our perceptual system. Realism is a question of its automatism. Art
– and this is Shklovsky’s major insight – lies in deautomatizing our perceptual
system. My qualification is that the best way for art to deautomatize perception is
to mobilize a special part of our cognitive apparatus adapted to identify individ-
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uals, events and objects as a unique and singular phenomenon. I call it “specifi-
city recognition,” and I will argue that what Shklovsky prescribes is diametrically
opposed to the simulation, and hence realist, effect of digitally produced moving
images. What is needed is a special, built-in capacity of our perceptual and cogni-
tive system by means of which the automatism simulation can be sidetracked or
blocked. However, more often than not, it is more complex than that. Toward the
end, I will propose a four-tier model to account for the various ways in which
deautomatized perception can be triggered in viewers. I would like to state that
ostranenie harbors the core idea of the model.
Perception and the Task of Film Theory1
One of the most comprehensive, if not the biggest, challenges that film theory
has to answer to these days is posed by the new digital technology in film produc-
tion. It started with the change in the material substance of the film “vehicle.”
After video had partly replaced, but mainly co-existed with celluloid, the classical
print, digital production and primary post-production introduced a whole gamut
of new technical possibilities from a “perfectly clear” imagery to digitally synthe-
sized figures, from shocking sound effects to variously animated scenes, from
“unnatural” colors to extreme close-ups. And not only that; with the latest devel-
opments of the camera, the reduction of its size, it has become possible to visua-
lize for the human eye never-previously-experienced scenes like tunnels of ro-
dents, food processing in the intestines, or even sub-atomic physical processes
which are not even “visual” in their nature.2
It is true that contemporary film theory has already met this challenge to a
certain extent when it traced the continuity between ontological realism in film
theory (Bazin and Kracauer) and “new age” digitalism. It was ecological film
theory, and Joseph D. Anderson and Barbara Anderson in particular, who advo-
cated a realist standpoint vis-à-vis the digital image. They argue that it is not the
way motion pictures are produced – analog or digital – but the way they are per-
ceived. As Anderson puts it, movies function “as a programmed surrogate world”
in the sense that they interact directly with the perceptual system of the viewers
and make use of the same cognitive system that is employed in everyday life for
understanding the natural world.3
Their basic claim is that the two acts of perception (of reality and digitally pro-
duced images) are the same for our cognitive system. This means that the percep-
tual similarity or sameness between the “real” thing and its digital image is inher-
ent in our cognition: it is implied in how our perceptual system works and not in
how things are out in the world. For there – and we know it by deduction – every
single thing, image or object, is dissimilar or specific, to use the term in the title
of my contribution to this book. This specificity is, however, perceptually and
cognitively lost for us when we turn to mechanically or digitally reproduced
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images, and we do not regret it that much because we get an enormous compen-
sation: the visual and emotional sense of immersion in an imaginative world ex-
perienced as if it were – many times the only – reality. But do we as film viewers
ever ponder on what is being lost here, the specificity of individuals, events and
objects? A reflection on the specificity of images in the context of ostranenie and
Benjamin’s idea of mechanical reproduction may help to regain a part of this
perceptual and cognitive “loss” in mechanically and digitally reproduced images.
In calling attention to specificity, my contention is that it is an inherent property
of aesthetic perception and stands in diametrical contrast to what has been said to
be mass culture.
To buttress my thesis, I will first elaborate on some points found in a seminal
article by Walter Benjamin, who is the principal source for anyone reflecting on
the consequences of mechanical reproduction. Media theorists often describe the
invention and the use of “new” visual technology, like the microscope, magnify-
ing glasses, or the camera, as prosthetic devices which in most cases improve
normal human perception. Making use of them, we see better or even see things
which otherwise would have remained invisible to us. The human perceptual sys-
tem and the artificial aid collaborate to produce a heightened visual effect. Conse-
quently, it seems fairly unproblematic to extend the prosthetic case to cover the
most recent digital technology. We can say in a slightly modified manner that the
new digital technique creates images or visualizes things just as the human per-
ceptual system perceives visual stimuli in the eye and creates images in the mind.
In this paper I build upon this parallel between digital technology and the human
visual system as the basis of the major perceptual shift that digitalized motion
pictures caused, both culturally and aesthetically. The major propagators of this
shift were Paul Virillo and Vilém Flusser.4 They argue that the introduction of the
camera and other “new” technology more than a hundred years ago created a new
regime of perception, despite the fact that the physiology of the human eye has
remained the same. Against an ecologically committed theorist like Joseph D.
Anderson, who claims that viewers watch movies with the same perceptual appa-
ratus we have evolved with, philosophers of the new media highlight the cultural
determinants of vision and the role of prosthetic devices in shaping human per-
ception. I think that the ecological and cultural conceptions of vision do not ne-
cessarily exclude each other, but I cannot argue that issue now. Here I would only
like to recall that people quickly become habitualized to a new technology after
the “novelty” period has worn off. Having become habitualized, it is a very small
step for viewers to “immerse” in the “surrogate” world that the new technology
makes accessible to them. Even if we accept that the new technology has indeed
changed the viewers’ mode of perception, they soon take the new regime for
granted. When the young generation goes to see fantasy films like the Harry
Potter series, they do not question the “reality” of what they see: culturally
speaking, they are born into the new regime of vision. The immediacy of the
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medium has had its effect. Film theorists would put it slightly differently. Making
use of Richard Wollheim’s famous distinction between seeing through and seeing in,
they would argue that by seeing the scene through, film viewers would not be
aware or primarily conscious of the fact that images appear in the surface of the
screen.5 To put it in semiotic terms, seeing the surrogate world directly through
the image amounts to closing the distance between the image and its model; the
two are no longer distinguishable for the viewers. As a consequence, the percep-
tual process becomes automatic and impermeable to consciousness. And it is all
the more so, if the image is indistinguishable not only from its model, but also
from other copies of the same image, a commonplace in an age of mechanical
reproduction.6 It is as if any two acts of perceiving a copy of an image were indis-
tinguishable from each other, hence they appear to be the same. It means that
similarity between image and model applies not only to the higher level of copies
of the same image but to the meta-level of acts of perception. Let us call it percep-
tual sameness: it derives from the way copies are reproduced, and it means that
because of the lack of perceptual distance between the individual copies, the view-
er does not distinguish between the “original” image and the image object; they
are the same. Images thus become simulacra, which have lost the “original” rela-
tionship with their referents. They are images which float in a space of pure simi-
larity, a space in between the signifier and the signified.
Now it is an aesthetically crucial consequence that an image which is “indistin-
guishable” from its model cannot be perceptually relevant to the perceiver since it
masks all differences – if there are any – between perceiving it and perceiving its
model. It means that there is virtually nothing in the image that would attract the
viewer’s attention to its status as an image vis-à-vis its model.7 In other words, the
secondary consciousness of the medium cannot be perceptually anchored. Simi-
larly, if something is automatic and non-conscious, it cannot be aesthetically re-
levant either. It is at this point that ostranenie reveals all its relevance to contempo-
rary aesthetics. Undoubtedly, the term can be understood in many ways, some of
which I will elaborate on in the subsequent paragraphs. Without denying its in-
herent historicity and relativity, in my view the concept of ostranenie rises above
history. In its applications in formal analysis of particular technologies, trends or
individual pieces, ostranenie is subject to history and can therefore be relative. Any
concrete perceptual act may become automatic and hence may have to be defami-
liarized. The concept itself, apart from its particular content, is rather like a norm
aloof of history. Like the principles of evolution, it specifies a guideline for aes-
thetics (or its history), which says that the formal character of art is very closely
tied to the type of perception to which it lends itself.
Walter Benjamin’s seminal article about the reproducibility of the photographic
image popularized the idea of the aura as a “unique phenomenon of a distance”
between the perceiver and the perceived object. He claims that every natural and
art object is tied to its hic et nunc, its position in space, in which it is historically
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rooted and to which it owes its uniqueness and singularity. As such it exists in a
“splendid isolation,” at a distance from the perceiver, which at the same time
safeguards its aura. As soon as it is detached from its hic et nunc and is appro-
priated, its distance evaporates, and its aura is lost. Benjamin seems to imply that
an object of art loses its artfulness and becomes an object of distraction for mass
audiences. Although for him reproducibility is a form of appropriation and is not
very beneficent to the aura, I will try to show that artfulness is not dependent on
reproducibility, an assertion that is also firmly grounded in Shklovsky’s idea of
defamiliarizing perception.8 As I already hinted, the capacity of recognizing
unique physical substances in contrast to categorical perception relies on a speci-
fic part of our cognitive apparatus. I therefore borrow the term “specificity” as a
common denominator not only in reference to the core concept of ostranenie, but
also in reference to Benjamin’s aura, Sontag’s photographic distance, and
Sobchack’s view on “the film’s body,” in the sense that in each case the recipient
is to recognize the specificity – the uniqueness and singularity – of the experi-
enced object. Finally, my methodological thought in tracing the lineage of ostrane-
nie is shaped by Shklovsky’s idea of defamiliarization as deautomatized percep-
tion. In the process of tracing its lineage, I will focus on the relation between the
formal elements of ostranenie and not so much on its historicity by primarily fol-
lowing Benjamin’s line of thought.
Before I begin my discussion, let me briefly revisit the elements of the original
concept of ostranenie, especially those which were echoed, rephrased or modified
in subsequent theoretical thought. Ostranenie is fundamentally two-sided, as it re-
sides on the one hand in the form of the artwork itself, but it is also expected to
produce a corresponding effect during the act of reception. This latter effect is gener-
ally called – by the Formalists – “defamiliarization.” The way they formulate defa-
miliarized perception, the core element of ostranenie, allows for two different inter-
pretations. It can either be taken as (i) object definition (literariness) or as (ii) a
conceptual tool. I would like to address the first one. The Formalists’ main aim
was to define literariness, or the proper object of literary theory, which they iden-
tified mainly in different forms of language (prose, poetry, rhythm, etc.). Yet they
were ready to embrace other media like film and extend their definition so as to
include moving images. They generalized the idea that the defamiliarization of
perception fosters or enhances the capacity of seeing new conceptual relations
among or linking otherwise different objects, and they opposed it to nineteenth-
century associativism, which emphasized the underlying or reflexive associative
chains, innate or marked out by past experience. Accordingly, they contrasted
perceiving with knowing, the latter standing roughly for automatized knowledge.
Automatized or habitualized perception is not only opposed to defamiliarized
perception but is very closely related, if not reduced, to knowledge. “The purpose
of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are
known.”9 It is knowledge as categorical perception which can become habitual.
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From the formalist argument it even follows that the specificity of an object can-
not be known but only perceived; if it were to become part of our overall concep-
tual scheme, it would lead to the habituation of perception which needs to be
defamiliarized or distanced once again. Furthermore, knowledge of an object is a
way of appropriating it, that is, reducing the distance between the subject and the
object.
Athough Russian Formalists refrained from using ostranenie as a methodologi-
cal tool, Shklovsky insisted that it should be applied to the history of art in order
to describe it as a series of formal changes: according to their historical poetics, it
is not so much the images that change from period to period but rather the poets’
technique to create a style which challenges the principle of economy and energy that
“delivers the greatest amount of thought in the fewest words.”10
The history of art is then defined as a history of changes in style. And changes
are effected by the poets precisely because old forms have become automatized.
Defamiliarization is needed to play down the effect of automatization. It is in this
sense that ostranenie applies to the history of art.11
Knowledge as Closeness vs. Specificity as Distance
Although there are two basic layers of ostranenie, a perceptionist and an analytic-
historic one to be precise, the former is the fundamental one. Apart from how
one would translate the term (defamiliarization, distanciation, etc.), to say that
“[t]he technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar’, to make forms difficult, to
increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception
is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged”12 is to claim that “the artful-
ness of an object” resides in creating or preserving a distance from the object
itself. Yet it is not easy to understand what the prolongation of perception really
constitutes. Does it mean that the perceiver should not strive for easily accessible
knowledge but remain in uncertainty or “half-truth” about the object perceived? If
it is, Shklovsky would be found to echo the idea of English Romanticism. Take
the famous dictum “Beauty is truth, truth beauty” which summarizes Keats’s idea
of literariness or artfulness described in detail in his letters. There he compares
what he takes to be the highest form of poetry, that of Shakespeare, to the mean-
ing of ancient myths: both are doomed to remain forever dim and inscrutable. He
values Dante, Shakespeare and other eminent authors because they did not want
to squeeze “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth” from reality.
They keep a distance. For them, prolonged perception constitutes the foundation
of poetry as well as a failure to know. Ode on a Grecian Urn is an apotheosis of that
failure, as is Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Kubla Khan.13 Obviously, the examples
could be multiplied. What matters here is the basically Kantian coupling of aes-
thetic feeling and ethical judgment,14 which also lies at the core of Benjamin’s
aura. By refraining from absolute knowledge, the poet demonstrates respect for
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the object perceived. In renouncing possession of it, his humbleness shows. But
this is not the whole story. By reversing the poles of the equation, beauty and
truth, Keats echoes the Kantian idea of recompense that is gained in and by
means of the ethical stance taken toward the world. This may be the point where
things show their real nature, especially when they are not “pressed” to do so,
when they are kept at a remove from knowledgeable man. As I understand, it is
by means of such a distance in or during perception that, following Shklovsky,
the “stony character of the stone” is given to the subject (perceiver). I would add
that what is actually given to us is the object’s specificity, but let me explain.
Maybe it would be better if we define knowledge as procedural knowledge, the
knowledge of how. Such knowledge is always functional. Knowing the stone in
this sense means you are able to throw it, kill birds with it, hammer a nail with it,
build or pave roads with it, etc. Thus, it is exactly how we functionally categorize
things, so we have chairs to sit on, tables to write on, or stones to throw. But the
question is this: does the “real” character of the stone show itself during such
appropriations?
Let me summarize. I have been trying to weave together three different threads.
The first is Shklovsky’s idea that perception should be prolonged so that objects
get removed from the automatism of perception when they fall under various
already known categories. The second idea – crucial for Deleuze – is that deauto-
matizing perception is tantamount to constituting a challenge to the intellect
which “normally” can only classify. The third and final element in this line of
thought is the core element of the Romantic Sublime itself by constituting a chal-
lenge to the system of human perception. In this case, either the familiarizing and
appropriating automatism blocks the new perception, or the perception of the
new leaves the object for the viewer at a distance and in a penumbra of half-truths
to such a degree that – as Shklovsky says – the object “itself” does not matter.15
Can we really say that prolonged perception, perception per se, is a perception
without an object? Do we really not perceive anything? My suggestion here is – as
I indicated earlier – that by rejecting categorical perception, that is, by not being
able to place the object within already known categories and thereby prolonging
the perceptional process, our cognitive system resorts to “specificity recognition,”
thus the perceiver comes into contact with the object itself, i.e. with the object in
its specificity.
Seen in this light, perhaps it does not seem too far-fetched to say that Benja-
min’s aura preserves the core element of the Sublime of Romanticism. And
maybe it would be worth comparing his concept and ostranenie in terms of the
formal characteristics of the Romantic Sublime. He also uses nature as an exam-
ple of being distant and having an aura.
We define the aura of the latter as the unique phenomenon of a distance, how-
ever close it may be. If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow with
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your eyes a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow
over you, you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch. Namely,
the desire of contemporary masses to bring things “closer” spatially and hu-
manly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness
of every reality by accepting its reproduction.16
Certainly, for Benjamin distance and closeness are spatial attributes, while ostrane-
nie seems to be an attribute of perceived objects or thought-objects. It is a distance
between perceptions that “delivers the greatest amount of thought in the fewest
words.”17 Here Shklovsky quotes Spencer about the working of the principle of
economy which he accepts, as long as its domain is “practical” language; how-
ever, he refuses to extend it to the language of poetry. A possible – and maybe the
only – explanation is that for Shklovsky the purpose (raison d’être) of practical lan-
guage is still knowledge, whereas poetry is for the “senses,” that is, it is deeply
perceptual in its nature. (Note the recurrent reference to rhythm, the most musi-
cal aspect, in poetry.) The contrast is once again between the appropriating of
knowledge and the defamiliarization of perception.18 Thus, it would be difficult
to argue that bringing things “‘closer’ spatially and humanly” is essentially differ-
ent from appropriating or knowing them. Listen to what Benjamin says about the
epistemic potential of the new media:
Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range
by way of its likeness, its reproduction. Unmistakably, reproduction as offered
by picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the un-
armed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as
are transitoriness and reproducibility in the former. To pry an object from its
shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose “sense of the uni-
versal equality of things” has increased to such a degree that it extracts it even
from a unique object by means of reproduction.19
Clearly, uniqueness or specificity of an object of art is resistant to the “sense of
the universal equality of things” that the photographic image is saturated with
according to Benjamin. The fact that Benjamin calls this knowledge “perception”
brings him even closer to Shklovsky, for whom such a sense would be nothing
but automatized perception.
Recasting Ostranenie in Cognitive Poetics
Benjamin is very skeptical – to say the least – with regard to the fact that films can
ever have an aura. At the same time, he seems to be desperate to find some aspect
of the photographic image that would indicate it has a special quality that other
art forms lack. Thus, in the second half of his paper, he hits on two elements, the
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close-up, especially of the face, and slow motion, which can render the film im-
age unique and singular in his view. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve
into the entire argument Benjamin constructs in favor of the film image despite
its loss of aura because of its reproducible character. Instead, I would like to
restrict his argument to an analogy of the senses: touch and vision. By emphasiz-
ing tactile visuality as opposed to optical visuality (the classical paradigm), he
paves the way for a multi-modal conception of film viewing that film phenomen-
ologists after Merleau-Ponty have developed in its entirety. With regard to the
close-up and slow motion, Benjamin argues that films do not simply give a shar-
per and more detailed view but reveal completely “new structural formations of
the subject,” qualities and sensations which the viewer never experienced.20 That
is to say, close-up and slowness in films prove to be the best means to defamiliarize
perception. Writing half a century later, Vivian Sobchack suggests that the film ex-
perience constitutes an encounter with the Other: the film itself makes visible the
Other’s intraceptive world, the enclosed innermost territory of one’s phenomeno-
logical life, which can never be shared in everyday communication. On the basis
of a multi-modal theory (or phenomenology) of perception, cinematic visuality
appears to be a unique and singular experience, despite the way moving images
are produced, projected and reproduced. (Note however that in Sobchack’s ap-
proach the distance between the perceiving subject and the perceived object or
the Other – which, in Benjamin’s view, the film dissolves by penetrating into the
“flesh” of the world – is re-established.) Thus, starting with the multi-modality of
film perception (haptic visuality for one), it can be argued that films can be cred-
ited with a kind of specificity that is close to the way the Formalists thought about
literariness and defamiliarized perception. The range of defamiliarized perception
extends significantly if tactile, and possibly other, forms of perception are consid-
ered for analysis.
Setting Benjamin’s argument about the loss of aura aside, it remains to be seen
how the experiential situation of viewing relates to the Formalists’ doctrine con-
cerning the economy principle of mental effort. When Shklovsky refers to the
“stoniness of the stone,” he is attacking the doctrine that art constitutes “thinking
in images.” He replaces this doctrine with the idea that art constitutes the arrang-
ing of images in a particular manner so that the artfulness of an object, and not
the object itself, could be experienced: “The purpose of art is to impart the sensa-
tion of things as they are perceived and not as they are known.” But what does
“artfulness” really mean for Benjamin? To avoid begging the question – art is
experiencing the artfulness of things – he turns to the perceptual process itself
and states that “the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself.” But why
insist on the purpose of making objects “unfamiliar”? Most likely, Benjamin
brings up this particular purpose because unfamiliar objects deautomatize per-
ception and dissolve its transparency. The subject becomes conscious of her per-
ceptual processes. However, art should not aim at creating new concepts, some-
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thing the imaginists wanted to do; rather, it should find the way to prolong the
process and to increase its difficulty.
If the purpose of art is to enhance perception, the object of perception must be
quite “complicated.” But what does complicated mean here? We cannot simply
answer that it refers to triggering a “long and difficult” process. In Tarnay/Pólya
we argued for an independent cognitive mechanism, which from a very early evo-
lutionary stage was responsible for recognizing individual objects, in the animal
world mostly individual conspecifics.21 We called this capacity “specificity recog-
nition” and contrasted it with “categorical perception.” The latter is a very gener-
al, all-purpose cognitive mechanism by means of which individual objects are
assigned to their respective categories. We use this capacity every time we want
to know what things are like, to identify them, or we use procedural knowledge.
In contrast, we need the other capacity, specificity recognition, in our social and
family life.22 Our argument becomes relevant to the present discussion when we
move onto the field of aesthetics and extend the argument about specificity to
cover individual works of art or, more precisely, aesthetic pleasure, or in the ter-
minology of the present paper, aesthetic perception. In short, Pólya and I stated
that as spectators of art we make use of the very same capacity, specificity recogni-
tion, when we perceive and process individual works. The underlying idea is that
to recognize an individual as such requires a much more fine-grained sense organ
or sensitive apparatus than with categorical perception. While categorical recog-
nition can be coarse-grained, as for example in Gestalt perception, individual re-
cognition can easily go wrong if the “pattern” is not identified finely enough.23
Aesthetic perception, in our view, capitalizes on the inherent hyper-sensitivity
of the sense organs which is a result of evolution, although it lost most of its
function when social evolution foregrounded visuality. Although our system for
visual recognition is very limited in individuating singularities,24 it displays an
extremely fine differentiating capacity. While natural languages have some 80
terms for shades of color ad maximum, the human eye can distinguish up to
1600 different shades if necessary.25 Although we possess a very finely tuned
visual system, experiencing art can be more than challenging for an “untrained”
eye just because the “hyper-sensitive” range of our visual system is not used in
everyday life.
Seen in light of the difference of categorical perception versus specificity percep-
tion, there are still two ways to unpack the meaning of the conception of ostrane-
nie, but this time the equivocation stems from the definition of a “property” like
stoniness. Is it something unique or uniquely perceived, or something that other
objects, other stones, can have as well? Does it singularize its object, or does it
align it with other objects? Accordingly, we have the following two options:
A) Defamiliarization or ostranenie is the artistic technique of forcing the audience to
see common things in an unfamiliar or strange way, in order to enhance perception of
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the familiar. It is a didactic tool in the history of twentieth-century art, including
Dada, constructivism, Postmodernism, Brechtian epic theater or even science fic-
tion.
The list of art movements and trends is by no means exhaustive. The core con-
cept originates with the Surrealists and is rooted in their dictum – once stated by
Lautrèamont – about the juxtaposition of otherwise different, incongruent or even
incoherent properties. The concept can be traced back and forth within the his-
tory of film theory as well as in literary theory. Let me illustrate with one example
how defamiliarization might work in this sense. Take visitation, a very common
topic in Renaissance painting. We can even say that the topic itself became so
canonical that it automatized perception. Painters strove to give an individual
taint to a familiar topic. Although it is not easy to define where defamiliarization
begins, surely one typical way to defamiliarize the concept of visitation percep-
tually is Tintoretto’s solution exhibited in the Scuola San Rocco in Venice. Tin-
toretto presents a decrepit house for the setting of Mary’s visitation by the angel
Gabriel. Poverty contrasts with the spirituality of angelic conversation. Thus, Tin-
toretto achieves a highly unique and singular – defamiliarized – representation of
a familiarized topic.
It is especially cognitive film theory which foregrounds the processing of film
images regarding classical Hollywood and mainstream popular movies, as well as
avant-garde and experimental films.26 Drawing upon the findings of cognitive
semantics and cognitive pragmatics, cognitive film scholars investigate both the
bottom-up and top-down cognitive processes that film viewing may trigger in the
viewer. Naturally, what is preserved from the original concept is the idea of de-
familiarization, yet reinterpreted in cognitive terms. Already inherent in Shklovs-
ky’s original concept of defamiliarization was the idea that poetry is meant to play
down the effect of the principle of mental effort or economy. The latter principle
signifies that when trying to understand a given “message,” people aim at retriev-
ing the maximum informational content with the least possible effort. Thus, the
principle of economy presents ideas in a way that they can be apprehended with
the least possible mental effort or to deliver the greatest amount of thought in the
fewest words.27 This is almost exactly the same principle that Sperber and Wilson
introduced as the guiding principle of understanding language: to achieve the
greatest possible contextual effect, to make it possible for the subject to appre-
hend the greatest number of contextual inferences and/or to increase the episte-
mic value of her beliefs with the least possible effort.28 The only – and not insig-
nificant – difference is that the Formalists considered the principle the very thing
that genuine art like poetry should oppose, whereas relevance theorists argued for
a general application of the principle. They claimed that the principle accounts for
all kinds of language use, including metaphoric, ironic and poetic speech. The
principle of relevance appears to be a general human capacity that works equally
well when the recipient of art is confronted with disparate or seemingly inco-
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herent elements and has to make the most of their juxtaposition. The recipient is
still guided by the principle of squeezing out the maximum amount of informa-
tion with the least effort, even if it is the Ulysses she is trying to understand. To put
it more formally, according to Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory, to under-
stand the meaning of a proposition or, let us add, an image means to draw the
highest number of contextual implications made available to the recipient by the
given proposition or image with the least possible mental effort.29 Automatiza-
tion and deautomatization are subject to the same laws of cognition. The differ-
ence lies not in the types of processes they evoke, but rather in the time of
processing. Deautomatization may be compared to a deviation route. To arrive at
a destination through deviations does not mean that the traffic rules are different.
Hence automatized and deautomatized routes also differ in their respective his-
tory: deautomatized routes are never, or almost never, trodden paths which may
or may not take longer than a normal path.
The other meaning of ostranenie is diametrically opposed to the first in that it
indeed marks out a qualitatively different route of processing.
B) Ostranenie is a mechanism by means of which the specificity of the world is per-
ceived: “it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony.”30 In this
sense, it contrasts with knowing things, which always implies appropriation by
means of concepts or categories when the new is being reduced to the already
known. While the latter is automatized knowledge, ostranenie is the idea that the
meaning of the unique and the singular is not constituted even by an exhaustive
list of shareable properties.
In Tarnay and Pólya (2005) we proposed a four-tier model of aesthetic plea-





The first meaning of ostranenie can be explained by our first level, where thing and
event perception occurs. Agreeing with Ramachandran and Hirstein32 that recog-
nizing camouflaged objects was a crucial ability in human evolution and that it
triggered a strong positive emotional reflex, I would say that recognizing the ele-
ments of the scene of the visitation in Tintoretto’s painting is of the same kind. If
the viewer hesitates in recognizing the figures against the background, as may be
the case with a William Turner painting, I would say that the viewer’s perception
is being “prolonged” which is a first step toward “artfulness of perception,” as
Shklovsky would have it. The importance of the object recedes into the back-
ground, and the importance of the process of perceiving the object takes over. It
belongs to our second level of aspect seeing. It may be argued that the first two
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levels, category perception and aspect change, can partly overlap, especially in
cases of defamiliarization in Shklovsky’s sense of the word. If the result of defa-
miliarization is such that the previous automatized category is still – at least partly
– applicable to the new image/object, the viewer may find herself switching be-
tween the “old” and “new” categories when contemplating the “defamiliarizing”
picture. Thus, the viewer of Tintoretto’s visitation may want to compare Tintoret-
to’s unusual setting with the canonical setting of the same scene in a church or a
Renaissance city structure. Not unsurprisingly, Tintoretto himself painted a visita-
tion of this kind. However, “defamiliarizing” cases differ from genuine examples
of aspect change in that they imply the use of memory, since the two aspects are
not directly perceivable in the same image as they are in, say, the duck/rabbit pic-
ture. That is, the viewer switches between a seen aspect and a remembered one. An-
other clear example of the second level of perceiving aspects is Andrea Manteg-
na’s picture of St. Sebastian, in which viewing shifts take place between two
different aspects (identifications): a mass of brick beneath the marble column, or
a grotesque head being chased away by the horsemen of the Apocalypse in the
cloud. Similarly, perception seems to be forever locked between two competing
categorical perceptions like “head” and “landscape” in the painting by Joos de
Momper.33 The logic behind our model is very simple. We think that aesthetic
pleasure derives basically either from categorical perception, when we recognize
members of already known categories, or from recognizing the singularity and
uniqueness of a given object. In addition, there can also be some “extra” pleasure
generated if the object is constantly shifting categories like the famous duck/rab-
bit drawing, or if its specificity is changing. Thus, by analogy with the first two
levels of categorical perception, we define the third level as specificity perception
(of texture). The fourth level, which we call “modulation,” is the level where per-
ception is shifting between two forms of specificity recognition.34 Recalling the
touch/vision analogy in Benjamin, I claim that specificity of an object is located
mostly in its texture, for it is especially the graininess of the picture which requires
a very highly tuned perceptual apparatus. The latter stands in neat contrast to
what Shklovsky calls “algebraic method of thought” with which “we apprehend
objects only as shapes with imprecise extensions; we do not see them in their
entirety but rather recognize them by their main characteristics.[…] The process
of ‘algebrization,’ the over-automatization of an object, permits the greatest econ-
omy of perceptive effort.”35
A very telling example of textural specificity can be found in Antonioni’s Blow-
up. It has become almost a commonplace to refer to the parallel between the
photographic process of blowing up and revealing secrecy. The crucial point in
the film’s narrative comes when Thomas begins to retrace the direction in which
Jane is looking in the picture shot in the park. While his suspicion of mystery is
aroused by the woman’s eerie gaze, his hunch becomes overwhelming when he
first scrutinizes and then magnifies the crucial section of the fence in the original
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photo. By magnifying the photograph, he alters the textual quality of the image
that enables him to see what he failed to notice before, but that does not mean he
is able to solve the mystery. It displays two important properties. First, the series
of snapshots trigger a shifting categorical or figure perception in the viewer (Tho-
mas and the audience); from seeing the figures in the foreground to seeing the
killer’s face and his gun in the background. As the latter becomes more and more
perceivable, the “original” picture turns less and less clear-cut. Finally, the face
stands out, together with the gun, after which the dead body “emerges” within
the grains of the magnified photo. All this seems to be a fairly straightforward
categorical identification on a par with the famous picture of a Dalmatian dog
used in psychology to demonstrate Gestalt or figure/ground perception. The
image is an example of “Emergence.” The Dalmatian in this well-known image is
not recognized by first identifying its parts, but rather as a whole and all at once
(as an emergence of parts). The whole cognitive procedure can be assigned to the
second level of our model of aesthetic pleasure. But this is not the whole story.
The photo must have the property of infinite magnifiability inherent in its ma-
terial substance. It is by this property that the close-up reveals its specificity – to
repeat Benjamin – “[t]he enlargement of a snapshot does not simply render more
precise what in any case was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new struc-
tural formations of the subject.”36 The surface visibility of the image is then de-
termined by the underlying granular structure of the image. It is this granular
texture that constitutes the specificity of the image like the inner structure of the
iris constitutes one’s individuality. In effect, Blowup thematizes the making visi-
ble of the photograph and realigns it with Post-impressionistic pointillist paint-
ing. It belongs to the third – specificity – level of our model of aesthetic pleasure.
Making the underlying granular structure of the image visible is nothing but a way of de-
familiarizing or deautomatizing the “original” image: by changing the figure/ground
relation in the image, it is not simply that another object is being focused on –
something similar to the zooming effect – but that the new figure/ground relation
becomes extremely difficult to perceive. There is hardly anything else that defami-
liarizes perception to such a degree than the micro-texture of a physical sub-
stance.37 It corroborates Shklovsky’s diachronic idea that there is no form outside
history, first because it is always a given historical context in which a formal fea-
ture defamiliarizes habitualized perception, and second because a defamiliarizing
form may later become habitualized. Granular texture was once a “natural” attri-
bute of documentary films, so much so that people “saw through” it without
being conscious of it.38
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Conclusion and Beyond
In conclusion, it seems that it is not the reproducibility of art objects in itself that
leads to the automatization of perception. It is the ambition to appropriate the
image by reducing it “economically” to the already known. What art as “defami-
liarization” and experimental films do, in contrast, is that they constitute a chal-
lenge for higher-order cognition by presenting a manifold of experience that can-
not be subsumed under any known or a priori categories and thereby cannot be
individuated consistently as determinable objects of experience. This theme high-
lights an important aspect of human perception. It was Gilles Deleuze who devel-
oped a philosophy of moving images, foregrounding the role of the sensible in
creative thinking. One of his key terms is “deterritorializing,” by which he means
that a given set of concepts should be defamiliarized, that is, subverted.39 Capita-
lizing on Bergson’s reflection on creative evolution, Deleuze assigns the role of
deterritorializing to the senses and the sensible.40 For him the radically new, a
radically new experience, can only come through the senses and not through
some rearrangement of the already known. For Deleuze it is only the sensible
that can challenge thought: “The sensible is opposed to the model of recognition
since it is not a component of a remembered, imagined, or conceived object
[…].”41 It escapes or challenges all knowledge innate or based on previous experi-
ence. Furthermore, it is the sensory challenge, that is the perceptually new, that
gives “new” fuel to thought.42 Ostranenie is an important landmark in conceptua-
lizing this challenge. When Shklovsky talks about defamiliarization as the prolon-
gation of perception and opposes it to associativism and the use of images, he in
fact foregrounds the sensible as the source of poetry and art. Its legacy is pre-
served in the cognitive approaches to art and film, which focus on the so-called
bottom-up processes in the brain like specificity recognition. But it is also upheld
in aesthetic theories which, following Benjamin, argue for the uniqueness and
singularity of the art object as a form of distance in the digital age.
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Estrangement and the Representation of
Life in Art
Barend van Heusden
Viktor Shklovsky considered estrangement, or “ostranennie,” to be the basic
function of art. He was right, but for the wrong reasons. In his work on the sub-
ject, he mingled three theoretical perspectives: a theory of perception, a theory of
semiosis, and a theory of abstraction. On the basis of an analysis of his discourse,
I will argue that the concept of estrangement can and should be reassessed in
contemporary art theory; that is to say, in the context of a theory of art as a speci-
fic instance of human semiotic cognition, realized in a variety of media, and fo-
cused on imaginative self-consciousness.
In “Art as Technique,”1 the famous essay he wrote in 1917, Viktor Shklovsky
argues that perception “as it becomes habitual, becomes automatic.”2 Thus, he
says, for instance, that “all of our habits retreat into the area of the unconsciously
automatic.”3 This process of habituation accounts for the fact that in ordinary
speech, we often leave phrases unfinished and words half expressed.
The process Shklovsky points at here seems to be a very basic cognitive one,
namely that of habit formation. This process is certainly not restricted to percep-
tion; it pertains to behavior as such. Habits are not genetically programmed (in
which case we would speak about “instincts” or “responses”) but are learned, as
in the case of language use. We learn how to walk and talk, and in the long run
we forget about it and perform these activities more or less unconsciously. Habi-
tuation is a general characteristic of human action, it is a way of saving energy. By
relying on habits, we save the energy with which we deal with what is strange or
different and therefore potentially more dangerous. From this perspective, habi-
tuation is certainly to be cherished. The more we can rely on habits, the better.4
Why spend energy on dealing with what is a little different, but not different
enough to jeopardize our habits? Why bother about, for instance, “the stoniness
of stones,” when we can rely on our habits to make sense of the world?
Shklovsky, however, takes us one step further. Perception, he states, not only
becomes automatic. In the process, he says, things are replaced by symbols: “In
this process, ideally realized in algebra, things are replaced by symbols.”5 I sug-
gest that we try to disentangle the intricate argument that underlies this state-
ment. How do we get from the first step in the argument, which was about the
habituation or automatization of perception, to this second one, which is about
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the replacement of the thing by a symbol? Should we assume that a habit of per-
ception is the same thing as a symbol? This seems to be highly improbable, as it
is unclear what the notion of the symbolic would add to that of a habit of percep-
tion; unless, of course, one term is just a synonym for the other. In that case,
however, the semiotic is reduced to the habitual. But a habit is not automatically
a symbol. A habit (of perception or otherwise) is not “about” the object perceived,
nor is intentionality required for successful perception. We find habits everywhere
in the world of the living. Many animal species rely on habits of perception and
action without being able to use signs. However, in Shklovsky’s argument about
the defamiliarization in art, the symbolic nature of habitual perception plays an im-
portant role.
Where does the sign come from if it is not simply the result of habit formation?
Apparently, perception becomes semiotic when the cognitive process involved is
not only a process of perceiving, but also a process of signifying (or signification).
Objects, in semiosis, are not only perceived but are also signified, which means
that they are recognized as an instance or “token” of a more stable representation
or “type.” The stable representation can be a perceptual image or schema, or it
can be a concept or a logical structure. The difference between the stable repre-
sentation (the “type”) and the occurrence (the “token”) turns perception into
semiotic perception, and human cognition into semiotic cognition, that is, into a
process of signification or semiosis.
The semiotic process is therefore a process of dealing with the difference be-
tween more or less stable types (the signs) on one side and ever-changing tokens
(the occurrences or “reality”) on the other. As humans we have only a limited
number of semiotic strategies at our disposal: from simple negation of the differ-
ence, via the imaginative transformation of the available schemata, to the use of
abstract concepts and structures. The “algebra” Shklovsky refers to in the quota-
tion above refers to these stable types or signs.6
Insight into the nature of semiotic cognition allows us to understand the point
Shklovsky is trying to make in “Art as Technique.” The habit formation of which
he speaks is at work in the process of signification as well. Instead of dealing with
the difference a situation or object confronts us with, we tend to ignore it, relying
upon the available schemata. We tend to assimilate, not accommodate to a
changing world.
In the process of signification, ignoring differences is hazardous. Shklovsky
points out the dangers of such a fundamentally “lazy” attitude. He also stresses
the fact that by discarding signification, which is not, of course, restricted to per-
ception, we are in danger of losing our humanity: “And so life is reckoned as
nothing. Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the
fear of war. If the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, then
such lives are as if they had never been.”7 Instead of dealing with difference and
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change, and questioning the worth of our semiotic habits (our schemata, con-
cepts, etc.) in each new situation, we rely upon them almost unconsciously, and
reality recedes into the background. “By this ‘algebraic’8 method of thought we
apprehend objects only as shapes with imprecise extensions; we do not see them
in their entirety but rather recognize them by their main characteristics. We see
the object as though it were enveloped in a sack. We know what it is by its config-
uration, but we see only its silhouette.”9 This is a crucial point: humanity is tightly
connected, not to perception as such, but to semiotic perception, and to the
semiotic in general. Our elaborate semiotic capacities distinguish us from other
living organisms and allow us to deal with the world in a very specific way, using
our imagination and our faculties of abstraction. What is at stake here is the
semiotic process, rather than perception as such.
The argument has become a complex one, as Shklovsky’s criticism can be un-
derstood as aiming at three different flaws at least: simple habit formation in
perception (the most unlikely variant), the general abstraction process which is
inherent in the use of signs (as derived from the “algebra” quotes), and the one-
sidedness of a semiotic process that is reduced to the assimilation of that which
differs from the available schemata. I strongly suspect that the latter is what
Shklovsky’s argument is really about, but due to a lack of a refined theory of
perception, cognition, and semiosis, this isn’t self-evident.
We can now turn to Shklovsky’s argument about art. The passage from “Art as
Technique” about what art must achieve is deservedly famous:
Art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel
things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation
of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art
is to make objects unfamiliar, to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty
and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end
in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an
object; the object is not important.10
We have argued that unfamiliarity is inherent in the semiotic process. A certain
degree of unfamiliarity assures us that the reality we live in does not coincide with
our representations of it. Thanks to the ubiquitous difference, we are able to dis-
tinguish occurrences (“reality”) from our representations (signs). Semiotic cogni-
tion means, therefore: dealing with difference. The greater the difference, the
harder the semiotic work. It is therefore semiosis itself that forces the unfamiliar
upon us. But if that is correct, then what do we need art for? The unfamiliar is
part and parcel of our semiotic life, and why would we need more unfamiliarity
than we get already?
There is a remark by Shklovsky which could be of help here. When he says that
art may recover the sense of life, “the sensation of things as they are perceived and
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not as they are known,” he recognizes in art the power to represent through recrea-
tion. From the perspective developed in this paper, if art recreates a sense of life,
this is because it represents the semiotic process itself: it represents our dealing
with the unfamiliar, with difference, with what exceeds the sign. What is rep-
resented in and with art is the experience (or feeling – the somatic)11 which is
inherent in the semiotic process. “Ostranennie” or estrangement is not so much
a characteristic of art but of human (semiotic) life. Art cannot turn the stone
stony, but it can represent the stone as “making a difference.” It thus represents
life.
The questions that remain to be answered now are: Why would we represent
the semiotic process, and how is this done? To answer the first question, we have
to take a step back. As I argued above, cognition becomes semiotic once a stable
pattern is matched against an unstable occurrence. But what could “an occur-
rence” be? More specifically, how can we ever know about an occurrence if we
recognize it in terms of stable patterns? How does the instability of the occur-
rence escape these patterns, how does difference arise? Apparently, what is ex-
perienced as an occurrence is represented as a “fuzzy set,” as an always changing
new combination of known elements. It must consist of elements from the stable
patterns but organized in such a way that they do not fit any of the patterns avail-
able. Semiotic cognition thus implies the matching of stable with unstable pat-
terns, although these patterns are all constituted by the same elements. The stable
patterns serve to interpret, give form to, or simply “recognize” the unstable pat-
terns or occurrences.
The analysis of the structure of the semiotic process allows us to understand
Shklovsky’s analysis of the “estranging” techniques, or “devices” in literature and
film, such as the striking use of language in poetry, the unfamiliar perspective
and the tension between fable and suzjet in narrative, or montage in film. In art,
the semiotic “fuzziness” of reality and the subsequent process of signification, be
it in perception or in thinking, is “recovered.” It is imitated in a specific medium
or combination of media (movement, sound, images, language). Signs that are
more or less conflicting are superposed on each other, the result being a multi-
layered structure which generates an interpretation process. Thus, life is rep-
resented mimetically in art through the recreating of the fuzziness of reality, and
by forcing the reader or spectator to deal with that fuzziness. There is something
ironic about the fact that what makes the stone “stony” is not so much its alleged
stoniness (whatever that may be), but the way in which it is represented in a com-
plex semiotic structure. But precisely because of this, Shklovsky could add that
“Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not impor-
tant.”12 Shklovsky seems to acknowledge that the stone (the object) is not so im-
portant; art is really all about semiosis. It is about the knight’s move of human
semiosis: never straight, but jumping over a void of meaning.
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There remains one last question to be answered, which is: Why? Why would we
want to represent our semiotic life? The answer is simple: insofar as the semiotic
process is itself an unfamiliar occurrence, it triggers a process of signification.
The reflexive semiotic process that ensues is again an attempt to relate an un-
stable occurrence to a stable form, that is to an image, a concept, or theory of
life. Semiotic self-consciousness develops along the same lines as semiotic con-
sciousness, that is, from self-images via self-imagination and self-conceptualiza-
tion to self-analysis. If we want to reflect upon our semiotic life, this life has to be
given a form, and it is the process of imaginative self-representation, both perso-
nal and collective, that we have been calling “art” at least since the eighteenth
century, but which has been with us since times immemorial. The imaginative or
mimetic representation of human life entails the imitative recreating of semiosis,
that is, of a process of relating stable and unstable patterns, signs and occur-
rences.13 In order to do so, what we have identified as “art” incorporates the un-
familiarity of reality in its own form. Depending on the historical context and
circumstances, the unfamiliarity is more or less strong, more or less prominent.
The stronger this unfamiliarity is experienced in a culture, the stronger it will
appear in its mimetic reflection, that is, in the arts. Instead of revealing to us
something which is absent from our lives, art shows us what is at the heart of it.
Foregrounding difference, it mimetically represents the sensation of life. By doing
so, it definitely contributes to the “somatic homeostatic regulation of our sense of
reality.”14
We can now round up the argument. Art does indeed represent the sensation
of life, but it does not recover it, as it was never lost. Instead of representing life in
terms of concepts and theories, it represents it mimetically by recreating the un-
familiar and confronting the recipient with an unstable reality. It does so not
because life has become a sign, but because life, in its unfamiliarity, asks for
signification. This process of signification always starts with attempts to give life
a more or less stable yet at the same time faithful representation. These faithful
representations of life are exactly what art provides us with. Once they are in
place, life can be dealt with also in more abstract terms, it can be conceptualized
and analyzed.
In art, devices such as narration and montage, are employed to strengthen,
mimetically, the strangeness, the difference of the experience that is conveyed.
This is, ultimately, what the concept of “estrangement” refers to: the ways in
which a work of art confronts its public, through a mimetic representation of the
semiotic process, with life as it is, or could be experienced.
That Shklovsky himself stressed the unfamiliar in art hardly comes as a sur-
prise, considering the circumstances in which he wrote. Around 1917, times in
Russia were turbulent. Life was very “estranging” indeed: habits of thought and
action were of little use during this period of revolution and modern warfare. As
he writes himself:
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We Russians didn’t know how to write about today. Art, no longer coupling
with life, from its continuous marriage with relatives – old poetic images –
shrank, expired. Myth expired… The application and simultaneously the coex-
istence of all artistic epochs in the soul of the passéist most fully resembles a
cemetery where the dead are no longer enemies. And life was left to chronicles
and cinema.15
Life for Shklovsky was not automatized at all. But many representations were: old
art and new entertainment joined forces in dealing with life by obfuscating it,
creating a smokescreen of worn-out language and easy-to-digest images. The
cruelty of war as Shklovsky experienced it was there, and it was real.16 People
experienced it, but they didn’t see it represented. Therefore, art once again had to
do what it had always done (and will always do), it had to represent life as well as
it could.
When Shklovsky urged literature to make us feel life as it is, he was actually
reminding literature and the arts, among which cinema figured prominently, of
their one and only task: to be art. Not surprisingly, in the review on Mayakovsky’s
“A Cloud in Trousers” quoted above, he also remarks that Formalism and Futur-
ism are allies. But in contrast to what he seems to think, Futurism was not the
result of Formalism; rather, Formalism provided the theoretical parallel to Futur-
ist art. Art has never had the task to render the world “unfamiliar.” It’s task has
always been to represent the representation process, not the world, but human
life as faithfully as possible. When and where life is unfamiliar, art will represent
it as such. In times of great stability, the unfamiliar may be limited to variations
on a well-known theme or even to the uniqueness of a single work or perfor-
mance. The stress on renewal in perception is not only a characteristic of Roman-
ticism17 but also, in general, of periods of cultural change and renewal (or “re-
naissance”). From that perspective, Shklovsky didn’t necessarily rely upon the
Romantics, he may have simply taken an analogous path in a different era. Today,
at the beginning of the 21st century, we see once again a turn toward perception,
away from a hyper-linguistic and self-referential postmodernism.
Shklovsky seems to have had it right when he stressed that art is a representa-
tion of life. He appears to be wrong, however, when he attributed the unfamiliar
to art, instead of discovering it in life itself. His theory of art reflects his own
experience, as has happened so often in the history of aesthetics, precisely be-
cause art does represent personal and collective experience: Just tell me what you
think art should be, and I’ll tell you what your life is like!
Thus, Shklovsky was right about art, but for the wrong reasons. The three per-
spectives he brings together in “Art as Technique”: a theory of perception (habit
formation in perception), a theory of semiosis (the object as symbol), and a theory
of abstraction (the “algebrization”) are related, but have to be distinguished if we
want to get a clear picture of the artistic process. Perception is not the same as
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semiosis, and semiosis is not the same as abstraction. The concept of estrange-
ment (“ostranennie”) can and should be reassessed within a more sophisticated
and complex theory of human semiotic cognition and of art as a specific instance
of semiosis, realized in a variety of media and characterized by imaginative self-
consciousness. The concept would refer to the experience generated by the mi-
metic representation of the estrangement which is inherent in all human semiotic
cognition, and which is the result of the difference between sign and occurrence
that functions as a continuous catalyst of the semiotic process. Estrangement is
basic to art because it is basic to (human) life.
Reflecting upon the fruitfulness of the concept of “ostranennie” for contempo-
rary criticism, we have to be very aware of the consequences of the foregoing
critical analysis of the concept. For Shklovsky, and in this respect he really was a
revolutionary thinker, the estrangement is caused by the formal structure of the
work of art. For him, the form is a substantial reality, and it was precisely this
reality of the artistic structure – the artistic techniques or devices – which gave the
new scientific study of literature of Formalism its stable ground. For Shklovsky, as
we have seen, these devices were directly related to the perceptual experience they
generated in the public of a work of art. In a later phase, which has become
known as Structuralism (with capital “S”!) and which originated in the work of
Jakobson and Tynjanov, the “locus” of structure moved, so to say, from the form
to the meaning. In an early stage, Jakobson repudiated Shklovsky’s crude “form-
alism,” replacing it by an apparently more sophisticated theory of linguistic
meaning. The “estrangement” of the form became a “tension” or “deviation” on
the level of meaning. This tension (or “écart” as it was coined in French) de-
manded interpretation, and literary studies moved from a phenomenological to a
hermeneutic structuralism. The transition was made possible by the replacement
of the analysis of the structure of the literary form (causing the experience of es-
trangement) to the interpretation of the meaning of the literary, or artistic devia-
tion. In a third phase, research focused on the grammar of artistic texts. Estrange-
ment was now understood in terms of the relation between the deep and surface
levels of this grammar – such as, for instance, between fabula and syuzhet in narra-
tive texts. Neo-formalism in film studies belongs here. In a fourth phase, the
seeds of which had been present already in the work on the “aesthetic object” by
the Prague structuralist Jan Mukařovský, and for which the philosophical move-
ments of deconstruction and pragmatism prepared the ground, the structure of
the text was replaced by the structure of interpretation, that is, by the structure of
a cognitive process. Pioneers of this development of reader-response research
were Wolfgang Iser in Germany and Norman Holland in the United States. In
film studies, Gestalt-psychologist Rudolf Arnheim paved the way. Estrangement
was now no longer an aspect of the literary form nor of literary meaning or gram-
mar; instead, it had become a dimension of the human cognitive process. It is in
this fourth, cognitive perspective that my own analysis of the concept of estrange-
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ment has its roots. The estrangement that characterizes human semiotic life, and
which may be mimetically represented through a work of art, is a dimension of
the cognitive process performed by a reader, viewer, listener, or spectator. And it
is precisely there – and not in a supposedly stable form or meaning – that it must
be studied. Thus, in the course of roughly one century, the study of the arts has
moved from a study of artistic forms, via the study of artistic meaning, to the
study of artistic cognition. If we want to keep the concept of “ostranenie” alive,
we will have to take this changed context of research into account and treat es-
trangement, accordingly, as a concept that refers to a crucial dimension of human
semiotic cognition.
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The Perception of Reality as Deformed
Realism
Miklós Kiss
“Our eyes may move like a camera, but our attention jumps like editing.”
– Jarmo Valkola1
Viktor Shklovsky stated that “[t]he purpose of art is to impart the sensation of
things as they are perceived and not as they are known.”2 Although this asser-
tion’s influence on cognitive studies is comparable to Hugo Münsterberg’s de-
servedly acclaimed study, it says less about the purpose of art than about the
purpose of Shklovsky.3 In the following, I would like to re-evaluate Shklovsky’s
highly progressive intuition on the cognitive distinction of “perceiving” as a bot-
tom-up and “knowing” as a top-down logic.4 The opposition will highlight the dis-
crepancy between the reality of perception and comprehension, and the realism of
representation. My aim is to point out the consequences of Shklovsky’s cognitive
hunch, which led him towards introducing his theory on the method of ostranenie.
Let us start with Mark Seddon’s laconic statement: “The real world in which we
live is continuous in time and in space. The world of the film is not.”5 No matter
how true this is in theory, the statement formulates an insignificant difference in
practice if we take recipient practice as a highlighted viewpoint. We must add the
supplement that the “reality” surrounding us is a physically chronological conti-
nuity, but its reception does not conform to this order; rather, it is closer to the
representational practice of film. The reception of reality appears in our mind as
edited, taken out of chronology; thus, it resembles film-like material. The process
of seeing guarantees this non-linear functioning: the omissions of the quick,
“jumping” saccadic eye movement;6 the fovea’s focused and detailed field against
the periphery’s diminishing information areas; or the processing of visual data,
which is primarily stored rather than filtered during the eye’s visual decoding;7 all
prove that even the slightest physiological features of the eye cannot perfectly
detect the chronology of physical reality. Accordingly, following Seddon, the eye
functions much more like a “biological camera.”8 It is not fully clear, even for
natural science, how our neural workings, constrained by the limited functioning
of the eye, are capable of creating a feeling of reality with linear continuity. How-
ever, it can be assumed that the narration-technique bluff of the Classical Narration9
imitates and, in addition, helps to restore the feeling of a linear physical reality. In
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whatever way it works, one thing is sure: one of its most apparent, if not the most
prominent principle is narrative linearity as the facade of this temporal manipula-
tion. Thus, this film-language method can be considered as the “most gracious
fraud” of Hollywood, upholding the norms of a classic mode of narration.
But does the narrative deformation through “‘the laying bare of the device,’
whereby art, having eliminated the usual lifelike facade” indicate any kind of
estrangement;10 more precisely, does it induce any processes of cognitive deauto-
matization against these norms?
Narrative Deformation ≠ Cognitive Deautomatization
In his early sketches on the psychology of the filmic perception, David Bordwell
claimed, “A filmmaker who presents story events out of chronological order thus
risks forcing the spectator to choose between reconstructing story order and los-
ing track of current action.”11 Insofar as the recipient agrees to take part and con-
structs rather than re-constructs a possible fabula of the plot, the viewer might create
the foundation of a new pattern as well, or might execute the affirmation of a still
evolving pattern including a non-linear formal schema.12 According to Bordwell,
the dynamics of changes in narration-technique patterns can be imagined gradu-
ally, step by step: in comparison to the previous ones, deviant narrative schemata
can be firmly fitted into the well-known patterns and can become determinative
over time, thereby creating a complex narrative template schema, a norm. With
this narrative schemata theory that prefers transition, we can smooth away the
subjectively selected threshold moments of film historical canon since “Problems
and solutions do not respect borders.”13 Bordwell, based on his own theory, de-
scribes Jean-Luc Godard as a brave innovator who, instead of the step by step
“traditional” method of changing patterns through schemata versions, aimed at
changing almost all narrative patterns at the same time. The most apparent of all
these is the narrative pattern that signifies an absolute tumbling of the patterns: it
challenges fossilized schemes of linear narrative, of linear temporality.
The temporality of the narration can be taken as a separate narrative template
schema, where patterns of the different sets of time-handling knowledge are
being formed during the film-watching activity of the recipient. Warren Buckland
also refers to Godard, or more precisely to the structure of one of the escape
scenes of Pierrot le fou (1965).14 He compares the treatment of time and
space, influencing the temporality of the narration, with the narrative montage of
the escape scene in which Pierrot and Marianne must flee from Frank (Marianne’s
lover). The scene mixes shots within the runaway sequence “according” to the
distracted situation:
The order of the syuzhet: (1) Marianne is about to leave the apartment, (2)
Marianne is driving a red car while Pierrot gets in, (3) Marianne and Pierrot
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are stepping out of the bathroom, Frank is lying unconscious in the bathtub,
(4) the red car drives faster and faster, (5) Pierrot and Marianne are looking
down from the top of the apartment, (6) two men are running towards the
apartment, (7) Pierrot and Marianne are still on the roof, (8) Pierrot and
Marianne are climbing down the gutter from the roof, (9) a shortened repeti-
tion of sequence (2), (10) the red car is speeding towards a barrier indicating
height, (11) Marianne gets into the red car and heads off, (12) the car reaches
the barrier, (13) the Statue of Liberty “waves friendly” at them, (14) the red car
drives to a petrol station (see the stills from Pierrot le fou on page 168-
169).
Unfolding a cognitive approach from a semiotic foundation, Buckland describes
the film mode of structuring as a carrier of three possible meanings: he enumer-
ates [a] grammatical and comprehensible, [b] ungrammatical but comprehensi-
ble (meaning can be deduced from the context, for example), or [c] ungrammati-
cal and incomprehensible units.15 The hectic montage of Godard disobeying time
and space relations is deviant compared to the classic film language which is in
keeping with the principle of linearity, but remains comprehensible with the help
of the context (the scene as the emotional representation of escape). According to
this, “[t]he sequence from Pierrot le fou is an ungrammatical but acceptable
filmic sequence,” a clear-cut example of type [b].16 It is true, however, that it
innovates its editing technique: it utilizes a montage based on the showing of
variations of shots that defy space and time continuation, but it does not elimi-
nate the fundamental narrative function and working of the montage. Buckland,
referring to the similar activity ascribed to the recipient, (re)arranges the non-
linear shots of the syuzhet into a linear, chronological order. He supposes that
“these features include spatio-temporal coordinates, together with the cause-
effect narrative logic linking the events.”17
After the (re)ordering of the non-linear shots of the above syuzhet (in the more chronologi-
cally and causally structured order of a potential fabula) the scene unfolds as follows: (1)
Marianne is about to leave the apartment, (3) Marianne and Pierrot are step-
ping out of the bathroom, Frank is lying unconscious in the bathtub, (5) Pier-
rot and Marianne are looking down from the top of the apartment, (6) two
men are running towards the apartment, (7) Pierrot and Marianne are still on
the roof, (8) Pierrot and Marianne are climbing down the gutter from the roof,
(11) Marianne gets into the red car and heads off, (2) Marianne is driving a red
car while Pierrot gets in, (9) the shortened repetition of sequence (2), (10) the
red car is speeding towards a barrier indicating height, (12) the car reaches the
barrier, (4) the red car drives faster and faster, (13) the Statue of Liberty “waves
friendly” at them, (14) the red car drives to a petrol station.
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Stills from Jean-Luc Godard’s Pierrot le fou, 1965.
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I believe that ordering the ungrammatical non-linearity of the syuzhet into a line-
ar chain does not enhance the facilitation of the episode’s comprehensibility,
since the scene did not take a discontinuing form for the solving of a mystery: it
is not the denouement of a narrative speculation that provides meaning. Analyz-
ing this same scene in accordance with Buckland, Bordwell states, “The sequence
invites us to rearrange the shots into ‘correct’ chronology.”18 The confutation of
the relevance of this approach is done by its wording: it is worth noting the use of
the expression “rearrange” which presupposes a previous, correct order and op-
poses the recipient’s constructive (vs. reconstructive) interpretative process that
was deduced convincingly by Bordwell himself.19 Buckland’s claim, “I shall at-
tempt to reconstruct this sequence by putting its shots (back) into a grammatical
sequence,” faces the same problem; that is, it induces a notion of previousness,
implementing some vague hierarchy among the different stages of comprehen-
sion.20
Sequences like the image of the Statue of Liberty, which do not fit into the plot
of the narrative course, reinforce my assumption against this rearranging effort.
The connotation of freedom of the statue will reduce the narrative emphasis of
the plot’s time and space, similar to the color psychology of the car, or the excite-
ment of escaping from the roof. The statue animates such, mostly film-related,
connotations that belong to the conventional (meaning film historical) pattern of
escape (with regard to the reflections on tradition by Godard, this is an almost
commonplace palpability). As long as we look thoroughly at the viewpoints of
creating comprehensibility, the scene as it is probably offers a more realistic pic-
ture of the nature of escape than the Bordwellian or Bucklandian linear ordering
of the supposed process of the chronological construction, because it stresses the
psychology of the excitement of escape in its essential non-linearity. The real ex-
citement accompanying an escape, the real feeling of panic is probably closer to
the hectic, non-linear Godard representation than to the classic, continuity-based
linear form.21 In this scene – and in many other instances – Godard creates a
more realistic and comprehensible story with a non-linear plot construction than
with a linear experience of the reality-imitating classic mode of narration.
Through the representation of the real recipient experience, Godard’s non-linear
approach exposes the reality-imitation technique of the classic Hollywood film
language, hiding behind sequential linearity and temporal chronology. The
space-time continuity of the classic norms’ realism is subordinated to the psycho-
logical, cognitive processes’ reality. It turns back the fraud of the classical narra-
tion style: realism cannot be represented through the imitation of reality but
through the showing of reality itself. Physical reality might be linear and chrono-
logical, but the perceptual experience of this reality is non-linear, achronological.
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Conclusion
I see the realistic effect of the hectic montage of Pierrot le fou in its non-
linearity, in direct opposition to the method of placing the events in a chronologi-
cal order, which was recommended by Bordwell’s or Buckland’s narrative analy-
sis. We are not watching cubist paintings as narrative puzzles. The heart of the
matter is not to solve some riddle, to understand what is represented, but what
matters is the alteration of sensation. As Shklovsky poignantly remarked:
An image is not a permanent referent for those mutable complexities of life
which are revealed through it; its purpose is not to make us perceive meaning,
but to create a special perception of the object – it creates a “vision” of the object
instead of serving as a means for knowing it.22
Here I would like to emphasize again that physical reality might be linear and
chronological, but the experience of this reality is non-linear, achronological.
This train of thought – remaining with Godard in connection with his À bout
de souffle (Breathless, 1960) – is continued by András Bálint Kovács, who
believes that with the help of its scene-entangling functioning, the non-linear
Godardian montage emphasizes “primarily not the narrative meaning of the
events, but their unexpectedness and hectic emotional content [...], it does not
describe a narration, but conveys the narration’s emotional content through the
fracturing of space and time.”23 Mobilized against classic narrative norms, ostra-
nenie at best deautomatizes the film-viewing practice; that is, it raises awareness24
and actually reduces the level of immersion through the self-conscious effect of
the non-linear narrative. Despite bringing about a deautomatized viewing percep-
tion, its efforts are just not able to alienate, to distance from the psychological,
cognitive-physiological functioning of the real experience. The deautomatization
that works against habitualization25 by means of narrative deformation only threat-
ens the realism of the classical norms of representation. To be more precise, it
threatens the viewers’ routines of understanding as maintained by the Classical
Narration. However, on a cognitive level it has no influence on the real, funda-
mentally non-linear processes of perception and understanding. It cannot alter
our biologically determined, essentially non-linear, perceptive and comprehensive
operations.26 The aesthetically motivated Godard, deforming the routines of real-
ism, dismantles and even supersedes the need of the reconstructible, indirect, top-
down logic of the narrative norms. He creates a provocative sequence of shots,
without relying on any previous narrative knowledge, so that it works on a phy-
siological rather than an inferential level. Bordwell, however, proposes an inferen-
tial model of narration:
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Instead of treating the narrative as a message to be decoded, I take it to be a
representation that offers the occasion for inferential elaboration. […] I sug-
gest that given a representation, the spectator processes it perceptually and
elaborates it on the bases of schemas she or he has to hand.27
Godard’s hectic montage, which works viscerally, supersedes this schemata-
based inferential logic. Additionally, on a cognitive level, the shuffling of shots
exactly mirrors the real, non-linear process of perceiving and understanding.28
Chrono-logic does not require chronology. Challenging everyday perception
and challenging realism are sometimes not against reality at all. Moreover, the
ensuing provocation of this challenge exactly mirrors the ways of our cognitive
interplay between perception and comprehension. Richard Shusterman’s highly
inspiring somatic theory, which integrates John Dewey’s pragmatic aesthetical phi-
losophy and the ecological approach of cognitive theory, brings the biocultural
interaction between aesthetical and biological functioning to deeper, even organic
levels of our being human.29 The theory implies that it is high time to leave the
objective rational (inferential) proposal of (neo-)formalism for what it is and turn
to the analysis of the “strange,” not as a detached form but as a complex aesthetic
experience: an experience which takes both cognitive, physiological and even
psychoanalytical consequences into consideration.
Godard’s neo-cubist montage, aptly commented on by Pier Paolo Pasolini as a
“poetic restoration of reality,”30 not only visualizes this complexity but at the








Conversation with András Bálint Kovács
Laurent Jullier
Let me begin by introducing my fellow colleague and interviewee, András Bálint
Kovács, Professor at the Institute of Art & Communication, ELTE (Budapest),
where he holds the Chair of the Department of Film Studies. He was born in
1959 in Budapest, Hungary. Because of his work on defamiliarization, he was
invited to contribute to this book. On the one hand, he frequently uses modern
items (films, directors and essays) as objects of research. His book Screening Mod-
ernism: European Art Cinema 1950-1980, published by Chicago University Press in
2008 (Limina Award, 2009) is well known, and so are his writings about Tarkov-
sky and Gilles Deleuze.1 On the other hand, he is a fellow of the Society for Cog-
nitive Studies of the Moving Image (SCSMI), where he studies the narrative uni-
versals.2 His ongoing research deals with the psychology of causal thinking while
understanding cinematic narrative. In academic Film Studies, this kind of combi-
nation is unusual. When choosing modern artworks and authors as objects of
research, scholars usually prefer aesthetic, deconstructionist, historical or cultural
tools to analyze them, since Modernism is the main purveyor of non-familiar things
in the field of culture and art. Cognitive Film Studies are supposed to provide
tools to explain how the audience perceives familiar things on the screen. András
Bálint Kovács is well aware of this paradoxical combination, since he has been,
and still is, involved in epistemological debates (see his article on the book Impos-
ture Intellectuelles).3 This is a good opportunity to ask him some questions about
this paradox in Film Studies (points 1 and 4), and about two mechanisms involved
in the defamiliarizing process: narrative causation (point 2) and veridicality of
knowledge (point 3).
Defamiliarization and Film Studies: Historical Context
LJ: The project text of The Key Debates. Mutations and Appropriations in European Film
Studies reminds us that “In the field of European Film and Film Studies, the
weight of an ‘American’ paradigm and all the institutional forces behind it is
strongly felt.” Nevertheless, the question of cinematic ostranenie was, in the begin-
ning, a typically European one. I am thinking of Walter Benjamin and Belá Balázs
writing about the close-up and constructive editing; I am thinking of the cinéma
dada and René Clair looking for new ways to show ancient artworks.4
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After these pioneering times, there is a first move towards more essentialist
preoccupations. I am thinking of Siegfried Kracauer and André Bazin (followed
in France by Jean Cocteau and Amédée Ayfre), and their ambition to subscribe to
the camera the power of revealing the Real and showing the audience the world
“before we look at it.”5 The idea of defamiliarization is still there, but reverted
(the cinematic apparatus produces defamiliarization only when – and because –
it tells the truth about the world). A second move, especially when one considers
French scholars, consists in subscribing the defamiliar, or defiant, to the artist, in
order to concentrate on other problems – narration (narratology), ideology (marx-
ist approach), gaze and identity (psychoanalytic approach), etc. On the contrary, it
seems that the “American paradigm” is once again including the question of de-
familiarization in a somewhat essentialist way in Stanley Cavell’s Projection of the
World, and the same goes for the field of Analytic Film Theory (Kendall Walton,
Noël Carroll, Richard Allen). Do you think this evolution has taken shape strictly
due to contingencies and “historical accidents,” or is it more logical to assume
that it evolved due to a deep divergence of view between Europe and America
regarding the cinema and the ways of comprehending and studying cinema?
ABK: Let me first say that I can see no “deep divergence” between Europe and
America. The basics of film theory were born in Europe in the first half of the
twentieth century, and it stands to reason that no American theorist can be imag-
ined without those points of departure.
Up until the mid-1980s “European” film theory was dominated by French and
British film theory both based on Marxist ideology critique, semiotics and psycho-
analysis, to different extents of course. The critical analysis of film from a struc-
tural and ideological point of view was at the center of this theory, which was
primarily concerned with finding “the meaning.” Now, let me put this in a very
provocative way: asking “what a film means” is not a theoretical question. One
can embrace as many theories and philosophical, scientific, or psychological
theses as one pleases, finding “the meaning” in an individual film, or in a group
of films, always remains the film critic’s work. To me, this kind of theorizing
comes across as an extremely erudite way of talking about movies addressed to
an erudite and theoretically demanding audience at a time when philosophers,
writers, artists, even scientists regularly went to the movies not merely to have
fun, but with the conviction that cinema was a form of art in its own right. They
believed that they could learn as much about the world from cinema as they could
from books and theater. This kind of erudite film criticism remains very impor-
tant and instructive, but we should stop believing that it is a theory in its own
right. A theoretical question is not about what something means, but about how
something is possible.
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Meanwhile, another paradigm started to emerge. From the late 1980s cognitive
science appeared in the writings of some literary and film theorists, and this new
scientific paradigm, it seems, firstly conquered American literary and film
theories. That is not to say that it was exclusively American in nature. If we look
at the membership of the Society for Cognitive Studies of the Moving Image,
which was founded in the United States, we find many Europeans (from Den-
mark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary and other countries,
too). All things considered, right now I can see no other productive theoretical
paradigm than the cognitive one: post-structuralist paradigms, having lost their
credibility regarding their potential to become all-embracing general explanatory
theories, are nothing more than auxiliary tools for interpretation.
Now, defamiliarization can be an interesting area of research in cognitive theo-
ry since it can be viewed as a psychological effect a film exercises over the viewer:
the circumstances, conditions and process of which can be researched or ana-
lyzed by a cognitively slanted aesthetic-analytical approach as done by Carroll or
Allen. Again, this is not an American paradigm. I believe it to be the most unified
and virulent theoretical paradigm that presently exists in film theory. I say this
accepting that other vast areas of film studies like different disciplines of interpre-
tation, such as cultural studies, political, psychoanalytical or feminist criticism,
still provide interesting insights for understanding the meaning of films.
Defamiliarization and Narration
LJ: You mentioned that defamiliarization is an interesting area of research in cog-
nitive theory, particularly with regard to film and narration. One can easily as-
sume that a lack of causality in a film narrative automatically means defamiliari-
zation, since inferring causality is a built-in mechanism that helps human beings
comprehend the world around them, but things are not so simple. In “Things
that come after another,”6 you used David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive (2001)
to point out that “a narrative can be understood by similarity and variation even
when causal connections are hopelessly blurred.” You go on by introducing:
[T]he category of narrative situation to suggest that all narratives consist of
such narrative fragments (situations) that suggest to the viewer different pos-
sible causal or non-causal continuations, and if a certain logic (causality, simi-
larity or varied repetition) of the changes within the sequences of the situation
can be grasped, the viewer can understand it even if causality is blurred or
non-existent in it.7
Does this interpretation imply that narrative defamiliarization is quite unobtain-
able, even in the most modernist and deconstructed experimental films, since the
spectator is always able to find some “narrative coherence” even in the absence of
conversation with andrás bálint kovács 177
a “certain logic”? This would mean that the only way to provoke estrangement is
to modify representation (because modifying narration in this case would be
pointless).
ABK: I don’t think that narrative defamiliarization is impossible on the basis that
the viewers always find some coherence in a film. Defamiliarization simply means
the usage of such poetic narrative devices that thwart the audience’s automatic
associative processes and provoke the audience to find other ways of making
sense of the work of art. Narrative defamiliarization occurs all the time when
events in a narrative sequence are such that most viewers cannot link them to
one another causally or in any other way. If, for example, a character shifts iden-
tity from one scene to another, this is unfamiliar to us, and we consider the event
sequence as not linked causally. If, on the contrary, a rule is set in the film ac-
cording to which characters often change their identities, the event sequence be-
comes familiar very easily, and we can now see the causal connections (this is
how fantastic films work). Modernist defamiliarization of narratives occurs when
event sequences do not elicit causality, and the film does not set rules by which
the audience could easily construct causal or other cohesive connections. But
most of this kind of defamiliarization inevitably becomes familiar after a while,
which is one reason why modernism ended. Defamiliarization is only a temporary
effect that just vanishes after a certain time in relation to a specific artistic solu-
tion. Incoherence is obviously one way of initiating defamiliarization, but if
no new associative rules are proposed by the work of art, it simply becomes unin-
teresting. It stands to reason that rules unavoidably become familiar or automatic
after a while. Some defamiliarization techniques remained effective, however, and
we could explain this by their self-reflexivity. The main effect in self-reflectivity is
that it disrupts narrative illusionism when, for instance, the author addresses the
audience directly. This device is always disturbing because it provokes a radical
change of attitude in the viewer. No matter how many times I watch À bout de
souffle, it always strikes me when, at the beginning, Jean-Paul Belmondo starts
talking to the camera. Defamiliarization always has an effect of estrangement, but
not all estrangement is self-reflective.
What has all this to do with people’s tendency to find coherence in narratives?
In the case of defamiliarized narratives, one could predict that to a certain extent
the viewers continue to construct causal connections even when the sequences
are unfamiliar to them. In the early 1970s a Hungarian filmmaker, Gábor Bódy,
performed an experiment that specifically tackled this problem. He created a film
entitled Hunt for Little Foxes by randomly piecing together shots he found
in the garbage can of an editing room at the Hungarian television. He screened
the film to an audience and asked the audience to comment on the film’s mean-
ing. Almost all of the members of the audience found some meaning in the film,
which is to say that they found at least some connections in the randomly edited
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sequences, and some of them were causal. Bódy emphasized that this process of
finding meaning has a time limit. If random shots follow each other long
enough, and there is no structure in the sequence, we just stop looking for a
sense. This is an empirical question and thus deserves to be investigated. So if we
see a narrative situation (someone is doing something somewhere) that provokes
us to extend it in time and space in our minds, followed by another narrative
situation, we automatically try to connect the two by various means: causation,
similarity, repetition, as unfamiliar as the given connection may seem. When we
find a rule that works, after a while the sense of unfamiliarity disappears, and we
have a sense of understanding even if causal connections between the situations
are blurred.
LJ: If the disturbance of narrative codes and traditions occurs at specific points in
time, then the question would be: should defamiliarization (as Shklovsky ex-
plained it in 1917 in “Art as Technique”) be considered “deeply modernist” since
in most cases the defamiliarizing effect is short-lived, because new rules of com-
prehension nullify the estranging effect? Clearly, defamiliarization, in this sense,
only “culturally authorizes” basic perceptual and cognitive schemes to be used by
the spectator. The Nouvelle Vague jump-cut, for instance, would only have been
effective for a couple of years before losing its defamiliarizing powers. Is it not
also a matter of film genre? A jump-cut is no longer disturbing in an independent
art film or a MTV music video, it seems, but would it not be disturbing if used in a
Harry Potter movie? The sociocultural “training” is an important factor here: once
introduced into a new “world” (in Howard Becker’s sociological meaning of the
term “world”), you learn to enjoy some new figures or you simply learn not to
find them strange anymore.
ABK: I agree, and it is also a matter of style. We cannot evaluate artistic devices
(“priom,” in Russian Formalist terminology) separately from their contexts. This
was one of the fatal misconceptions of early film semiology. A new solution may
appear and may disturb artistic reception in a certain context. It becomes familiar
after a while in that particular context, while unfamiliar in another context. Jump
cuts are no surprise, as you say, in music videos or commercials, nor are they in
art films, or contemporary action films, and they also infiltrated into recent televi-
sion series, like 24 or The Wire. Nonetheless, they remain unfamiliar in most
romantic comedies and children’s films, like Harry Potter (although I haven’t
seen the last one yet). A jump cut is a sort of “error” in editing (cf. the French
term faux raccord explicitly refers to that), and pure convention determines whether
the error is tolerated or not. Nothing prevents “shocking” effects from becoming
familiar and even boring after a while, independent of the context in which they
occur. We could call this “socio-cultural training,” but bear in mind that this is
also a perceptual or cognitive training. We just learn how certain visual effects
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affect us and what they mean. We learn how to differentiate between two visual
effects, the way a child learns how to differentiate between shapes of objects.
Defamiliarization and Knowledge
LJ: Let us move towards the question of the “veridicality” of the knowledge one
can acquire through defamiliarization. In my essay, I claim that evolutionary psy-
chology and most “Darwinian” disciplines, broadly speaking, radically reject the
concept of Derrida’s “différance” because these disciplines primarily consider the
“useful part” of the knowledge (the know-how, for instance: how can I find food,
safety, heat, partners...). Richard Allen and Murray Smith, following the same line
of thought, assert that not only “Darwinian” disciplines, but also analytical philo-
sophy do not share the Derridean “epistemic atheism.” So, what does this athe-
ism entail? According to Allen and Smith:
[T]he presence of an object in the mind’s eye is guaranteed only by the pres-
ence of something – the material signifier – that is by definition absent. Thus,
for Derrida, any knowledge claim, founded by definition upon the presence of
the object in the mind’s eye, must make reference to its own impossibility in
the very act of being made.8
That is why defamiliarization would be a “better way” to get to know something:
it escapes the failure of the absence/presence dilemma because the material sig-
nifier is not intended to be there in the first place. The fallacy of its presence (i.e.,
at the movies the so-called “illusion of reality”) is therefore avoided. To my mind,
the Derridean argument is stronger in literature than in the cinema, because a
wide range of cinematic “information” about the world is not encoded in words
but in kinesthetic schemes for instance. I do not understand why estrangement
per se – at least at the movies – would necessarily allow me to learn better or truer
things about my environment.
ABK: I agree. Defamiliarization or estrangement do not per se allow getting in
touch with truth or reality. This is the modernist ideology about these techniques.
This is by the way one of the main differences between modernism and post-
modernism: in postmodernistic thinking, reality does not exist behind the image,
there are only more images behind the image. It is no big news that someone
inspired by evolutionary theory and analytic philosophy does not share Derridian
deconstruction.
Différance is Derrida’s clever neologism to express his opinion about meaning,
namely that meaning always escapes us, because we can grasp it only through
what it is not. The meaningful element, the present, can only be defined “by
means of this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a
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past or a future as a modified present.”9 What happens when we accept this idea?
Do we get any closer to the reality of what we want to talk about? I don’t think so.
Something can be defined against an infinite number of “others,” and what we
get is still the idea that the identity of the thing we want to know more about
escapes us all the time. If I have to choose between poststructuralist ideas about
identity, I would rather choose Deleuze’s répétition, which also stretches the
knowledge of identity in time, but the concept of répétition explains at least some-
thing of the difference about what something is against what something is not.
Do we know more about what a pipe is when we read from Magritte’s painting:
Ceci n’est pas une pipe? No. What we do understand from this is that it is hard to
know what something is at any rate. And that what we can see is only a part of the
“real” identity. And maybe we never grow to learn it. But we have no other choice
but to look for it in a series of appearances, each of which provides an aspect of
the “Whole,” as Deleuze says, which is open and never ends.
So we always have to deal with partial aspects of reality. Nobody needs to be
warned that watching a movie is something else than watching reality. What
sometimes needs warning about is that what we see is only a partial appearance
of a reality that can never be grasped in its entirety. If there is any “truth” in
defamiliarization or estrangement, it is this general truism about the partiality of
all representation of reality. And this is in harmony with the cognitive approach to
perception. According to the cognitive approach, perception is a constructive pro-
cess by which we always compare external stimuli with complex patterns we have
in our minds. With the help of this comparison, we always complete or augment
what we physically see in order to construct an entire image with our mind’s eye.
This process always changes the image as we move forward; we add more details,
change the shape and so on, and we change the pattern, too, even though we can
never physically see the whole object at any time.
To put it really bluntly, the reason why cognitivist researchers cannot make use
of the concept of différance is, I think, that this kind of philosophy, rather than
trying to find a way of accomplishing the really difficult task of explaining human
understanding, explains to us why we cannot ever accomplish this task. I think it
is a more productive standpoint to suppose that things can be made intelligible,
can be understood, even if this understanding is partially our own construction,
and necessarily partial as it is, understanding escapes us all the time, and identity
cannot be grasped even for a moment, and meaning is never where we look for it.
Defamiliarization and Film Studies: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
LJ: You probably know Gender Studies and Cultural Studies are reluctant to use
any part of the cognitive-evolutionary paradigm. One might even say they totally
reject it, even though some cognitivists demonstrated that a “biocultural” ap-
proach could indeed be useful to describe cultural problems related to gendered
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behaviour.10 One might also say that there is no debate at all. French researcher
Dan Sperber describes the problem in terms of a meeting he once attended, be-
tween psychologists and anthropologists, trying to work on the same object. After
a while, Sperber writes:
[T]he disappointment is strong on both sides. The anthropologists fail to see
the relevance of experimental evidence... They object to what they see as the
artificiality of experiments collected outside of an ethnographic context. More-
over, they find the psychologists’ view of culture, exemplified by the fact that
they are talking about Western and Asian cultures in general, far too crude.
The psychologists feel that the anthropologists are just blind to the importance
of experimental evidence, that they criticise experimental methodology without
understanding it... In the end, the thesis itself is not given any discussion. 11
Dan Sperber labels the miscomprehension as a language problem (as does Bruno
Latour):
The two communities, psychologists and anthropologists, have different voca-
bularies, presuppositions, priorities, criteria, references. In general, different
disciplines have different sub-cultures, and the difference is made worse, not
attenuated, by the existence of superficial similarities, for instance identical
words used with quite different meanings (“culture” and “mode of thought”
in the present example).12
In our case, ostranenie is a typical interdisciplinary object. It is the perfect example
of an object whose studying needs both cognitive and cultural approaches, but I
do not see such a collaboration happening any time soon, I’m afraid. More than a
language problem, it is a political problem, don’t you agree? Perhaps culturalists
are “just blind to the importance of experimental evidence.” They seem to associ-
ate cognitivism with a conservative point of view on account of the built-in auto-
matic schemes of perception. They may perceive cogniticians as behaviorists,
helping the industry of low entertainment to sell more of its non-defamilarizing
products… If my reading is correct, the “disappointment on both sides” (as Sper-
ber puts it) is going to last.
ABK: I’m afraid so, too. There are several problems here, and none of them are
easy to resolve. The first problem is that there are many trends in cognitive
science, and there are many conceptions about how our biological construction
is related to our minds and to our culture. Some hardline cognitivists think that at
the end of the day, all our mental products are reducible to material, physical or
chemical processes. Those are called “physicalists.” On the other hand, most cul-
turalists adopt a Cartesian dualist approach, according to which our mental phe-
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nomena are located in an independent realm with its own rules and logic, none of
which can be explained by material processes. The two extremes will never be
able to enter into a dialogue. There are so many mental phenomena that cannot
be explained by known biological or neuronal processes, so dualist explanations
will always survive, or for a very long time anyway. There are different ways in
contemporary cognitive theory to try to find the theoretical framework of fitting
higher-level mental processes to lower-level biological or neuronal processes.
“Embodiment” is one of the very fashionable terms.13 Thermodynamics and
“phase transition” are also often-heard catchwords.14 What we can say for sure is
that we do not know. But we cannot say that we will never know, or that this is a
sheer mystery, impossible to know.
Take the example of the conscious will. This is one of the central topics of philo-
sophy, law, aesthetics, and all kinds of culturalist arguments. A psychologist,
David Wegner dedicated his career to the research of the real meaning of con-
scious will. In his writings15 he argues that conscious will is in fact an illusion
and explains how this works. He refers to tons of experiments and cases which
prove that most of the time when we think that we do what we will, in fact it is the
other way around: we will what we do, and then we explain it. In none of those
cases is something that can be called “conscious will” the cause of our actions.
All his examples and experiments are highly compelling. Why will this never con-
vince a dualist culturalist? That is probably because, regardless of whether the
idea that our own “conscious will” determines our actions is true or not, Wegner
fails to give an alternative. He cannot say what it is that causes our actions if it is
not our “conscious will.” With his scientific methods he can go as far as gather-
ing phenomena that refute the idea of the causal power of “conscious will” and
support the conception that “will” is the feeling which assures us that we are the
authors of what we are doing, but by no means can this feeling be conceived of as
the causal source of our acts. But what is the causal source of our acts? Because
there is a huge knowledge gap here, there is enough room for radical culturalists,
theologists, biologists, and physicalists to impose their own seemingly coherent
theories about such an intricate issue like the “conscious will,” theories which are
at the same time impossible to justify or refute. So, as long as we do not know
enough about how our brain works, many mutually exclusive theories and beliefs
will continue to survive.
The other problem is that even if we know enough or very much about some-
thing, politics and religious convictions will always enter into the debate. When
there are moral or political consequences at stake, rational arguments can prevail
only to a certain degree. Especially theories about the causes of human acts be-
come the subject of different theories that are closely linked with certain ideolo-
gies. The main problem here is that the culturalist approach is almost necessarily
“blind” to experimental evidence, because they think that the essential part of hu-
man actions – its meaning in a specific context – cannot be an object of an experi-
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ment. Meaning comes out of the complexity of “real life,” and no experimental
situation can reach to those levels of complexity. Even someone like Freud did not
think that his psychoanalytical theory needed experimental justification. He
thought that a great amount of empirical data interpreted the way he did sufficiently
underpinned his theory. Culturalists believe that the mere interpretation of em-
pirical facts is a good methodology for creating theories, because (1) this kind of
interpretation is based on the complexity of real life, (2) real-life facts cannot be
repeated for experiment’s sake, (3) culture and society are essentially historical,
so cultural and social facts are basically ruled by historical contingencies, (4) if
there are any non-historical rules in culture or society, they are nonetheless inde-
pendent of the biological or psychological nature of humans, (5) interpretation is
based on intentions and values rather than natural causes. Political use of the
culturalist approach comes much easier than the political use of the cognitivist
approach. Yet many culturalists condemn cognitivists for political reasons just
because they refrain from supporting political ideas based on mere interpretation.
The third problem is that the culturalist approach focuses on individual differ-
ences in cultures, whereas the cognitivist approach looks for the mechanisms and
general conditions of knowledge and cognition common to human nature. They
mutually ignore each other’s field of interest. But in reality there is no real contra-
diction between the two approaches if we do not push them to the extreme. As
Torben Grodal said in his Embodied Visions, “Even if many of the fundamental
aspects of culture work within innate specifications and boundaries, the possibi-
lities of making culturally specific products are, nevertheless, unlimited.”16 Which
is to say that both approaches can very well survive next to each other if they are
willing to accept the specificity of one other’s field of interest and are willing to
respect one another’s justifiable results, even if as a consequence they will be
required to change some of their own ideas. The differences of cultural products
can best be explained by historical contingencies, and cultural and historical tra-
ditions. But there are undeniable regularities across even the most distant cul-
tures, there are recurrent patterns in human behavior at all levels, from history to
personal behavior, which may be traced back to the psychological and neuronal
construction of the human being. People and cultures follow patterns. Some of
these patterns are historical or based in tradition, some are biological or psycho-
logical. There is a merit in studying all of them.
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Conversation with Laura Mulvey
Annie van den Oever
New questions in Film Studies seem to have acquired urgency recently. We have
seen some major changes in Film Studies, such as a focus on the spectator and
the viewing experience, and cinema’s special appeal to historical audiences.
Moreover, the current rapid transitions in digital and optical techniques and view-
ing practices have also called for attention. These current research interests in
Film Studies are explored by Laura Mulvey, Professor of Film and Media Studies
at Birkbeck College, University of London, who, in her latest book Death 24x a
Second. Stillness and the Moving Image (2006), addresses the role new technologies
play in the viewing experience and re-evaluates the nature of the filmic medium.
By investigating the ramifications of these new technologies, Laura Mulvey is able
to explore some aspects of spectatorship and the film’s materiality that have been
transformed by the new developments, particularly the way the viewer experiences
the unfolding of time, space, and movement. She also looks at the arrival of the
cinema and the ways it affected the, as yet, “inexperienced” moviegoer. In doing
so, she reconsidered some interesting aspects of the early movie going experience
and the unexpected confrontations with the uncanny it elicited in particular that
are relevant to this present discussion on ostranenie. As Laura Mulvey has ex-
plained, one may see the introduction of the cinema into culture as an abrupt
one, and as a decisive point in its history. She agrees with film historians that the
cinema and its prehistory “are too deeply imbricated, ideologically and technolo-
gically, for an abrupt ‘birth of the cinema’ to be conceptually valid,” as she wrote.
But she does not agree with them that this is all that there is to it. In her last
book, she argued that “from the perspective of the uncanny, the arrival of cellu-
loid moving pictures constitutes a decisive moment.”1 Early cinema “baffled” its
audience by reproducing “the illusion of life itself,” as she analyzed, but “the
image of life was necessarily haunted by deception.”2 Laura Mulvey’s approach
creates some fundamentally new insights into the nature of these early viewing
experiences, highly relevant for our rereading of Shklovsky’s “Art as Technique.”
It is in the light of this that I invited Laura Mulvey to elaborate on some of the
issues concerning ostranenie and film at the end of this book.
AvdO: Within the context of our debate on ostranenie (“making strange”), it might
be a good idea to start our conversation with a reflection on early cinema’s “alie-
nating” qualities and their specific appeal to early audiences, or to what André
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Gaudreault recently referred to as “early cinema’s alien quality, a properly irre-
ducible alien quality which traditional film historians have always tried to paper
over.”3
As you know, the alien, uncanny or “barbaric” powers of the cinema, as Virgi-
nia Woolf called them, were the very powers which impressed the early cinema’s
audiences. The “alienating” powers of the cinema and the new optical techniques
“making things strange” seem to have been center stage at this specific moment in
time. In retrospect, it is very hard for us to understand these early, and slightly
destabilizing, viewing experiences. It seems to me that, due to a cascade of re-
search on early cinema (by Aumont, Gunning, Gaudreault, Tsivian, Christie,
Kessler, and many others) as well as separate reflections on the experience of the
“alien” or “alienating” powers (or techniques) of the cinema (e.g., Casetti’s, Sob-
chack’s and your own work, to name but a few), the impact on art and on culture
at large of what mostly was a truly alienating viewing experience has indeed been
tremendous, particularly between about 1900 to 1920. So now let me pose my first
question.
When we look back on this specific period in time with the extensive knowl-
edge we have of it now, would you say that we need to reconsider some major
reflections of those days as we understand them now? Do we need to historicize the
key texts once again? Of course I think of Shklovsky’s “Art as Technique” here,
which was written in 1916, while the issues raised in the crucial paragraphs on
perception were already presented by Shklovsky to his Futurist friends as early as
1913.4 And of course, with regard to your own work, I also think of Freud’s reflec-
tion on the uncanny, Das Unheimliche, from 1919.5 In Death 24x a Second you write
that “there is a coincidence of chronology in the 1890s between Freud’s ambition
to find ways of analyzing the irrational and the arrival of the cinema” and that
“Freud’s great contribution to modernity was to recognize that the irrational was
intrinsic to human reason, ‘housed’ in the unconscious.”6
Within this specific context, it seems beneficial to re-read Freud on the uncan-
ny as a reflection that in part may have been initiated by the alienating impact
early cinema as a new medium had on audiences, that is, as a reflection on the
uncanny experience of being face to face with something that was inexplicable,
leaving the audience baffled by what they saw on the screen. As with the automa-
ton, Olympia, in the grotesque story “Sandman” by E.Th.A. Hoffmann, to which
Freud also refers in his Uncanny essay (the example is well-known in German
aesthetics), one is not sure about the ontological status of the seen. It seems that
the intellectual uncertainty it triggers has a strong impact on the imagination. Is it
in fact possible to perceive the “automaton” – half machine, half animated being
– as an emblem for the new medium, that miraculous machine which produces
still images of “humans” and makes them come to life? Did Hoffmann (and
Jentsch, who also brought up the example in an early reflection on the aesthetic
exploitation of uncertainty in 1906)7 in fact provide a well-known example for
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Freud to reflect on the uncanny experiences triggered by that new automaton, the
“cinema machine”? In short, would you say that Freud’s text, read within its spe-
cific historical context, might be appreciated as a rather brilliant reflection on the
destabilizing powers of the new optical medium and its sudden and strong impact
on the imagination?
LM: Thank you for inviting me to participate in this “conversation” and giving me
the opportunity to return to Freud’s essay “The Uncanny” from a perspective that
differs from the chapter “Uncertainty” in Death 24. Perhaps predictably, however,
I did find some, if only incidental, pointers towards this conversation when I re-
read that chapter. I would like to distinguish a couple of points here in your very
rich and suggestive commentary above. I think perhaps they relate to each other,
but it might be worthwhile beginning by taking them separately.
To my mind, the first issue raised in your question about the “new medium’s
work” in its early days, its allegorical relation to the automaton and then to the
fusion between the animate and inanimate created by the cinematic illusion, goes
straight to the heart of the paradox of cinema. From this perspective, as you point
out, defamiliarization of the everyday, inherent in its translation onto the screen,
works on two levels: the still frames that, when animated by a projector, mimic
human perception and, then, the filmic rendition of time as flow, capturing the
passing of time in the present and recording it for the future (to mention the most
obvious). The first has to do with cinematic mechanics, the transition from mate-
rial, inanimate, filmstrip to illusion of movement on the screen. The second has
more to do with the fascination of the images watched either due to their content
or, more to the point here, to their visualization of passing time. The automaton
that is “brought to life” (wound up, as it were) by the projector “materializes” into
an image on the screen and performs beautifully, usually concealing its inanimate
nature. The raw mutation of one into the other might or might not raise ques-
tions in people’s minds about its actual mechanics, but a certain uncanniness
would probably have been particular to early film because the effect was, literally
speaking, unfamiliar. But that strange animation of the inanimate, although fa-
miliarized by the everyday and by fiction, is carried across time from then until
now and is central to the cinema’s potential for defamiliarizing the everyday. On
the other hand, it might have been a means of engaging with the modern that I
will return to later.
You begin by suggesting that, alongside the important, recent research into the
history of early cinema itself, the theoretical essays by Shklovsky “Art and Techni-
que” and Freud “The Uncanny” could benefit from being restored to, or read
alongside, that expansion of cinema as a key element in their historical and cul-
tural context. Both essays are clearly addressing questions of perception, albeit
from very different perspectives. Freud was attempting to restore the rigor of psy-
choanalytic theory in the face of Ernst Jentsch’s speculations on the “uncanny”
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phenomenon, while also making a few, both rigorous and quite speculative, ob-
servations of his own. Shklovsky, of course, was concerned with stimulating a
“strangeness” effect through techniques of writing for radical aesthetic purposes.
I am interested in the way that the cinema might be seen (perhaps retrospectively)
to offer a “threshold” between the two: the term “uncanny” arguably describes
(attempts to name) a psychic mechanism that the device of estrangement exploits
(or taps into). Both involve disorientation of a norm and thus an enforced pause. I
will return to these points more specifically towards the end of our conversation.
You have pointed out that although neither essay mentions the cinema, it
would have been hard, at that moment in history, to avoid consciousness of it
altogether. While there is copious evidence of Shklovsky’s interest in cinema, he
does seem to have been concerned in this essay with actual procedures of writing
and the practice of poetics. I doubt that Freud had the cinema in mind. By the
time he wrote “The Uncanny” in 1919, cinema was no longer “early” and had
become very widely diffused. His lack of interest, even antipathy, to it has been
traced very convincingly by Stephen Heath who points out that even in 1925,
Freud preferred to use the “magic writing-pad” as an analogy for understanding
the psyche. Heath comments that contemporaneously:
Virginia Woolf writes an essay celebrating cinema’s capacity to give the ‘dream
architecture of one’s sleep’, to depict deep fantasies no matter ‘how far fetched
or insubstantial’, to offer a reality of the mind in defiance of conscious syntax
and propositions of identity ‘some secret language that we feel and see but
never speak’.8
However, it seems to me that, in spite of Freud’s own indifference, your question
stands. Freud was put off by the cinema’s literalness and the anxiety he felt about
translating the “abstractions” of psychoanalytic theory into “figurations.” A more
rewarding approach may lie not so much in the images projected onto the screen,
but rather in the cinema’s mechanism, perhaps its “technique” as such that I
mentioned earlier. From this point of view, the cinema’s illusion might well touch
the kind of imponderables that make the human mind “boggle,” that reveal its
vulnerability and reach towards the unconscious. With the hindsight generated by
recent work on early film, it might be possible to consider ways in which the
cinema concentrated these kinds of effects and brought them to the surface of
experience in a new way. But I will also speculate (perhaps recklessly) that the
cinema did visibly, for its early spectators (and then, even post-narrative, continue
to), fuse incompatibles (alongside reality and illusion, for instance, stillness/
movement and “then”/”now”) into a special kind of paradox particular to its for-
mal, technological structure.
In a sense, the uncanny, distanciation and cinema bring together three quite
contrasting phenomena. First, an involuntary shudder caused by something that
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touches a repressed anxiety or reaches back into primal, animistic beliefs suppos-
edly, Freud points out, “surmounted” by civilization. Second, a “technique” de-
vised specifically to jolt the reader out of habit and into sudden consciousness of
its dulling effects on the human perception. Finally, a new means of generating
an illusion of living reality, unreal in its obvious displacement from its original
time and place, but utterly convincing to perception. Your questions suggest not
necessarily that the phenomena are linked in some way, but that they might
share, even if only coincidentally, some appeal to the human mind’s vulnerability
to “estrangement” and also, it should be emphasized, its pleasure in these jolts or
surprises. The three phenomena lead into the debates on the attractions of early
cinema and Tom Gunning’s original formulation that popular entertainment
(particularly early cinema) could incorporate “uncanny” or “estranging” effects
that the avant-garde would continue to try to reproduce through a conscious de-
ployment of “techniques” of defamiliarization.
First of all, I would like to think about ways in which it might be possible to
bring the ideas of “uncanniness” and “estrangement” into some kind of shared
framework. My first point relates to space and has a closer relevance to the kind
of disorientations someone might experience in life rather than in art or poetry.
The second relates more to time and brings the two concepts rather closer to-
gether.
Freud’s discussion of the uncanny revolves (from multiple perspectives) around
the human mind’s response to certain kinds of shocks that are, by and large,
sudden and unpredictable. In this sense, the uncanny is posited on a distortion
of normal, continuous, and significantly habitual experience into something
strange and frightening. Leaving aside Freud’s concern to identify the (uncon-
scious) sources of the uncanny effect, he reiterates the immediacy of a particular
experience, as a shift in perception involving loss of ego control. In a short and
perhaps quite minor discussion, he brings up three examples of topographical
disorientation. In the first, he cites an experience of his own in an Italian town:
wandering, he found himself in what was unmistakably a red-light district and
describes how, in his efforts to get away, he found himself back three times in
the same location and experienced the “uncanny” effect. His ego, disorientated by
anxiety and embarrassment had failed to operate normally. He then mentions two
generalized experiences: of being lost in a mist and returning, willy nilly, to the
same familiar spot repeatedly and, in the dark, searching for a light switch,
bumping unexpectedly and repeatedly into a familiar piece of furniture. All of
these leave the subject with a sense of mental as well as spatial disorientation.
There are, it seems to me, two points of particular interest here.
Freud is describing an experience of estrangement, a defamiliarized sensation.
Habit is no longer of use in these situations, and any dependence on automatic
bodily movement, guided by pre-existing spatial orientation or established in-
stinct, dissolves into a physical and raw feeling of uncertainty. There might be
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resonances here with Shklovsky’s concept of estrangement: for the poetic effect
to have the necessary impact, the reader should be disorientated, taken away from
normal or habitual aesthetic expectations, and left in a state of vulnerability com-
parable to that of the disorientated ego, stripped of defenses as it were.
The second point relates to time. Freud’s concept of the uncanny and Shklov-
sky’s of distanciation are located within a particularly heightened experience of
the present, accompanied by a falling away, or dissolution, of a normal sense of
passing time within which the self/ego feels at home. Habit depends on the invi-
sible progression of moment to moment that carries everyday actions smoothly
forward. Both the uncanny and estrangement plunge the subject into a relation
to and sensation of time. (Incidentally, Proust occasionally evokes a similar sensa-
tion of time detached from its usual flow; this happens when something – an
emotion, perception, or quite simply drunkenness, for instance, in the Rivebelle
episode9 in Volume 2 – breaks the hold of Habit, liberating the mind into a non-
sequential experience of time in its immediacy.)
AvdO: While on the subject of time, Vladimir Nabokov opens his writer’s memoir
Speak, Memory with a reference to the movies and their impact on his imagination
in terms of a changed consciousness of time. His words indeed strengthen your
argument. He describes the deeply alienating experience of watching his mother
in a home movie that was made a few weeks before his birth, noticing that at that
specific moment in time nobody “mourned his absence.” When watching the
movie in Petersburg in 1903, he, a four-year-old “chronofobiac,” suddenly felt
plunged into “the pure element of time.” While firmly and explicitly rejecting a
connection between the strong appeal of the movies on his immature imagination
and Freud’s Ur scene and castration complex, Nabokov reflects on the problem of
time:
I felt myself plunged abruptly into a radiant and mobile medium that was none
other than the pure element of time. One shared it – just as exited bathers
share shining seawater – with creatures that were not oneself but that were
joined to one by time’s common flow, an environment quite different from
the spatial world, which not only man but apes and butterflies can perceive.10
The denunciation of Freud is a running gag in Nabokov’s novels, as you well
know. Instead of exploring the workings or symbols of the “fundamentally med-
ieval” (in Nabokov’s words), primitive world of the Freudian subconscious, Nabo-
kov, as an author, seems almost exclusively interested in exploring and describing
the poetic effects of such moments of alienation or disruption on his imagination,
which he, contrary to Freud, wishes to see not as basically primitive (“shabby” or
“vulgar”) but as supreme: “the supreme delight of the immortal and the imma-
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ture.”11 In retrospect, “probing my childhood,” Nabokov labels this disruptive
early viewing experience as an awakening moment:
I see the awakening of consciousness as a series of spaced flashes, with the
intervals between them gradually diminishing until bright blocks of perception
are formed, affording memory a slippery hold.12
Interestingly, he describes both the awakening of consciousness and the forma-
tion of memory, and many other things besides, in terms of the cinema and cine-
matographic techniques (a series of spaced flashes, the intervals or ellipses be-
tween them, bright blocks of perception), which once again points at the huge
cultural impact these early viewing experiences have had on him and his genera-
tion, as Yuri Tsivian already stated in his Early Cinema in Russia and its Cultural
Reception.
LM: This is certainly a very vivid example – one that I hadn’t come across before.
And beyond the temporality memory (a past “then” returning to a later “now”),
Nabokov’s moment of “awakening consciousness” seems to me also to evoke an
extended present, both in the act of memory retrieval and in the memory itself,
both, as you point out, “cinematic.” This takes me back to “dehabitualized” time,
as experienced in estrangement. The immediate “strangeness” of the moment
prolongs time beyond the sense of an extended linear flow, carving out a space of
sensation outside it, in an overwhelming “now.” For Shklovsky this experience
was aesthetic and an effect of “art as technique,” that is, the defamiliarization
essential to poetic language:
The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived
and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar’
to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and the length of perception
because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be
prolonged.13
The “sensation” in which “perception must be prolonged,” essential for the defa-
miliarized aesthetic, has a parallel in the sensation of the uncanny, its immediacy
in which the subject experiences the present as prolonged until, that is, the ego’s
habitual defense is reasserted. Although one (Shklovsky) might have been con-
cerned with an agenda for a radical poetics and the other (Freud) with analyzing
the human mind, one with exploiting disorientation, the other with explaining it,
the experience of time might offer a point of linkage.
Perhaps Freud, in spite of some freer speculations, tended to overstate his case
in “The Uncanny” essay, partly to counter Jentsch and the idea that uncanniness
might be precipitated by the new, strange and unfamiliar, partly to insist on the
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primary presence and influence of the unconscious. It seems to me that a rather
more flexible approach is needed in order to consider the psychic implications of
uncanniness, one in which the unconscious is a constituent element but different
“levels” of repression and response may be incorporated into the effect. This
would perhaps enable a “rapprochement” between Freud’s 1919 insistence on the
unconscious sources of uncanniness and the estrangement produced as an effect
of art or writing. I hope the following point might be relevant.
My friend and colleague, Ian Christie, recently pointed out to me that the new
translation of Freud’s 1936 letter to Roman Rolland “A disturbance of memory on
the Acropolis”14 uses the term “estrangement” in such a way as to invite discus-
sion in this context. Freud describes his “disturbed” experience: in a sudden
change of plan while traveling during the Summer of 1904, he and his younger
brother went unexpectedly to Athens. On the Acropolis, instead of the happiness
that this moment, longed for since childhood, should have brought him, Freud
experienced a sense of unreality, “what I am seeing here is not real.” He goes on
to analyze these kinds of moments generally as “estrangements,” as “sensations’”
in which “a piece of reality or a piece of one’s own self has become strange,” and
he compares them to experiences such as déjà vu, illusions or false-recognitions
or depersonalizations.
Freud discusses this kind of estrangement from two perspectives: first, the
mechanism as such and, second, its source in memories or painful experiences
that might have precipitated this particular sensation at that particular moment in
time. From the point of view of my argument, this analysis interestingly reiterates
the topographical with the temporal, as the strangeness of place disrupts time
into an elongated “sensation” reminiscent, I think, of Shklovsky’s evocation of
the prolonged moment of perception. But Freud’s “estrangement” has other im-
plications that will take me back more specifically to questions of cinema. For
him, this sensation is caused by a failure of the ego’s defenses. That is, between
the total irrational force of repression and the normal rational and habitual work-
ings of recognition, judgment and so on are “a whole series of modes of behavior
on the part of the ego that are clearly pathological in character.” Here he ac-
knowledges a more nuanced working of the psyche’s pathology than he was pre-
pared to accept in the “Uncanny” essay; there he allows little space between re-
pression and the rational in which the kind of uncanniness suggested by Jentsch,
or indeed the uncanniness of the cinema, might make itself felt. This uncanni-
ness might hover in between the unconscious and the rational, located precisely
neither in one nor in the other.
Freud describes the estrangement he felt on the Acropolis as a “double con-
sciousness” in that it involved a strong denial of an obvious reality. To push the
point beyond his argument, as the process of denial creates a break with the ego’s
habitual forms of perception, the raw, unmediated sensation of “now-ness”
stumbles into an excess of reality, untranslatable and “strange.” In the first in-
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stance, there is nothing more to this than the psychic mechanism, a feeling of
strangeness. On the other hand, for Freud, needless to say, this psychic mecha-
nism was a symptom of something deeper, and the purely psychological effect
might enable the subject to engage with his or her own history and psychic dilem-
mas and so, in the process, bring “forgotten” but “familiar” material to con-
sciousness. Freud’s analysis of the content aspect of his moment of estrangement
does indeed lead back to his memories of childhood, his family and, most of all,
to his father. From this perspective, the experience leads directly into the “poli-
tics” of his psychic structure, opening up a new perspective on his own history
but also on a wider history, bringing new understanding with it. First of all, there
is the paternal/filial relation, guilt at dissatisfaction with home, family and its
limitations, and then, awareness of his family’s place within the class and racial
structure of its surrounding society. It might not be too far fetched, I hope, to see
Freud’s experience of estrangement and its analysis as throwing some light on
the aspirations of Shklovsky’s radical poetics: changed perception, triggered by
the sensation of estrangement, might lead, past the mechanism as such, to new
ways of perceiving the world. (Ultimately, this would lead towards Brecht and his
adaptation of Shklovsky’s term for overtly political purposes.)
Although the material that I am discussing here (on the Acropolis) dates from
1936, much later than the “Uncanny” essay with which we started our “conversa-
tion,” I have tried to “read backwards” from the later to the earlier, to engage
with a more nuanced consideration of the uncanny than the 1919 essay allows at
first sight. Thus, Freud suggests that the experience of estrangement involves a
“double consciousness” that contains both a denial of an obvious reality and the
presence of a lost, past feeling from which the present sensation emanates. Both
these phenomena might lead into our discussion of the cinema.
But it might also be interesting to note, in passing, that Freud does acknowl-
edge a literary uncanny towards the end of the 1919 essay. While he continues to
dismiss the strange events of fairy stories, he makes a remark that seems to point
towards “an aesthetic uncanny” or the possibility of an “estrangement device”
constructed by a writer:
In the main we adopt an unvaryingly passive attitude to our real experience and
are subject to the influence of our physical environment. But the story teller
has a peculiarly directive power over us; by means of the moods he can put us
into, he is able to guide the current of our emotions, to dam it up in one direc-
tion and make it flow in another...15
He seems here to have shifted his attention away from character and what uncan-
ny events happen in fiction, towards the mechanics of writing and the writer’s
ability, as a storyteller, to conjure up certain feelings… “art as technique” per-
haps?
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It might be particularly telling for this discussion that he mentions our “passive
attitude” to real experience. It is tempting to see this “passivity” in terms of habit
and the self’s unthinking integration into daily space and time that the estrange-
ment device is intended to shatter. However, on a personal note, I have always felt
a rather uncanny shudder when Freud says: “We should hardly call it uncanny
when Pygmalion’s beautiful statue comes to life.”16 Although I will return to the
question of the animate/inanimate later on, this comment might remind us that,
for Freud, the category “beautiful” and the category “uncanny” seem to be incom-
patible.
AvdO: I fully agree that Freud’s comment is quite surprising. Basically, I am not at
all convinced that the category of the beautiful forms the heart of the matter. To
my mind, beauty is a perceptual category, used for “what pleases the eye,” that is
often viewed in terms of the senses, of colors, proportions, symmetries, regulari-
ties, and so on. The category of the uncanny, however, inevitably points towards
some sort of conceptual or cognitive problem (to what Jentsch calls “intellectual
uncertainty”). A statue being beautiful is one thing, it coming to life and starting
to move about is quite another.
The story of E.Th.A. Hoffmann that Freud and Jentsch reflect on in their discus-
sion of the uncanny is part of the grotesque tradition in German aesthetics. The
fundamental problem in this story on the beautiful “automaton” Olympia coming
to life is, no doubt, the category problem Hoffmann created (which Freud seems
to understate): is she a woman or a robot, animate or inanimate, dead or alive? As
Wolfgang Kayser convincingly argued in his standard work on the grotesque, The
Grotesque in Literature and Art, the “uncanny” (“das Unheimliche,” in Kayser’s
words)17 was exactly what Hoffmann was playing on while keeping his readers in
uncertainty about the ontological status of Olympia. Hoffmann was deliberately
aiming for this type of effect, as was Edgar Allen Poe, who followed Hoffmann’s
example. The aesthetics of the grotesque point in the direction of a use of techni-
ques which purposefully yet secretly disturb fundamental biological and ontologi-
cal categories when representing beings (humans). Therefore, we may respond
strongly when we are face to face with the grotesque: “Die Kategorien unserer
Weltorientierung versagen,” as Kayser put it.18 The categories of the understand-
ing fail. I always felt that Kayser is very close to Kant here, who stated that when
face to face with the sublime, the categories of the understanding momentarily
give way to a free interaction between Reason and the Imagination. Kayser, how-
ever, stresses the particularly uncanny feeling of “Verfremdung” triggered by the
grotesque.
As for Freud, perhaps he toned down the uncanny effect Pygmalion’s statue
had on him, for the sake of argument. Or perhaps he just quietly enjoyed the
statue’s beauty without giving much thought to whether he was in front of a sta-
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tue or an animate being. It may also be that, due to habitualization, the experi-
ence was not very deep or immediate at all, since he had seen statues like Pygma-
lion’s before and read stories like Hoffmann’s many a time.
The trope of a sculpture so lifelike it seems about to move is a commonplace
with writers on works of art from Antiquity to the present day. The well-known
rhetorical figure seems part of a discourse strategy to help sculptors stun and
stupefy their viewers in a well-organized moment of “monstration,” as André Gau-
dreault labeled such moments in relation to early cinema: moments of demon-
stration and celebration of new techniques devised to make viewers marvel at the
novelties, to stun and stupefy them.
Interestingly, this type of stupor and distinct feelings of the uncanny are also
described as part of the experience viewers had when seeing the Pietà by Miche-
langelo for the first time. This is very hard to understand, in retrospect, since the
statue is beautiful to us in the first place. It is well-proportioned, made of a
pearly-white marble, and its depiction of a grieving Mary is of course full of trage-
dy. Michelangelo succeeded in coming closer to real life than any sculptor before
him had been able to, using new techniques to represent the body in an anatomi-
cally correct manner, a typical Renaissance discovery. The problem for Renais-
sance viewers was, as David Summers describes, that they could not distinguish
the statue from a real human being and were confused and deceived by the re-
semblance.19 Once again, a category confusion is at the basis of this disturbing
experience: the categories of “real” and “mediated” were being confused by view-
ers who did not yet know the new techniques Michelangelo used to represent the
body. It might also be interesting to note that Michelangelo worked for the Pope
and was paid by the Pope and may well have been looking for a good moment of
monstration to “stun and stupefy,” as it were. Monstration is part of Catholic
tradition, as a friend of mine, the art historian Eric de Bruyn, pointed out to me
only recently. It is a well-known element in Catholic liturgy and part of a practice
of adoration I have never seen described within the context of monstration in
early cinema so far. In Catholic Mass, a golden, so-called “monstrance” contain-
ing the “blessed sacrament” is displayed by the priest for veneration during the
mass’s climatic moment of “consecration” (admiration). In terms of the liturgy,
this is the pivotal moment of transubstantiation or transfiguration of the common
bread and wine into the blood and body of Christ. Strikingly, Arthur Danto la-
beled Andy Warhol’s presentation of close-ups of Marilyn Monroe and Jackie
Kennedy (enormously enlarged, highly stylized, ornament-like, decorative) exhib-
ited in museums all over the world as “transfigurations of the commonplace.”20
The point I am trying to make here is that it is not so much the category of beauty
that is fundamental to this “practice of admiration” (or to these other experiences
described here), but rather the uncanny, which you described as a distinct experi-
ence of something outside the common. Would you agree that the elevated as
well as the abyssal may be part of the experience? And that it is not triggered by
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the techniques to establish beauty but rather by techniques which confuse ani-
mate and inanimate, the living and the dead?
One of the problems for Freud, as well as for us, trying to understand the
impact of early cinema, is to explain why the uncanny seems so at home in this
context. It seems that, particularly in the field of the pictorial and the visual, an
uncanny effect is easily triggered. As the pictorial tradition of the grotesque has
elaborately shown in its long history, a relatively small formal change already
manages to trigger a radical and unexpected twist in meaning. For example, a
close-up, distorting the natural scale and proportions, poses a disturbing category
problem that may well induce a sudden uncanny shudder. In fact, a novelty like
the gigantic eye in Grandma’s Reading Glass (1900) was thrilling to its early
audiences for this very reason: an eye the size of an elephant is not an eye but a
monster, the same way a gigantic spider is not a spider but a monster. The same
could be said for the enormous ear, shown as a maximum close-up in black and
white in Eisenstein’s Old and New (1928). The close-up of the ear is sinister
and crater-like, and according to Shklovsky, a perfect example of one of the “gro-
tesques” found in Eisenstein’s work.21 When suddenly and “aggressively” put in
front of an audience, such a close-up, as Sergei Eisenstein understood perfectly
well, would undoubtedly have been perceived as deeply uncanny and an attraction
in itself. Eisenstein, his mentor Meyerhold, Shklovsky and Eichenbaum: they were
all familiar with this type of distortion and with the tradition of the grotesque in
theater, art, and literature. For them, this tradition may well have functioned as an
historical model for understanding the “deformations” early cinema and the
avant-gardes provided to them. I have always felt that Boris Eichenbaum was
quite right when he reminds us in Poetika Kino that “deformations,” as in the
grotesque, are the basis of “photogenicity” (Delluc) in the cinema and that defa-
miliarization is really at the heart of it: because film is a lens-based art and optical
technology is basic to it, films easily provide deformed and distorted images of
the world. According to Eichenbaum, “Art lives on that which removes itself from
the everyday,” and as he explains further, “If art does make use of the everyday, it
uses it […] in an explicitly deformed state (as in the grotesque).”22 We must keep
reminding ourselves that only a slight technical deformation, caused by a new
technology or new artistic technique (like Michelangelo’s), may turn a normal
human being into something uncanny and that historical audiences indeed may
well have responded accordingly. A real problem for Film and Media Studies, it
seems to me, is trying to understand these ongoing confrontations with the un-
canny, because in the end these instances all seem to lose the power to defami-
liarize due to habitualization, a process which makes the history of film (and the
media, and art) so very hard to understand in retrospect.
LM: I think your points about changing responses to the Pietà remind us very
clearly of the contingent nature of aesthetic perception, which is also relevant to
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changing attitudes to the cinema. And included in those must be the shift from
the early sense of something “alien” with which you started this discussion to its
incorporation into a habitual mode of perception, smoothed on its way, it has
been argued, by narrative. In his essay [in Rethinking Media], Tom Gunning makes
the very thought-provoking suggestion that the move from one mode of percep-
tion to the other may be reversed. He begins by tracing the simple shift from (in
his terms) wonder and astonishment to their subordination to habit and the in-
corporation of the strange into second nature. He then argues that Shklovsky’s
concept of defamiliarization through art could enable habituated perception to
once again recover its strangeness. Furthermore, he points out that the uncanny
is constantly “crouching ready to spring” in the threshold space of these transi-
tions, bringing with it Freud’s sense of those “primitive beliefs” that civilization
seemed to have, or should have, surmounted. Uncertainty about the seemingly
magical functioning of the cinema, its illusion of life easily collapsing into a be-
wildering consciousness of the living dead and the human machine, would make
it a particularly appropriate technology for triggering these kinds of sensations.
But here the cinema’s uncanniness seems to be caught in the underworlds of
ghostliness and the automata. It might be interesting to reconfigure the question
in terms of the cinema’s modernity and its ability to offer a means of negotiation
between residual uncanninesses and their transcendence, or rather their incor-
poration into new forms of perception that accompany the modern world.
AvdO: Interestingly, Shklovsky connects “making strange” with “techniques” and
the technical in art in his “Art as Technique.” In my view, he thus opens up a
conceptual space for a radically new reflection on the crucial connection between
the technical deformations and distortions, caused by the optical technology of
the apparatus, and the artistic techniques, invented and used by artists of all dis-
ciplines (from Michelangelo to Giacometti, Tolstoy to Mayakovsky, Meliès to Ei-
senstein): all techniques may have a disruptive impact on perception, and as such
all techniques are equal, as he states. Eisenstein would repeat these very words in
the 1920s. As early as 1913, Shklovsky understood the disruptive perceptual ex-
perience to be fundamental to art, and not specifically to art associated with the
avant-garde or avant-garde techniques (such as collage techniques), as many have
come to think in later decades.
Rereading Shklovsky on art as a technique from our current perspective, one
may suddenly become aware of subtle hints and traces that might well refer to
early confrontations with the new “cinema machine,” and although Shklovsky
does not refer to the cinema per se in “Art as Technique,” his manifest certainly
gives the impression he was indeed influenced by the impact of the new medium.
The world “made strange” by the new optical techniques and a sense of destabili-
zation may well have been center stage in those early days.
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Whereas Shklovsky and Opoyaz laid out a new research agenda for the study of
art “as technique,” basically from 1913 onwards, Freud became the author to ela-
borate on the impact of disruptive experiences on the imagination. The avant-
garde movements, in the meantime, seem to have understood the destabilizing
powers of all sorts of optical, formal, and visual techniques quite early on. So
when the cinema (still very young as an institution) started to reject, repress, and
domesticate these very powers to create a stable story-telling system, the avant-
garde movements were the first to reinforce those destabilizing powers yet again.
There is indeed an interesting simultaneity between all these developments.
Now let us suppose that there was a “shared historical experience”23 at the
basis of all these discursive reflections and explorations of the disruptive percep-
tual experience. Moreover, let us suppose that the early cinema experience was at
the heart of the shared experience of the modern. That is, the experience not just
of a film but of the whole “cinema machine” (as you call it), which “alienated” its
early audiences from the world they were familiar with by (optically, perceptually)
“making it strange” all of a sudden. The “uncanny” experience of a world “made
strange” by the new mass medium may have been a very important factor in the
shaping of the way people “experienced” the modern. Because it was shared ex-
perience enjoyed on a massive scale, the new medium most likely deepened its
cultural impact far more quickly and effectively than any other medium could.
The shared experience may even have functioned as a model for the new experi-
ence of the new century as opposed to the old century, now past, in other words:
now lost. In that case, understandably, “it” (the new experience, the new medium)
may have resonated, culturally, in many different ways, in many different dis-
courses, in many different fields – and in the end, contributions to the discourse
may well have come from authors who even tried to stay away from the new and
the modern... Of course, I am not thinking of Shklovsky here, nor of the avant-
garde movements, but of Freud.
LM: It would probably be logical, at this point, to consider whether the medium’s
devices used across the long tradition of avant-garde film (as Gunning empha-
sized in his original “Attractions” article) to “defamilarize” and “estrange” are in
any way uncanny, or whether they enable this kind of perceptual transition. I
would be tempted, in the first instance, to echo Freud’s dismissive 1919 voice and
put them on the side of the too rational, too obviously exposing the mechanisms
of film and thus failing to cause the spectator to shudder. However, in many of its
aesthetic strands, avant-garde aesthetics bring the spectator face to face with the
way that, unlike other art forms, film is an emanation of a machine, ultimately
beyond the human, however closely it might be guided by human intention.
As Vertov constantly reiterated, the kino eye is detached from and unlike the
human eye. Man with a Movie Camera, from this perspective, pushes our
argument beyond the uncanny into a “materialist” celebration of the machine.
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While the film makes use of cinema’s implicitly uncanny mechanisms to intro-
duce the “shock” of the modern, the sensation it provokes may no longer be one
of the uncanny but of a more modernist estrangement, as though, in the process
of learning modernity, the archaic shudder gives way to a more questioning curi-
osity. For instance, as still frames give rise to an illusion of movement (illustrated
in the editing room sequence), so images of machines shift from stillness to
movement and, even more so, shop window automata come “to life” alongside
the city and its working day. This is a liberating rather than a mystifying phenom-
enon. The film conjures up a new and modern world, in which the time has come
to “surmount” any primitive feelings of uncanniness that might have been lurk-
ing in the cinema and its surrounding machines. Just as Freud considered reli-
gion simply as a “respectable” version of primitive superstition, Vertov shows
that there need be nothing “mind boggling” in the magic of cinema… Here, I am
(obviously, to those who know it) thinking of Annette Michelson’s article about
Man with a Movie Camera, “From Magician to Epistemologist,”24 in which
she traces and celebrates the brilliant way in which Vertov carries his audience
from residual amazement to jubilant understanding.
However, Vertov’s film draws attention to and dwells on those paradoxes of
cinema that I mentioned at the beginning of our conversation: those that go be-
yond the workings of the mechanism to the very special relation it has to time and
its passing. The mechanism’s fusion of movement and stillness entrances the
audience, showing that the perceptual threshold of “estrangement” brings plea-
sure and might well be a means of incorporating new sensations within new con-
figurations. However, Man with a Movie Camera introduces, and reflects on,
the paradox of the “then” of registration and “now” of illusion, once again find-
ing its own way of visualizing this dimension of cinematic engagement with time.
At the end of the film, as we see its original audience watching Man with a
Movie Camera, the cuts between the point of view of the 1928 audience and the
screen image are supplemented by shots of the screen in which the point of view
of future audiences is implicitly inserted. This fusion of temporalities could be
understood as uncanny: the sequence addresses the spectator directly, “now”
from the “then” of a ghostly past, as just one historical moment en route to audi-
ences of the future. I find that the way this sequence conveys the physical sensa-
tion of time as being “beyond” my grasp (bringing with it the characteristic shud-
der that marks the momentary retreat of ego and reason) is not diminished, but
rather mutates. The sequence generates a reflection on time itself and a sense of
“physical exhilaration” at the way in which cinema mediates between past and
future, between the living Moscow audience then and me at the moment of
watching now, as well as vividly illustrating the importance of film’s mechanisms
for an aesthetics of modernity. The sense of being directly addressed (that Gun-
ning evokes in “The Cinema of Attraction(s)”) tends to draw the spectator’s atten-
tion to the presence of time in film, especially when the address comes from
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beyond the grave. From this perspective, the substance of the address is more or
less irrelevant; it is the sensation, or rather the mechanism, of psychic disorienta-
tion that counts (as in Freud’s initial feelings on the Acropolis). But ultimately the
disorientation leads to questioning, to the pleasure in mutation and a vertiginous
sense of a new phase of understanding.
I would like to return to the question of changing perceptions of cinema
throughout its history, in keeping with your earlier comments on the Pietà. To
my mind, the experience of film time varies according to varying modes of audi-
ence experience as well as according to variations in the cinematic mode of ad-
dress. I would like to suggest that, at the present moment in time, consciousness
of the cinema’s history and its specific relation to temporality comes to the sur-
face along the lines that Gunning evokes as a “renewable” defamiliarization.
However, this sensation contrasts with that of early audiences.
For instance, Mitchell and Kenyon (British showmen/entrepreneurs active at
the very beginning of the twentieth century) filmed working-class people in the
cities of northern England, coming out of factories, in the streets, and then in-
vited them, with placards and handbills, to view the results later that day in the
fairground. In this instance, uncanny animation of the film-strip through the ma-
chine into movement might be overtaken by the uncanny recognition of the newly
animated self on the screen, heightened by the closeness in time between the
moment of being filmed and the moment when people saw themselves projected
on the screen within, and extracted from, the continuum of the everyday. But this
experience might also offer a way of thinking between a disorientating uncanni-
ness and an exhilarating sensation of modernity. Although it’s difficult to specu-
late, it might, in fact, be possible to imagine that this encounter with oneself on
screen, animated by a machine, transforming an ordinary gesture into an extra-
ordinary enlargement, embalming the very immediate past into a chunk of impos-
sibly repeated time, would have been an experience in which uncanniness mu-
tated out of the deception of artifice into curiosity and engagement with the
paradoxes of cinema. The photograph’s preservation of a frozen moment would
have been a familiar phenomenon at the time, but the strangeness engendered by
cinematic “animation” and the extension of a single moment into the impossible
flow of preserved time complicates and considerably adds strangeness to the
photograph’s fusion of “now” and “then.”
The immediacy and the direct address essential to these films recall the “exhi-
bitionist cinema” that Tom Gunning describes in “The Cinema of Attraction(s),”
and it is, perhaps, this raw sense of “being there” that carries another kind of
uncanniness, the sensation derived from witnessing not only the past but that
chunk of extended time past, across one hundred years until now. Then, it was
the closeness of one moment experienced in life (registration) to the next (the
witnessed projection) that created an estrangement from a habitual sense of pas-
sing time, a jolt in a continuum. Now, on the contrary, the actual distance in time
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between then and now introduces a new dimension to the animate/inanimate fu-
sion, and the sensation of uncanniness is intertwined with the preservation of
these informal, casual beings animated on the screen long after their death.
From this perspective, the way that the cinema is increasingly inhabited by
ghosts, literally due to the passing of time, returns it to the uncanny and has
perhaps reduced the exhilaration of the modern. These points relate to my argu-
ments in Death 24… When I first started working on the ideas for the book, I was
struck by the way that a shift in aesthetic sensibility can introduce, retrospectively
and, as Gunning points out, reversibly, a new sense of amazement at an old tech-
nology. Suddenly, one sees the cinema as it had always been… but with its famili-
ar features estranged into a reconfigured profile, its patterns shifting their well-
known contours into a new relief.
AvdO: If we return for a moment to our first questions and to the start of the
cinema: would you say that the “automaton,” central in Jentsch’s and Freud’s
reflections on the uncanny, comes close to being a metaphor for the new “cinema
machine”? Does early cinema not “work” on its viewers the way the “automaton”
(Olympia) works on the reader of Hoffmann’s story? Does the “automaton,” the
way it (she) moves and seems animate, not create an “intellectual uncertainty” in the
viewers about its (her) true ontological status? In effect, does it not push them
outside their stable relations to tradition (representational) and the symbolic?
Could it be that the new medium (early cinema) created such a strong impact on
the imagination precisely because it challenged intellectual certainties? Of course,
I am well aware I touch upon your own reflections on pre- and early cinema in
Death 24 x a Second. Could you share some of those reflections with us, particularly
those regarding Freud and the automaton?
LM: Freud covered a number of different approaches to the uncanny in his essay.
Beyond the examples of spatial disorientation that I mentioned before, he was
ultimately interested in the presence of an unconscious fear behind a sensation
of uncanniness. As I tried to suggest in Death 24…, he was concerned to attribute
the uncanny sensation to something old and familiar that “returns,” and thus to
distance himself from the new “technological” uncanny that had caught Jentsch’s
attention. For Freud, unlike Jentsch, the actual confusion of the animate and the
inanimate encapsulated by Olympia (the automaton with which Nathaniel falls in
love in Hoffmann’s “The Sandman”) was of little interest. He attempted to dis-
place the automaton, to make her irrelevant to the argument, and analyze instead
Nathaniel’s castration complex. For Freud, castration was deeply rooted in the
archaic nature of the unconscious, and perhaps, this perspective also enabled
him to insist on the primary, structuring theories of psychoanalysis and avoid the
newfangled – whether it might be theoretical or technical.
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I suggested in Death 24... that Freud overreacted by dismissing Olympia so easi-
ly in his 1919 “Uncanny” essay… But this may have been anachronistic on my
part: it was in 1927, in his essay on “Fetishism,” that Freud associated castration
anxiety with the over-valuation of a reassuring substitute, a fetish object, that
could disavow the female body’s missing penis. It is here that one might be able
to find a key role for the automaton in the slippage between the “Uncanny” essay
and “Fetishism.” In the light of Freud’s later theory, Nathaniel might be seen to
“fetishize” the automaton Olympia, the artificially beautiful, mechanically perfect
woman who, without a messy “inside” or frightening “wound,” provides a fasci-
nating substitute for the real female body and its lack. From this perspective, the
Olympia of “The Uncanny” might be reconfigured, retrospectively in the light of
“Fetishism,” not to dismiss the centrality of castration but to include disavowal in
Nathaniel’s fetishistic over-valuation of the automaton. The mechanical female
can then be included in an analysis of the story, no longer irrelevant but an essen-
tial displacement and substitute for the fear initiated by “the sandman’s threat to
Nathaniel’s eyes, on which Freud based his analysis in the ‘Uncanny,’” The me-
chanical woman fends off the fear triggered by the female body. In quite an inter-
esting way, the uncanniness of the automaton, which triggers the shudder of
strangeness, can then be traced to its source in his castration complex in the case
of Nathaniel. From this perspective, neither Nathaniel in the story nor Freud in
his analysis of it realizes the essential connection between the two. One might
follow this argument further: if the machine’s presence erupts into the spectator’s
consciousness, if the mechanism of projection makes itself felt, the sense of
“breakdown” threatens the illusion on which so much narrative cinema depends.
For this kind of cinema, there is a possible analogy between the anxiety provoked
by castration and the anxiety provoked by the threat of mechanical failure. Both
share a fetishistic investment in illusion.
I would like to end by returning to a point you raised at the beginning of our
discussion. You cited André Gaudreault’s question: what happened to the “prop-
erly irreducible alien” quality of early cinema? Following on from my reflections
above about “The Sandman” and the fictional character Nathaniel’s castration
anxiety as the unconscious “source” for his inability to acknowledge that Olympia
is an automaton, I have been thinking about my 1975 article [“Visual Pleasure and
Narrative Cinema”]25 in which I make an association between the erotic spectacle
of women and castration anxiety. There might be a way in which, as the cinema
evolved into an industry and a more sophisticated means of storytelling than
those early films had been able to manage, consciousness of the mechanism (as
a source of uncanniness and amazement) became displaced onto the excess of
spectacle personified by the female star. In “VP and NC” I saw her as disruptive
to conventions of narrative, asserting the instantaneous aspect of voyeuristic
pleasure that threatened to assert the “now-ness” of the spectacle over the integ-
rity of fictional time. From this perspective, the alien nature of the film mecha-
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nism (perhaps alongside narrativity) retreated into the unconscious and found a
“home” in the “alien nature” of female sexuality, which threatened to emerge as
an excess of spectacle, only to slip back, as the story’s fictional time reasserted
itself, into the over-riding demands of male narrative control. The eruption of the
female star as spectacle, needless to say, cannot be understood as smooth and
well balanced within a given film/story but as a startling presence at certain privi-
leged moments, often, I argued in 1975, rationalized as disruptive performance
became actual “show girl” performance. Here, as I said in the 1975 article and
developed in the later collection of essays Fetishism and Curiosity,26 the beautiful
woman’s surface distracts from her unpleasant, hidden body just as the surface
of the screen covers over the unsightly process of projection. The beautiful auto-
maton might then be seen as a figuration of both.
I am very grateful, Annie, to you for sending me Eric Naiman’s essay “Shklovs-
ky’s Dog and Mulvey’s Pleasure: The Secret Life of Defamiliarization”27 which I
had never come across before now and I read, by chance, soon after reading Scott
Bukatman’s essay “Spectacle, Attractions and Visual Pleasure”28 in The Cinema of
Attractions Reloaded. Both point out that I must have been familiar with Shklovsky’s
argument and the concept of “estrangement.” Although I am pretty sure that I
had not read the actual article “Art and Technique,” the recent revival of interest
in Russian Formalism, during the 1960s and early 1970s (and particularly due to
Peter Wollen’s close involvement with both the aesthetic theory and the Soviet
avant-garde in general), the articles and reprints in Screen would have meant that I
must have been influenced by the idea, probably loosely connected with Brechtian
aesthetics, similarly going through a revival at the time. It is interesting to look
back at the 1975 article reconfigured in these terms which draw attention to the
way that the argument about Hollywood cinema was closely connected to my
political intuition that any feminist engagement with film would have to be
through avant-garde aesthetics.




1. Lee T. Lemon, and Marion J. Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays (Lincoln: Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press, 1965), 3. In retrospect, these early post-war re-readings of
Russian Formalism may be said to have been part of setting a research agenda for the
new post-war field of General Literature or Literaturwissenschaft.
2. For information on Shklovsky’s lecture as a freshman in 1913, see Richard Sheldon in
his “Introduction” to A Sentimental Journey (New York: Cornell University Press), 1970.
Shklovsky’s Theory of Prose, from 1919, is often mistaken as the text in which ostranenie
was introduced for the first time – but it was not. It was preceded by several other texts
presenting the concept, or principle, if you will.
3. Yuri Tsivian, Early Cinema in Russia and its Cultural Reception, trans. A. Bodger, and ed. R.
Taylor (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), 12.
4. Ibid. 217.
5. See Svetlana Boym, “Poetics and Politics of Estrangement: Victor Shklovsky and Han-
nah Arendt,” Poetics Today 26, 4 (winter 2005).
6. See Dominique Chateau in this book.
7. An earlier and interesting attempt to rethink the avant-gardes from the perspective of
a new vision on (artistic) technique (mainly painterly or pictorial techniques) was under-
taken by the late Dietrich Scheunemann and a team of researchers at the University of
Edinburgh. His book and the “new perspectives” he presented explicitly go against the
assumptions regarding artistic technique held by the highly valued Peter Bürger, an
authority in the field of avant-garde studies from the 1970s onwards. It was Scheune-
mann’s attempt to enrich the field with new insights by criticizing Bürger’s indeed
slightly elevated and idealist attitude towards artists and their artistic techniques. Ci-
nema and media studies, however, do not play a crucial role in this book. See: European
Avant-Garde: New Perspectives, ed. Dietrich Scheunemann (Amsterdam & Atlanta: Rodo-
pi), 2000.
8. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media. The Extensions of Man, (London & New York:
Routledge, 2008), 6.
9. A new and extended edition of Poetika Kino (Poetics of Film) was presented in a Ger-
man translation in 2005. This interesting volume contains many earlier and later writ-
ings on the cinema by the Russian Formalists, apart from the texts published in Russia
in 1927 under the title Poètika Kino. A considerable amount is written by Shklovsky.
Wolfgang Beilenhoff, ed. Poetika Kino. Theorie und Praxis des Films im russischen Formalis-
mus, trans. Wolfgang Beilenhoff (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp), 2005.
10. See Yuri Tsivian in this book.
11. Meir Sternberg, “Telling in Time (III): Chronology, Estrangement, and Stories of Lit-
erary History,” Poetics Today 27, 1 (2006): 125, 168-178. Sternberg devoted several long
205
articles and a special issue of Poetics Today to the problem of Ostranenie. See also Cha-
teau in this book.
The Gesture of Revolution or Misquoting as Device
1. An earlier version of this contribution was published in October. See: “Turning Objects,
Toppled Pictures: Give and Take Between Vertov’s Films and Constructivist Art,” Octo-
ber 121 (summer 2007): 92-110.
2. Aleksey N. Tolstoy, “Vozmozhnosti kino,” [The Potential of the Cinema] Kinonedelya
[Cinema Weekly], published in installments in numbers 1, 2, 3, 8:№ 1, c. 2;№ 2, c. 2-
3;№ 3, c. 2-3;№ 8, c. 3 (1924).





8. The qualification “primal” seems to have come from Tolstoy, although the idea of the
superficial and profound gestures is, of course, not his. It is considered to go back to
Lessing’s Hamburg Dramaturgy. There, Lessing teaches Hamburg actors that there are
ordinary gestures (Geste or Gebaerde), but also a special sort of gestures (Gestus), which
were once the secret of the actors of the ancient theatre. Lessing’s Gestus is the gesture
touching the very essence of human existence. See Daniel Albright, Untwisting the Ser-





12. Viktor Shklovsky, O teorii prozy [Theory of Prose] (Moscow: Krug, 1983), 73.
13. Ibid., 74-75.
14. Isaak Levitan, Pis’ma. Dokumenty. Vospominaniya [Letters, Documents, Reminiscences]
(Moscow: 1956), 132.
15. Ibid., 213.
16. Here is how Kandinsky saw art of the end of the nineteenth century in the early twen-
tieth century: “Ladies fainted and men felt sick in front of a Repin painting, so vivid
was the blood which flowed and clotted in his Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan. “‘What
have I got to do with art,’ Repin seems to be saying, ‘I just need the blood to flow and
smell bloody.’ The only subtler material for art was ‘mood,’ the song of sadness and
inconsolable longing. This was the art which, like the great Russian literature, re-
flected the despair of closed doors. Both in Chekhov’s works and in Levitan’s land-
scapes, the inescapably dreadful atmosphere of a viscous, boundless, suffocating
cloud lived and multiplied. In such works art fulfils only half of its mission.” (Vasily
Kandinsky, “Kuda idet ‘novoye iskusstvo’?” [Where is the ‘new art’ heading?] in Se-
lected Writings on the Theory of Art 1901-1914 [Izbranye trudy po teorii iskusstva] (Mos-
cow, 2001), 1: 90.
17. Vasily Kandinsky, “Stupeni. Tekst khudozhnika,” [Steps. An Artist’s Text] in Selected Writ-
ings on the Theory of Art (Moscow, 2001), 1: 280-281 [my translation].
18. Ibid.
206 notes
19. Viktor Shklovsky, O teorii prozy [Theory of Prose] (Moscow: Krug, 1925), 61); in my quota-
tions from this book I made use of Benjamin Sher’s competent translation (Elmwood
Park, IL.: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990) which I afforded to modify but slightly.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. [my translation].
22. Anton Chekhov, Sobranye sochinenii, [Collected Works] (Moscow: 1963), 10: 493.
23. Aleksandr Rodchenko, “Puti sovremennoy fotografii,” [The Paths of Contemporary
Photography] Novyi LEF 9 [The New LEF] (1928): 33.
24. Ibid., 39.
25. Ibid., 38.
26. Aleksey N. Tolstoy, “Vozmozhnosti kino,” [The Potential of the Cinema] Kinonedelya 2
(1924): 3.
27. Sergey Eisenstein, “A Lecture in Biomechanics 28 March 1935,” in V.A. Shcherbakov,
Meyerkhol’dovskii sbornik [The Meyerhold Collection] 2d ed.: Meyerhold i drugie, [Meyer-
hold and Others] ed. O.M. Feldman (Moscow: 2000), 73.
Ostranenie, “The Montage of Attractions” and Early Cinema’s
“Properly Irreducible Alien Quality”
1. For a reflection on the relation of the post-war readings of Russian Formalism within
the context of immanent criticism, revering the linguist Roman Jakobson and a Jakob-
sonian research agenda, as is suggested, see Meir Sternberg’s contributions to Poetics
Today, a journal which, over the years, devoted several specials to the topic of ostrane-
nie. See for a critique on the (Jakobsonian) post-war reintroduction of Russian Formal-
ism in particular Sternberg’s “Telling in Time (III): Chronology, Estrangement, and
Stories of Literary History,” Poetics Today 27, 1 (2006): 125-135. See also Dominique
Chateau in this volume.
2. See Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press), 1965. See also Eichenbaum, “The Theory of the ‘Formal
Method,’” in Russian Formalist Criticism, eds. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 113. I am by far not the first to protest against the
post-war structuralist version of Russian Formalism. An interesting critique is to be
found in Gerald L. Bruns’ “Introduction” to a 1991 translation of Shklovsky’s Theory of
Prose (trans. Benjamin Sher (Illinois State University, USA: Dalkey Archive Press,
1991).: “Russian Formalism is not Structuralism. Its method is historical research
rather than the analytical construction of models. Structuralism raises itself on an
opposition between system and history, structure and event; Russian Formalism de-
fines itself not against history but against psychology. The difference between Formal-
ism and Structuralism lies in the way the singular is preserved in the one but erased by
the other. Structuralism is a method of subsumptive thinking. What matters is the
totality of the system. But Shklovsky’s formalism is distributed along a diachronic
plane. His theory of prose is a prose theory of prose, not the systematic construction of
a model indifferent to its examples […]. Shklovsky’s model is not the linguistics of
Saussure but historical linguistics and comparative philology. He is closer to Auerbach
than to Todorov. He is interested in the historicality of forms rather than in the rules
notes 207
of how formal objects work.” See Gerald L. Bruns, “Introduction,” in Theory of Prose,
trans. Benjamin Sher (Illinois State University, USA: Dalkey Archive Press, 1991), xii.
3. Note that the word “manifesto,” most often used in these days, also by Eichenbaum,
acknowledges that this term for a brash piece of writing by a group to loudly present
or rather manifest itself was coined in the context of politics and was also used slightly
earlier in the context of Italian Futurism in which the manifestos by Marinetti grew to
fame in the 1910s and 1920s.
4. Eichenbaum refers to their violation of traditional notions, “which had appeared to be
‘axiomatic,’” in “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method,’” 104.
5. The words “brash irreverence” I took from Victor Erlich’s “Russian Formalism,” Jour-
nal of the History of Ideas 34, 4 (October – December 1973): 638. One must doubt, how-
ever, that these words are used by Erlich in a positive way. Most contemporaries and
many later scholars took note of the “brashness” of the avant-garde attacks on tradi-
tion with great reserve.
6. “Formalism and Futurism seemed bound together by history,” as Eichenbaum wrote
in his 1926 retrospective overview of the formative years of Russian Formalism. See
Eichenbaum in “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method,’” 104-105: “Our creation of a
radically unconventional poetics, therefore, implied more than a simple reassessment
of particular problems; it had an impact on the study of art generally. It had its impact
because of a series of historical developments, the most important of which were the
crisis in philosophical aesthetics and the startling innovations in art (in Russia most
abrupt and most clearly defined in [Futurist] poetry). Aesthetics seemed barren and art
deliberately denuded – in an entirely primitive condition. Hence, Formalism and Fu-
turism seemed bound together by history.”
7. Yuri Tsivian is of course of invaluable significance in this field. See in particular his
Early Cinema in Russia and its Cultural Reception, trans. A. Bodger, and ed. R. Taylor (Lon-
don & New York: Routledge, 1994), 217. One must note that in the last two decades,
interesting and highly valuable research in this area – also on the connection between
early cinema and the avant-garde – mostly comes from Film Studies and so-called
Early Cinema Studies in particular, and less from what is institutionally labeled as
(continental) “Avant-Garde Studies.”
8. See Boris Eichenbaum in “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method,’” 115: “Concerning
form, the Formalists thought it important to change the meaning of this muddled
term. It was important to destroy these traditional correlatives and so to enrich the
idea of form with new significance. The notion of ‘technique,’[…], is much more significant
in the long-range evolution of formalism than is the notion of ‘form.’”
9. Svetlana Boym, “Poetics and Politics of Estrangement: Victor Shklovsky and Hannah
Arendt,” Poetics Today 26, 4 (winter 2005).
10. See Boris Eichenbaum in “Theory of the ‘formal method’” on the crucial passages in,
and impact of, Shklovsky’s “The Resurrection of the Word,” published in 1914.
11. For a description of Shklovsky’s lecture as a freshman in 1913, see Richard Sheldon in
his “Introduction” to A Sentimental Journey (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970).
12. On the year “the general craze for cinema reached its peak in Russia, ” see Yuri Tsivian
in his Early Cinema in Russia and its Cultural Reception, 12. For a description of Shklovsky’s
208 notes
lecture as a freshman in 1913, see Richard Sheldon in his “Introduction” in A Sentimen-
tal Journey (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970).
13. See Chapter 5 of Malte Hagener’s Moving Forward, Looking Back. The European Avant-Garde
and the Invention of Film Culture 1919-1939 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press,
2007).
14. See, among many others, Victor Erlich, “Russian Formalism,” in Journal of the History of
Ideas, 34, no. 4 (Oct. – Dec., 1973), 630, 634. Interesting, Erlich complains about “Art
as Technique” not being more helpful in this area of interest and he states that he
prefers Roman Jakobson’s work for this very reason. Erlich (p. 630): “Shklovsky’s key
terms, e.g., “making it strange,” “dis-automatization,” received wide currency in the
writings of the Russian Formalists. But, on the whole, Shklovsky’s argument was
more typical of Formalism as a rationale for poetic experimentation than as a systema-
tic methodology of literary scholarship. The Formalists’ attempt to solve the funda-
mental problems of literary theory in close alliance with modern linguistics and
semiotics found its most succinct expression in the early, path-breaking studies of
Roman Jakobson. For Jakobson, the central problem is not the interaction between
the percipient subject and the object perceived, but the relationship between the
“sign” and the “referent,” not the reader’s attitude toward reality but the poet’s atti-
tude toward language.”
15. André Gaudreault, “From ‘Primitive Cinema’ to ‘Kine-Attractography,'” in The Cinema
of Attractions Reloaded, ed. Wanda Strauven (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press,
2006), 99. See also Gaudreault’s and Gunning’s older but influential article “Early
Cinema as a Challenge to Film History” which is reprinted in the same book.
16. See Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second. Stillness and the Moving Image (London: Reaktion
Books Ltd.), 2006. See also the “Conversation” with Laura Mulvey on this topic in this
book.
17. See the Introduction to Tsivian’s Early Cinema in Russia and its Cultural Reception, 1-14.
18. Ibid., 2.
19. Tom Gunning described the stupefying effect of early cinema on its early spectator in
several places. He also described and analyzed other confrontations with the “new” in
similar terms. See Tom Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Sec-
ond Nature, and the Uncanny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century,”
in Rethinking Media Change: The Aesthetics of Transition, eds. David Thorburn, and Henry
Jenkins (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 40-41. Here Gunning describes a typical
response of “astonishment,” triggered by Universal Expositions: one in which the first
excited silence in the first moment of “astonishment” is followed by a typically
speechless (as Kant would say) “Oh Oh oooooooo!” in the first moments of awe. See
also Gunning's “The Cinema of Attractions. Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-
Garde,” in Early Cinema. Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (London: BFI),
1990. See in particular his analysis of the first “astonishment” as part of the early
viewing experience in an article in which Gunning not only touches upon the uncan-
ny, but also on the sublime, the aesthetic experience which is known for its moment
of “stupor,” as Immanuel Kant has famously described in his analyses of the sublime
experience: Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)
notes 209
credulous Spectator,” in Viewing Positions. Ways of Seeing Film, ed. Linda Williams (New
Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press), 1994.
20. See Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period (Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2007), 102 [my italics].
21. Ibid.
22. Virginia Woolf and her husband, Leonard Woolf, Virginia Woolf’s sister the painter
Vanessa Bell, the biographer Lytton Stratchey, the painter Dora Carrington, the econ-
omist John Maynard Keynes, the art historian Roger Fry, and others.
23. For a reflection on the shared historical experience and its impact on historical think-
ing, see Frank Ankersmit, Sublime Historical Experience (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press), 2005.
24. See Ian Christie and Richard Taylor's “General Editor’s Preface” to Yuri Tsivian's Early
Cinema in Russia and its Cultural Reception, IX.
25. Ibid.
26. Gunning, “Foreword,” in Yuri Tsivian, Early Cinema in Russia and its Cultural Reception,
XXI.
27. Tsivian, Early Cinema in Russia and its Cultural Reception, 217.





32. Viktor Shklovsky, Mayakovsky and His Circle, trans., and ed. Lily Feiler (London: Pluto
Press Ltd, 1974), 112-113. A few pages later, he added that it was explicitly “in opposi-
tion to the Symbolists, [that] the [Futurist] poets Khlebnikov, Mayakovsky and Vasily
Kamensky put forward a different kind of poetics.” Ibid., 113-114.
33. Markov describes the cascade of Futurist groups in Russia which attacked each other
as fiercely as they did the rest of the world. Vladimir Markov, “Russian Futurism and
Its Theoreticians,” 169. He also states that Russian and Italian Futurists were not as
unrelated to each other as they often chose to pretend, yet one can safely state that
they were not friends (Markov, 168.) Decisive for their more lasting impact in the field
of the arts, one may argue, were the mutual relations of the Russian Futurists with
OPOYAZ and their leading figure, Victor Shklovsky, who himself reaffirmed that Ser-
gei Eisenstein would have been less significant without LEF and Mayakovsky.
34. See, apart from Tsivian, also an expert on the history of the Futurist movement in
Russia, Vladimir Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its Theoreticians,” in The Avant-Garde
Tradition in Literature, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982), 171.
See also Annie van den Oever, “Een klap in het gezicht van de goede smaak. [A Slap in
the Face of Public Taste] Symbolisme, avant-garde, formalisme en het probleem van
de artistieke vorm,” in Avantgarde! Voorhoede? eds Hubert van den Berg, and Gillis Dor-
leijn (Nijmegen: Uitgeverij Vantilt, 2002), 191-204.
35. Tsivian, 12.
36. See Vladimir Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its Theoreticians,” 171. in The Avant-Garde
Tradition in Literature (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982), 171. See also Annie van den
Oever, “Een klap in het gezicht van de goede smaak. [A Slap in the Face of Public
210 notes




39. See the comments on these words from Andreas Huyssen by Malte Hagener, who
adopted the statement from Andreas Huyssen as a motto in his book, from which I
took this quote: Moving Forward, Looking Back. The European Avant-Garde and the Invention
of Film Culture 1919-1939 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 19.
40. Siegfried Zielinski, "Media Archeology," was originally published: 7/11/1996 Available
at: www.ctheory.net. See http://www.debalie.nl/artikel.jsp?dossierid=10123&subdos-
sierid=0&articleid=10116; INTERNET.
41. As Tsivian indicates, Nikolay Gogol was often mentioned by the Futurists in relation
to the “distortions” of the seen in the cinema; see Tsivian, Early Cinema and its Cultural
Reception, 205, 210. Gogol was the Russian 19th-century author of grotesque prose, also
labeled as “strange,” “distorted” and “deformed” like early cinema, but with apprecia-
tion. The distortions must have been “grotesque” to their experience. In fact, the tra-
dition of the grotesque (or monstrous), and Gogol’s grotesque prose in particular,
may be said to have provided an historical model for framing the experience of the
“deformed.”
42. Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its Theoreticians,” 171-172.
43. Many books of the period refer to Mayakovsky’s memorable performances. See,
among many others, memoirs by Shklovsky, (Mayakovsky and His Circle), Eisenstein,
and see also an essay on their aggressive and vitriolic attacks, by Markov (“Russian
Futurism and Its Theoreticians”) and Wellek (“Russian Formalism,” in The Avant-Garde
Tradition in Literature, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982).
44. Quote taken from Tom Gunning, The Cinema of Attractions. Early Film, its Spectator and the
Avant-Garde. First published in Wide Angle vol. 8 no. ¾ (fall 1986): 4. He cites Filippo
Tommaso Marinetti, “The Variety Theater 1913” in Futurist Manifestos, ed. Umbro Apol-
lonio (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 127.
45. See Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)credulous
Spectator,” in Viewing Positions. Ways of Seeing Film, ed. Linda Williams (New Bruns-
wick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press), 1994.
46. See Sergej M. Ejzenstejn [Sergei Eisenstein], “Montage: The construction Principle in
Art,” [1923] in The Eisenstein Reader, ed. Richard Taylor (London: BFI, 1998), 30.
47. Viktor Shklovsky, Mayakovsky and His Circle, 172.
48. Ibid., 172.
49. See Sergej M. Ejzenstejn [Sergei Eisenstein], “Montage: The Construction Principle in
Art,” 30.
50. Shklovsky has commented on these words by Mayakovsky in his book on Eisenstein,
Ejzenštejn [Eisenstein], trans. Manfred Dahlke (Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag
GmbH, 1977), 115-116 [First published in Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1973]. It is an anthology
of essays by Shklovsky in German translation. In the German translation, Mayakov-
sky’s famous poem “A Cloud in Trousers” reads as follows: “Doch es wird klar – /
bevor zu singen er beginnt, / geht lange man, bekommt man Schwielen vom Umher-
irrn, / und leise wählt im Schlamm des Herzens sich / die dumme Plötze der Vorstellungs-
notes 211
kraft [my italics]” (p. 115). Shklovsky could much easier relate to this Futurist evocation
of the unexpected ways inspiration and the imagination chose to follow than to the
one evoked by the “cliché” of the classical authors, “Pegasus” (p. 116). Here, Shklovs-
ky adds to his quote as a comment that Mayakovsky’s image of the Imagination:
“Schöne Worte darüber, wie schwer es ist, Bücher zu schreiben, und wie sich die
<Plötze der Vorstellungskraft> hin und her wirft. Ein realeres Bild als der geflügelte
Pegasus.”
51. Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its Theoreticians.”
52. See Tsivian, 12.
53. The qualification “brilliant” was given by Erlich, who tends to be slightly ambivalent
about Shklovsky; “brilliant but brash” and “the gadfly of Opojaz” are two characteri-
zations to be found in his contribution to The Avant-Garde Tradition in Literature, ed.
Richard Kostelanetz (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982), 159. The information on The
Stray Dog lecture is in part taken from Benedikt Livshits, and in part from Richard
Sheldon, quoted here.
54. See Richard Sheldon’s “Introduction” to Viktor Shklovsky’s A Sentimental Journey (New
York: Cornell University Press, 1970), x. [my italics]
55. See Vladimir Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its Theoreticians.”
56. See Richard Sheldon’s “Introduction,” x.
57. The younger Eisenstein became part of the circle surrounding Mayakovsky’s LEF in
1923, ten years after Shklovsky's lecture in The Stray Dog, and Shklovsky saw him as a
young man, “in wide trousers, very young, gay and with a high-pitched voice,” a “ver-
satile” person who brought to this environment of “extreme diversity” his own speci-
ality: “he brought to LEF his ideas on eccentrism.” (See Shklovsky, Mayakovsky and His
Circle, 172.) The ideas on eccentrism Eisenstein presented to LEF came from the time
he spent in the theater, in the years in which Meyerhold was his mentor. In fact, these
two major figures and their impact on Eisenstein form an area of research in the study
of Eisenstein and the “cinema of attractions” that has yet to be explored more fully.
58. See Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its Theoreticians,” 171. Markov does not mention
the relation to the 1914 essay by Shklovsky; The Resurrection of the Word, as both Wellek
and Eichenbaum do. Factually, Sheldon described the relation in far more detail,
mostly using Shklovsky's typically loose and sketchy notes that are to be found in his
diaries, letters, memoirs, and novels. Sheldon points out how Shklovsky presented his
lecture in The Stray Dog and worked these thoughts out into his book on The Resurrec-
tion of the Word, a year later, which he then read to his fellows at the Department of
Philology – which started OPOYAZ. See Sheldon, “Introduction,” xi: “In 1914 he pub-
lished his paper under the title Resurrection of the Word. Shortly after its appearance, he
took a copy to his teacher, Jan Baudouin de Courtenay. The famous linguist intro-
duced Shklovsky to his most gifted students, Lev Yakubinsky and E.D. Polivanov.
Although the master objected to Shklovsky’s apotheosis of sound in poetry, his stu-
dents responded enthusiastically. They felt that the sound patterns of poetry offered a
fertile new field for linguistic analysis. Under Shklovsky’s leadership, these students of
Baudouin de Courtenay joined forces with the futurists in 1914. This new alliance was
called OPOYAZ – Obshchestvo izucheniia poeticheskogo iazyka (Society for the Study of Poe-
tic Language); it eventually evolved into the full-fledged critical movement known as
212 notes
Russian formalism. Resurrection of the Word is usually considered the first document of
that movement.” See Sheldon, “Introduction,” in Viktor Shklovsky's, A Sentimental Jour-
ney (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), xi.
59. Viktor Shklovsky, Voskresheniye slova [The Resurrection of the Word] (Petersburg), 1914.
60. Boris Eichenbaum, “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method,’” 112.
61. Victor Shklovsky, Voskresheniye slova, 11. See Boris Eichenbaum's “The Theory of the
‘Formal Method,’” 112 for a comment and an English translation of this quote.
62. As they abducted the notion of “form” and replaced it by “technique,” they obviously
were against being called “Formalists” since the word carried the wrong connotations
of late 19th-century aestheticism, as preached by the late 19th-century autonomists. If
anything, they should have been called Russian “de-Formalists” and not “Formalists”
as I have tried to explain in my 2002 article, “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste.”
63. Ibid.,12.
64. Shklovsky, Mayakovsky and His Circle, 111.
65. Ibid. 112-113. [my italics].
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid. 113-114. [my italics].
68. Eichenbaum, “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method,’” 115.
69. Tom Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the
Uncanny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century,” in Rethinking Media
Change: The Aesthetics of Transition, eds. David Thorburn, and Henry Jenkins (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 52.
70. See Wellek, “Russian Formalism,” in The Avant-Garde Tradition in Literature, ed. Richard
Kostelanetz (Buffalo: Prometheus Books), 1982.
71. Ibid., 159.
72. Tsivian, Early Cinema in Russia and its Cultural Impact, 2.
73. See Wellek, “Russian Formalism,” 156-159; and Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its
Theoreticians,” 168.
74. As Vadim Sercenevic, one of the Futurists, already stated in 1916, the Futurists were
the first to create a new artistic practice, yet they could not create good theory: “It is
precisely futurism that began with [poetic] practice, and it is in futurism that we find
almost no theory.” See Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its Theoreticians,” 168.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., 168-172.
77. The early avant-garde must be seen as separate from the later avant-garde. Whereas the
first responded to the early cinema experience, the later avant-garde responded to the
cinema in its institutional phase. As Gunning wrote, the avant-garde responded to a
later phase in the development of the cinema, a phase that somewhat disappointed the
high expectations of the avant-garde as it started to adopt conventional forms and
patterns from the other arts as time went on. In most countries, this seems to have
happened in a phase often seen as part of the years of institutionalization of the cine-
ma. See André Gaudreault, “From ‘Primitive Cinema’ to ‘Kine-Attractography,’” in The
Cinema of Attractions Reloaded, ed. Wanda Strauven (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press, 2006), 97-99. Note that the institutionalization took place in the United States
in an earlier phase from 1906 onwards, as is often said, and that the process had a
notes 213
different make-up and outcome than the one in Russia and the USSR. It should also
be noted that pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union after the revolution had a
very self-conscious, even arrogant re-editing practice, as Hagener has argued in Chap-
ter V of his book, and that the montage film could be seen as having been “born”
from this in the 1920s, as part of the later avant-garde. All in all, the process of insti-
tutionalization both before and after the revolution followed a quite different pattern
than the one in the United States, a process described by Eileen Bowser, Charles Mus-
ser, André Gaudreault, Tom Gunning, and others.
78. See Francesco Casetti, Eye of the Century. Film, Experience, Modernity, trans. E. Larkin, and
J. Pranolo, ed. John Belton ( New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 7. Transla-
tion of Balázs’ words taken from Casetti [my italics].
79. See Markov on the genre and topic: “Manifestoes in the strict sense of the word were
not always concerned with theory. Most of them [by the Futurists of these days] were
largely arrogant and vitriolic attacks on proceeding and contemporary literature, more
often on fellow-futurists; at other times their aim was to épater les bourgeois, rather than
declare their aesthetics.” Markov, “Russian Futurism and Its Theoreticians,” 169.
80. Victor Erlich, “Russian Formalism,” Journal of the History of Ideas Vol. 34, 4 (October –
December 1973), 638.
81. See for instance a critique by Eric Naiman, “Shklovsky’s Dog and Mulvey’s Pleasure:
The Secret Life of Defamiliarization,” Comparative Literature 50, no. 4 (autumn 1998):
333-352.
82. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 13.
83. See Eichenbaum, “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method,’” 115.
84. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 13.
85. Ibid., 17. [my italics]
86. Ibid., 18.
87. Lemon, and Reis, “Introduction” to Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays (Lincoln: Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press, 1965), ix.
88. See Annie van den Oever, “Monstration and the Monstrous. The Grotesque in the Very
Beginning and at the Very End,” in Proceedings of the XVI International Film Studies Confer-
ence-Permanent Seminar on History of Film Theories. In the Very Beginning, at the Very End. Film
Theories in Perspective, eds F. Casetti, and J. Gaines, V. Re. Udine: Forum, 2010.
89. These words are taken from Gunning’s, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonish-
ment, Second Nature, and the Uncanny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-
Century,” in Rethinking Media Change: The Aesthetics of Transition, ed. David Thorburn,
and Henry Jenkins (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 49. Note that this in part is
a highly interesting re-visit of Shklovsky’s thinking on ostranenie and the experience of
the newness of new technologies and techniques and their potential (“uncanny”) im-
pact.
90. Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment, “ 117.
91. Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second. Stillness and the Moving Image (London: Reaktion
Books Ltd.), 2006.
92. See Annie van den Oever, “Monstration and the Monstrous.” See also the “Conversa-
tion” with Laura Mulvey on ostranenie and the uncanny in this book.
214 notes
93. One may argue that this period in Russia was extended by the typical re-editing culture it
had, which rearranged and deformed the provided filmic material for its own, idiosyn-
cratic or political purposes, thus destabilizing the film’s given structure and meaning,
and “alienating” it from its earlier context and purposes; see Malte Hagener, Moving
Forward, Looking Back. The European Avant-Garde and the Invention of Film Culture 1919-1939
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), Chapter V.
94. One may indeed feel that “primitive” is a useful word in this context, as Wanda Strau-
ven has argued. See Wanda Strauven, “From ‘Primitive Cinema’ to “’Marvelous’” in
The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded (Amsterdam: AUP, 2006), 105-120. She revisits the
dictions between Primitive Modes of Narration and Institutional Modes of Narration,
a diction which may well be made relevant in research again. See also, on the primi-
tive, André Gaudreault, “From ‘Primitive Cinema’ to ‘Kine-Attractography,'” in The
Cinema of Attractions Reloaded, ed. Wanda Strauven (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press, 2006), 85-104.
95. Eichenbaum, “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method,’” 115.
96. The term “monstration” for an introduction, or rather, demonstration of new optical
techniques in culture is a valuable term which was coined by André Gaudreault. For
further explanation, see Annie van den Oever, “Monstration and the Monstrous. The
Grotesque in the Very Beginning and at the Very End,” 2010. See also the Conversation
with Laura Mulvey in this book.
97. “The history of art is, at least in part, a history of the tools and materials with which
art is made.” See for more information the Daniel Langlois Foundation (Canada) and
its online DOCAM research initiative, which explains having been concerned with the
relationship between technological invention and artistic creation “from the begin-
ning.” See http://www.docam.ca/en/technological-timeline.html
98. See Shklovsky’s Mayakovsky and His Circle, trans., and ed. Lily Feiler (London: Pluto
Press Limited, 1974), 125.
99. I took this quote from Tom Gunning, who cites Shklovsky’s “Electricity and the
Theme of Old Newspapers,” Podenshchina (Leningrad: Pisatelej, 1930), 14-15. See Tom
Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the Un-
canny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century,” in Rethinking Media
Change: The Aesthetics of Transition, eds. David Thorburn, and Henry Jenkins (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 44.
100. Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies…, ” 39-44.
101. See Viktor Shklovsky, Literature and Cinematography, [1923] trans. Irina Masinovsky. In-
troduction by Richard Sheldon (Champaign & London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2008),
XVI-XVII. This quote is taken from Hamburg Account [Gamurgskii schet, 110. (1928)] as
translated into English and cited by Richard Sheldon in his Introduction to Literature
and Cinematography, XVI-XVII. 19 Viktor Shklovsky, Literature and Cinematography, VII-IX,
XII-XIII, XVI-XVII; 4-6, 13-14, 27, 38, 65-66, 73. [First published by Russkoe Univer-
sal’noe izdatel’stvo, 1923.]
102. For an excellent analysis of the romantic idea of the writer or artist as Creator, see
Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press), 2005. [Translation
from Les Règles de l’art (Éditions du Seuil, 1992). Translated by Susan Emanuel.]
notes 215
Ostranenie, Innovation and Media History
1. The writing of this article was supported by a fellowship at the Internationales Kolleg
für Kulturtechnikforschung und Medienphilosophie in Weimar.
2. Frank Kessler, “Ostranenie. Zum Verfremdungsbegriff von Formalismus und Neofor-
malismus,” Montage/AV 5, 2 (1996): 51-65.
3. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays, trans. Lee





7. David Bordwell, “Lowering the Stakes: Prospects for a Historical Poetics of Cinema,”
Iris 1, 1 (1983): 14.
8. Kristin Thompson, Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible: A Neoformalist Analysis (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1981) and Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis (Prin-
ceton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
9. Bordwell, “Lowering the Stakes: Prospects for a Historical Poetics of Cinema,” 13.
10. The concept of “foregrounding” can in fact be seen as something like a variant of
“ostranenie,” as Sternberg points out. See: Meir Sternberg, “Telling in Time (III):
Chronology, Estrangement, and Stories of Literary History,” Poetics Today 27, 1 (2006):
126, 130.




15. Juri Tynyanov, “On Literary Evolution,” in Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and Struc-
turalist View, ed. Ladislav Mateijka and Krystyna Pomorska (Cambridge, Mass.: The
MIT Press, 1971), 66-78.




19. David Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema:
Mode of Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
20. For an overview charting the interaction between the various strands of study in Bord-
well’s and Thompson’s work and a bibliography up to 1995, see: Britta Hartmann, and
Hans-Jürgen Wulff, “Vom Spezifischen des Films. Neo-formalismus – Kognitivismus
– Historische Poetik,” Montage/AV4, 1 (1995): 5-22.
21. David Bordwell, Poetics of Cinema (New York & London: Routledge, 2008), 27.
22. Christian Metz, Langage et cinéma (Paris: Larousse, 1970), 77.
23. Thompson, Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis, 49-86.
24. Thierry Kuntzel, “The film-work, 2,” Camera Obscura 5 (1980): 6-69.
25. Thompson, Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis, 50-51.
26. Peter Steiner, “Three Metaphors of Russian Formalism,” Poetics Today 2, 1b (1981/82):
59-116.
27. Frank Kessler, “Brieven uit de verte. Een analyse van de film Een telegram uit
Mexico,” Jaarboek Mediageschiedenis 8 (Amsterdam: Stichting Mediageschiedens/Sticht-
ing beheer IISG, 1997), 201-213.
216 notes
28. See Frank Kessler, “L’insistance de la lettre,” Vertigo 2 (1988): 17-23.
29. See Eileen Bowser, “Le coup de téléphone dans les films des premiers temps,” Les
premiers ans du cinema français, ed. Pierre Guibbert (Perpignan: Institut Jean Vigo, 1985),
218-224 and Tom Gunning, “Heard over the Phone. The Lonely Villa and the Lorde
Tradition of the Terrors of Technology,” Screen 32, 2 (1991): 184-196 and Frank Kessler,
“Bei Anruf Rettung!,” Telefon und Kultur 4. Das Telefon im Spielfilm, ed. Forschungs-
gruppe Telekommunikation (Berlin: Spiess, 1991), 167-173.
30. These are terms used by Barry Salt (1983, 101), though explicitly in a purely descriptive
manner and without implying any value judgement.
31. Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose (Elmwood Park, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990), 190.
32. Ibid.
33. Sternberg, “Telling in Time (III): Chronology, Estrangement, and Stories of Literary
History,” 198.
34. Bordwell, Poetics of Cinema, 27.
35. For an analysis of the cutting rate in films by Bauer and Kuleshov, see Yuri Tsivian,
“Cutting and Framing in Bauer’s and Kuleshov’s Films,” KINtop. Jahrbuch zur Erforschung
des frühen Films 1 (1992): 103-113.
36. Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Mode of Production to
1960.
37. Michèle Lagny, Marie-Claire Ropars and Pierre Sorlin, Générique des années 30 (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1986).
38. See Noël Burch, Life of Those Shadows (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
39. See Tom Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions. Early Film, Its Spectator and the
Avant-Garde,” in Early Cinema. Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (London:
BFI, 1990), 56-62.
40. See André Gaudreault, Du littéraire au filmique. Système du récit (Paris: Méridiens Klinck-
sieck, 1988).
41. Stan Brakhage, The Brakhage Lectures (Chicago: The School of the Art Institute of Chica-
go, 1972).
42. One could think here, among others, of the increasing accessibility of many film ar-
chives, which enabled scholars to considerably expand the corpus they were working
with. Film festivals such as Le Giornate del Cinema Muto in Pordenone or Cinémé-
moire in Paris had similar effects.
43. Sternberg, “Telling in Time (III): Chronology, Estrangement, and Stories of Literary
History,” 126.
44. Ibid.
45. Tom Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the
Uncanny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century,” in Rethinking Media
Change: The Aesthetics of Transition, ed. David Thorburn and Henry Jenkins (Cambridge,




49. Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1900 (New York: Scrib-
ner, 1990).
50. Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions. Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde,”
58.
51. Jay David Bolter, and Richard Grusin, Remediation. Understanding New Media (Cam-
bridge, Mass. & London: MIT Press, 1999).
52. Ibid., 21.
notes 217
53. One might add that the continuous presence of a channel’s logo nowadays almost
always (with the exception of the commercial break) introduces an element of hyper-
mediacy into the televisual image.
54. Bolter and Grusin, Remediation. Understanding New Media, 65.
55. Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the Un-
canny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century,” 39.
56. Isabelle Raynauld, “Le cinématographe comme nouvelle technologie: opacité et trans-
parence,” Cinémas 14, 1 (2003): 117-128.
57. “Nous constatons, dans la lignée des idées de Grusin, Bolter et Gunning, qu’un média
en émergence traverse une période d’opacité durant laquelle sa matérialité est si visi-
ble qu’elle peut littéralement faire écran au contenu. Par contre, lorsque la compé-
tence des récepteurs s’accroît, l’opacité du média s’atténue pour faire place à sa trans-
parence, donnant par conséquent plus de visibilité au contenu.”
58. Bolter and Grusin, Remediation. Understanding New Media, 65.
59. André Gaudreault, Cinéma et attraction. Pour une nouvelle histoire du cinématographe (Paris:
CNRS Editions, 2008).
60. Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the Un-
canny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century,” 39-45.
Knight’s Move: Brecht and Russian Formalism in Britain in the
1970s
1. Bernhard Reich, Im Wettlauf mit der Zeit (Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1970), 371. This recol-
lection by the German theatre director Bernhard Reich is cited in Stanley Mitchell’s
article “From Shklovsky to Brecht: Some Preliminary Remarks Towards a History of
the Politicisation of Russian Formalism,” Screen 15, no. 2 (summer 1974): 80.
2. Peter, Wollen, “Some Thoughts Arising from Stanley Mitchell’s Article,” Screen 12, no.
4 (winter 1971-72): 165.
3. Zygmunt Bauman, The Art of Life (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 61.
4. Ibid., 62. Bauman also refers here to Ulrich Beck’s “zombie concepts” and to Jacques
Derrida’s use of terms “sous rapture,” with a caveat about their lack of currency.
5. André Bazin, What Is Cinema? Vol. 1. Essays selected and translated by Hugh Gray (Ber-
keley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 36-37. The essay by Bazin,
“The Evolution of the Language of Cinema,” published in 1967 was in fact a compo-
site created by Hugh Gray of three articles, the latest of which, “Editing and its Evolu-
tion” (from which these quotations come), appeared in L’Age Nouveau in 1955.
6. “Editorial” Screen 12, no. 4 (winter 1971-72): 5.
7. Ibid.
8. Screen was explicitly echoing the position announced by Cahiers du cinéma two years ear-
lier: “To us the only possible line of advance seems to be to use the theoretical writ-
ings of the Russian filmmakers of the twenties...” (Cahiers 216 (October 1969); quoted
in Screen 12.1: 35). The French debates and their relationship to the events of 1968 are
usefully summarised in Sylvia Harvey, May ’68 and Film Culture (London: British Film
Institute), 1980.
9. Films from a wider range of countries than France and Italy lent critical mass to the
international art cinema of this period, and similar tropes are apparent in such films
as Alfred Hitchcock’s VERTIGO (1958) and PSYCHO (1960) and Michael Powell’s
PEEPING TOM (1960). But these did not generate the same level of critical discussion
as the New Wave.
218 notes
10. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (London:
Weidenfelf and Nicholson 1994), 300.
11. In Britain, Panther, Cape and Fontana all offered new editions of classic authors, as
well as new translations of newly “discovered” writers and highly contemporary texts
that drew on them.
12. The invocation of “ceux qui inventent chaque jour le langage de notre temps” appears
in the series rubric of Editions Seghers Cinéma d’aujourd’hui, which reached eighteen
titles by 1963, including volumes on Antonioni, Resnais and Godard.
13. The earliest “Formalist” texts to appear in paperback translation were two by Shklov-
sky and one by Eichenbaum, in a series on literary criticism (Lee T. Lemon, and Mar-
ion J. Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays (Lincoln, Nebraska University Press),
1965), which soon reached a much wider audience.
14. P. Adams Sitney, “Structural Film” in Film Culture (1969); reprinted in Film Culture an-
thology (New York: Anthology Film Archives, 1970), 415.
15. Hayward exhibition, Art in Revolution – Bann’s Constructivist anthology?
16. Viktor Shklovsky, Knight’s Move, [1923] trans. Richard Sheldon (Dalkey Archive), 2005.
17. New paperback imprints with radical intellectual and political ambitions, and an inter-
national perspective, were an important feature of the 1960s. In the UK, these included
Cape, Fontana and Panther, and their success would also encourage established im-
prints to respond to a new readership. Marx’s early writings of the 1840s were pub-
lished in English translation in 1961 and 1963, then appeared in a popular Panther
anthology with commentary by David Caute, Essential Writings of Karl Marx, in 1967. A
selection of Benjamin’s essays appeared in English translation as Illuminations (Fonta-
na) in 1970, and became an immediate bestseller.
18. James Smith, “Brecht, the Berliner Ensemble, and the British Government,” New Thea-
tre Quarterly 22, 4 (2006): 307-323.
19. Margaret Eddershaw, Performing Brecht: Forty Years of British Performances (London: Rout-
ledge, 1996), 59-61.
20. John Arden, Plays 1 (London: Methuen), 2002.
21. John Willett, The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht [1959] (London: Methuen, 1967), 178.
22. The other work was Martin Esslin, Brecht: The Man and His Work (New York: Double-
day), 1961.
23. Karl Marx, Economic and Political Manuscripts [1844], cited in David Caute, ed. Essential
Writings of Karl Marx (London: Panther, 1967), 59.
24. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana,
1976): 29-31.
25. Daily Express, 30.3.1962.
26. LA Daily News, 15.9.1998. Available from http://www.thefreelibrary.com/LESS-THAN
PERFECT+%60THREEPENNY+OPERA'+HAS+ITS+CHARMS-a083836726
27. Godard wrote of his two scavenging soldiers in LES CARABINIERS: “these characters
are not situated psychologically or morally, and even less sociologically. Everything
happens at the animal level, and this animal is filmed from a vegetable point of view,
when it’s actually mineral, that’s to say Brechtian.” Scenario des CARABINIERS
(1962), (Jean Collet, 1963: 94)
28. On Brecht’s distinction between “Aristotelian” and “epic” theatre, see for instance
Bertolt Brecht, Short Description of a New Technique of Acting which Produces and Alienation
Effect, at http://www.english.emory.edu/DRAMA/BrechtAlien.html (accessed 29.6.10).
29. Colin MacCabe, “Realism in the Cinema: Notes on Some Brechtian Theses, Screen 15. 2
(1974): 26.
notes 219
30. Stanley Mitchell, “From Shklovsky to Brecht: Some Preliminary Remarks Towards a
History of the Politicisation of Russian Formalism,” Screen 15. 2 (summer 1974): 74-81.
31. Brecht quoted in: Mitchell, “From Shklovsky to Brecht,” 74.
32. Ibid., 76.
33. Ibid., 75
34. Ben Brewster, “From Shklovsky to Brecht: A Reply,” Screen 15.2 (summer 1974): 88.
35. Boris Eikhenbaum, “Problems of Film Stylistics,” in Russian Poetics in Translation, ed.
Richard Taylor (Oxford: RPT Publications, 1982).
36. This “new Eisenstein” was celebrated in the 1988 exhibition, Eisenstein: Life and Art,
held at the Hayward Gallery and Museum of Modern Art Oxford, in a book based on
the accompanying conference: Christie & Taylor, Eisenstein Rediscovered (London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1993), and in a new edition of Eisenstein’s writings under the
general editorship of Taylor.
37. Stephen Heath, “From Brecht to Film: Theses, Problems,” Screen 16, no. 4 (1975-76):
34.
38. Ibid.
39. The movement that became known as “cinéma-vérité” in the early 1960s, inspired by
Vertov’s “kino Pravda,” had become a target of attack in France by 1968, accused of
merely reflecting bourgeois reality rather than exposing or criticising it.
40. Claire Johnston, and Paul Willemen, Screen 16, no. 4 (1975-76): 34.
41. Ibid., 110-111.
42. Scenarios by Mayakovsky in the “Soviet Film 1920s” issue of Screen (12. 4 (1971): 122-
149).
43. Peter Wollen, Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (London: Secker and Warburg, 1970),
124.
44. Interview with Peter Wollen in Screen 15. 3 (1971): 130.
45. Blackbird Descending: Tense Alignment (1977); Emily, or Third Party Speculation (1978), Finne-
gan’s Chin: Temporal Economy (1981).
46. Marcellin Pleynet, “The ‘Left’ Front of the Arts: Eisenstein and the ‘Young Hegelians,’
Cinéthique 5 (Sept-Oct 1969), trans. Susan Bennett, Screen 13.1 (spring 1972). Trotsky
denounced both Futurists and Formalists in his Literature and Revolution (1925). The
dangers of giving ammunition to Cold War anti-Sovietism were stressed by Cinéthique.
47. Ian Christie, and John Gillet, eds, FEKS, Formalism, Futurism: ‘Eccentrism’ in Soviet Cinema
1918-1935 (London: British Film Institute), 1978.
48. Although some essays from this collection of Formalist studies on cinema had already
appeared in Screen, a full English translation of Poetika Kino would not appear until
1982, edited by Richard Taylor.
49. This extract from Kozintsev’s memoir, L’écran profonde (1966), was translated from the
French by Tom Milne (Christie, Gillett, 1978, 25)
50. Shklovsky quoted in (Christie, Gillett, 16).
51. Vladimir Nedobrovo quoted in (Christie, Gillett, 19).
52. Narboni quoted in (Christie, Gillett, 57-60). Narboni adds as a footnote (without giv-
ing any source): “Eisenstein underlined the following sentence in his copy of Archaists
and Innovators (Tynyanov): ‘What is important is that language does not merely convey
a concept but is a way of constructing the concept.’”
53. David Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press),
1985; Kristin Thompson, Breaking the Glass Armor. Neoformalist Film Analysis (Princeton:
Princeton University Press), 1988.
54. Viktor Shklovsky, Knight’s Move [1923], trans. Richard Sheldon (Dalkey Archive), 2005.
220 notes
55. Selections from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks appeared in English translation in
the early 1970s and had a powerful effect on the New Left of the period (Antonio
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. trans. Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Now-
ell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).
56. Brecht letter to Neues Deutschland, 1953, quoted in Willett (1967): 205-6.
Ostranenie in French Film Studies: Translation Problems and Con-
flicting Interests
1. Without going back to the monarchy, the French political centralism can be character-
ized by the “so called 1992 ‘Toubon law’ that protects French against the use of other
languages (both English and… regional languages, on occasion!),” Les Langues régio-
nales de France, un état des lieux à la veille du XXIe siècle, [The Regional Languages of
France: An Inventory on the Eve of the XXIst Century] eds. Philippe Blanchet, Roland
J.L. Breton, Harold F. Schiffman (Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters Publishers, 1999), 74.
2. Tzvetan Todorov, Théorie de la littérature (Paris: Seuil, 1965), 83.
3. Ibid., 45.
4. I am indebted to my friend and colleague, Pere Salabert, who provided me with infor-
mation about the Spanish translation of ostranenie, which helps to clarify that the diffi-
culty of translating ostranenie is not restricted to a particular language or country.
5. “On aurait également tort d’identifier la découverte, voire l’essence de la théorie «
formaliste », aux platitudes galvaudées sur le secret professionnel de l’art, qui serait
de faire voir les choses en les désautomatisant et en le rendant surprenantes (“ostra-
nénie”).” Todorov, Théorie de la littérature, 10-11 [my translation].
6. Meir Sternberg, “Telling in Time (III): Chronology, Estrangement, and Stories of Lit-




10. “Trente ans après, la théorie de l’information ressuscite les thèses de Chklovski en
expliquant que l’information apportée par un message diminue au fur et à mesure
que sa probabilité augmente.” Todorov, Théorie de la littérature, 16 [my translation].
11. Umberto Eco, L’Œuvre ouverte, [Opera aperta, 1962] trans. C. Roux de Bézieux (Paris:
Seuil, Pierres vives, 1965), 88, 110.
12. In his essay Das Unheimliche, Freud wrote that “the word ‘heimlich’ is not unambiguous,
but belongs to two sets of ideas (…): on the one hand, it means what is familiar and
agreeable, and on the other, what is concealed and kept out of sight” (http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/~amtower/uncanny.html).
13. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Minuit, Le Sens Commun,
1979).
14. Ibid., 568.
15. François Albèra, Les Formalistes Russes et le cinéma. Poétique du film, translation of Poetika
Kino by V. Posener, R. Gayraud and J.C. Peuch, ed. François Albèra (Paris: Nathan,
1996), 16.
16. Jean Narboni, “Introduction,” in Formalistes Russes et le cinéma. Poétique du film Poétique du
film. Translation of Poetika Kino by V. Posener, R. Gayraud, and J.C. Peuch. Edited by
François Albèra (Paris: Nathan, 1996), 57.
“The Formalist “jamming” could be seen in light of the absence of a unified doctrine,
or consensus on how to approach the work of art, which caused difficulties, a “jam,”
notes 221
in agreement as to what constituted as poetical and what as practical” [my transla-
tion]. “La rectification de Jakobson et le marquage qu’il opère du travail véritable de-
vant porter sur le rapport signifiant/signifié, indique tout ce qui sépare le brouillage
formel d’une possible pratique matérialiste.”
17. Ibid., 57. “L’influence des thèses de Chklovski sur la nécessité dans l’art de “désauto-
matiser” la perception par des effets d’ “ostranénie,” dont a vu plus haut la réfutation
par Jakobson, et abandonnées par Chklovski lui-même (cf. entretien avec Vladimir
Pozner, in “Les Lettres Françaises,” 17), fut considérable en Rusie pendant les années
20 (…). Incapables de poser le rapport dynamique des signifiants aux signifiés, axées
sur le seul plan des “effets stylistiques,” des altérations superficielles et finalement
fort peu subversives de la langue poétique, les théories shklovskiennes tombent tout à
fait normalement sous le coup de l’accusation de formalisme (…)” [my translation].
18. Vladimir Pozner, “Victor Chklovski parle à Vladimir Pozner,” Les Lettres Françaises 1206
(October 1967): Narboni’s reference, 17, is fanciful.
19. Frédérique Matonti, “L’anneau de Mœbius. La réception en France des Formalistes
Russes,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. Engagements intellectuels. Sociologie publique
176-177, eds. Frédérique Matonti and Gisèle Sapiro (2009): 66 [my translation].
20. Catherine Depretto, “Roman Jakobson et la relance de l’Opojaz (1928-1930),” Littéra-
ture 107 (October 1997). Jakobson’s remark in the preface reveals he was already in
dispute with Shklovsky as he preferred to side with Osip Brik instead of with Shklov-
sky himself.
21. Léon Robel, “Un trio prodigieux,” ed. Charles Dobzynski, Europe, Les Formalistes Russes
911 (March 2005): 6 [my translation].
22. Matonti, “L’anneau de Mœbius. La réception en France des Formalistes Russes,” 65-
66.
23. Antoine Vitez, “Pour un portrait de Vsévolod Meyerhold,” Les Lettres Françaises 1010 (2-8
June 1964), quoted by Frédérique Matonti, “L’anneau de Mœbius. La réception en
France des Formalistes Russes,” 67.
24. Jean-Pierre Faye, “Formalisme ou sens,” Critique 215 (April 1965): 339.
25. “Victor Chklovski parle à Vladimir Pozner,” Les Lettres Françaises 1206 (October 1967)
[my translation].
26. Ibid.
27. Sigmund Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams,” [1900] in The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works, trans. James Stratchey (London: Hogarth Press and The
Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1986), 339.
28. “Victor Chklovski parle à Vladimir Pozner,” Les Lettres Françaises 1206 (October 1967)
[my translation].
29. Ibid.
30. Concerning his book Zoo, or Letters Not About Love, Shklovsky explains that it proceeded
emotionally from his unhappy relationship with Elsa Triolet, and speaking about
being rivals, we must bear in mind that she was Lili Brik’s sister and that Jakobson
considered marrying her.
31. Barthélemy Amengual, Que viva Eisenstein (Lausanne: L’Âge d’homme, 1981).
32. Ibid., 490 [my translation].
33. François Albèra, Les Formalistes Russes et le cinéma, 8.
34. François Albèra, L’Avant-garde au cinéma (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005), 38.
35. Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981) [backcover].
36. Ibid., 5.
222 notes




40. Gérard Genette, Figures I (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 207.
41. “Victor Chklovski parle à Vladimir Pozner,” Les Lettres Françaises 1206 (October 1967)
[my translation].
Christian Metz and the Russian Formalists: a “Rendez-Vous
Manqué”?
1. Roland Barthes, “En sortant du cinéma,” in Le bruissement de la Langue (Paris: Seuil,
1984), 386.
2. Christian Metz, “Sur mon travail,” in Essais Sémiotiques (Paris: Klincksieck, 1977), 176.
3. Boris Eichenbaum, “Problems of Film Stylistics,” Screen 15, 3 (autumn 1973): 22.
4. The history of the metaphor of the language of cinema has been studied in: Domini-
que Chateau, Le cinéma comme Language (Paris: Editions l’association Internationale
pour la sémiologie du spectacle/Publication de la Sorbonne ACEV, 1986).
5. Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Roman Jakobson, “‘Les Chats’ de Baudelaire,” L’homme: Revue
Française d’anthropologie 2 (1962): 5-21.
6. Thomas Elsaesser, and Emile Poppe, “Film,” in The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguis-
tics Vol. 3, ed. Rich Asher (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1994), 1228.
7. In Koch’s Evolutionary Cultural Semiotics four epochs are differentiated: his formalist
period from 1914 to 1920, in which R. Jakobson was both the founder of the Moscow
Linguistic Circle and a member of the influential Opayaz group. Then a structuralist
period (1920-1939), when R. Jakobson was a dominating figure of the Prague School
of Linguistics and Aesthetics. In his semiotic period, from 1939 to 1949, he was asso-
ciated with the Copenhagen Linguistic Circle (Brøndal, Hjelmslev), and he was active
in the founding of the Linguistic Circle of New York. The interdisciplinary period be-
gan in 1949 with his teaching at Harvard (…). See: Walter Koch, Evolutionary Cultural
Semiotics (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1986), 225-226.
8. Christian Metz, Le Signifiant Imaginaire (Paris: Union Générale d’Editions, 1977).
9. Herbert Eagle, ed., Russian Formalist Film Theory: An Introduction (Ann Arbor: Michigan
Slavic Publications, 1981), 13-14.
10. Christian Metz, Language and Cinema, trans. Donna Jean Umiker-Sebeok (The Hague
etc: Mouton, 1974), 184-185. French original: Langage et cinéma (Paris: Larousse, 1970).
11. Christian Metz, “Problems of Denotation in the Fiction Film,” in Film Language. A
Semiotics of the Cinema, trans. Michael Taylor (New York: Oxford University Press,
1974), 120n; French original “Problèmes de denotation,” in Essais sur la Significations au
cinéma (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1968), 122n.
12. Christian Metz, “Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic,” in Language and Cinema, 177. Original
“Paradigmatique et Syntagmatique,” in Langage et Cinéma, 133. In a note, Metz refers to
the texts of Boris Tomashevsky and J. Tynyanov, which were reprinted in Tzvetan To-
dorov’s Théorie de la littérature (Paris: Seuil, 1965).
13. Boris Tomachevski “La nouvelle école d’histoire littéraire en Russie,” Revue des etudes
slaves (1928): 238-239; or J. Tynyanov in “De l’évolution littéraire”(1927), reprinted in
Tzvetan Todorov ed., Théorie de la littérature (Paris: Seuil, 1965), 123.
14. “[…]ce n’est pas le premier ouvrage où l’on trouve des réflexions de cet ordre. Il ne
faut pas oublier les divers apports des Formalistes russes, en particulier le recueil col-
notes 223
lectif de 1927, Poetika Kino, auquel ont collaboré Chklovski, Tynianov, Eichenbaum.
Et aussi, de façon plus diffuse, plus éparse certains passages dans les écrits des princi-
paux critiques et/ou théoriciens du cinéma: Eisenstein, évidemment, mais aussi Arn-
heim, Balázs, Bazin, Laffay, Mitry dans une autre optique, Cohen-Séat, Morin. Ces
auteurs (et d’autres auxquels je ne pense pas sur le moment) se posaient assez précisé-
ment divers problèmes de signification […].” See: Raymond Bellour and Christian
Metz, “Entretien sur la Sémiologie du cinéma,” [1970] in Essais sur la signification au
cinéma, Tome II (Paris: Klincksieck, 1972), 195 [my translation].
15. Roger Odin, in an article on C. Metz, sums up all the linguists and other movements
in the theoretical field which had an “influence” on the work of the film semiotician:
“(the great erudition of Metz is also visible here): ‘[…] la liste des linguistes qu’il cite
(…) Charles Bally, E. Benveniste, Claire Blanche Benveniste, Charles Beaulieux, Karl
Bühler, Henri Bonnard, Eric Buysssens, Jean Cantineau, André Chevel, N. Chomsky,
Marcel Cohen, Dubois, la commentatrice de Hjlemslev, Mme E. Fischer-Jorgensen, les
formalistes russes, Gougenheim, A. Julien Greimas, Guillaume, Pierre Guiraud, Har-
ris, Louis Hjelmslev, Jakobson, Kurylowicz et la notion de “catégories isofonction-
nelles,” Labov et l’école “variationniste,” Samuel R. Levin, André Martinet, Matoré,
Antoine Meillet […]’ and this is just part of a long list of names.” See: Roger Odin,
“Christian Metz et la linguistique,” in Christian Metz et la théorie du cinéma [numéro spé-
cial], eds. M. Marie and M. Vernet (Paris, Méridiens: Klincksieck, 1990), Iris 10 (April
1990): 90.
16. “Je retoucherais aujourd’hui sur deux points cette estimation intuitive des impor-
tances. Les travaux de Jean Epstein, malgré leur intelligence si vive, me semblent en
définitive brouillons, exaltés, terriblement idéalistes (…). D’autre part les Formalistes
Russes, dont on ne connaissait rien à l’époque, ont consacré au cinéma des études de
grand poids, dont certaines ont été traduites entre-temps grâce à la politique systéma-
tique d’”éditions” qu’ont suivie les Cahiers du Cinéma.” See: Christian Metz, “Une
étape dans la réflexion sur le cinéma,” in Essais sur la signification au cinéma, Vol. 2, 14.
17. With the Russian Formalists, the recourse to linguistic notions was part of a cultural
strategy: to help break down the division of high culture and popular or folk culture,
by developing methods of analysis which could be seen to apply to both with equal
success. This agenda may well explain why their writings were “rediscovered” in the
1960s, when thanks to the pervasive influence of structuralism in the fields of mass-
cultural artefacts, a similar agenda took shape. Thomas Elsaesser and Emile Poppe,
“Film,” 1228.
18. The term in fact has the character of a comprehensive result of an already realized
semiosis. For a semiotician, the term poses more or less the same problem as the
notion of style. See A.J. Greimas: “Il paraît difficile, (…) de transformer la notion de
“style” en un concept opératoire (…) La difficulté, tient sans doute à la puissance in-
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sémiosis réalisée.” A.J. Greimas and J. Courtés, Sémiotique: dictionnaire raisonné de la
théorie du langage, Vol. 2 (Paris: Hachette, 1986), 213.
Should I See What I Believe?
1. “A biocultural perspective can explain how evolution has made knowledge possible,
albeit imperfectly, and how it has made the quest for better knowledge possible.” Brian
Boyd, “Getting It All Wrong: Bioculture Critiques Cultural Critique,” American Scholar
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artist Robert Irwin: “The act of art has turned to a direct examination of our perceptual
processes.” Robert Irwin, “Reshaping the Shape of Things, Part 2,” Arts 47, no. 1 (Sep-
tember-October 1972): 30.
56. Nicolas Bullot, “L'attention esthétique et les objets,” Art and Cognition Virtual Conference,
available from http://www.interdisciplines.org/artcog/papers/5; INTERNET.
57. “It is through the notion of aesthetic judgement, elaborated in the Critique of Judgement,
that Kant undertakes to solve the philosophical conundrum of how to render mental
mediation (what grounds reality) transparent to itself in a meaningful but non-con-
ceptual way, avoiding the circularity and tautology of self-reference. [After that], the
Romantic intuitionist aesthetic [will appear as] the ‘royal’ road to the rationally im-
penetrable structure of subjectivity.” Szaloky, “Making New Sense Of Film Theory
Through Kant. A Novel Teaching Approach,” 38.
58. Linking Shklovsky’s “Art as Device” and the cinematic apparatus raises some episte-
mological problems, see: Eric Naiman, “Shklovsky’s Dog and Mulvey’s Pleasure: The
Secret Life of Defamiliarization,” Comparative Literature 50, no. 4 (autumn 1998): 333-
352.
59. “The Venus effect occurs every time the observer sees both an actor (eg Venus) and a
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64. Ellen Dissanayake, What is Art For? (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).
65. “Today it is recognized that the human species has had an evolutionary history of
about four million years. Of that timespan, 399/400ths is disregarded when it is as-
sumed that ‘human history’ or the ‘history of art’ begins, as it does in our textbooks,
about 10,000 B.C. Unless we correct our lens and viewfinder, our speculations and
pronouncements about human nature and endeavor ‘in general’ can hardly escape
being limited and parochial. If we presume to speak about art, we should try to take
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anytime. Modern aesthetic theory in its present state is singularly unable and unwill-
ing to do this.” Dissanayake, What is Art For?, 5.
66. Universal devices of art include [among other things] “innovatory tendencies (explora-
tion, originality, creation, invention, seeing things a new way, revising the old order,
surprise) and the immediate fullness of sense experience (as opposed to habituated unre-
garded experience).” Dissanayake, What is Art For?, 36.
67. Queer theoreticians would agree to this particular point, since the politics of queer
theory include ideas of “subversive repetition” and “transgressive reinscription.”
On Perception, Ostranenie, and Specificity
1. As is already clear from the brief introduction, contemporary film theory must address
the issue of digitally synthesized motion picture images as well as television, computer
games, webcam, etc. Thus, the proper term for the theory should be “moving image
theory” rather than the classical “film theory.” However, for sake of simplicity, in this
paper I will mostly use the shorter term but with the meaning of the longer one.
2. A detailed analysis of such “puzzling” pictures can be found in James Elkin, Why are
Our Pictures Puzzles? On the Modern Origin of Pictorial Complexity (New York & London:
Routledge, 1999).
3. Thus, digitally synthesized images appear no less “realistic” to our perceptual system
than a Neo-realist movie or a classical photograph, because they are both processed by
the same cognitive mechanism we have developed during evolution. Digitally synthe-
sized images draw their appeal precisely from their perceptual similarity or – in the
case of simulation games – perceptual sameness with perceiving natural scenes or real
individuals.
4. See Paul Virillo, The Aesthetics of Disappearance (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991) and Vilém
Flusser, Für eine philosophie der fotografie (Göttingen, European Photography, 1983), and
Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, trans. Martin Chalmers (London: Reakton
Books, 2000).
5. Michel Polanyi in his book Personal Knowledge makes a distinction between focal vs.
subsidiary awareness, which he applies to the perception of visual images in Michel
Polanyi, “What Is a Painting?” British Journal of Aesthetics 10 (1970): 225-236. The gist of
the argument revolves around the idea that for aesthetic perception the viewer should
have a subsidiary awareness of the surface (i.e. the canvas) over and above the focal
awareness of the painted scene. The subsidiary awareness of the surface amounts to
being conscious of the way the painting or, in our case, the image has been made, that
is the scene is not fully transparent but opaque: it is seen – as Wollheim (Richard
Wollheim, “Seeing-as, Seeing-in and Pictorial Representation,” in Art and its Objects
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980), 205-226) and Walton (Kendall Walton, “Transpar-
ent Pictures. On the Nature of Photographic Realism,” Critical Inquiry 12 (1984): 246-
277) put it – in the picture and not through.
6. In concluding his article Benjamin makes a distinction between the masses who seek
distraction when watching a movie, and art which demands concentration from the spec-
tator. He claims that “distraction and concentration form polar opposites,” and the
film is most adept to provide a sort of immediacy for distraction. Bolter and Grusin
(Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation. Understanding New Media (Cam-
bridge, Mass. & London: MIT Press, 1999), 21) claim the purpose of virtual reality is
“immersive” in that it distracts the viewers’ attention from the technology which
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makes its perception possible, so that the medium itself becomes transparent. I will
argue that, in contrast to the medium’s transparency, art and aesthetic perception im-
ply its opaqueness, or what amounts to the same, the viewer comes to be aware of its
mediating role. The proper viewer of art, according to Benjamin, is the critic who pays
attention to and examines how the given work of art is made. Whereas the film, he
claims, requires no attention, and its “proper” public is an “absent-minded” one.
While I embrace Benjamin’s analysis of the aura, I will attempt to go beyond the scope
of his conclusion and contest his overall characterization of the film as distraction. I
demonstrate with examples that, despite its reproducibility, film does not stand a les-
ser chance of being specific than an autographic art like painting. By autographic art,
theorists mean that a work of art cannot be wholly codified or scored down in a sym-
bolic language, hence it is sensitive to forgery. In contrast, allographic works of art
like musical compositions can be scored, hence they cannot be forged. And the reason
is that the specificity is an inherent property of objects including art, and as such it
cannot be reproduced entirely mechanically, but it can and in fact is sometimes per-
ceived as a singular and unique property of objects by means of which they can be
unambiguously identified. That means that the reception of art, i.e. the distinction
between attention and distraction, is primarily a perceptual problem, whereas Benja-
min in the first part of his article uses aura and its core element, distance, as if they
were ontological concepts. Film would then demand a different ontology from auto-
graphic arts. While not denying this, I would remind the reader of the fact that visual
technology has significantly widened the scope of human perception.
7. For a counter-example, think of goofs (e.g. misuse of props, shadow of camera, part
of audio cable seen in the image, etc.) in films which reveal the use of audio-visual
technology by means of which they have been shot and put together.
8. Three decades later Susan Sontag reflects upon the effect of the photograph (see Sus-
an Sontag, On Photography (New York: Anchor Books), 1973). She observes, although
not entirely unequivocally, that the photograph penetrates the world, eliminates dis-
tance, gets very close to the thing itself; however, the photograph’s presence is only a
fake presence: it can never totally abolish the distance that opens up between the
photographer and the photographed object. With this claim Sontag implicitly restores
Benjamin’s aura into its own right even in an age of mechanical reproduction. She sets
a lower bound to artfulness as a form of perception. Finally it is today’s phenomeno-
logical film theory which in my view can explain most consistently why and when the
aura is lost: it is not lost during the reception of the film, but it dissolves during the use
of digital media, especially the digital internet space. In my discussion, however, I
limit myself to a few remarks about Vivian Sobchack’s seminal book, The Address of the
Eye, and her approach to digital media (Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: a Phe-
nomenology of Film Experience (Princeton: Princeton UP), 1992). Instead of elaborating
the phenomenological point further, I introduce some ideas from my own research in
cognitive aesthetics and cognitive film theory.
9. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays, trans. Lee
T. Lemon, and Marion Reis (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1965),
12.
10. Ibid., 9.
11. It does not so much inaugurate a norm/deviation model; rather it calls for a functional
description of formal features within a given style. Kristin Thompson uses the concept
of ostranenie in this sense for the analysis of artistic form.
12. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 12.
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13. Note that in the case of Kubla Khan, remaining in half-truth is the result of a fictional
story. In the preface prefixed to the poem, Coleridge admits that he wrote his verse as
a dim recollection of a dream from which he was woken up by an unexpected visitor. The
loss of meaning is due to the opaque boundary between waking up and sleeping,
being half-awake and half-asleep as he was. We could say he was one of the first
artists who was writing while taking drugs.
14. The relevance of the main ideas appearing in The Critique of Pure Reason on the idea of
the Sublime, which gets only a passing treatment, is important to note. The third
critique is still controversial, despite the famous Kantian dictum about the starry sky
above and the moral law inside man. Moreover, many philosophers and scholars have
pointed out that there are a couple of terms in the two critiques which are closely
related. Respect may be the most important one. (See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Prac-
tical Reason (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1997) It should be applied both to transcendental laws and to finite objects of Nature
and man himself as a social being. Sublime objects may be the best means to awaken
man to ethical consciousness. The connection of the two books is a common topic,
especially in modern French thought, as it is attested by the unorthodox treatment of
the Sublime in Lyotard (See Jean-François Lyotard, Leçons sur l’Analitique du Sublime
(Paris: Galilée, 1991)). But for film studies, it is Deleuze’s approach to critical thinking
that can be the most relevant. To put it succinctly, for Deleuze critical thinking means
that each human faculty should be pushed to its very limits in order to arrive at a form
of thinking which becomes productive, creative, experimenting and even artistic.
15. On the Deleuzian and the romantic element, see previous note.
16. Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction [Das kunstwerk im
zeitalter seiner technischen reproduzierbarkeit (1936)], trans. Harry Zohn. in Illumina-
tions: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Shocken Books, 1968), 240.
17. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 9.
18. Or in Sontag’s terminology, between informative value and aesthetic distance, i.e.
time’s signature in the photograph.
19. Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 240.
20. Ibid., 248.
21. See László Tarnay and Tamás Pólya, Specificity Recognition and Social Cognition (Frankfurt
a/M & New York & Oxford: Peter Lang, 2004).
22. Our contention in the book is that specificity recognition was crucial in social evolu-
tion: species which live in groups or families need to recognize their fellow family
members individually as this-and-this, and not only categorically as so-and-so. Nest-
leaving bird parents, for example, would not feed others but only their own young
ones, and vice versa, the young would not accept food from other conspecifics but
their parents. Among primates and humans the upper limit of recognizing individual
group or family members is said to be around 160. This seems to be a cognitive (brain
size) limit to distinguish among individuals. Beyond that limit categorical perception
overtakes the function of specificity recognition, and we identify people as “the man
with the Martini,” “the king of France” or “the most intelligent person in the class.”
23. This is the reason why newer and newer forms of individual recognition have been
introduced at custom check-ins in the past years, from facial recognition systems,
through fingerprint recognition, to iris recognition.
24. This means that many forms of individual recognition, which are very developed in
other species, have regressed in humans. Dogs and cheetahs identify even a single
pheromone by smelling, whales identify their conspecific’s individual sound, nest-
leaving birds recognize the heads of their family members, etc. Probably the only bio-
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logically hard-wired human capacity to individuate is the mothers’ ability to identify
their newborn babies by their smells, even without having ever touched them. (See
Marsha Kaitz, A. Good, A.M. Rokem, and A.I. Eidelman, “Mother’s Recognition of
their Newborns by Olfactory Cues,” Developmental Psychobiology 20 (1987): 587-591.)
And it works the other way round as well: babies prefer their mothers’ perfume. (See
Benoist Schaal, “Presumed Olfactory Exchanges between Mother and Neonate in Hu-
mans,” in Ethology and Psychology, eds. J. LeCamus and J. Cosnier (Toulouse: Privat-
IEC, 1986), 101-110.)
25. No wonder that in his letters to his brother, Van Gogh praises the Dutch painter Frans
Hals of making use of 20 different shades of black, while at the end of his career van
Gogh himself insisted upon using more than 20 different shades of white. To add an
example from film history, Gilles Deleuze, the film philosopher, praises Abel Gance
for composing his images “white on white.”
26. See especially J.D. Anderson, The Reality of Illusion: An Ecological Approach to Cognitive Film
Theory (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1996) and James Patterson, “Is a Cognitive
Approach to the Avant-Garde Cinema Perverse?” in Post-theory: Reconstructing Film Stud-
ies, eds. David Bordwell and Noël Caroll (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1996), 108-129.
27. See Alexander Veselovsky, Sobranie Sochinenii (St. Petersburg, 1913) and Herbert Spen-
cer, Philosophy of Style [1852] (Whitefish, MT.: Kessinger Publishing, 2004 ), as quoted
by Shklovsky in “Art as Technique,” 9-10.
28. Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communicátion and Cognition (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986).
29. It is along the same line that Noël Carroll (See Noël Carroll, “A Note on Film Meta-
phor,” in Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 212-223) in-
corporates the core concept of ostranenie into his approach to the film metaphor, where
he defines the core of film metaphors “[t]he physical noncompossibility of the homo-
spatially fused but disparate elements” encountering which “the spectator is encour-
aged to search or to explore some other way in which the symbol before her may be
taken in order to make sense” (215). From the fact that there is no automatic answer
to the noncompossibility of the image (or accordingly to the strangeness or newness
of a poetic metaphor), it does not follow that “deautomatization” is possible only if
the principle of relevance runs off-line. When the viewer tries to understand the non-
compossible figure of Moloch devouring the workers as an entrance to the factory in
Fritz Lang’s Metropolis and rakes her brain for a “proper” meaning within the
film’s fiction, she may well follow the principle of relevance to understand most with
the least effort.
30. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 12.
31. See László Tarnay, and Tamás Pólya, “Reprezentáció és specificitás,” Passim 7 (2005):
67-100.
32. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, and William Hirstein, “The Science of Art,” Journal of
Consciousness Studies 6.6-7 (1999): 15-41.
33. See D. Gamboni, Potential Images. Ambiguity and Indeterminacy in Modern Art (London:
Reaktion Books, 2002), 28-35.
34. We use the term “modulation” for its musical overtones. In music, modulation refers
to the specific (singular and unique) manner in which the different qualities of sound
or singing shift almost imperceptibly between moods, pitches, singing and speech
(recitative) or rhythmic patterns (rubato). In all these cases the term expresses the
spontaneous, uncontrollable aspect of the changes. Thus, it is a near synonym of im-
provisation, yet it is more general than the latter. A reference must be made here to
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David Bordwell’s use of the term in David Bordwell, Figures Traced in Light (Berkeley &
Los Angeles: University of California Press), 2005, where he applies it to the small,
hardly perceptible changes within the film image or, I would say, texture of the image.
Understood in this latter sense, modulating images highlighted by Bordwell in the
films of Hou, Angelopulos, Misoguchi, etc. would indeed belong to our fourth level.
35. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 12.
36. Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 248.
37. No wonder that even in the digital age, film makers frequently reproduce digitally. By
re-recording the film on celluloid or tape, the over-magnifying creates a granular
structure in the photographic substance. By making their otherwise digitally made
films look granular – sometimes also considered to be “noisy” – they refer to the
“old” tradition of shooting films on 35 mm footage, or they would like to add a touch
of the documentary.
38. It is widely accepted in cognitive aesthetics and film theory that in most cases the
spectators see the represented scene directly, i.e., they “see through” the surface or
the plane of representation (the canvas or the projected image plane), even if the sur-
face is noisy to a certain extent. That means the surface of representation is transpar-
ent for them. They are primarily aware of the represented scene, while they are secon-
darily aware of the surface of representation. Blowup toys with our cognitive
“tolerance” concerning the quantity of noise in the image. We as spectators can still
see through its “messy” texture and recognize the figure.
39. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. Janis Tomlinson and
Graham Burchell III (1991; reprint, New York: Columbia UP, 1996).
40. See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (1968; reprint, London:
Athlone Press, 1994).
41. Manola Antonioli, Deleuze et l’Histoire de la Philosophie (Paris: Klimé, 1999), 85.
42. At least a passing reference must be made here to the Deleuzian project of philosophy.
According to him, it is in the sensible that the radically new appears. It follows that
one cannot think but at the expense of pulling down or bypassing all its existing cate-
gories and concepts and creating new concepts. At least this is how Deleuze conceives
the task of philosophy. The Deleuzian project is not totally irrelevant for the present
investigation. When Deleuze in his cinema books argues that modern film blocks the
working of the sensorimotor scheme which is so typical of classical movies, he sug-
gests – although not explicitly – that traditional narrative interpretation relies on the
“seamless” action-reaction scheme, once again a form of “automatized” perception.
What is needed for “new” thought or the thought of the new is perceptually new stimu-
li. It is only the senses which provide the intellect with radically new materials and
thus provoke it, ignite it, and carry it onto never trodden paths far away from concep-
tual categories. The senses act as the source of the Sublime for the intellect (for a brief
and lucid survey, see Antonioli, Deleuze et l’Histoire de la Philosophie).
Estrangement and the Representation of Life in Art
1. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays, trans. Lee
T. Lemon and Marion Reis (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 3-
57. For recent contributions on the concept of estrangement in Shklovsky and Russian
Formalism, see Poetics Today 26, 4 (2005) and 27, 1 (2006).
2. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 11.
3. Ibid.
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4. For a recent ode to habit see Alva Noë, Out of Our Heads. Why You Are Not Your Brain, and
Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 97-128.
5. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 11.
6. For a more elaborate treatment of semiotic cognition, see Van Heusden, “A Band-
width Model of Semiotic Evolution,” in Semiotic Evolution and the Dynamics of Culture,
eds. M. Bax, B. van Heusden and W. Wildgen (Bern: Peter Land, 2004), 1-28, Van
Heusden, “Dealing with Difference: From Cognition to Semiotic Cognition,” in Cogni-
tive Semiotics 4 (2009): 117-133, and Van Heusden, “Semiotic Cognition and the Logic
of Culture,” in Pragmatics and Cognition 17, 3 (2009) [in press].
7. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 12.
8. The term “algebraic” stems from Bergson (cf. James M. Curtis, “Bergson and Russian
Formalism,” Comparative Literature 28, 2 (1976): 109-121).
9. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 11.
10. Ibid., 12 [italics in the original].
11. Douglas Robinson, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature. Tolstoy, Shklovsky, Brecht
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
12. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 12 [italics added].
13. See Van Heusden, Why literature? An Inquiry into the Nature of Literary Semiosis (Tübingen:
Stauffenburg Verlag, 1997) for a theory of literature as mimetic semiosis.
14. Robinson, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature. Tolstoy, Shklovsky, Brecht, 99.
Shklovsky takes a much broader and also a more neutral view on art than Brecht. The
“truth” revealed is a different one: for Shklovsky it is the truth of experience, of life.
For Brecht it is a discursive, ideological truth. From my point of view, Shklovsky is the
one who got it right. Brecht mixes up the artistic with a non-artistic, rhetorical or
political function. Which does not mean of course that art could not be political. It
often is, but the political should not be confused with the artistic function.
15. From “Vyshla” 1915, a review of Mayakovsky’s “A Cloud in Trousers,” translated and
quoted by Robinson, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature. Tolstoy, Shklovsky, Brecht,
86.
16. Shklovsky gave a heart-breaking personal account of his “life and times” in his auto-
biographical Sentimental Journey (Ithaka New York: Cornell University Press, 1984). For
the original work, see Sentimental'noe putesestvie (Moskow: Gelikon, 1923).
17. As Robinson (Robinson, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature. Tolstoy, Shklovsky,
Brecht, 79) points out, estrangement is one of the central ideas of German and English
Romanticism and German idealism (Rousseau, Hegel, Novalis, Shelley, Schlegel,
Wordsworth and others). It is a direct consequence of the suspicion of the modern
world view towards tradition and “idées reçues” (what Wordsworth, in the 1798 adver-
tisement to the Lyrical Ballads, calls the “gaudiness and inane phraseology” of many
modern writers). The autonomous individual, relying on his or her own intellectual
capacities, must see the world anew again and again. The discovery of the world as
being separated from habits of perception is thus one of the effects of an enlightened
world view, although it is questionable whether the romantic poets would themselves
have acknowledged this.
The Perception of Reality as Deformed Realism
1. Jarmo Valkola, Cognition and Visuality (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2004), 179.
2. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique” [1919] Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, ed.
and trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
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1965), 12. The distinction between “perceived” and “known” materializes through the
trope of ostranenie as an intentional defamiliarizing, deautomatizing, estranging action
of an artist.
3. Hugo Münsterberg, The Film: The Psychological Study [1916] (New York: Dover Publica-
tions, 1970). The goal of Münsterberg’s masterwork was to get film across as an in-
dependent, separate art form. It highly correlates with Shklovsky’s (first published in
1919), and the Russian Formalism’s theoretical efforts (which is to define literaturnost
(literariness) in general, a contemporary term of Roman Jakobson); see Boris Eichen-
baum’s “historical summation” of the “formal method,” which is more about the
“struggle for a science of literature” rather than providing a definitive methodology.
Boris Eichenbaum: “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method,’” [1926] eds. Lee T. Lemon
and Marion J. Reis, 99.
4. The construction process of induction, from the parts towards the whole, is similar to
the bottom-up interpretative root, while the deductive – from the whole towards the
parts, narrative approach imitates the top-down perceptive attitude. Serial, bottom-up
inductivity believes in the priority of direct, distinct stimuli (typically activated at the
recognition of colors, or at tracking moving objects), while the direction of deductive
top-down, which is influenced by previous knowledge, is activated, for example, by
recognizing faces (the case of selecting the familiar from the crowd).
5. Mark D. Seddon, Investigating the Effect on Attention of Action Continuity (MSc thesis in
Cognitive Science and Natural Language: University of Edinburgh, 2003), 21.
6. For example, Stephen E. Palmer confirms that about 150-200 milliseconds pass be-
tween the idea to move the eye and the execution of the movement, and the eye needs
an average of 300 milliseconds to fix on the object of seeing. Stephen E. Palmer, Vision
Science: Photons to Phenomenology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
7. This still has nothing to do with short- or long-term memories: according to Eugene
Zechmeister and Stanley Nyberg, the role of the sensory store is restricted to the physio-
logical process of the visual decoding of the eye. Eugene B. Zechmeister, and Stanley
E. Nyberg, Human Memory: An Introduction to Research and Theory (Monterey, CA.: Thom-
son Brooks / Cole, 1982).
8. Seddon, 22.
9. Within the film history of narrative representation from around 1910 onward, the nar-
rative-centered rules keep developing into norms. The most important aim of this, still
evolving, set of “formal and stylistic norms” (Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson 1985,
xiv) – which was named “Classical Narration” by David Bordwell (1985, 156-204) and
“Institutional Mode of Representation” by Noël Burch (1990) – is accessibility, the
maintenance of comprehensibility through film language (that is, about linearity,
causality, seamlessness, transparency, redundancy, limited consciousness, the work-
ing mechanisms of the camera identified with the ideal viewer, etc.). In order to deli-
ver these, it employed the help of narrative, psychological, and cognitive theories of
the last hundred years. Its final goal is to perfect the deduction, as Bordwell (1997a,
95) claims, “Filmmakers had to create psychologically convincing representations.” In
accordance with my present interest, it is important to highlight that this is not about
the presentation of reality but rather about its psychologically based representation,
which utilizes strategies of “convincing/persuasiveness.” David Bordwell, Janet Stai-
ger, and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Produc-
tion to 1960 (London: Routledge & Paul Kegan; New York: Columbia UP, 1985). David
Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).
Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows. ed. and trans. Ben Brewster (Berkeley: University of
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California Press, 1990). David Bordwell, On the History of Film Style (Cambridge, Mass.,
& London: Harvard UP, 1997a).
10. Meir Sternberg, “Telling in Time (III): Chronology, Estrangement, and Stories of Lit-
erary History,” Poetics Today 27, 1 (spring 2006): 138.
11. Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film, 33.
12. Schemata: Top-down structured sets of knowledge that form the information of the
perceptual input into coherent mental representations. The term is from Ernst Gom-
brich, meaning “ready” knowledge groups helping reception through categorization.
To interpret “ready” is the goal of the cognitive analysis of the notion.
Template schemata: Cognitive systems for storing data, bigger structures, which develop
from adequately ordered hierarchy of schemes. Accordingly, these are culture-specific
units building on stronger knowledge and learning compared to schemata. Bordwell,
Narration in the Fiction Film, 31, 34-35. Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the
Psychology of Pictorial Representation (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961), 146-178.
13. Bordwell, On the History of Film Style, 155.
14. Warren Buckland, The Cognitive Semiotics of Film (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000),
124-131.
15. In connection with the latter, category [c], Christian Metz adds with a little cognitive
malignity that notwithstanding their aims, not even avant-garde filmmakers can rea-
lize this category, as their socialization based on a cognitive film basis does not allow
them to disobey the rules of film grammar. Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of
the Cinema, trans. Michael Taylor (New York: Oxford UP, 1974), 211.
16. Buckland, 127.
17. Buckland, 129.
18. Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film, 318. In another comprehensive film theoretical
study, Bordwell examines this scene maintaining his point, “Such manipulation of
editing blocks our normal expectations about story and forces us to concentrate on
the very process of piecing together the film’s narrative action.” David Bordwell, Film
Art. An Introduction, [1979] 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997b), 305.
19. To make a difference is a cardinal question: the theory of neo-formalism and con-
structivism does not reconstruct the fabula anymore than in the Tynjanovian or Prop-
pian sense, but rather, it constructs it. Following András Bálint Kovács’s recapitula-
tion, “In the original terminology, fabula (tale, story) is a chronological and causal
sketch what the syuzhet (plot) ‘dresses’ with concrete characters, twists, settings, etc.
The viewers’ task is to construct a tale from the procedures of the syuzhet (narration
tricks, prijom by Viktor Shklovsky) and stylistic elements. Wording is important here.
Bordwell does not talk about reconstruction, he does not say that the viewers understand
and re-complete an already existing story in their head. Bordwell thinks that the story
is not ‘hidden’ anywhere ‘behind’ the syuzhet. […] The tale is the mental construction
of the viewer based on those signals that the formal elements of the film offer for
them.” András Bálint Kovács, A film szerint a világ (Budapest: Palatinus, 2002), 20 [my
translation].
20. Buckland, 127. Buckland’s struggle expressed talkatively by his parentheses around
the word “back” (supposedly the quotation mark has the same role in Bordwell’s “'cor-
rect’ chronology”).
21. According to Barry Salt’s Cinemetrics measurements, while the entire film’s average
shot length (ASL) is 21.3 seconds, the analyzed scene’s ASL is approximately only 2
seconds. Barry Salt, “Cinemetrics on Pierrot le Fou” (29-03-2007), available from http://
www.cinemetrics.lv/movie.php?movie_ID=617 [06-08-2009]; INTERNET.
22. Shklovsky, ”Art as Technique,” 18.
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23. András Bálint Kovács, Metropolis, Párizs, (Budapest: Képzõmõvészeti Kiadó, 1992), 177
[my translation].
24. Thus eases Shklovsky’s dejection: “we have lost our awareness of the world. […] Only
the creation of new forms of art can restore to man sensation of the world, can resur-
rect things and kill pessimism.” Viktor Shklovsky, “The Resurrection of the Word,”
[1914] Russian Formalism. A collection of Articles and Texts in Translation, ed. Stephen Bann,
and John E. Bowlt (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press,1973), 46.
25. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 11-12.
26. Shklovsky’s poetical and Godard’s political narrative-estranging aims against the clas-
sical norms are seemingly identical: however, both their intended conclusions and the
actual appearances of these intentions point in different directions. In order to gain
poetical increments, Shklovsky wanted to wedge the divisive deautomatization of ostra-
nenie into the course of the perception of reality.
27. David Bordwell, Poetics of Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2008), 93.
28. Deductive top-down processes are “influenced by the individual’s knowledge and ex-
pectations rather than simply by the stimulus itself” and do not take the information
coming from the object of reception as the sole decisive factor. Michael W. Eysenck,
and Mark Keane, Cognitive Psychology. A Student’s Handbook, 5th ed. (Hove: Psychology
Press Ltd., 2005), 2.
29. Thus, the estrangement’s manifestation is not only a structural or narrative question,
not only a simple category concerning the perception’s automatisms, it also is a ques-
tion of shaping an indirect, emotional, somatic, sometimes even unconscious domain
of the experience. Closely following and quoting Dewey’s progressive thoughts, Shus-
terman concludes that “the roots of art and beauty lie in the ‘basic vital functions,’ ‘the
biological commonplaces [where] ‘formal conditions…are rooted deep in the world
itself,’ in our own biological rhythms and the larger rhythms of nature, which gradu-
ally get reflected and elaborated into the rhythms of myth and art.” As a matter of fact,
in order to grasp these “roots of art,” Shusterman pursues his own definition of litera-
riness, merging Shklovsky’s formal investigations of the physical appearances of arti-
facts with the receivers’ biocultural, somatic character.
Considering the fact that Joseph D. Anderson’s pioneering book on the ecological
approach of film theory was first published in 1996, Shusterman’s work – first pub-
lished in 1992 – is not only highly inspiring but highly progressive as well. Joseph D.
Anderson, The Reality of Illusion – An Ecological Approach to Cognitive Film Theory [1996]
(Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois UP, 1998). Richard Shusterman, Prag-
matist Aesthetics. Living Beauty, Rethinking Art (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).
30. Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Cinema di Poesia” (paper presented at the Festival of the New
Film, Pesaro, Italy, June 1965). Published in the Cahiers du Cinéma, October 1965. Paul
Beers, trans., “De poëtische film,” De Revisor 1, no 9 &10 (December 1974): 74 [my
translation].
Conversation with András Bálint Kovács
1. András Bálint Kovács, “Tarkovsky,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film,
eds. Paisley Livingstone and Carl Plantinga (New York: Routledge, 2009). Kovács,“O-
penness of the Work of Art: Deleuze and Eco,” in Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film
Philosophy, ed. David Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009 (he
was the Hungarian translator of Deleuze’s Cinema I-II). See also: Kovács, “Sartre, the
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Philosophy of Nothingness and the Modern Melodrama,” in The American, Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol. 64. no.1 (2006) 135-145.
2. See for instance the papers András Bálint Kovács presented at SCSMI conferences:
“Causal Inference During Filmviewing”(2009), “Causal Cues in Narratives” (2008),
“Situations and Narrative Comprehension” (2004).
3. András Bálint Kovács, “The Sokal-Briqmond Affair,” 2000 (February 1998): 53-61.
4. Remember, for example, the way René Clair in his Entr’acte [1924] uses Dutch shots,
blurred images, dissolving stills, etc. to frame the church of La Madeleine and the
Place de l’Opéra.
5. See the essay by Laurent Jullier in this book.
6. András Bálint Kovács, “Things that Come After Another,” New Review of Film and Televi-
sion Studies 5, no.2 (August 2007): 157-73.
7. Ibid.
8. Richard Allen, and Murray Smith, “Introduction” in Film Theory and Philosophy, (Oxford
& New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 12.
9. Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” trans. Alan Bass, in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1982), 3-27.
10. See for instance Anne Campbell, A Mind of Her Own. The Evolutionary Psychology of
Women (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
11. Dan Sperber, Why rethink interdisciplinarity? Text discussed in the virtual seminar “Re-
thinking interdisciplinarity,” available from www.interdisciplines.org; INTERNET.
12. Ibid.
13. See for example: Torben Grodal, Embodied Visions (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), or Robert Hanna, and Michelle Maiese, Embodied Minds in Action (Oxford & New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
14. Walter J. Freeman, “Consciousness, Intentionality and Causality,” in Does Consciousness
Cause Behavior? eds. Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher (Cam-
bridge, MA.: MIT, 2006), 73-105.
15. See for example: David Wegner, The Illusion of the Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA.: MIT
Press, 2002).
16. Torben Grodal, Embodied Visions (Copenhagen: Department of Film and Media, Univer-
sity of Copenhagen, 2006), 27.
Conversation with Laura Mulvey
1. Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second. Stillness and the Moving Image (London: Reaktion
Books Ltd., 2006), 52.
2. Ibid.
3. André Gaudreault, “From ‘Primitive Cinema’ to ‘Kine-Attractography,’” in The Cinema
of Attractions Reloaded, ed. Wanda Strauven (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press,
2006), 99.
4. For a description of Shklovsky’s lecture as a freshman in 1913, see Richard Sheldon in
his “Introduction” in A Sentimental Journey (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970).
5. Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIV ed. James Stratchey (London, 1953-74).
6. Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second, 34.
7. Ernst Jentsch, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny,” [1906] Angelaki 2, no. 1 (1995): 7-
16. In her article (lecture) “A Sudden Gust of Wind (after Hokusai): from After to
Before the Photograph,” Laura Mulvey discusses the work of photographer Jeff Wall
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in relation to the “question of technology and the conceptual space which Wall him-
self describes as ‘improbable.’” Interestingly, Mulvey approaches Wall’s work in terms
of a “technological uncanny” and refers to Jentsch’s 1906 essay “On the Psychology of
the Uncanny” to indicate that Jentsch located “the uncanny in the disorientation ex-
perienced by the most rational mind when faced with an illusion that is, if only mo-
mentarily, inexplicable. This sense of ‘intellectual uncertainty’ could be aroused, for
instance, by automata or wax works that seem to be almost alive.” See: Laura Mulvey,
“A Sudden Gust of Wind (after Hokusai): from After to Before the Photograph,” Oxford
Art Journal 30, no. 1. (2007): 31-32.
8. Stephen Heath, “Cinema and Psychoanalysis,” in Endless Night. Cinema and Psychoanaly-
sis. Parallel Histories, ed. Janet Bergstrom (University of California Press, 1999), 30, and
Virginia Woolf, “The Cinema,” [1926] in Collected Essays II (Hogarth Press, 1966).
9. Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu, Vol. 2, 1913-1927.
10. Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 19.
11. Ibid., 17-18.
12. Ibid., 18.
13. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays, trans. Lee
T. Lemon and Marion Reis (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 3-
57.
14. Sigmund Freud, “Letter to Romain Rolland (A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropo-
lis),” ed. Adam Phillips in The Penguin Freud Reader (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2006),
68-76.
15. Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIV ed. James Stratchey (London, 1953-74).
16. Ibid.
17. Wolfgang Kayser, Das Groteske. Seine Gestaltung in Malerei und Dichtung (Tübingen: Stauf-
fenburg Verlag, 2004).
18. Ibid., 199.
19. See David Summers, Michelangelo and the Language of Art (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1981).
20. Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
21. See Shklovsky on Eisenstein: Ejzenštejn, trans. Manfred Dahlke (Reinbek: Rowohlt
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977), 125. [First published in Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1973.]
22. Boris Eichenbaum, “Problems of Cinema Stylistics,” in Formalist Film Theory (Michigan:
University of Michigan, 1981), 57. [First published in Poetika Kino (Moscow, Leningrad:
Kinopečat’ 1927).]
23. Frank Ankersmit, Sublime Historical Experience (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press,
2005).
24. Annette Michelson, “The Man with the Movie Camera: From Magician to Epistemologist,”
Artforum 10, no. 7 (March 1972): 60-72.
25. Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” in Screen (autumn 1975): 6-18.
26. Laura Mulvey, Fetishism and Curiosity (London: BFI, 1996).
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